CN110988926A - Method for realizing position accurate fixed point deception migration in loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode - Google Patents

Method for realizing position accurate fixed point deception migration in loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode Download PDF

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CN110988926A
CN110988926A CN201911327446.4A CN201911327446A CN110988926A CN 110988926 A CN110988926 A CN 110988926A CN 201911327446 A CN201911327446 A CN 201911327446A CN 110988926 A CN110988926 A CN 110988926A
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李勇
黄燕
黄凯
方立
王洪平
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Fujian Strait Beidou Navigation Technology Research Institute Co ltd
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/42—Determining position
    • G01S19/48—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system
    • G01S19/49—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system whereby the further system is an inertial position system, e.g. loosely-coupled

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Abstract

The invention provides a precise fixed point deception method under a GNSS/INS integrated navigation mode, which is characterized in that according to the data fusion process of a loose GNSS/INS integrated navigation filter, the functional corresponding relation between each element in a steady-state gain matrix and the GNSS/INS integrated navigation estimation output result and false satellite signals is obtained, and the physical meaning of each element in the steady-state gain matrix is determined; finding out main observed quantities influencing the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position filtering estimation result by comparing and substituting the magnitude relation of each element of the filtering steady-state gain matrix into different inertial navigation precision parameters, and deducing a total offset analytical expression of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position estimation by taking each element of the steady-state gain matrix as a coefficient and taking the position offset applied to satellite signals at each past moment as a variable; and finally, determining controllability and stability of the influence degree of the deceptive jamming on the estimation output result of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position according to the analytical expression, and designing a false satellite signal to enable the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position to generate accurate fixed-point deviation.

