EP0513129B1 - Bahnschaltungssystem - Google Patents

Bahnschaltungssystem Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0513129B1
EP0513129B1 EP91903576A EP91903576A EP0513129B1 EP 0513129 B1 EP0513129 B1 EP 0513129B1 EP 91903576 A EP91903576 A EP 91903576A EP 91903576 A EP91903576 A EP 91903576A EP 0513129 B1 EP0513129 B1 EP 0513129B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
track circuit
information
telegrams
track
fail
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Revoked
Application number
EP91903576A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0513129A1 (de
Inventor
Roberto Caporossi
Maurizio Feuli
Gustav Spangberg
Karl-Erik Sundvall
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
DaimlerChrysler Rail Systems Signal AB
Original Assignee
EB Signal AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
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Application filed by EB Signal AB filed Critical EB Signal AB
Publication of EP0513129A1 publication Critical patent/EP0513129A1/de
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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
    • B61L3/16—Continuous control along the route
    • B61L3/22—Continuous control along the route using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using electromagnetic radiation
    • B61L3/24—Continuous control along the route using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using electromagnetic radiation employing different frequencies or coded pulse groups, e.g. in combination with track circuits
    • B61L3/246—Continuous control along the route using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using electromagnetic radiation employing different frequencies or coded pulse groups, e.g. in combination with track circuits using coded current
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L1/00—Devices along the route controlled by interaction with the vehicle or train
    • B61L1/18—Railway track circuits
    • B61L1/181—Details
    • B61L1/188—Use of coded current

