CN115236702B - Hidden directional spoofing method based on exponential spoofing signal model - Google Patents

Hidden directional spoofing method based on exponential spoofing signal model Download PDF

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CN115236702B
CN115236702B CN202210792200.XA CN202210792200A CN115236702B CN 115236702 B CN115236702 B CN 115236702B CN 202210792200 A CN202210792200 A CN 202210792200A CN 115236702 B CN115236702 B CN 115236702B
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speed
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CN115236702A (en
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郭妍
耿兴寿
唐康华
吴文启
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National University of Defense Technology
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02T—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO TRANSPORTATION
    • Y02T10/00—Road transport of goods or passengers
    • Y02T10/10—Internal combustion engine [ICE] based vehicles
    • Y02T10/40—Engine management systems

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Abstract

The application relates to a hidden directional spoofing method based on an exponential spoofing signal model. The method comprises the following steps: generating an exponential type deception signal by using the exponential type deception signal model, and performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned system from the deception initial moment to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation output results at different moments and the offset of the GNSS deception signal; recursion is carried out on the objective function relation, the deception signal coefficient is regulated according to the obtained final function relation, the obtained position deception signal is utilized to carry out directional deception on the integrated navigation system, a concealed optimization design model of directional deception is constructed according to the obtained position deception offset, speed error and attitude error, and the deception signal coefficient is optimized through a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS deception signal model; generating an optimal GNSS spoofing signal by using the optimal GNSS spoofing signal model to perform hidden directional spoofing on the target unmanned system. By adopting the method, the deception success rate can be improved.

Description

Hidden directional spoofing method based on exponential spoofing signal model
Technical Field
The application relates to the technical field of unmanned system navigation, in particular to a hidden directional spoofing method based on an exponential spoofing signal model.
Background
In recent years, GNSS fraud technology has been widely used in security defense, public security protection, and protection of important facilities, such as installing GNSS fraud jamming devices around important facilities such as airports, petroleum terminals, and gas stations, to achieve security defense and protection of important facilities.
However, at present, the unmanned system mostly adopts a combined navigation mode taking a satellite navigation system as an auxiliary means, a deception detection module exists in the navigation system of many deception targets, and deception signals generated by the conventional deception method are easily detected and removed by the deception detection module, so that deception failure is caused, and deception success rate is low.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, it is desirable to provide a hidden directional spoofing method based on an exponential spoofing signal model that can improve the spoofing success rate.
A method of covert directional spoofing based on an exponential spoofing signal model, the method comprising:
acquiring INS data, GNSS data and an INS/GNSS loose combination navigation system model of a target unmanned system to be deceived;
Discretizing the INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model to obtain a discretized INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model;
The discrete Kalman filter and the discrete INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model are utilized to fuse the INS data and the GNSS data, and an integrated navigation output result is obtained; the combined navigation output result comprises combined navigation position output, combined navigation speed output and combined navigation attitude output;
Performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned system from the deception initial moment by using the exponential deception signal generated by the exponential deception signal model to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation output results of different moments of deception of the target unmanned system and the offset of the GNSS deception signal;
Recursion is carried out on the target function relation to obtain a final function relation of a combined navigation output result of the final moment when the target unmanned system is deceptively executed and the GNSS deception signal offset; the final functional relation contains the fraud signal coefficients;
Adjusting the deception signal coefficient according to the final functional relation to obtain a position deception signal, and directionally decepting the integrated navigation system by utilizing the position deception signal to obtain a position offset of directional deception and a speed error and an attitude error of the integrated navigation system caused by the directional deception;
Constructing a hidden optimal design model of directional deception according to the position deception offset, the speed error and the attitude error, and optimizing deception signal coefficients of the hidden optimal design model through a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS deception signal model;
Generating an optimal GNSS spoofing signal by using the optimal GNSS spoofing signal model to perform hidden directional spoofing on the target unmanned system.