Description

Method for realizing position accurate fixed point deception migration in loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of navigation, in particular to a method for realizing accurate position fixed point deception migration in a loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode.
Background
The current deception method is mainly developed for a pure satellite navigation terminal, and the deception method in a combined navigation mode is not considered sufficiently. In order to ensure the Navigation accuracy and usability of military/civil equipment systems, a plurality of Navigation systems are generally used in cooperation, for example, a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) combined Navigation mode is a common combined mode. The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is free from external interference and has low dynamic noise, but has a disadvantage that errors are accumulated over time, while satellite navigation can output a stable navigation positioning result, but is easily subjected to external interference and has high dynamic noise due to reception of radio signals, and an optimized navigation mode with a stable navigation positioning result and low dynamic noise can be formed by combining the two.
Aiming at spoofing of a GNSS/INS combined navigation system, although access point still implements access spoofing on satellite navigation signals, in order to achieve the attack goal of achieving accurate position and fixed point offset under a loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode, the needed false satellite signals need to be designed and constructed. Therefore, the method combines theoretical analysis and simulation verification to analyze the controllability and stability of the influence degree of the deceptive jamming on the estimation output result of the GNSS/INS combined navigation position, and researches and designs a false satellite signal to enable the GNSS/INS combined navigation position to generate accurate fixed point offset.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method for realizing position accurate fixed point deception migration in a loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode, which can effectively solve the problems by using each element of a filtering steady-state gain matrix as a break-through and utilizing a false satellite signal to realize the position accurate fixed point deception migration.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a method for realizing position accurate fixed point deception migration in a loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode is characterized in that common characteristics of influences of false satellite signals on GNSS/INS combined navigation output results under different inertial navigation accuracies are searched based on each element of a filtering steady-state gain matrix, a total offset analysis expression of GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation is deduced, wherein each element of the steady-state gain matrix is used as a coefficient, and position migration applied to the satellite signals at each past moment is used as a variable, and the false satellite signals are designed according to the total offset analysis expression to realize accurate fixed point migration of the GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation. The method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) constructing a state space model of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation system by adopting a loose combination mode, and researching the solving process of a steady-state gain matrix in a data fusion filter;
(2) according to the function corresponding relation between each element in the steady-state gain matrix and the GNSS/INS combined navigation estimation output result and the false satellite signal, determining the physical significance of each element in the steady-state gain matrix;
(3) finding out main observed quantities influencing the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position filtering estimation result by comparing the magnitude relation of each element of the filtering steady-state gain matrix after substituting different inertial navigation precision parameters;
(4) supposing that deceptive interference is applied to the target satellite receiver at the moment k, researching and deducing a k-moment GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation output analytical expression by taking a steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and taking a position offset applied to a satellite signal at the moment k as a variable in a feedback correction mode;
(5) further researching and deducing a total offset analytical expression of the k + n time GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation, which takes the steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and takes the position offset applied to the satellite signal from the k time to the k + n time as a variable;
(6) and analyzing the maneuverability and stability of the influence degree of the deceptive jamming on the estimation output result of the loose GNSS/INS combined navigation position, and researching and designing a false satellite signal to enable the estimation result of the GNSS/INS combined navigation position to generate accurate fixed point offset.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a diagram of spatial correspondence among elements of a steady-state gain matrix, state vectors, and observation vectors.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some, but not all, embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The invention researches the feasibility of implementing the deception attack in the loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode by taking each element of the steady-state gain matrix as a breakthrough, namely, verifies the feasibility analysis method for realizing the accurate fixed-point offset of the position by using the false satellite signal. Referring to fig. 1, the specific steps are as follows:
(1) and constructing a state space model of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation system by adopting a loose combination mode, and researching the solving process of a steady-state gain matrix in a data fusion filter.
Defining the state vector X of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation system as follows:
Figure BDA0002328710180000031
wherein L and lambda are respectively the carrierδ L and δ λ represent error information thereof; vNAnd VENorth and east information, respectively, of the carrier, delta VNAnd δ VERepresenting error information thereof; phi, theta and
Figure BDA0002328710180000041
respectively are the roll angle, pitch angle and course angle errors of the carrier.
When the satellite navigation system provides position and velocity information, an observation vector Z is defined as:
Z＝[LINS-LGNSSλINS-λGNSSVN,INS-VN,GNSSVE,INS-VE,GNSS]T
＝[δL δλ δVNδVE]T
wherein L isINS、λINS、VN,INSAnd VE,INSRespectively calculating the latitude, longitude, north speed and east speed of the carrier for the inertial navigation system; l isGNSS、λGNSS、VN,GNSSAnd VE,GNSSThe carrier latitude, longitude, north direction speed and east direction speed are provided for the GNSS system respectively.
The sum of the state equations of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation system is as follows:
Figure BDA0002328710180000042
f and G are respectively a system state matrix and an input matrix, and the value of each parameter can refer to a position error equation, a speed error equation and an attitude angle error equation of the inertial navigation system; w ═ δ ωgxδωgyδωgzδfxδfy]TFor the system noise matrix, δ ωgx、δωgyAnd δ ωgzIs the noise of the three-axis gyro of the inertial navigation system, δ fxAnd δ fyForward and right accelerometer noise, respectively;
Figure BDA0002328710180000043
to observe noise, nL、nλ、
Figure BDA0002328710180000044
And
Figure BDA0002328710180000045
position and velocity error noise for GNSS systems; h is a measurement matrix, and
Figure BDA0002328710180000046
discretizing equation (1) and estimating the state vector X using classical Kalman filtering, i.e.
And (3) state one-step prediction:
Figure BDA0002328710180000047
and (3) state estimation:
Figure BDA0002328710180000048
a filter gain matrix:
Figure BDA0002328710180000051
one-step prediction of mean square error matrix:
Figure BDA0002328710180000052
