EP0632413B1 - Verfahren zur Eingabe einer vertraulichen Information und entsprechendes Endgerät - Google Patents

Verfahren zur Eingabe einer vertraulichen Information und entsprechendes Endgerät Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0632413B1
EP0632413B1 EP94401499A EP94401499A EP0632413B1 EP 0632413 B1 EP0632413 B1 EP 0632413B1 EP 94401499 A EP94401499 A EP 94401499A EP 94401499 A EP94401499 A EP 94401499A EP 0632413 B1 EP0632413 B1 EP 0632413B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signs
series
sign
user
confidential information
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP94401499A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0632413A1 (de
Inventor
Jacques Patarin
Michel Ugon
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
CP8 Technologies SA
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Bull CP8 SA
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Bull CP8 SA filed Critical Bull CP8 SA
Publication of EP0632413A1 publication Critical patent/EP0632413A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0632413B1 publication Critical patent/EP0632413B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
    • G07F7/1033—Details of the PIN pad
    • G07F7/1041—PIN input keyboard gets new key allocation at each use
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
    • G07C9/33—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check by means of a password
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method for entering, by a terminal, a confidential information provided by a user, this information comprising several signs belonging to a first series of signs.
  • Some systems include keyboards, the signs of which are arranged according to positions that vary from one keyboard to another so that for a third party who does not know the arrangement of signs on a keyboard in use, it is not possible to guess confidential information by observing simply the position of the keys that are typed by the user.
  • This has however, the disadvantage of significantly complicating the construction of the keyboard and generates errors in the introduction of confidential information when of users, accustomed to a certain arrangement of signs, do not lend note that the keyboard in question does not have the layout usual.
  • an experienced fraudster can analyze the distribution of signs on a specific keyboard before or after entering information confidential by the user and memorize the position of the keystrokes to finally deduce confidential information.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a method of protecting a confidential information including several signs belonging to a first series of signs when entering this information, even when this operation can be observed by a third party without carry out a periodic modification of the assignment of the various signs of the keyboard to the keys of it.
  • the method according to the invention consists in defining a second series of signs; to display, on display means, the first and second series of signs so that each sign of the first either placed next to a second sign, according to a determined correspondence, chosen from a set of different matches, and to use signs of the second series of signs next to which are the signs of the first series of signs composing said confidential information for the designation by the user of this confidential information.
  • the user does not directly designate the signs composing the information confidential but signs - those of the second series - which are correlated with these according to a correlation link which does not appear explicitly on the display means. Consequently, the mere observation of the means display by a third party does not allow the latter to deduce the signs confidential seized.
  • a keyboard is used distinct from the display means and comprising several keys, we identify each of the keyboard keys by assigning it a sign belonging to the second series of signs, the first and second series of signs according to a known mutual random distribution of the terminal; and we carry out the designation of the signs of the first component series said confidential information by actuating each key of the keyboard, the sign corresponds to the sign of the second series located opposite one of the signs, belonging to the first series, constituting said information confidential.
  • At least one of the series of signs disappears as soon as a key is hit. So it is not possible for a fraudster to first look at the key that is hit and then to take note of the corresponding sign of the first series in observing the series displayed.
  • the user can now enter confidential information without disclosing any information to a third party observing only the keyboard or the screen.
  • a solution to problem of a third party observing both the screen and the keyboard is brought up; for this do, we secretly define, among the signs of the second series, at least one reference sign known to the terminal and the user, then display, in look at signs of the second set of signs, signs of the first series so that each time one of the signs composing said information confidential is placed opposite said reference sign.
  • each of the keys of said keyboard is identified by assigning it a sign belonging to the first series of signs and we display, for each key pressed, the sign of the first series assigned to this key next to a sign of the second series, the terminal being arranged for make a comparison between the sign of the first series thus placed by the user before the reference sign and at least one of the signs of confidential information.
  • the invention also relates to a terminal comprising display means and means for entering confidential information supplied by a user, said information comprising several signs belonging to a first series of signs, said terminal being arranged to display, on means display, said first and second series of signs so that each sign of the first series is placed next to a sign of the second series, according to a determined correspondence chosen from a set of correspondences different, and comprising, on the one hand, means of using the signs of the second series located opposite the signs constituting the information confidential to allow the user to designate the signs of the first series that make up said confidential information and secondly, means validation of entries.