In one embodiment, generating an exponential spoofing signal using an exponential spoofing signal model starts to perform GNSS spoofing interference on the target unmanned system from a spoofing initial time to obtain an objective function relation between combined navigation output results of different times when the target unmanned system is spoofed and an offset of the GNSS spoofing signal, including:
Generating an exponential type deception signal by using the exponential type deception signal model, and performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned system from the deception initial moment to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation position output and the GNSS deception signal offset at different moments as follows
Wherein,Representing combined navigational latitude position output,/>Representing a combined navigational longitude position output,Respectively, the latitude and longitude which are output after correct combination navigation correction under the condition that GNSS signals are not deceptively interferedDeception signal offset for applied GNSS north velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS east velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS latitudes,/>For the applied GNSS longitude spoof signal offset, K ∞(3,1)、K∞(3,2)、K∞(3,3)、K∞ (3, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the latitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively, and K ∞(4,1)、K∞(4,2)、K∞(4,3)、K∞ (4, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the longitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively.
In one embodiment, generating an exponential spoofing signal using an exponential spoofing signal model performs GNSS spoofing jamming on the target unmanned system from a spoofing initial time to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation speed output and the GNSS spoofing signal offset at different time when the target unmanned system is spoofed as
Wherein,Representing a combined navigational north speed output,/>Representing a combined navigational east speed output,The north velocity and east velocity outputted after the correct combined navigation correction under the condition that the GNSS signal is not deceptively disturbed are respectively represented by K ∞(1,1)、K∞(1,2)、K∞(1,3)、K∞ (1, 4) which are gain coefficients when the north velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables, and K ∞(2,1)、K∞(2,2)、K∞(2,3)、K∞(2,) which are gain coefficients when the east velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables.
In one embodiment, generating an exponential spoofing signal using an exponential spoofing signal model performs GNSS spoofing jamming on the target unmanned aerial vehicle from a spoofing initial time to obtain an objective function relation between combined navigation attitude outputs at different time instants when the target unmanned aerial vehicle is spoofed and GNSS spoofing signal offsets as
Wherein,Respectively outputting the combined navigation roll angle, pitch angle and azimuth angle gesture,And K-infinity (5, 1) and K- ∞(5,2)、K∞(5,3)、K∞ (5, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the roll angle error estimation value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observables, K- ∞(6,1)、K∞(6,2)、K∞(6,3)、K∞ (6, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the pitch angle error estimation value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observables, and K-infinity (7, 1), K-infinity (7, 2) and K- ∞(7,3)、K∞ (7, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the azimuth angle error estimation value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observables.
In one embodiment, the method for performing directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system by using the position spoofing signal to obtain a position offset of the directional spoofing and a speed error and a posture error caused by the directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system includes:
directional deception is carried out on the integrated navigation system by utilizing the position deception signal, and the obtained offset of the position deception is
Where k 0 denotes the initial time of spoofing, k+n denotes the final time, k denotes any time from the initial time of spoofing to the final time, and n denotes the total number of times of spoofing.
In one embodiment, the combined navigation system is directionally spoofed by using the position spoofing signal to obtain a speed error caused by the directional spoofing to the combined navigation system as follows
In one embodiment, the combined navigation system is directionally spoofed by using the position spoofing signal to obtain that the attitude error caused by the directional spoofing on the combined navigation system is
In one embodiment, constructing a hidden optimization design model of directional spoofing according to a position spoofing offset, a speed error and an attitude error, optimizing spoofing signal coefficients of the hidden optimization design model by a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS spoofing signal model, including:
constructing a hidden optimization design model of directional spoofing according to the hidden optimization design model of the directional spoofing, namely, the position spoofing offset, the speed error and the attitude error
Wherein K speed is the speed scale factor,For the attitude error threshold values in different directions, A L,Aλ and B are deception signal coefficients,/>For spoofing distance within the same time,/>For the maximum value of the spoofing distance in the same time,Representing the true speeds of the north and east directions of the spoofed target at times k+n, respectively.
In one embodiment, setting a speed scale factor and an attitude error threshold according to the sensitivity of a deception target and a navigation system to deception signal detection, and determining values of 3 deception signal coefficients of GNSS deception signals meeting a hidden optimal design model through a traversing method;
And obtaining an optimal GNSS spoofing signal model according to the determined spoofing signal coefficient value.