estimating a mean square error matrix:
Figure BDA0002328710180000053
(2) and according to the spatial correspondence between each element in the steady-state gain matrix and the GNSS/INS combined navigation estimation output result and the false satellite signal, as shown in figure 1. According to the characteristics of the Kalman filter, the filter gain matrix KkThere exists a steady state value K∞(7 × 4 matrix) whose physical meaning of the individual elements is as follows:
Figure BDA0002328710180000054
(3) and finding out the main observed quantity influencing the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position filtering estimation result by comparing the magnitude relation of each element of the filtering steady-state gain matrix after substituting different inertial navigation precision parameters.
Substituting the parameters of the inertia devices with different precisions as follows:
1. navigation level: gyro zero-bias stability 0.01 deg/h, surface zero-bias stability 5X 10-5g；
2. Tactical level: gyro zero-bias stability 1 degree/h, plus table zero-bias stability 5X 10-4g；
3. Consumption level: gyro zero-bias stability 20 deg/h, and surface zero-bias stability 5X 10-3g；
Meanwhile, under the assistance of a satellite augmentation system, the positioning accuracy of the GNSS is better than 3m, and the speed measurement accuracy is better than 10 m/s.
Calculating and comparing a steady-state gain matrix K by using the set simulation environment parameters∝It can be seen that when there are position offsets (latitude offset, longitude offset) and velocity offsets (north velocity offset, east velocity offset) in the implanted false satellite signals, the main factors affecting the position estimation value of the GNSS/INS combined navigation filter are:
Figure BDA0002328710180000061
the main factor affecting latitude estimates is latitude offset (K)∞(1,1)＞＞K∞(1,2)) and a north velocity offset (K)∞(1,3)＞＞K∞(1,4)), and the lower the INS system accuracy, the greater the impact strength;
Figure BDA0002328710180000062
the main factor affecting the longitude estimate is the longitude offset (K)∞(2,2)＞＞K∞(2,1)) and east-direction velocity offset (K)∞(2,4)＞＞K∞(2,3)), and the lower the INS system accuracy, the greater the impact strength.
(4) Supposing that deceptive interference is applied to the target satellite receiver at the moment k, researching and deducing a k-moment GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation output analytical expression by taking a steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and taking a position offset applied to a satellite signal at the moment k as a variable in a feedback correction mode;
assuming that when a spoofed interfering signal is applied to the target receiver at time k, the position and velocity output by the GNSS receiver are:
Figure BDA0002328710180000071
wherein,
Figure BDA0002328710180000072
and
Figure BDA0002328710180000073
respectively outputting position and speed information of the GNSS receiver after deception jamming; (L)G)k、(λG)k、(vN,G)kAnd (v)E,G)kRespectively the position and speed information output by the GNSS receiver under normal conditions; (δ L)G)k、(δλG)k、(δvN,G)kAnd (δ v)E,G)kRespectively applied offset position and velocity component information.
For the long-endurance and high-precision GNSS/INS combined navigation filter, a feedback correction mode is generally adopted, namely, after an inertial navigation system is corrected by using an INS error estimation value, the INS error estimation value is cleared, and a one-step prediction estimation value in the next filter calculation is zero. Thus, the latitude error estimate of the GNSS/INS combined navigation output is now in the event of deceptive jamming
Figure BDA0002328710180000074
And longitude error estimate
Figure BDA0002328710180000075
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002328710180000076
wherein,
Figure BDA0002328710180000077
and
Figure BDA0002328710180000078
respectively, correct latitude and longitude filtering estimated values under the condition of no deceptive interference; Δ LkAnd Δ λkRespectively, latitude and longitude offsets due to deceptive jamming, and
Figure BDA0002328710180000079
and (3) the latitude error and the longitude error output by the combined navigation filtering estimation are fed back to an inertial navigation resolving result, and the position result after k time correction can be obtained as follows:
Figure BDA0002328710180000081
wherein,
Figure BDA0002328710180000082
and
Figure BDA0002328710180000083
respectively, the position results after correct correction.
It can be known from equation (5) that deceptive jamming has an effect on the position output estimate of the GNSS/INS combined navigation filter, and the degree of this effect is related to the magnitude of the offset generated by the jamming. Meanwhile, as each element of the gain matrix under different navigation accuracies tends to be stable, the combined navigation output position offset constructed by taking the stable gain matrix element as a coefficient and taking the offset strength generated by interference as a variable parameter has maneuverability.
(5) Further researching and deducing a total offset analytical expression for constructing the GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation at the k + n moment by taking the steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and taking the position offset applied to the satellite signal from the k moment to the k + n moment as a variable;
assuming that the GNSS receiver is still subjected to deceptive interference at the time k +1, the GNSS observation at this time is:
Figure BDA0002328710180000084
by using the same method as shown in step (4), the position output result after feedback correction at the time k + n can be obtained by recursion:
Figure BDA0002328710180000085
wherein, Δ Lk→k+nAnd Δ λk→k+nThe total position offset caused after applying deceptive jamming from the time k to the time k + n, respectively, and
Figure BDA0002328710180000091
i.e., the total amount of positional offset is a linear combination of the amounts of positional offset applied at various times in the past.
For further analysis of Δ Lk→k+nAnd Δ λk→k+nThe stability of (2) is that if the interference position offset implanted at each moment is taken as a unit step function, the output position offset result of the combined navigation system with different navigation accuracies is as follows:
1. navigation level: the steady state value of the position deviation is 0.999;
2. tactical level: the steady state value of the position deviation is 0.999;
3. consumption level: the steady state value of the position deviation is 1.000.
From the above results, it can be seen that the GNSS position offset signal caused by the deceptive jamming is fused to the integrated navigation filter, and the generated position offset is stable.
(6) The maneuverability and stability of the influence degree of the deception jamming on the output result of the loose GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation prove that a deception attacker can enable the GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation to generate an expected stable offset value by adjusting the position deviation component caused by the deception jamming.
The specific analysis is as follows:
further analysis of equation (8) first yields:
Figure BDA0002328710180000092
similarly, can obtain
Figure BDA0002328710180000101
If the position offset is designed to be the same at each moment, that is
Figure BDA0002328710180000102
The above formulae are combined with formula (9) and formula (10) to obtain
Figure BDA0002328710180000103
According to the equation (12), when the attacker applies the same position offset signal at the attack start time, the GNSS/INS combined navigation filtering position estimation will exhibit the same position offset effect at last, that is, the accurate fixed point offset of the GNSS/INS combined navigation position is realized by using the designed false satellite signal.
The above examples are only intended to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention, but not to limit it; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments may still be modified, or some technical features may be equivalently replaced; and such modifications or substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the corresponding technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims (4)