  • a first variant embodiment of the method according to the invention is intended to allow the protection of information confidential, for example the code of a bank card, when entering it on a keyboard of a terminal.
  • information confidential for example the code of a bank card
  • FIG. 1 only the keyboard of the terminal generally designated in 1, and the terminal display screen generally designated in 2.
  • confidential information is made up of signs belonging to a series of signs, for example figures in the example shown. In the following description, we will assume that confidential information is made up of four signs and that within illustrated examples, these four signs are the numbers 4723.
  • the keys 5 of the keyboard 1 are shown of the terminal, a second series of signs and we display on the terminal on the one hand the first series of signs which is here arranged along a line 3 on the screen display, and on the other hand the second series of signs which is here arranged according to a line 4 on the display screen above line 3 of the first series of signs, the first and second series of signs being displayed according to a random relative position i.e. the correspondence between the signs of the first series and the signs of the second series may vary each time a card is inserted in the terminal. So the keys that have to be keystrokes vary with each new display of the two sets of signs so that a third party who only observes the keys hit by the user will not be able to reuse the information obtained during an entry later.
  • the display screen 2 preferably comprises in a usual manner a line 6 of markers indicating the number of signs already entered and thus allowing the user to know at which position of confidential information it is found.
  • the signs of line 6 are initially points which are gradually replaced by stars each time the user enters a sign.
  • the second series of signs has remained in the same position but the first series of signs is displayed according to a new arrangement of the numbers while in the line of marks 6 the first point has been replaced by a star.
  • the user after having started as previously by hitting the key , the user will hit the key this time which corresponds to the second digit, 7, of its code. It will be noted that it is therefore not possible for a fraudster who has waited to see the key hit by the user to determine the corresponding sign of the first series. Indeed, the fraudster who waited to see the user hit the key and who then looks at the display screen will read that the number corresponding to is the number 3 and will therefore make an error in the assessment of the first digit of the confidential information.
  • the fraudster will therefore have to memorize successively the correspondences between the first and the second series of signs before the user strikes a sign, which considerably reduces the risk of having a fraudster capable of memorizing the of the signs of confidential information.
  • the two series of signs are displayed on the screen but only the signs of the first series have a variable position. Note that it is of course possible to vary also the position of the signs of the second series or to vary the position of the signs of the second series while maintaining the position signs of the first series.
  • Figures 3 to 5 illustrate another version of the method according to the invention.
  • the signs of the second series are this time arranged below the signs of the first series and are fixedly arranged on the terminal box below the display screen.
  • This arrangement does not characterize this version of the process of the invention and one could adopt for signs the same arrangement as in FIGS. 1 and 2.
  • What characterizes this version of the process of the invention is the fact that the second series of signs this time comprises a number of distinct signs lower than the first series of signs so that in order to have a correspondence between each of the signs of the first series of signs and the signs of the second series of signs, it is necessary to assign the same sign of the second series to several signs of the first series. In the example illustrated in FIGS.
  • the first series of signs comprises, as previously, ten digits, from zero to nine, and the second series of signs this time comprises five signs. separate only which are , , , , .
  • certain signs from the second series are repeated. So the is assigned two digits as well as the and the , while the is assigned three digits and the is assigned to a single digit.
  • the signs of the first series are displayed randomly so that each sign of the first series corresponds to a sign of the second series.
  • the position of the signs of the first series can be completely random, that is to say that the signs of the first series are arranged not only in a random manner with respect to the signs of the second series, but are also arranged randomly in relation to each other, or in a pseudo-random fashion, that is to say that while being randomly arranged in relation to the signs of the second series, the figures of the first series are arranged in an ordered manner with respect to each other. This is the case in the example illustrated in FIG. 3 where the figures are ordered with respect to each other in a loop sequence, the random position with respect to the signs of the second series being determined by a random shift of the sequence. In particular in Figure 3, the zero corresponds to the second box of the from the second series.
  • the variant of Figure 5 differs from that of Figure 3 in that the elaborate pictograms, made up of the signs of the second series, are replaced here by simpler signs, constructed from a single sign elementary, namely an isosceles triangle.
