CN114512983B - Distributed power supply elasticity control method for network attack - Google Patents
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H02J3/00—Circuit arrangements for ac mains or ac distribution networks
- H02J3/001—Methods to deal with contingencies, e.g. abnormalities, faults or failures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H02J3/00—Circuit arrangements for ac mains or ac distribution networks
- H02J3/24—Arrangements for preventing or reducing oscillations of power in networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H02J3/00—Circuit arrangements for ac mains or ac distribution networks
- H02J3/38—Arrangements for parallely feeding a single network by two or more generators, converters or transformers
- H02J3/388—Islanding, i.e. disconnection of local power supply from the network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H02J3/00—Circuit arrangements for ac mains or ac distribution networks
- H02J3/38—Arrangements for parallely feeding a single network by two or more generators, converters or transformers
- H02J3/46—Controlling of the sharing of output between the generators, converters, or transformers
- H02J3/48—Controlling the sharing of the in-phase component
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H02J3/00—Circuit arrangements for ac mains or ac distribution networks
- H02J3/38—Arrangements for parallely feeding a single network by two or more generators, converters or transformers
- H02J3/46—Controlling of the sharing of output between the generators, converters, or transformers
- H02J3/50—Controlling the sharing of the out-of-phase component
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- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security
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Abstract
The invention discloses a distributed power supply elasticity control method for network attack, and belongs to the technical field of micro-grid operation control. The method firstly provides a control protocol for adjusting the quality of a micro-grid communication link; secondly, effectively discarding damaged information received from adjacent attacked distributed power supplies by using information obtained from neighbor nodes by each distributed power supply through a weighted average subsequence reduction algorithm; finally, distributed secondary control is carried out to realize the frequency and voltage recovery of the system, thereby achieving the purpose of isolating the attacked distributed power supply and further improving the safety operation elasticity of the micro-grid. The control method gives consideration to the normal communication scene and the network attack scene, has strong robustness, and has important significance for ensuring the safe and stable operation of the micro-grid.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of micro-grid operation control, and particularly relates to a distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attack.
Technical Field
With the increasing exhaustion of petroleum, coal and other non-renewable resources on the earth and the aggravation of environmental pollution, the research and application of the comprehensive energy system are widely focused by the students and governments worldwide, and more distributed power supplies are connected into a power grid. While a microgrid is a controllable power system capable of supplying its local loads through available distributed power sources. The distributed power source may be of the electric machine type, such as a synchronous generator, or of the inverter type, to facilitate integration of emerging resources such as fuel cells, battery energy storage systems, and solar energy.
Micro-grids make great use of information and communication technologies, but this in turn exposes them to cyber threats. Micro grid network security is critical. In a microgrid control system, both the control entity and the communication entity may be potential targets for network threats. The goal of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks is to sensor and control decision units, which in turn destroy the data transmitted over the communication link, affecting the microgrid data integrity. Denial of service (DoS) attacks threaten the availability of communication system services. FDI attack can jeopardize the stability of the voltage and the frequency of the micro-grid, and further cause cascading failure and power failure of a micro-grid user, the response speed of a control system of the distributed power supply is reduced, and the problems of synchronization of the distributed power supply and values except for actual voltage and frequency reference values, overload or violation of the thermal limit value of micro-grid equipment and the like are solved. Therefore, the distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attack are very important, and have a crucial role in ensuring the stability and economic operation of the micro-grid.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attack, thereby improving the safety of a power system and ensuring the stable operation of a power grid.
The invention can be realized by the following technical scheme:
A distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attack are characterized in that the control method comprises the following steps:
step 1, acquiring a micro-grid system model and parameters, wherein the steps include acquiring a communication topological structure diagram G of the micro-grid system and a Laplace matrix L corresponding to the communication topological structure diagram G, the number of distributed power supplies N, the number of the distributed power supplies under attack N NC and the like.
And 2, performing primary droop control on the micro-grid, wherein the primary droop control is realized through the following formula:
Wherein P i and Q i respectively represent the output active power and reactive power of the ith distributed power supply, ω ni and V ni respectively represent the rated values of the frequency and amplitude of the output alternating voltage, m Pi and n Qi respectively represent the sagging coefficients of P i and Q i, ω i and V o,magi are the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply.
Wherein the droop coefficient is calculated proportionally from the active and reactive ratings of the distributed power supply, determined according to the following equation:
Where P maxi,Qmaxi and P maxj,Qmaxj represent the active and reactive power ratings, respectively, of the ith and jth distributed power supplies.
