CN115201856A - Global positioning system deception detection and positioning recovery method based on pseudo-range residual error - Google Patents
Global positioning system deception detection and positioning recovery method based on pseudo-range residual error Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/015—Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/393—Trajectory determination or predictive tracking, e.g. Kalman filtering
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/396—Determining accuracy or reliability of position or pseudorange measurements
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/42—Determining position
- G01S19/45—Determining position by combining measurements of signals from the satellite radio beacon positioning system with a supplementary measurement
- G01S19/47—Determining position by combining measurements of signals from the satellite radio beacon positioning system with a supplementary measurement the supplementary measurement being an inertial measurement, e.g. tightly coupled inertial
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- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention discloses a pseudo-range residual error-based global positioning system deception detection and positioning recovery method, which comprises the following steps: s1: initializing system parameters, determining initial position information of a receiver and a clock error of the receiver, and acquiring latest navigation ephemeris information; s2: using the measurement information of the inertial sensor to perform prior estimation on the position of the current receiver; s3: obtaining measurement information of a global positioning system, and calibrating satellite pseudo-range information; s4: acquiring an estimated value of a satellite pseudo range through the navigation ephemeris information and the estimated position of the receiver; s5: judging whether the currently received satellite data is deception data or not by using the residual error of the satellite pseudo-range measured value and the estimated value; s6: the receiver utilizes the real satellite information and the measurement information of the inertial sensor to realize the positioning recovery. The method can detect the deception of the GPS, and fully utilize the effective information in the GPS data to comprehensively optimize the positioning error.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, particularly relates to a navigation positioning technology, and mainly relates to a pseudo-range residual error-based global positioning system deception detection and positioning recovery method.
Background
With the rapid development of mobile communication and automobiles, global Positioning System (GPS) technology and its applications have not only gained wide application in the military field, but also have gone deep into various industries, providing great convenience for our daily life. However, because the signal strength is weak, the GPS signal is easily interfered without encryption measures, and the GPS signal is easily deceived by attackers. There are two main types of attacks on GPS receivers: jamming and fraud. The former disturbs legitimate signals simply by sending noise to the GPS frequency, thereby making it impossible for the receiver to calculate its position, and interference attacks are easily discovered because they cause the receiver to lose lock, thereby indicating their presence to the receiver. And a spoofing attack is handled by an adversary that generates and transmits a spoofing signal to spoof the GPS receiver. Spoofing allows the attacker to guide the victim off track, as the attacker can force the receiver to believe that it is in a different position than it actually is. Using software radios and the like can interfere with accurate navigation by sending spurious GPS signals, affecting the position, velocity and time of the receiver, enabling the receiver to trust and rely on signals containing spurious location information and initiate erroneous navigation.
The receiver receives data of M independent GPS satellites at each sampling, i belongs to {1,2.. Multidot.M } to represent the serial number of the current satellite data, and k belongs to {1,2.. Multidot.N } to represent the serial number of the current sampling. In a GPS spoofing environment, the received pseudorange information may be represented for satellite i at the kth sample time
Where ρ is i，k Represents the pseudorange measurement to satellite i at the kth sample time by the receiver;
represents the geometric distance from the receiver to the satellite i at the kth sampling; d is the receiver error; alpha is a constant representing the compensation of the measurement values by the relevant parameters in the navigation message to eliminate ionospheric errorsSatellite clock errors and satellite ephemeris errors; lambda represents deviation data injected by a malicious attacker, when the value of lambda is 0, a non-deceptive signal is represented, and when the value of lambda is not 0, a deceptive signal is represented; v. of g Is zero mean white noise.