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and a device for automatic traffic control in connection with trackbound communication.
  • the method and the device comprise means for detection of rail-mounted vehicles on a track circuit and identification of the track circuit in order to supervise the movement of the rail-mounted vehicle on the circuit in question.
  • the method and the device make possible the transmission of selective information to the supervision units of adjacent track circuits for control of the movement pattern of a leading or trailing rail-mounted vehicle.
  • the device is based on the utilization of digital information transmission between the units included.
  • the EP-A-0 288 564 describes an apparatus for detecting a vehicle on a rail track section.
  • the track is subdivided in various track sections isolated from each other.
  • a so-called alternating voltage local signal is fed via a first transformer into the rails of the track section and as a reference voltage to the detection circuit.
  • the voltage is taken out by a second transformer and compared with the local signal with respect to the phase between these two signals and with respect to its level. In case that a vehicle is on the track section this level will be reduced to near zero, due to the short-circuit cause by the vehicle. If no such reduction occurs, a relay is activated to indicate that the track section is not occupied by a vehicle.
  • the voltages on the two track sections adjoining the track section in question have a phase shift of 180 degree with respect to the voltage of the track section in question.
  • the level of the voltage taken out from the section in question will also be reduced close to zero, preventing thus the output relay from indicating that the track section is unoccupied.
  • Special means are provided to make the apparatus relatively insensitive to the noise channelled into the apparatus by the track signal.
  • the invention aims at developing a method for automatic control of rail-mounted vehicles on a railway line and a device for carrying out the method which operate with a different modulating method and which increase the fail-safety in the transmission of messages.
  • the invention suggests a method for automatic control of rail-mounted vehicles on a railway line according to the introductory part of claim 1, which is characterized by the features of the characterizing part of claim 1.
  • a device for carrying out the method according to the invention is characterized by the features of claim 8.
  • the following describes a system of functions which are applicable to a system concept which includes a track circuit system combined with an automatic train control system for rail-mounted vehicles.
  • standard baseband modulation technique for telecommunication systems is chosen to modulate a signal for a track circuit in order to achieve feeding of serial data by way of the rails.
  • the level of the baseband signal is used to indicate the presence of shunting vehicle axles on the track circuit.
  • Baseband modulation provides a possibility of synchronous serial data transmission.
  • the data to be transmitted are collected in information messages in so-called telegrams. These telegrams are divided into blocks or frames in accordance with the high-level data link control (HDLC) technique, according to the standard worked out by CCITT.
  • HDLC high-level data link control
  • a bitoriented protocol is used for the information transmission. It is, of course, also possible to use other synchronous protocols, or even asynchronous transmission and asynchronous protocols. The latter protocols are, however, less biteffective than bitoriented protocols, such as, for example, HDLC.
  • Transmitting serial data and indicating the presence of vehicle axles within a track circuit by means of the carrier of the signal are known, as previously mentioned, and utilized in other control systems.
  • a novelty in the present supervision or control system is the use of standard transmission technique for, for example, telephony and the like in this application.
  • the address contents of the HDLC telegrams are the basis for track circuit identification, which is of value for separating disturbance signals from the environment or from the influence of other track circuits. Identification by using serial data may also have been performed by others in the past.
  • the telegrams may contain safety information which is picked up by antennas on the rail-mounted vehicles, located, for example, in front of the first axle. These telegrams are evaluated in train-borne equipment for speed supervision.
  • the telegrams for the rail-mounted vehicle may also contain other information of non-safety character. Information may also be conveyed from one track circuit to the next in order to provide a railway line with a block system. This also belongs to the state of the art described, for example, in "Vertician der Systemmerkmaleeaser Switzerlandbeeinhneeinhneeinhneungs respondeden", Köth, Eisenbahn Technische Rundschau 20 (1971).
  • the HDLC telegrams provide freedom to place information in one or a number of the frames which build up the telegram, which gives great flexibility when modelling a system for information transmission.
  • Information to the system may be mixed in or between the frames in different ways. Unspecified information may be put in one of the frames in a data telegram or be mixed with safety information in several different frames. In the latter case, the unspecified information may be multiplexed in several frames and time-shared with the safety information which is transmitted in repeated frames. This is a process which is also not used elsewhere.
  • the track circuit system needs a fail-safe level detector, a function which has been mentioned above. This unit will not be further discussed in this description.
  • Another aspect is the principle of safe detection of data in the track circuit.
  • the generation of the information and the associated and necessary redundancy are achieved in two separate channels, of which one feeds the track circuit with a signal at one end of the track circuit.
  • the signal received at the other end of the track circuit is compared in a fail-safe way with the output signal in a first comparator.
  • the output signal from the first comparator is forwarded, for example to a track relay or some other safety unit as, for example, a computerized interlocking system. In this way, any influence of disturbance in the track as well as failures in the transmitter units connected to the track are discovered.