1. A method for realizing position accurate fixed point deception migration under a loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode is characterized in that common characteristics of influences of false satellite signals on GNSS/INS combined navigation output results under different inertial navigation accuracies are searched based on each element of a filtering steady-state gain matrix, a total offset analysis expression of GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation is deduced, wherein each element of the steady-state gain matrix is used as a coefficient, and position migration applied to the satellite signals at each past moment is used as a variable, and the false satellite signals are designed according to the total offset analysis expression to realize accurate fixed point migration of the GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation.
2. The method of claim 1, for implementing position fix spoofing offset in a loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode, comprising the steps of:
(1) constructing a state space model of the GNSS/INS integrated navigation system by adopting a loose combination mode, and researching the solving process of a steady-state gain matrix in a data fusion filter;
(2) according to the function corresponding relation between each element in the steady-state gain matrix and the GNSS/INS combined navigation estimation output result and the false satellite signal, determining the physical significance of each element in the steady-state gain matrix;
(3) finding out main observed quantities influencing the GNSS/INS integrated navigation position filtering estimation result by comparing the magnitude relation of each element of the filtering steady-state gain matrix after substituting different inertial navigation precision parameters;
(4) supposing that deceptive interference is applied to the target satellite receiver at the moment k, researching and deducing a k-moment GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation output analytical expression by taking a steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and taking a position offset applied to a satellite signal at the moment k as a variable in a feedback correction mode;
(5) further researching and deducing a total offset analytical expression of the k + n time GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation, which takes the steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and takes the position offset applied to the satellite signal from the k time to the k + n time as a variable;
(6) and analyzing the maneuverability and stability of the influence degree of the deception jamming on the output result of the loose GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation, and proving that a deception attacker can enable the GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation to generate an expected stable offset value by adjusting the position deviation component caused by the deception jamming.
3. The method for implementing position fix spoofing offset in loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode as claimed in claim 2, wherein in the step (4): deducing a k-time GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation output analysis expression which takes the steady-state gain matrix element as a coefficient and takes the position offset applied to the satellite signal at the k time as a variable, wherein the k-time GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation output analysis expression comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002328710170000021
wherein,
Figure FDA0002328710170000022
and
Figure FDA0002328710170000023
respectively outputting results of the positions after feedback correction under the condition of deceptive interference;
Figure FDA0002328710170000024
and
Figure FDA0002328710170000025
outputting correct results for the positions after feedback correction under the condition of no deceptive interference; (L)I)kAnd (lambda)I)kRespectively calculating position information for the inertial navigation system;
Figure FDA0002328710170000026
and
Figure FDA0002328710170000027
position error estimated values output by the GNSS/INS combined navigation under the condition of deceptive jamming respectively;
Figure FDA0002328710170000028
and
Figure FDA0002328710170000029
respectively are position error estimated values output by GNSS/INS combined navigation under the condition of no deceptive interference; Δ LkAnd Δ λkRespectively, the amount of positional offset due to deceptive interference, i.e.
Figure FDA00023287101700000210
4. The method for implementing position fix spoofing offset in loose GNSS/INS combined navigation mode as claimed in claim 2, wherein in the step (5): and deducing a total offset analytical expression of the k + n time GNSS/INS combined navigation position estimation with the position offset applied to the satellite signals from the k time to the k + n time as a variable, wherein the total offset analytical expression comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002328710170000031
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CN112197767A (en) * 2020-10-10 2021-01-08 江西洪都航空工业集团有限责任公司 Filter design method for improving filtering error on line
CN113625324A (en) * 2021-07-30 2021-11-09 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Deception method for realizing precise fixed point offset of unmanned aerial vehicle in integrated navigation mode
CN113721280A (en) * 2021-07-30 2021-11-30 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Method for realizing directional driving under combined navigation condition
CN113721280B (en) * 2021-07-30 2023-08-15 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Method for realizing directional driving-away under combined navigation condition
CN115236702A (en) * 2022-07-07 2022-10-25 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Concealed directional deception method based on exponential type deception signal model
CN115236702B (en) * 2022-07-07 2024-04-19 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Hidden directional spoofing method based on exponential spoofing signal model

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