According to the hidden directional deception method based on the exponential deception signal model, the exponential deception signal model is introduced to generate the exponential deception signal to perform GNSS deception interference on the target unmanned system from the deception initial moment, and the target function relation between the combined navigation output results of different moments when the target unmanned system is deception and the GNSS deception signal offset is obtained; and then recursively estimating the target function relation to obtain a final function relation between a final navigation output result of the target unmanned system at the final moment of being deceptively applied and the GNSS deception signal offset, analyzing the final function relation to obtain the influence of the GNSS deception signal on the INS/GNSS combined navigation output, adjusting deception signal coefficients according to the final function relation to obtain a position deception signal, directionally decepting the combined navigation system by using the position deception signal to obtain the position deception offset of directional deception and speed errors and attitude errors caused by the directional deception on system, researching constraint conditions of the speed and attitude errors caused by the GNSS deception signal to construct and determine an optimal GNSS deception signal model meeting the hidden directional deception, and realizing the hidden directional deception of the target unmanned system in the INS/GNSS deception combined navigation mode by using the optimal GNSS deception signal model, thereby improving the deception success rate of the target unmanned system.
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FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of a method of covert directional spoofing based on an exponential spoofing signal model in one embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a spoofing scenario in one embodiment;
Detailed Description
The present application will be described in further detail with reference to the drawings and examples, in order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the application.
In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, there is provided a covert directional spoofing method based on an exponential spoofing signal model, comprising the steps of:
And 102, acquiring INS data, GNSS data and an INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model of the target unmanned system to be deceived, and discretizing the INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model to obtain a discretized INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model.
And respectively acquiring INS data and GNSS data by using an INS system (inertial navigation system) and a GNSS system (satellite navigation system), wherein the INS data comprises north and east speeds, latitude and longitude, roll angle, pitch angle and azimuth angle obtained by the INS calculation, and the GNSS data comprises north and east speeds, latitude and longitude provided by GNSS. The INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model of the target unmanned system to be spoofed is an existing model, which is not described in this patent too much.
104, Fusing INS data and GNSS data by using a discrete Kalman filter and a discretized INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model to obtain an integrated navigation output result; the combined navigation output result comprises a combined navigation position output, a combined navigation speed output and a combined navigation posture output.
And 106, generating an exponential type deception signal by using the exponential type deception signal model, and performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned system from the deception initial moment to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation output results of different moments when the target unmanned system is deception and the offset of the GNSS deception signal.
Assuming that GNSS spoofing interference is implemented on a spoofed target from the point of time k 0, the position and velocity information received by the target receiver at any point of time k is:
wherein, Signal offsets are spoofed for applied GNSS speeds and positions. The application adopts an exponential type deception signal offset model comprising two coefficients of A and B as/>
The target function relation between the k moment combined navigation position output and the GNSS deception signal offset after Kalman filtering fusion and feedback correction is as follows:
wherein, Representing combined navigational latitude position output,/>Representing a combined navigational longitude position output,Respectively, the latitude and longitude which are output after correct combination navigation correction under the condition that GNSS signals are not deceptively interferedDeception signal offset for applied GNSS north velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS east velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS latitudes,/>For the applied GNSS longitude spoof signal offset, K ∞(3,1)、K∞(3,2)、K∞(3,3)、K∞ (3, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the latitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively, and K ∞(4,1)、K∞(4,2)、K∞(4,3)、K∞ (4, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the longitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively.
The objective function relation between the integrated navigation speed output at any moment k in the deception process and the GNSS deception signal offset is as follows
Wherein,Representing a combined navigational north speed output,/>Representing a combined navigational east speed output,The north velocity and east velocity outputted after correct combined navigation correction under the condition that the GNSS signal is not deceptively interfered are respectively represented by K ∞(1,1)、K∞(1,2)、K∞(1,3)、K∞ (1, 4) which are gain coefficients when the north velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables, and K ∞(2,1)、K∞(2,2)、K∞(2,3)、K∞ (2, 4) which are gain coefficients when the east velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables.
The target function relation between the combined navigation attitude output at any moment k in the deception process and the GNSS deception signal offset is as follows
Wherein,Respectively outputting the combined navigation roll angle, pitch angle and azimuth angle gesture,The attitude results are respectively output after correct combined navigation correction under the condition that GNSS signals are not deceptively interfered, K ∞(5,1)、K∞(5,2)、K∞(5,3)、K∞ (5, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the roll angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity, K ∞(6,1)、K∞(6,2)、K∞(6,3)、K∞ (6, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the pitch angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity, and K ∞(7,1)、K∞(7,2)、K∞(7,3)、K∞ (7, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the azimuth angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity.