Step 3: and carrying out distributed secondary control on the micro-grid.
Further, the distributed secondary control of the micro-grid comprises the following processes:
s1: each distributed power source exchanges information with a neighbor node;
s2: updating auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol;
s3: and carrying out secondary control on the frequency and voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply, and realizing the frequency and voltage recovery of the distributed power supply under normal conditions and network attacks.
Further, in the step S1, each distributed power source exchanges information with a neighboring node, that is, each distributed power source i sends its own angular frequency ω i and voltage amplitude v o,magi to the distributed power source j of the neighboring node, and simultaneously obtains a series of angular frequency ω j and voltage amplitude v o,magj from each neighboring node, and sorts the signals according to the magnitudes.
Further, updating the auxiliary angular frequency and the voltage amplitude control variable of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol in S2 includes the following steps:
The quality weight of the communication link between distributed power sources, i.e., weight a ij, is set as follows:
Where δ i and δ j are the power angles of distributed power supplies i and j, respectively. R 1 and R 2 describe relative power angle thresholds as indicators reflecting the health of the microgrid control system. When the power angles of the distributed power sources are relatively close, the micro-grid is in a healthy operating state in terms of frequency stability. Thus, this threshold is set to a relatively small value. As the power angle difference increases, the communication link quality is exponentially decreased until the power angle difference is greater than R 2, the communication link quality becomes zero, and the flow of information between the two distributed power sources is interrupted. Gamma is a design parameter, the smoothness and shape of the exponential function is adjusted, and a max represents the maximum value of the parametric communication link quality weights;
Comparing the magnitudes of lambda 2 and eta x 4n NC, wherein lambda 2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the communication topological structure diagram of the micro-grid, and eta is a parameter factor smaller than 1, can provide enough margin for algebraic connectivity to keep the algebraic connectivity above a network safety threshold.
If lambda 2＜η×4nNC, the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply are updated according to the following distributed control protocol:
vvi＝0
In the method, in the process of the invention, Is a control parameter, δ i is the power angle of the distributed power supply i, v 2 is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ 2.
If lambda 2≥η×4nNC, the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply are updated according to the following distributed control protocol:
where c ω and c v are the frequency control gain and the voltage control gain, respectively, and where the fixed gain of only one distributed power supply is non-zero, and g i≥0.Rωi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the ith distributed power supply. The generation mode of the neighbor set is as follows: comparing ω j and v o,magj of adjacent distributed power supplies to their own ω i and v o,magi, if there are n NC or more values greater than ω j, then n NC values greater than ω j are discarded. If there are less than n NC values greater than ω j, then these values are discarded. For values less than ω j, the same procedure is applied to discard ω j neighbor values. R vi describes updated neighbor sets in the distributed voltage control protocol of the ith distributed power supply, generated in a similar manner as R ωi.
Further, in the step S3, secondary control of the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply is performed by the following formula:
ωni＝∫(vwi)dt
Vni＝∫(vvi)dt
through the above process, the distributed secondary control can restore the operating frequency ω i and the terminal voltage amplitude v o,magi of the distributed power supply to the reference frequency ω ref and the reference voltage v ref.
The invention relates to an attack-resistant distributed cooperative control algorithm based on a hidden layer, which can solve the problem of secondary control of a micro-grid under network attack. Compared with the existing anti-attack distributed control method, the controller has stronger robustness, can reduce adverse effects of time-dependent FDI attacks on actuators, sensors and communication links of a control system, and has robustness on state-dependent FDI attacks. Furthermore, the algorithm works even if all distributed power and communications are corrupted.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is an island micro-grid block diagram of an IEEE 34 bus model;
FIG. 3 is a distributed power specification parameter;
FIG. 4 is a load specification parameter;
FIG. 5 is a distributed power communications network diagram;
FIG. 6 is a timing diagram of the distributed power supply frequency and active power ratio under the control of the present invention;
FIG. 7 is a timing diagram of the distributed supply voltage amplitude and reactive power ratio under the control of the present invention;
fig. 8 is a timing diagram of the distributed power supply power angle under the control of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The objects and effects of the present invention will become more apparent from the following detailed description of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The flow of the distributed power supply elastic control strategy with robustness to network attack applied to the micro-grid is shown in fig. 1, and specifically comprises the following steps:
And step 1), acquiring a micro-grid system model and parameters, wherein the steps comprise acquisition of a communication topological structure diagram G of the micro-grid system, a Laplacian matrix L corresponding to the communication topological structure diagram G, the number N of distributed power supplies, the number N NC of the distributed power supplies under attack and the like.