To date, many researches have been successfully carried out in the field of navigation positioning technology to detect GPS by utilizing the characteristic that inertial navigation equipment is not easy to be attacked, but the following problems still exist: 1) Most researches are judged based on data after GPS positioning calculation, and specific satellite data of each satellite are not judged to be maliciously attacked and real and effective; 2) After the receiver detects that the current GPS data is deception data, the real satellite data which is not deception-injected in the current GPS data cannot be effectively utilized to participate in positioning calculation.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a pseudo-range residual error-based global positioning system deception detection and positioning recovery method aiming at the problems that deception data and real data cannot be distinguished and real and effective data cannot be fully utilized in the prior art, which comprises the following steps: s1: initializing system parameters, determining initial position information of a receiver and a clock error of the receiver, and acquiring latest navigation ephemeris information; s2: using the measurement information of the inertial sensor to perform prior estimation on the position of the current receiver; s3: obtaining measurement information of a global positioning system, and calibrating satellite pseudo-range information; s4: acquiring an estimated value of a satellite pseudo range through the navigation ephemeris information acquired in the step S1 and the estimated position of the receiver acquired in the step S2; s5: judging whether the satellite data currently received is deceptive data or not by utilizing the satellite pseudo-range measured value obtained in the step S3 and the residual error of the estimated value obtained in the step S4; if the accumulated test statistic data is larger than a preset threshold value, the current data is deceptive data; otherwise, the data is real data; s6: the receiver utilizes the real satellite information and the measurement information of the inertial sensor to realize the positioning recovery. The method can detect the deception of the GPS, and fully utilizes the effective information in the GPS data to comprehensively optimize the positioning error.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that: the method for detecting cheating and recovering the positioning of the global positioning system based on the pseudo-range residual error comprises the following steps:
s1: initializing system parameters, determining initial position information of a receiver and a clock error of the receiver, and acquiring latest navigation ephemeris information;
s2: using the measurement information of the inertial sensor to perform prior estimation on the position of the current receiver;
s3: obtaining measurement information of a global positioning system, and calibrating satellite pseudo-range information;
s4: acquiring an estimated value of a satellite pseudo range through the navigation ephemeris information acquired in the step S1 and the estimated position of the receiver acquired in the step S2;
s5: judging whether the satellite data currently received is deceptive data or not by utilizing the satellite pseudo-range measured value obtained in the step S3 and the residual error of the estimated value obtained in the step S4; if the accumulated test statistic data is larger than a preset threshold value, the current data is deceptive data; otherwise, the data is real data;
s6: the receiver utilizes the real satellite information and the measurement information of the inertial sensor to realize the positioning recovery.
Compared with the prior art, the method has the advantages that 1) the method uses the original satellite data to carry out deception detection instead of judging the position data after GPS positioning calculation, so that the position calculation by using the GPS data is ensured without introducing error data; 2) Under the environment of GPS deception, the method can distinguish the real and effective part in the received satellite data, and the positioning error can be controlled in a meter level by comprehensively optimizing the positioning error by fully utilizing the group of data; 3) The method is mainly characterized in that innovation is carried out on software, the existing hardware equipment does not need to be changed, the complexity of the algorithm is low, and the requirement of a motion control system on high-speed sampling is met.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic view of a navigational positioning system used in the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a comparison of positioning error performance under fixed pseudorange bias attack using the method of the present invention and a non-spoofing detection method;
FIG. 3 is a comparison graph of positioning error performance under incremental pseudorange bias attack using the method of the present invention and a non-spoofing detection method;
FIG. 4 is a comparison of the change over time of a single point positioning error after the method of the present invention is run when an attacker injects different incremental pseudorange bias errors;
fig. 5 is a comparison graph of fused positioning error over time after the method of the present invention is run when an attacker injects different incremental pseudorange bias errors.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be further illustrated with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, which are to be understood as merely illustrative of the invention and not as limiting the scope of the invention.
Example 1
A method for global positioning system spoofing detection and location recovery based on pseudorange residuals, fig. 1 is a schematic view of a navigation and location system used in this embodiment, and the method specifically includes the following steps:
step S1, initializing system parameters including a state matrix phi, an input matrix gamma, a variance Q of system noise, a variance R of measurement noise, and a window size of accumulated measurement statistics
Detection threshold
Determining initial position information r of a receiver 0 And the clock error d of the receiver 0 And acquiring the latest navigation ephemeris information eData.
S2, carrying out prior estimation on the position of the current receiver by using the measurement information of an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
Wherein x k ＝[δr k ，δv k ，δe k ] T Represents the amount of change, r, of the system from the initial time at the k-th sampling k Indicating the position information of the receiver, v k Indicating speed information of the receiver, e k Representing attitude information of the receiver, u k ＝[δf k ，δω k ] T Denotes the input of the system at the time of the (k-1) th sampling, f k Representing the specific force, ω, of the inertial system k Representing the angular velocity of the inertial system.