From the objective function relation, it is known that the GNSS spoofing signal has an effect on the estimation of the position output, velocity output and attitude output of the INS/GNSS integrated navigation, and the magnitude of this effect is correlated with the spoofing signal. Therefore, the control of the position offset, the speed offset and the attitude offset of the integrated navigation system can be realized by designing the GNSS deception jamming signals.
Step 108, recursion is carried out on the target function relation to obtain a final function relation of the combined navigation output result of the final moment when the target unmanned system is deceptively executed and the GNSS deception signal offset; the final functional relation contains the spoofing signal coefficients.
The functional relation between the integrated navigation output result and the GNSS deception signal offset after feedback correction at the final moment k+n is obtained through recursion, and the stability of the GNSS deception signal on the integrated navigation output result is analyzed;
After the position deviation generated by the GNSS deception jamming, although the INS is not deception jamming, the position and the speed deviation generated by the GNSS deception signal are as same as the constant drift of an inertial device and are directly accumulated to the next moment, and the final function relation between the combined navigation position output and the GNSS deception signal deviation is as follows, wherein the final moment k+n of the final moment k 0, which is obtained by recursively implementing the GNSS deception jamming on the deception target and reaching the expected directional deception target, is obtained by feedback correction:
Similarly, the objective function relation between the combined navigation speed output and the GNSS deception signal offset is recursively calculated to obtain the final function relation between the combined navigation speed output at the final moment and the GNSS deception signal offset, namely GNSS deception jamming is implemented on deception targets from the moment k 0, and the combined navigation speed output after feedback correction at the final moment k+n is obtained by recursion
Recursion is carried out on the objective function relation between the combined navigation attitude output and the GNSS deception signal offset to obtain a final function relation between the combined navigation attitude output at the final moment and the GNSS deception signal offset, namely GNSS deception interference is carried out on deception targets from the moment k 0, and the combined navigation attitude output after feedback correction at the moment k+n is obtained through recursion
Coefficient functions in final functional relation by analyzing combined navigation position output and GNSS spoofing signal offsetTo verify the stability of GNSS fraud, then there is: 0<K ∞(j,j)<1,0<1-K∞ (j, j) <1 is known, then:
Therefore, the spoofing coefficient function converges. After the offset signal caused by the spoofing interference is fused to the integrated navigation filter, the resulting position offset is stable. Taking GNSS spoofing interference is implemented on the spoofing target from the time K 0, the position output result after feedback correction at the time k+n can be obtained by recursion as an example, because of K ∞(3,3)≈K∞ (4, 4), when the spoofing offset applied to the longitude and latitude is the same, the longitude and latitude offset output after the offset is fused to the integrated navigation filter is the same.
And 110, adjusting the deception signal coefficient according to the final functional relation to obtain a position deception signal, and directionally decepting the integrated navigation system by using the position deception signal to obtain a position deception offset and speed errors and attitude errors caused by directional deception.
The final functional relation contains a deception signal coefficient A L、Aλ、BP, and the position deception signal is controlled by adjusting the value of A L、Aλ、BP, so that the deception offset ratio in the longitude and latitude direction output by the integrated navigation system is a stable constant value, thereby realizing the purpose of deception target integrated navigation directional deception.
Step 112, constructing a hidden optimizing design model of directional deception according to the position deception offset, the speed error and the attitude error, and optimizing deception signal coefficients of the hidden optimizing design model through a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS deception signal model; generating an optimal GNSS spoofing signal by using the optimal GNSS spoofing signal model to perform hidden directional spoofing on the target unmanned system.
And researching constraint conditions of speed and attitude errors caused by GNSS deception signals to construct a hidden optimal design model meeting hidden directional deception, optimizing deception signal coefficients of the hidden optimal design model through a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS deception signal model, generating the optimal GNSS deception signal by using the optimal GNSS deception signal model to realize hidden directional deception of the target unmanned system in an INS/GNSS deception combined navigation mode, and improving deception success rate of the target unmanned system.
Generating GNSS spoofing signals using a model of GNSS spoofing signals in the spoofing scenario of fig. 2 performs blind directional spoofing on the target unmanned system.