  • the second set of signs includes five signs, each distinguished by a number of particular triangles or a particular orientation of these. So the numbers 2 to 4 of the first series of signs are all three designated by the same sign constituted by two triangles 6 juxtaposed and oriented to the right of Figure 5. A brace 7 defines this match.
  • the numbers 0 and 1 are designated by a single triangle 6 having the same orientation as for the numbers 2 to 4.
  • a second series of this type, built from a single simple sign is advantageous in that the use immediately memorizes all of the signs used.
  • the figures of the first series of signs (for example 2 to 4) designated by the same sign of the second series are juxtaposed, so that a single sign (here, the two triangles 6) designate them simultaneously, which further facilitates the task of the user.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates another variant embodiment of the method in which one assumed that, in addition to the numbers 4723, the user's PIN includes two secret reference signs 3 and 9 among the signs of the second series, all of these signs being known to the user and the terminal when of the entry.
  • These reference signs can for example be provided to the user, as well as confidential information, by the authorized body, when subscribing to the requested service.
  • the two series are identical, the signs composing them being here the numbers from 0 to 9.
  • the terminal therefore displays the second series of signs 61, either in a fixed manner, the signs being engraved on the means display, either randomly. Display boxes are provided to to display next to these signs of the second series those of the first which are going to be seized.
  • the boxes 63 corresponding to the boxes placed opposite the reference signs 3 and 9.
  • the display on the screen being trivialized, it does not appear any indication allowing a fraudster to determine which of the displayed signs are those reference.
  • the keyboard 65 associated with these display means includes keys identified by signs 0 to 9 and allows the user to enter these signs which are then displayed as and when entered in the boxes located in look at the signs of the second series. The user will therefore enter signs without interest in all the boxes other than those here referenced 63. At otherwise he enters the first two digits, 4 and 7, of his information confidential in these boxes 63. This entry is complete when all the boxes are filled and the terminal then offers the user to enter again a series of signs next to the series containing the signs of reference, in order to enter the two digits of its information in the same way confidential 2 and 3 remaining.
  • means for shifting these signs are provided for this purpose.
  • two shift keys to the left and right, respectively, or even a single key causing the signs of the first series, can be used.
  • the sequence is therefore shifted by one position in the chosen direction, and this cyclically, so that there is always a sign of the first series placed next to a second sign.
  • the user gives a validation order, for example using a validation key or by voice command.
  • the signs of at least one of the two series are then displayed according to a new random sequence before entering the next sign of information confidential. This is usually enough to indicate to the user that the sign previous was actually entered by the system and the system is waiting for the next entry.
  • the cycle repeats until all of the confidential information is capture. At the end of the operation, you can simply display a message or erase the sequences of signs, signaling to the user that the entry is finished. We can also provide for the display of a character, for example a sign *, for each sign entered.
  • the signs of confidential information are entered in an orderly fashion, according to an arrangement (1..i..n). In order to confuse an observer, this information can be entered in a haphazard manner.
  • the terminal presents for this purpose a message asking the user to place his or its signs of rank i look at its reference sign (s). Of this In this way, the entry order is scrambled and changes with each new entry.
  • the terminal message can also ask the user to place the figure resulting from a function of those of rank i, j of his confidential information against the reference signs.
  • this function is modified with each entry.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • User Interface Of Digital Computer (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Input From Keyboards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Facsimile Transmission Control (AREA)
  • Storing Facsimile Image Data (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Facsimiles In General (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Claims (15)

  1. Verfahren zum Erfassen einer von einem Benutzer gelieferten vertraulichen Information durch ein Terminal, wobei diese Information mehrere Zeichen umfaßt, die einer ersten Zeichenreihe (3) zugehören, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß es die folgenden Schritte umfaßt, die darin bestehen:
    eine zweite Zeichenreihe (4) zu definieren;
    auf Anzeigemitteln die ersten und zweiten Zeichenreihen in der Weise anzuzeigen, daß sich jedes Zeichen der ersten Zeichenreihe gemäß einer bestimmten Zuordnung, die aus einer Gesamtheit unterschiedlicher Zuordnungen gewählt ist, gegenüber einem Zeichen der zweiten Zeichenreihe befindet; und
    Zeichen der zweiten Zeichenreihe zu verwenden, denen gegenüber sich die die vertrauliche Information bildenden Zeichen der ersten Zeichenreihe befinden, um diese vertrauliche Information durch den Benutzer zu bezeichnen.