And S3, acquiring GPS measurement information and calibrating the satellite pseudo-range information. After correction, the measured value rho of pseudo range in GPS i Comprises the following steps:
ρ i ＝|r k ，r i，k |+d+α+v g
wherein i =1,2,. Denotes the received satellite number, k denotes the k-th sample of the receiver, r k Is the position in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system coordinate at the kth sampling of the receiver, r i，k Is the component of the ith satellite in the geocentric Earth's fixed coordinate system at the kth sample, d = c δ t s，clk Is the deviation of the receiver clock, c is the speed of light, and α is a known constant that represents the ionospheric, tropospheric, satellite clock, and ephemeris errors in the measurements.
Using the Newton-Raphson method, the above equations can be linearized and solved iteratively. With r 0 ＝(x 0 ，y 0 ，z 0 ) And d 0 As an initial value of receiver position and receiver clock offset, ρ i，k Is the corrected pseudorange measurement, ρ, for satellite i at the kth sample 0，k Is based on the initial x 0 And d 0 Corresponding approximation to the kth sample. Then we can get
δρ i，k ＝ρ i，k -ρ 0，k
＝f i ·δr k +δd+ε i，k ，
Wherein δ d = d k -d 0 Is a constant number epsilon i，k Is a high order residual. We now have more than four linear systems of equations to solve the unknowns: delta r k And δ d. By linking several equations, we can get the following equations
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
determined by the sampled satellite data, G * Is composed of a group f i The geometric matrix of which epsilon is the measurement error vector. The above equation is solved by using Least Squares (LSM) to obtain delta r k And δ d.
Step S4, estimating the position of the receiver through the latest navigation ephemeris information eData
Estimates of satellite pseudoranges are obtained. From the navigation ephemeris information eData, we can calculate the coordinate r of the received satellite under ECEF i And thus estimates of receiver to satellite pseudoranges may be computed
And S5, judging whether the satellite data currently received is deception data or not by using the residual error between the satellite pseudo-range measured value and the estimated value.
In a GPS spoofing environment, an attacker spoofs the receiver by modifying the pseudorange values in the GPS measurement data, when the 6PS pseudorange values in the receiver become
Wherein
The method can be regarded as a constant, wherein lambda represents deviation data injected by a malicious attacker, when the value of lambda is 0, a non-spoofing signal is represented, and when the value of lambda is not 0, a spoofing signal is represented. Defining the error variable gamma of the satellite i at the kth sample i，k Is composed of
Considering that we do not know whether the currently received satellite data is spoofed data and that r and d change negligibly when the interval between two position fixes is short, we use the receiver error d at the time of the k-1 sample to participate in the calculation.
Thus, it is possible to provide
γ i，k ＝v g +λ
In the absence of an attack, the error γ i，k A gaussian distribution with a mean value of zero is followed. If an attack occurs, the injected pseudorange bias λ may become a large value for spoofing purposes. Thus, the cumulative test statistic q at the k-th sample i，k Is defined as the error gamma i，k Sum of squares over time
The proposed spoof detector is used to check test statistics q i，k Whether or not it is less than a predetermined threshold value, i.e.
Let n be the number of measurements updated per GPS measurement, in the absence of an attack, at kthTest statistics q at sub-GPS measurement update i，k Is a chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom kn. Threshold for a given false positive requirement
Is determined by the inverse chi-squared cumulative distribution function. If it is not
A false alarm will be detected indicating that the currently accepted ith satellite data is erroneous data being injected.
By examining the collected satellite data, we can know which of the currently acquired GPS data are spoofed and non-spoofed injected data. Next, we select non-spoof injected data and calculate using least squares
δ d is saved for iterative calculations.
And S6, the receiver utilizes the real satellite information and the measurement information of the inertial sensor to realize positioning recovery. The IMU data and the real satellite data are integrated by using a Kalman filter to realize the function of positioning recovery. In the data fusion stage, the IMU and GPS raw data are processed in a unified Kalman filter, wherein the coupling between the IMU process model and the GPS measurement model can be realized by firstly carrying out state vector delta r k And (3) obtaining by association, wherein the process is as follows:
(1) Determining a state vector:
(2) Calculating a priori estimated values of the state vectors according to a Kalman state equation:
(3) Calculating a prior estimation covariance matrix at the k-th moment:
(4) And optimizing by an estimator to obtain a Kalman gain matrix at the k moment:
(5) Calculating a posterior estimate of the state vector:
(6) Updating the covariance matrix:
based on initial position information r of the receiver 0 The location update of the receiver at the kth sample can be found as: r is k ＝r 0 +δr k . And then repeating the steps 2 to 6 until the system finishes running.