In the hidden directional spoofing method based on the exponential spoofing signal model, the exponential spoofing signal model is introduced to generate the exponential spoofing signal to perform GNSS spoofing interference on the target unmanned system from the initial spoofing moment, so that an objective function relation between the combined navigation output results of different spoofed moments of the target unmanned system and the offset of the GNSS spoofing signal is obtained; and recursively estimating the target function relation to obtain a final function relation between a final navigation output result of the target unmanned system at the final moment of being deceptively applied and the GNSS deception signal offset, analyzing the final function relation to obtain the influence of the GNSS deception signal on INS/GNSS combined navigation output, regulating deception signal coefficients according to the final function relation to obtain a position deception signal, directionally decepting the combined navigation system by using the position deception signal to obtain the position deception offset, a speed error and an attitude error caused by directional deception, researching constraint conditions of the speed and the attitude error caused by the GNSS deception signal to construct and determine an optimal GNSS deception signal model meeting the hidden directional deception, and realizing the hidden directional deception of the target unmanned system under the INS/GNSS deception combined navigation mode by using the optimal GNSS deception signal model, thereby improving the deception success rate of the target unmanned system.
In one embodiment, generating an exponential spoofing signal using an exponential spoofing signal model starts to perform GNSS spoofing interference on the target unmanned system from a spoofing initial time to obtain an objective function relation between combined navigation output results of different times when the target unmanned system is spoofed and an offset of the GNSS spoofing signal, including:
generating an exponential spoofing signal by using the exponential spoofing signal model, and performing GNSS spoofing interference on the target unmanned aerial vehicle system from the initial spoofing moment to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation position output and the GNSS spoofing signal offset of different moments when the target unmanned aerial vehicle system is spoofed as follows
Wherein,Representing combined navigational latitude position output,/>Representing a combined navigational longitude position output,Respectively, the latitude and longitude which are output after correct combination navigation correction under the condition that GNSS signals are not deceptively interferedDeception signal offset for applied GNSS north velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS east velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS latitudes,/>For the applied GNSS longitude spoof signal offset, K ∞(3,1)、K∞(3,2)、K∞(3,3)、K∞ (3, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the latitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively, and K ∞(4,1)、K∞(4,2)、K∞(4,3)、K∞ (4, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the longitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively.
In one embodiment, generating an exponential spoofing signal using an exponential spoofing signal model performs GNSS spoofing jamming on the target unmanned system from a spoofing initial time to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation speed output and the GNSS spoofing signal offset at different time when the target unmanned system is spoofed as
Wherein,Representing a combined navigational north speed output,/>Representing a combined navigational east speed output,The north velocity and east velocity outputted after correct combined navigation correction under the condition that the GNSS signal is not deceptively interfered are respectively represented by K ∞(1,1)、K∞(1,2)、K∞(1,3)、K∞ (1, 4) which are gain coefficients when the north velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables, and K ∞(2,1)、K∞(2,2)、K∞(2,3)、K∞ (2, 4) which are gain coefficients when the east velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables.
In one embodiment, generating an exponential spoofing signal using an exponential spoofing signal model performs GNSS spoofing jamming on the target unmanned aerial vehicle from a spoofing initial time to obtain an objective function relation between combined navigation attitude outputs at different time instants when the target unmanned aerial vehicle is spoofed and GNSS spoofing signal offsets as
Wherein,Respectively outputting the combined navigation roll angle, pitch angle and azimuth angle gesture,The attitude results are respectively output after correct combined navigation correction under the condition that GNSS signals are not deceptively interfered, K ∞(5,1)、K∞(5,2)、K∞(5,3)、K∞ (5, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the roll angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity, K ∞(6,1)、K∞(6,2)、K∞(6,3)、K∞ (6, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the pitch angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity, and K ∞(7,1)、K∞(7,2)、K∞(7,3)、K∞ (7, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the azimuth angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity.
In one embodiment, the combined navigation system is directionally spoofed by using the position spoofing signal to obtain a position spoofing offset and a speed error and a posture error caused by the directional spoofing, and the method comprises the following steps:
Directional spoofing is carried out on the integrated navigation system by utilizing the position spoofing signal, and the position spoofing offset is obtained
Where k 0 denotes the initial time of spoofing, k+n denotes the final time, k denotes any time from the initial time of spoofing to the final time, and n denotes the total number of times of spoofing.