  • the transmission is also continuously checked by a second comparator which compares the information contents in two telegrams generated in two separate units before the information of the transmitting channel is transmitted to the track. This is necessary because when there is a rail-mounted vehicle on the track circuit, no signals reach the receiving unit on the track, which makes the output signal of the first comparator of no interest.
  • Different temporary disturbances and influences may be filtered out by imparting significance only to repetitive telegrams, where the demand is placed such that at least m out of n telegrams must be unmistakably given the same information content.
  • the proposed method may provide the advantage that a smaller amount of redundant information need be fed to the track, since the information of the output signal has been verified by the above-described signal generation and the ensuing comparison. For that reason the telegrams can also be accepted by rail-mounted vehicles which utilize the same filtering technique and which with certainly sense the information as safe. Thus, more information can be transmitted per unit of time.
  • the safety information must be made relevant of m out of n telegrams, which, of course, reduces the information flow in the channel.
  • the bit error rate in the digital signals must therefore be fairly low to provide an acceptable system. However, this requirement does not affect the safety.
  • the transmitter feeds signals towards the rail-mounted vehicle.
  • the transmitter/receiver must change places.
  • the accompanying figure shows a schematic view of a linking of units which gives the system the functions aimed at in the description.
  • a first encoder E1 produces telegrams to be sent to a track circuit.
  • Each such telegram contains, in the general case, three different parts comprising a to c, in which
  • the a-part of a telegram is always the same in a track circuit, whereas the b- and c-parts may be changed from time to time depending on the traffic situation and the like.
  • a second encoder E2 the same data messages as in the first encoder E1 are produced but not necessarily in the same format.
  • the telegrams which are built up in the two encoders E1 and E2 are controlled by external control signals, which carry the information which is to be conveyed via the track circuit system. These control signals are symbolized in the figure by the arrows at 1.
  • the signal with messages in the form of telegrams from the first encoder E1 is forwarded to a combined code generator-transmitter G as well as to a second comparator C2.
  • the combined code generator-transmitter G is connected to an amplifier A and transmits to this the telegrams which have been produced by the first encoder E1 for the track circuit.
  • a track circuit is a section of a railway line, in which such a section is electrically delimited from adjacent sections by, for example, an electrical insulation 3 between the track circuits.
  • the amplifier A converts the signal voltage from the code generator-transmitter G to a level and shape adapted for transmission to the track circuit.
  • This amplifier A is provided with an adjustment device which makes possible adaptation of the voltage level to the length of the track circuit connected.
  • the signals from the amplifier A are fed to the track circuit with one pole to each rail 2 and are preferably connected at the end point of the track circuit.
  • the signal voltage which is fed via the track is picked up at the other end point of the track circuit by a receiver B with an interface for reception from the track circuit.
  • the receiver B comprises screening circuits which filter out the desired signal from electrical interference, if any, in the track.
  • the received signal is forwarded to a fail-safe level or threshold detector TD, which in a reliable manner measures the amplitude of the signal voltage in the track to determine whether the signal voltage level lies above or below a certain value, which indicates a free track circuit or a track circuit occupied by a vehicle.
  • TD fail-safe level or threshold detector
  • the signal is forwarded in the reception channel to a decoder D, where the code message is again quantified.
  • both encoders E1, E2 produce data codes with the same telegram contents.
  • the signals from the two encoders E1, E2 are brought to the second comparator C2 where the code messages are compared in a fail-safe manner. If there is no correspondence between the two separate signals, the transmission from the code generator G is cut.
  • the signal received from the track circuit is compared with the transmitted signal in a fail-safe manner, among other things to avoid that a signal from adjacent track circuits can be received in case of a fault in insulating joints 3.
  • a comparison is made at least of the a-part in the telegram and is carried out in a first comparator C1, where the signal transmitted to the track circuit is fetched from the data encoder E2 and the signal received from the track circuit is fetched from the decoder D. If the contents of the two channels in the a-part of the telegram are equivalent, a fail-safe output signal 4 is generated from the first comparator C1.
  • This output signal 4 indicates a track circuit free from vehicles.
  • This output signal 4 from the track circuit system is utilized for controlling different devices in the signal system of which the track circuit forms a part.
  • a rail-mounted vehicle adapted to the track circuit system has a receiver with an antenna near the rail in front of the first axle in the direction of travel. Since the signals in the track have different polarities in the two rails, the vehicle may suitably be equipped with two antennas, which pick up the same signal but with opposite polarity. When these signals are added, a more powerful input signal is received by the receiver while at the same time disturbing signals from the two antennas cancel each other.
  • the rail-mounted vehicle according to the above is provided, in principle, with the same type of data communication receiver as the track circuit system and thereby senses telegrams received from the track circuit as failsafe; thus, the rail-mounted vehicle can be supervised by the system.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Verfahren zur automatischen Steuerung eines Schienenfahrzeugs auf einer Schienenwegstrecke, die Gleisschaltkreise enthält, von denen jeder einen Gleisabschnitt der genannten Schienenwegstrecke umfaßt, welche Gleisabschnitte elektrisch gegeneinander isoliert sind, und mit einem automatischen Steuersystem zur automatischen Steuerung des Schienenfahrzeugs, wobei