Test comparative example
In order to verify the practical beneficial effect of the method, the steps of the scheme and the method without spoofing detection are respectively operated under different parameter environments, specifically as shown in fig. 2-5, fig. 2 is a comparison graph of the positioning error changing with time when the attacker injects a fixed pseudorange bias error λ =200m, and the proposed spoofing detection and positioning recovery method and the method without spoofing are respectively operated; fig. 3 is a comparison graph of the positioning error over time when the proposed spoofing detection and positioning recovery method and the non-spoofing detection method are respectively operated when the increased pseudorange bias error Δ λ =1m is injected by an attacker; as can be seen from fig. 2 to fig. 3, the positioning error of the GPS single-point positioning proposed by the present invention is controlled within 20m, and the maximum error does not exceed 2m from the final position information after the fusion with the IMU, which can reflect the position information of the actual trajectory.
FIG. 4 is a comparison of a point location error over time after the proposed spoofing detection and location recovery method is run when an attacker injects different incremental pseudorange bias errors; FIG. 5 is a comparison graph of fused position error over time after the proposed spoof detection and position recovery method is run when an attacker injects different incremental pseudorange bias errors; as can be seen from fig. 4 and 5, the larger the attacker increment Δ λ is set, the faster the pseudorange error changes, and the threshold set by the cumulative test statistic is reached first, so the injected spoofed data becomes discovered earlier, and as time increases, the distance error between the GPS-solved position and the real track remains within 30m, and does not increase as time increases, and the fused position error remains within 1.8 m. The result shows that the method provided by the invention can easily detect the GPS deception behavior, and can control the positioning error to be in a meter level under the condition of the GPS deception environment.
It should be noted that the above-mentioned contents only illustrate the technical idea of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby, and it is obvious to those skilled in the art that several modifications and decorations can be made without departing from the principle of the present invention, and these modifications and decorations fall within the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. The global positioning system deception detection and location recovery method based on the pseudo-range residual error is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
s1: initializing system parameters, determining initial position information of a receiver and a clock error of the receiver, and acquiring latest navigation ephemeris information;
s2: using the measurement information of the inertial sensor to perform prior estimation on the position of the current receiver;
s3: obtaining measurement information of a global positioning system, and calibrating satellite pseudo-range information;
s4: acquiring an estimated value of a satellite pseudo range through the navigation ephemeris information acquired in the step S1 and the estimated position of the receiver acquired in the step S2;
s5: judging whether the satellite data currently received is deceptive data or not by utilizing the satellite pseudo-range measured value obtained in the step S3 and the residual error of the estimated value obtained in the step S4; if the accumulated test statistic data is larger than a preset threshold value, the current data is deceptive data; otherwise, the data is real data;
s6: the receiver utilizes the real satellite information and the measurement information of the inertial sensor to realize the positioning recovery.
2. The pseudorange residual based global positioning system spoofing detecting and position recovering method according to claim 1, wherein the initialized system parameters in step S1 at least include a state matrix Φ of the system, an input matrix Γ, a variance Q of system noise, a variance R of measurement noise, a window size of accumulated measurement statistics
Detection threshold
Determining initial position information r of a receiver 0 And the clock error d of the receiver 0 And acquiring the latest navigation ephemeris information eda.
3. The pseudorange residual based global positioning system spoofing detection and location recovery method of claim 2, wherein: in step S2, the current receiver position is estimated a priori
The calculation method comprises the following steps:
wherein x is k ＝[δr k ，δv k ，δe k ] T Representing the variation of the system relative to the initial time at the k-th sampling; r is a radical of hydrogen k Indicating location information of the receiver; v is a cell k Representing speed information of the receiver; e.g. of the type k Representing attitude information of the receiver; u. of k ＝[δf k ，δω k ] T Represents the input of the system at the time of sampling of the (k-1) th time; f. of k Representing the specific force of the inertial system; omega k Representing the angular velocity of the inertial system; phi represents an initialization state matrix of the system; Γ denotes the initial input matrix of the system.