In one embodiment, the combined navigation system is directionally spoofed using the position spoofing signal to obtain a speed error caused by the directional spoofing as
In one embodiment, the combined navigation system is directionally spoofed by using the position spoofing signal to obtain a posture error caused by the directional spoofing as follows
In a specific embodiment, the position spoofing offset of the integrated navigation system in the spoofing process is:
Wherein, A L,Aλ and B are nonzero GNSS spoofing signal coefficients, when the spoofing offset in the longitude and latitude direction is not 0, the azimuth angle of directional spoofing is:
The value of K S may be varied by the design of the spoofing signal coefficient a L,Aλ, i.e., different directional spoofing effects may be achieved. When the deception offset in the longitude direction is 0, the azimuth angle of the directional deception can be obtained by adjusting the positive and negative of the deception signal in the latitude direction, and the azimuth angle is as follows: phi 2 = ±90°; when the deception offset in the latitude direction is 0, the azimuth angle of the directional deception can be obtained by adjusting the positive and negative of the deception signal in the longitude direction, which is: phi 3 = ±180°.
In summary, the azimuth of the directional spoofing is:
The speed error caused by the GNSS position spoofing signal after the feedback correction at the moment k+n is as follows:
from the relationship of the K ∞ values, ,K∞(1,1)≈K∞(2,2);K∞(1,3)>K∞(2,4);K∞(3,3)≈K∞(4,4), is known [1-K ∞(1,1)-K∞(3,3)]≈[1-K∞(2,2)-K∞ (4, 4) ], so that the influence of the GNSS position spoofing signal on the north speed is always larger than the influence on the east speed even though the position spoofing offset applied on the longitude and latitude is the same. In the application, when the hidden optimal design model is designed, the influence of the deception signal on the speed output is reduced by designing the deception signal, and the speed error caused by deception is prevented from being detected by the deception detection algorithm, so that the hidden performance of the deception algorithm is improved.
The attitude error caused by the GNSS position spoofing signal after the feedback correction at the moment k+n is as follows:
wherein, And respectively, the gesture results after correct correction when the GNSS signals are not deceptively generated.
Since K∞(3,3)≈K∞(4,4),K∞(6,3)>K∞(5,4),K∞(7,3)>K∞(6,3), is aware that GNSS fraud can have an impact on the attitude of the integrated navigational output, especially on the attitude angle, this is particularly serious. And this effect is related to spoofing the interfering signal. According to the application, the deception signal is designed, so that the influence of the deception signal on gesture output is reduced, and further, the deception detector of the target unmanned system is disabled, thereby achieving the purpose of hidden deception.
In one embodiment, constructing a hidden optimization design model of directional spoofing according to a position spoofing offset, a speed error and an attitude error, optimizing spoofing signal coefficients of the hidden optimization design model by a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS spoofing signal model, including:
Constructing a hidden optimization design model of directional spoofing according to the position spoofing offset, the speed error and the attitude error as follows
/>
Wherein K speed is the speed scale factor,For the attitude error threshold values in different directions, A L,Aλ and B are deception signal coefficients,/>For spoofing distance within the same time,/>For the maximum value of the spoofing distance in the same time,Representing the true speeds of the north and east directions of the spoofed target at times k+n, respectively.
In one embodiment, setting a speed scale factor and an attitude error threshold according to the sensitivity of a deception target and a navigation system to deception signal detection, and determining the values of 3 deception signal coefficients of GNSS deception signals meeting constraint conditions in a hidden optimal design model through a traversing method;
And obtaining an optimal GNSS spoofing signal model according to the determined spoofing signal coefficient value.