  2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine von den Anzeigemitteln verschiedene Tastatur (1) verwendet wird, die mehrere Tasten aufweist, und daß die folgenden Schritte ausgeführt werden, die darin bestehen:
    jede der Tasten der Tastatur zu identifizieren, indem ihr ein zur zweiten Zeichenreihe (4) gehörendes Zeichen zugeordnet wird;
    auf den Anzeigemitteln die erste und die zweite Zeichenreihe gemäß einer dem Terminal bekannten, zufälligen gegenseitigen Verteilung anzuzeigen; und
    die Zeichen der ersten Reihe, die die vertrauliche Information bilden, zu bezeichnen, indem jede Taste der Tastatur (1) betätigt wird, deren Zeichen dem Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4) entspricht, das sich gegenüber einem der Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3), die die vertrauliche Information bildet, befindet.
  3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß wenigstens eine der Zeichenreihen (3, 4) verschwindet, sobald eine Taste der Tastatur (1) angeschlagen wird.
  4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß es die folgenden Schritte enthält:
    geheimes Definieren wenigstens eines dem Terminal und dem Benutzer bekannten Referenzzeichens aus den Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4); und
    jeweiliges Anzeigen der Zeichen der ersten Reihe gegenüber den Zeichen der zweiten Zeichenreihe in der Weise, daß jedesmal eines der die vertrauliche Information bildenden vertraulichen Zeichen gegenüber dem Referenzzeichen angeordnet ist.
  5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 4, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß:
    während jeder Erfassungsoperation die Gesamtheit von Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) in einer beliebigen Reihenfolge angezeigt wird;
    die Gesamtheit dieser Zeichen (3) in bezug auf jene der zweiten Reihe (4) verschoben wird, um wenigstens ein die vertrauliche Information bildendes vertrauliches Zeichen vor dem Referenzzeichen anzuordnen; und
    der Benutzer einen Validierungsbefehl an das Terminal schickt, wenn dieses vertrauliche Zeichen vor dem Referenzzeichen angeordnet ist.
  6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 4, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine Tastatur (1) mit mehreren Tasten verwendet wird, wovon jede dadurch identifiziert wird, daß ihr ein zur ersten Zeichenreihe (3) zugehöriges Zeichen zugewiesen ist, wobei die Anzeige jedes der Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) gegenüber den Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4) dadurch erfolgt, daß die durch dieses Zeichen identifizierte Taste betätigt wird, wobei das Terminal so beschaffen ist, daß es einen Vergleich zwischen dem Zeichen der ersten Reihe, das somit durch den Benutzer vor dem Referenzzeichen angeordnet wird, und wenigstens einem der Zeichen der vertraulichen Information ausführt.
  7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die vertrauliche Information mehrere vertrauliche Zeichen umfaßt, die gemäß einem bestimmten Rang (1 ... i ... n) angeordnet sind, und daß vor der Anzeige der Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) durch den Benutzer das Terminal eine Nachricht an diesen schickt, die ihn auffordert, das vertrauliche Zeichen mit Rang i gegenüber dem Referenzzeichen anzuordnen.
  8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3), die die vertrauliche Information bilden, Ziffern sind und das Terminal den Benutzer auffordert, gegenüber dem Referenzzeichen das Ergebnis einer Funktion der Ziffer mit Rang i der vertraulichen Information anzuordnen.
  9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die zweite Zeichenreihe (4) eine Anzahl unterschiedlicher Zeichen enthält, die kleiner als die Anzahl der Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) ist.
  10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4) von jenen der ersten Reihe (3) verschieden sind.
  11. Terminal, mit Anzeigemitteln und mit Mitteln zum Erfassen einer von einem Benutzer gelieferten vertraulichen Information, wobei die Information mehrere Zeichen umfaßt, die zu einer ersten Zeichenreihe (3) gehören, wobei das Terminal dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, daß es so beschaffen ist, daß es die erste und eine zweite Zeichenreihe (4) in der Weise anzeigt, daß jedes Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) gemäß einer bestimmten Zuordnung, die aus einer Gesamtheit unterschiedlicher Zuordnungen gewählt ist, gegenüber einem Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4) angeordnet ist, und daß es enthält:
    Mittel zum Verwenden der Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4), um dem Benutzer zu ermöglichen, die Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3), die die vertrauliche Information bilden, zu bezeichnen;
    und
    Mittel zur Validierung der Erfassungen.