4. A pseudorange residual based global positioning system spoofing detection and position recovery method as recited in claim 3, wherein: after the satellite pseudo range information is calibrated in the step S3, the measured value rho of the pseudo range in the global positioning system i Comprises the following steps:
ρ i ＝|r k ，r i，k |+d+α+v g
wherein i =1,2.. Denotes the received satellite number, k denotes the k-th sample of the receiver; r is k Is the position of the receiver in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system coordinate at the kth sampling; r is i，k Is the component of the ith satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system coordinates at the kth sampling; d = c δ t s，clk Is the deviation of the receiver clock; c is the speed of light; α is a constant;
the above equation is linearized and solved iteratively using the Newton-Raphson method to yield
δρ i，k ＝ρ i，k -ρ 0，k
＝f i ·δr k +δd+ε i，k ，
Wherein r is 0 ＝(x 0 ，y 0 ，z 0 ) And d 0 Is an initial value of receiver position and receiver clock bias; rho i，k Is the corrected pseudorange measurement for satellite i at the kth sample; ρ is a unit of a gradient 0，k Is based on the initial x 0 And d 0 The corresponding approximation at the kth sample of (a); δ d = d k -d 0 Is a constant number epsilon i，k Is a high order residual;
more than 4 GPS satellite data can be obtained at each sampling of the receiver, and the data can be obtained by combining a plurality of equations
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
determined by the sampled satellite data, G * Is composed of a group f i Forming a matrix, wherein epsilon is a measurement error vector, and delta r is obtained by solving by using a Least Square Method (LSM) k And δ d.
5. The pseudorange residual based global positioning system spoofing detection and location recovery method of claim 4, wherein: the estimated value of the satellite pseudo range in the step S4
Wherein, the first and the second end of the pipe are connected with each other,
is an a priori estimate of the receiver position at k samples.
6. The pseudorange residual based global positioning system spoofing detection and location recovery method of claim 5, wherein: in step S5, the ith satellite accumulates test statistics q at k sampling times i，k Is defined as the pseudorange error gamma i，k Sum of squares over time
Wherein the error variable gamma of the ith satellite i，k Is defined as
Since in the GPS spoofing environment, an attacker spoofs the receiver by modifying the pseudo-range values in the GPS measurement data, the GPS pseudo-range values in the receiver become
Wherein
The method can be regarded as a constant, wherein lambda represents deviation data injected by a malicious attacker, when the value of lambda is 0, a non-spoofing signal is represented, and when the value of lambda is not 0, a spoofing signal is represented; test statistics q at kth GPS measurement update without attack i，k The chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom kn is met; threshold for a given false positive requirement
Is determined by an inverse chi-squared cumulative distribution function;
if it is not
It indicates that the currently accepted ith satellite data is injected with error data and is spoofed data.
7. The pseudorange residual based global positioning system spoofing detection and location recovery method of claim 6, wherein: in step S6, a kalman filter is used to integrate the inertial sensor data and the real satellite data, and in the data fusion stage, the raw data of the inertial sensor and the gps are processed in a unified kalman filter, wherein the coupling between the inertial sensor process model and the gps measurement model can be obtained by first associating the state vector δ rk, and the process is as follows:
1) Determining a state vector:
2) Calculating a priori estimated values of the state vectors according to a Kalman state equation:
3) Calculating a prior estimation covariance matrix at the k-th moment:
4) And optimizing by an estimator to obtain a Kalman gain matrix at the k moment:
5) Calculating the posterior estimated value of the state vector:
6) Updating the covariance matrix:
based on initial position information r of the receiver 0 The location update of the receiver at the kth sample can be found as: r is k ＝r 0 +δr k And then repeating the steps 2 to 6 until the system finishes running.
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116299576A (en) * | 2023-05-12 | 2023-06-23 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Deception jamming detection method and device for integrated navigation system |
| CN116774252A (en) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-09-19 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Navigation deception jamming detection method based on single receiver pseudo-range variation |
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Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116299576A (en) * | 2023-05-12 | 2023-06-23 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Deception jamming detection method and device for integrated navigation system |
| CN116299576B (en) * | 2023-05-12 | 2023-12-12 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Deception jamming detection method and device for integrated navigation system |
| CN116774252A (en) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-09-19 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Navigation deception jamming detection method based on single receiver pseudo-range variation |
| CN116774252B (en) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-10-27 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Navigation deception jamming detection method based on single receiver pseudo-range variation |
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