In a specific embodiment, in order to optimize the hidden directional spoofing of the target unmanned system, the spoofing distance in a fixed time period needs to be maximized, i.e., the distance that the target unmanned system is spoofed is the farthest, under the premise of ensuring the concealment of the directional spoofing. The influence of the GNSS position spoofing signal on the INS/GNSS combined navigation attitude and speed estimation value can be known, in order to realize hidden directional spoofing, the influence of the GNSS position spoofing signal on the attitude and speed needs to be reduced, and the important point is to reduce the influence of the GNSS position spoofing signal on the north speed and the course angle, so that the GNSS spoofing signal is prevented from being detected by a spoofing detection algorithm of the target unmanned platform. By analyzing the position deception offset, the speed error and the attitude error caused by the directional deception, reasonable constraint conditions are set to enhance the concealment of the directional deception, and the concealed optimization design of the directional deception is converted into the following model:
wherein, For spoofing distance within the same time,/>Maximum value of spoofing distance in the same time; Representing the true north and east speeds of the spoofing target at time k+n, respectively, if the spoofer and spoofing target are on the same carrier, then/> Is the speed of the vehicle; if the deception and the deception targets are not on the same carrier, then K speed is a speed scale factor representing the northbound and eastern speeds of the deception carrier when the carrier of the deception and the deception targets are approximately equal; /(I)Respectively, attitude error thresholds.
The values of the 3 coefficients A L,Aλ and B of the GNSS deception signal meeting the conditions are determined through a traversing method, and the required optimal GNSS deception signal model can be obtained through the values A L,Aλ and B, so that hidden directional deception of the target unmanned system in the INS/GNSS loose combined navigation mode is realized.
When the speed scale factor K speed and the attitude error threshold are setAnd then, determining the values of the 3 coefficients A L,Aλ and B of the GNSS deception signal meeting the conditions by a traversing method, and obtaining a required GNSS deception signal model by the values A L,Aλ and B. Wherein/>The sensitivity of the spoofing target and the navigation system to spoofing signal detection may be set to different values.
It should be understood that, although the steps in the flowchart of fig. 1 are shown in sequence as indicated by the arrows, the steps are not necessarily performed in sequence as indicated by the arrows. The steps are not strictly limited to the order of execution unless explicitly recited herein, and the steps may be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least some of the steps in fig. 1 may include multiple sub-steps or stages that are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, nor do the order in which the sub-steps or stages are performed necessarily performed in sequence, but may be performed alternately or alternately with at least a portion of other steps or sub-steps of other steps.
The technical features of the above embodiments may be arbitrarily combined, and all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described for brevity of description, however, as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features, they should be considered as the scope of the description.
The above examples illustrate only a few embodiments of the application, which are described in detail and are not to be construed as limiting the scope of the application. It should be noted that it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the application, which are all within the scope of the application. Accordingly, the scope of protection of the present application is to be determined by the appended claims.

Claims (9)

1. A method of covert directional spoofing based on an exponential spoofing signal model, the method comprising:
acquiring INS data, GNSS data and an INS/GNSS loose combination navigation system model of a target unmanned system to be deceived;
Discretizing the INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model to obtain a discretized INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model;
Fusing the INS data and the GNSS data by using a discrete Kalman filter and a discretized INS/GNSS loose integrated navigation system model to obtain an integrated navigation output result; the combined navigation output result comprises combined navigation position output, combined navigation speed output and combined navigation attitude output;
Performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned system from the deception initial moment by using an exponential deception signal generated by the exponential deception signal model to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation output results of different moments when the target unmanned system is deception and GNSS deception signal offset;
recursion is carried out on the target function relation to obtain a final function relation of a combined navigation output result of the final moment when the target unmanned system is deceptively transmitted and the GNSS deception signal offset; the final functional relation comprises a spoofing signal coefficient;
adjusting the deception signal coefficient according to the final functional relation to obtain a position deception signal, and directionally decepting the integrated navigation system by utilizing the position deception signal to obtain a position deception offset and speed errors and attitude errors caused by directional deception on the integrated navigation system;
Constructing a hidden optimizing design model of directional deception according to the position deception offset, the speed error and the attitude error, and optimizing deception signal coefficients of the hidden optimizing design model through a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS deception signal model;
and generating an optimal GNSS spoofing signal by using the optimal GNSS spoofing signal model to perform hidden directional spoofing on the target unmanned system.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein performing GNSS spoofing on the target unmanned system from a spoofing initiation time using an exponential spoofing signal generated by an exponential spoofing signal model to obtain an objective function relationship of combined navigational output results and GNSS spoofing signal offsets for different times when the target unmanned system is spoofed, comprising:
Performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned aerial vehicle from the deception initial time by using an exponential deception signal generated by using an exponential deception signal model to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation position output and GNSS deception signal offset of different time when the target unmanned aerial vehicle is deception as follows
Wherein,Representing combined navigational latitude position output,/>Representing combined navigational longitude position output,/>The latitude and the longitude which are output after the correct combination navigation correction under the condition that the GNSS signals are not deceptively interfered are respectively,Deception signal offset for applied GNSS north velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS east velocity,/>Deception signal offset for applied GNSS latitudes,/>For the applied GNSS longitude spoof signal offset, K ∞(3,1)、K∞(3,2)、K∞(3,3)、K∞ (3, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the latitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively, and K ∞(4,1)、K∞(4,2)、K∞(4,3)、K∞ (4, 4) represents the gain factor when calculating the longitude error estimate using the north speed, east speed, latitude and longitude observations, respectively.