    - eine Modulationstechnik verwendet wird zur Modulation eines Signals für einen Gleisschaltkreis, um eine Übertragung von seriellen Daten durch die Schienen (2) zu erzielen, wobei die an den Gleisschaltkreis zu übertragenden Daten in Informationsnachrichten, sogenannten Telegrammen, gesammelt werden,
    - eine Nachricht, die an den Gleisschaltkreis durch Übertragungseinrichtungen (G, A), die an einer Stelle des Gleisschaltkreises angeschlossen sind, von einem Empfänger (B), der an eine andere Stelle innerhalb des Gleisschaltkreises angeschlossen ist, aufgenommen wird,
    - die Größe des empfangenen Grundbandbreitensignals zur Anzeige des Vorhandenseins einer überbrückenden Fahrzeugachse in den Gleisschaltkreis verwendet wird,
    - das Verfahren für eine fehlersichere Signalgrößenerkennung des von dem Gleisschaltkreis empfangenen Signals sorgt,
    - das sich in dem Gleisschaltkreis befindliche Schienenfahrzeug kontinuierlich die an den Gleisschaltkreis gesandte Information zu decodieren vermag und wobei
    - die Übertragung der Information, die in den Informationsnachrichten enthalten ist, auf das Schienenfahrzeug und die Erkennung der Schienenfahrzeuge in dem Gleisschaltkreis durch den Austausch digitaler Nachrichten zwischen elektronischen Einheiten (E1, E2, C1, C2, G, A, B, TD, D) erfolgt,
    dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    - die Modulationstechnik eine Standard-Grundbandbreiten-Modulationstechnik für Telekommunikationssysteme ist,
    - separate elektronische Einheiten (E1, E2) mindestens zwei Nachrichten mit dem gleichen an einen Gleisschaltkreis zu übertragenden Information erzeugen, welche Nachrichten vor der Übertragung der Information an einen Gleisschaltkreis zur Erzielung einer Fehlersicherheit in einer elektrischen Einheit (C2) verglichen werden und
    - eine an den Gleisschaltkreis übertragene Nachricht und eine von dem Gleisschaltkreis durch den genannten Empfänger (B) empfangene Nachricht in einer fehlersicheren Weise in einer anderen elektronischen Einheit (C1) verglichen werden, die ein fehlersicheres Ausgangssignal erzeugt, welches Informationen für das automatische Steuersystem darüber enthält, ob sich in dem Gleisschaltkreis ein Fahrzeug befindet oder nicht.
  2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Übertragung von Nachrichten zwischen den elektronischen Einheiten (E1, E2, C1, C2, G, A, B, TD, D) durch Telegramme erfolgt, die in einer Anzahl von Abschnitten unterteilt sind, wobei ein Abschnitt Sicherheitsinformationen über die Identität des Gleisschaltkreises enthält, ein anderer Abschnitt der sicheren Verkehrssteuerung dienende Informationen enthält und ein dritter Abschnitt variierende unspezifische Informationen enthält.
  3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Fehlersicherheit beim Vergleich zwischen einer übertragenen Nachricht und einer empfangenen Nachricht von dem Gleisschaltkreis durch einen Zähler erreicht wird, in welchem mindestens m von n Telegramme identisch sein müssen, mindestens hinsichtlich der Abschnitte der Telegramme, die für die Sicherheit relevant sind, um eine fehlerfreie Datenkommunikation in dem Gleisschaltkreis zu überprüfen.
  4. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Telegramme an Schienenfahrzeuge in dem Gleisschaltkreis Informationen bezüglich der Fahrgeschwindigkeit im Gleisschaltkreis und andere Informationen sicherheitstechnischer Natur enthalten.
  5. Verfahren nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Telegramme in Datenübertragungsblöcke unterteilt sind, wobei gemischte Informationen separat in einem Block oder multiplext in mehreren Blöcken verschachtelt (time-shared) mit wiederholten Blöcken, die Sicherheitsinformationen enthalten, übertragen werden.
  6. Verfahren nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Telegramme Informationen über einen freien oder besetzten Gleisschaltkreis enthalten, welche Informationen in einem Blocksystem verwendet werden können.
  7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die an einen Gleisschaltkreis übertragene Nachricht Informationen für ein in dem Gleisschaltkreis befindliches Schienenfahrzeug enthält, die so beschaffen ist, daß sie kontinuierlich von dem genannten Fahrzeug decodiert werden können, welches mit einem Empfänger und einer oder zwei Antennen ausgerüstet ist.
  8. Anordnung zur Durchführung des Verfahrens nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß zu der Anordnung gehören
    - eine erste Codiereinrichtung (E1), die serielle Daten in Gestalt von Telegrammen erzeugt, die in verschiedene Abschnitte unterteilt sind, die unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Sicherheit signifikant sind,
    - eine zweite redundante Codiereinrichtung (E2), die Datentelegramme mit dem gleichen Informationsinhalt wie die erste Codiereinrichtung (E1) erzeugt, aber nicht notwendigerweise im gleichen Datenformat wie die Telegramme der ersten Codiereinrichtung (E1),
    - ein Code-Generator-Transmitter (G), der ein Grundbandbreitensignal erzeugt, welches mit dem Signal von der ersten Codiereinrichtung (E1) moduliert wird und dessen erzeugtes Signal zur Einspeisung in den Gleisschaltkreis verstärkt wird,
    - eine Empfängereinheit (B), die an einen fehlersicheren Niveaudetektor (TD) und eine Decodiereinrichtung (D) angeschlossen ist,
    - ein fehlersicherer erster Komparator (C1) zum Vergleichen der von dem Gleisschaltkreis empfangenen Telegramme mit den an den Gleisschaltkreis gesendeten Telegrammen,
    - ein fehlersicherer zweiter Komparator (C2) zum Vergleichen des Ausgangssignals der Codiereinrichtungen (E1, E2) und zur Unterbrechung der Übertragung von dem Code-Generator-Transmitter (G) an den Gleisschaltkreis, wenn die Ausgangssignale von den entsprechenden Codiereinrichtungen (E1, E2) nicht zueinanderpassen.
  9. Anordnung nach Anspruch 8, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Codiereinrichtungen (E1, E2), der Code-Generator-Transmitter (G), der Niveaudetektor (TD), die Decodiereinrichtung (D) und die Komparatoren (C1, C2) in einer fehlersicheren Computereinheit ausgeführt sind.
  10. Anordnung nach Anspruch 8 oder 9 in Verbindung mit einer Schienenwegstrecke, welche den Gleisschaltkreis enthält, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine Einheit (A) Telegramme an den Gleisschaltkreis überträgt und die Empfängereinheit (B), welche Telegramme von dem Gleisschaltkreis empfängt, an verschiedene Enden des Gleisschaltkreises angeschlossen sind.
EP91903576A 1990-01-25 1990-12-21 Bahnschaltungssystem Revoked EP0513129B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE9000259A SE465458B (sv) 1990-01-25 1990-01-25 Spaarledningssystem
SE9000259 1990-01-25
PCT/SE1990/000865 WO1991011356A1 (en) 1990-01-25 1990-12-21 Track circuit system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0513129A1 EP0513129A1 (de) 1992-11-19
EP0513129B1 true EP0513129B1 (de) 1996-09-18