  12. Terminal nach Anspruch 11, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß es eine von den Anzeigemitteln verschiedene Tastatur (1) aufweist, die mit mehreren Tasten (5) versehen ist, wovon jede mittels eines Zeichens identifiziert wird, das zur zweiten Zeichenreihe (4) gehört, und daß die Betätigung jeder Taste der Tastatur, deren Zeichen dem Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4), das gegenüber einem der die vertrauliche Information bildenden Zeichen angezeigt wird, der Erfassung dieses die vertrauliche Information bildenden Zeichens entspricht.
  13. Terminal nach Anspruch 11, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß es enthält:
    Mittel zum Speichern wenigstens eines dem Benutzer bekannten und zur zweiten Zeichenreihe (4) gehörenden Referenzzeichens; und
    Mittel, die dem Benutzer ermöglichen, die Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) in der Weise anzuzeigen, daß eines der die vertrauliche Information bildenden Zeichen gegenüber dem Referenzzeichen angeordnet ist.
  14. Terminal nach Anspruch 11, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die zweite Zeichenreihe (4) eine Anzahl unterschiedlicher Zeichen enthält, die kleiner als die Anzahl der Zeichen der ersten Reihe (3) ist.
  15. Terminal nach Anspruch 11, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Zeichen der zweiten Reihe (4) von jenen der ersten Reihe (3) verschieden sind.
EP94401499A 1993-07-01 1994-07-01 Verfahren zur Eingabe einer vertraulichen Information und entsprechendes Endgerät Expired - Lifetime EP0632413B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9308073A FR2708358B1 (fr) 1993-07-01 1993-07-01 Procédé de saisie d'une information confidentielle, terminal et système de vérification associés.
FR9308073 1993-07-01

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0632413A1 EP0632413A1 (de) 1995-01-04
EP0632413B1 true EP0632413B1 (de) 2000-03-15

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EP94401499A Expired - Lifetime EP0632413B1 (de) 1993-07-01 1994-07-01 Verfahren zur Eingabe einer vertraulichen Information und entsprechendes Endgerät

Country Status (16)

Country Link
US (1) US5815083A (de)
EP (1) EP0632413B1 (de)
JP (1) JP2746757B2 (de)
KR (1) KR0146434B1 (de)
CN (1) CN1047856C (de)
AT (1) ATE190743T1 (de)
AU (1) AU664673B2 (de)
CA (1) CA2143651C (de)
DE (1) DE69423390T2 (de)
DK (1) DK0632413T3 (de)
ES (1) ES2145111T3 (de)
FR (1) FR2708358B1 (de)
NO (1) NO308148B1 (de)
SG (1) SG48009A1 (de)
TW (1) TW346579B (de)
WO (1) WO1995001616A1 (de)

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AU664673B2 (en) 1995-11-23
NO950783L (no) 1995-04-28
EP0632413A1 (de) 1995-01-04
NO950783D0 (no) 1995-02-28
CA2143651C (fr) 2000-06-13
TW346579B (en) 1998-12-01
JPH07509583A (ja) 1995-10-19
WO1995001616A1 (fr) 1995-01-12
ES2145111T3 (es) 2000-07-01
ATE190743T1 (de) 2000-04-15
DK0632413T3 (da) 2000-06-26
NO308148B1 (no) 2000-07-31
FR2708358B1 (fr) 1995-09-01
AU7189494A (en) 1995-01-24
CN1047856C (zh) 1999-12-29
FR2708358A1 (fr) 1995-02-03
US5815083A (en) 1998-09-29
KR0146434B1 (ko) 1998-12-01
DE69423390T2 (de) 2000-08-24
SG48009A1 (en) 1998-04-17
JP2746757B2 (ja) 1998-05-06
DE69423390D1 (de) 2000-04-20
CN1111462A (zh) 1995-11-08

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