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the method further comprises:
Performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned aerial vehicle from the deception initial time by using an exponential deception signal generated by using an exponential deception signal model to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation speed output and GNSS deception signal offset at different time when the target unmanned aerial vehicle is deception as follows
Wherein,Representing a combined navigational north speed output,/>Representing a combined navigational east speed output,The north velocity and east velocity outputted after correct combined navigation correction under the condition that the GNSS signal is not deceptively interfered are respectively represented by K ∞(1,1)、K∞(1,2)、K∞(1,3)、K∞ (1, 4) which are gain coefficients when the north velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables, and K ∞(2,1)、K∞(2,2)、K∞(2,3)、K∞ (2, 4) which are gain coefficients when the east velocity error estimation value is calculated by using the north velocity, east velocity, latitude and longitude observables.
4. A method according to claim 3, characterized in that the method further comprises:
performing GNSS deception jamming on the target unmanned aerial vehicle from the deception initial time by using an exponential deception signal generated by using an exponential deception signal model to obtain an objective function relation between the combined navigation attitude output and the GNSS deception signal offset of different time when the target unmanned aerial vehicle is deception as follows
Wherein,Respectively outputting the combined navigation roll angle, pitch angle and azimuth angle gesture,The attitude results are respectively output after correct combined navigation correction under the condition that GNSS signals are not deceptively interfered, K ∞(5,1)、K∞(5,2)、K∞(5,3)、K∞ (5, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the roll angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity, K ∞(6,1)、K∞(6,2)、K∞(6,3)、K∞ (6, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the pitch angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity, and K ∞(7,1)、K∞(7,2)、K∞(7,3)、K∞ (7, 4) respectively represent gain coefficients when the azimuth angle error estimated value is calculated by using the north speed, the east speed, the latitude and the longitude observed quantity.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein using the position spoofing signal to directionally spoof the integrated navigation system to obtain a position offset for the directional spoofing and a velocity error and a gesture error caused by the directional spoofing to the integrated navigation system comprises:
performing directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system by utilizing the position spoofing signal to obtain a position offset of the directional spoofing as follows
Where k 0 denotes the initial time of spoofing, k+n denotes the final time, k denotes any time from the initial time of spoofing to the final time, and n denotes the total number of times of spoofing.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the method further comprises:
performing directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system by using the position spoofing signal to obtain that the speed error caused by the directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system is
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the method further comprises:
Performing directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system by using the position spoofing signal to obtain that the attitude error caused by the directional spoofing on the integrated navigation system is
8. The method of claim 7, wherein constructing a hidden optimization design model for directional spoofing based on the position spoofing offset, velocity error, and attitude error, optimizing spoofing signal coefficients of the hidden optimization design model by a traversal algorithm to obtain an optimal GNSS spoofing signal model, comprising:
Constructing a hidden optimization design model of directional spoofing according to the position spoofing offset, the speed error and the attitude error as follows
Wherein K speed is the speed scale factor,For the attitude error threshold values in different directions, A L,Aλ and B are deception signal coefficients,/>For spoofing distance within the same time,/>For the maximum value of the spoofing distance in the same time,Representing the true speeds of the north and east directions of the spoofed target at times k+n, respectively.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the method further comprises:
Setting a speed scale factor and an attitude error threshold according to the sensitivity of a deception target and a navigation system to deception signal detection, and determining the values of 3 deception signal coefficients of GNSS deception signals meeting a hidden optimal design model by a traversing method;
And obtaining an optimal GNSS spoofing signal model according to the determined spoofing signal coefficient value.
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