Family

ID=20378346

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP91903576A Revoked EP0513129B1 (de) 1990-01-25 1990-12-21 Bahnschaltungssystem

Country Status (6)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0513129B1 (de)
DE (1) DE69028638T2 (de)
DK (1) DK0513129T3 (de)
ES (1) ES2094220T3 (de)
SE (1) SE465458B (de)
WO (1) WO1991011356A1 (de)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3495230A1 (de) * 2017-12-08 2019-06-12 Thales Management & Services Deutschland GmbH Zugsteuerungsnetzwerk, verfahren zur kommunikation und verfahren zur überprüfung der zugvollständigkeit

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CA2170171A1 (en) * 1996-02-23 1997-08-24 Cyprien Gauthier Broken rail position detection
GB0127927D0 (en) * 2001-11-21 2002-01-16 Westinghouse Brake & Signal Railway track circuits
DE602008001597D1 (de) * 2008-03-11 2010-08-05 Bombardier Transp Gmbh Erkennungsvorrichtung und Verfahren für Gleisstromkreise mit BPSK modulierter Codierung
MX2012000847A (es) 2009-07-17 2012-07-17 Invensys Rail Corp Comunicaciones de circuito de via.
US8500071B2 (en) 2009-10-27 2013-08-06 Invensys Rail Corporation Method and apparatus for bi-directional downstream adjacent crossing signaling
US8660215B2 (en) 2010-03-16 2014-02-25 Siemens Rail Automation Corporation Decoding algorithm for frequency shift key communications
US8297558B2 (en) 2010-03-17 2012-10-30 Safetran Systems Corporation Crossing predictor with authorized track speed input
CN104002833A (zh) * 2014-04-28 2014-08-27 中铁二院工程集团有限责任公司 相敏轨道电路微电子接收系统
CN113184011B (zh) * 2021-04-29 2022-08-23 北京和利时系统工程有限公司 一种轨道电路安全校核方法及系统

Family Cites Families (2)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4498650A (en) * 1982-03-10 1985-02-12 General Signal Corporation Microprocessor based track circuit for occupancy detection and bidirectional code communication
DE3650708T2 (de) * 1986-10-03 1999-07-01 The Nippon Signal Co., Ltd., Tokio/Tokyo Vorrichtung zur fahrzeugerkennung auf einer spur

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3495230A1 (de) * 2017-12-08 2019-06-12 Thales Management & Services Deutschland GmbH Zugsteuerungsnetzwerk, verfahren zur kommunikation und verfahren zur überprüfung der zugvollständigkeit
WO2019110673A1 (en) * 2017-12-08 2019-06-13 Thales Management & Services Deutschland Gmbh Train control network, method for communication and method for controlling train integrity
AU2018379331B2 (en) * 2017-12-08 2022-06-16 Thales Management & Services Deutschland Gmbh Train control network, method for communication and method for controlling train integrity
US11460288B2 (en) 2017-12-08 2022-10-04 Thales Management & Services Deutschland Gmbh Train control network, method for communication and method for controlling train integrity

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE69028638T2 (de) 1997-05-07
SE465458B (sv) 1991-09-16
EP0513129A1 (de) 1992-11-19
DK0513129T3 (de) 1997-03-17
SE9000259L (sv) 1991-07-26
WO1991011356A1 (en) 1991-08-08
DE69028638D1 (de) 1996-10-24
ES2094220T3 (es) 1997-01-16
SE9000259D0 (sv) 1990-01-25

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