Step 2) performing primary droop control on the micro-grid according to the formula (1), and maintaining the power balance of the micro-grid:
Where P i and Q i represent the output active and reactive power of the ith distributed power supply, respectively, ω ni and V ni represent the ratings of the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltage, respectively, and m Pi and n Qi represent the droop coefficients of P i and Q i, respectively. Omega i and v o,magi are the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply.
Wherein the droop coefficient is calculated proportionally from the active and reactive ratings of the distributed power supply, determined according to equation (2):
Where P maxi,Qmaxi and P maxj,Qmaxj represent the active and reactive power ratings, respectively, of the ith and jth distributed power supplies.
Step 3): carrying out distributed secondary control on the micro-grid, and specifically comprising the following steps:
3-1) each distributed power source exchanges information with its neighbor node, and the specific implementation manner is that the distributed power source i transmits its own angular frequency omega i and voltage amplitude v o,magi to the distributed power source j of the neighbor node, and simultaneously obtains its angular frequency omega j and voltage amplitude v o,magj from the distributed power source j of the neighbor node, and sorts the angular frequencies omega j and voltage amplitudes v o,magj of a series of neighbor nodes according to the sizes.
3-2) Setting a communication link quality weight between distributed power supplies, i.e., weight a ij, according to equation (3):
Where δ i and δ j are the power angles of distributed power supplies i and j, respectively. R 1 and R 2 describe relative power angle thresholds as indicators reflecting the health of the microgrid control system. When the power angles of the distributed power sources are relatively close, the micro-grid is in a healthy operating state in terms of frequency stability. Thus, this threshold is set to a relatively small value. As the power angle difference increases, the communication link quality is exponentially decreased until the power angle difference is greater than R 2, the communication link quality becomes zero, and the flow of information between the two distributed power sources is interrupted. Gamma is a design parameter that adjusts the smoothing and shape of the exponential function.
3-3) Comparing the sizes of lambda 2 and eta x 4n NC, and executing different distributed control protocols according to the result.
Wherein lambda 2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the micro-grid communication topology, eta is a parameter factor smaller than 1, and can provide enough margin for algebraic connectivity to keep above the network security threshold.
Case 1: if lambda 2＜η×4nNC, the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage magnitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply are updated according to the distributed control protocol performed as follows (4) (5):
vvi＝0 (5)
In the formula (4), the amino acid sequence of the compound, Is a control parameter, δ i is the power angle of the distributed power supply i, v 2 is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ 2.
Case 2: if lambda 2≥η×4nNC, the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage magnitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply are updated according to the distributed control protocol performed as follows (7) (8):
where c ω and c v are the frequency control gain and the voltage control gain, respectively, and where the fixed gain of only one distributed power supply is non-zero, and g i≥0.Rωi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the ith distributed power supply. The generation mode of the neighbor set is as follows: comparing ω j and v o,magj of adjacent distributed power supplies to their own ω i and v o,magi, if there are n NC or more values greater than ω j, then n NC values greater than ω j are discarded. If there are less than n NC values greater than ω j, then these values are discarded. For values less than ω j, the same procedure is applied to discard ω j neighbor values. R vi describes updated neighbor sets in the distributed voltage control protocol of the ith distributed power supply, generated in a similar manner as R ωi.
3-4) Performing secondary control on the frequency and voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply by the following formulas (9) (10)
ωni＝∫(vwi)dt (9)
Vni＝∫(vvi)dt (10)
The effectiveness of the invention is proved by simulation experiments.
The simulation is tested by adopting an IEEE 34 bus model, and the island micro-grid structure is shown in fig. 2, and 6 distributed power supplies are integrated, which are marked as DER in the figure. Figures 3 and 4 provide specifications for the distributed power supply and the load, respectively. The microgrid was operated at a frequency of 60Hz with a nominal line-to-line voltage of 24.9kV. The distributed power supply is integrated on the feeder line through a Y-Y transformer, and the rated voltage is 480V/24.9kV and the rated power is 400kVA.
A communication network diagram of the distributed power supply is shown in fig. 5. Setting g 1＝1,ωref＝2π×60rad/s.vref is calculated using the following formula (11).
vref＝kp(vnom-vc,mag)+ki∫(vnom-vc,mag)dt (11)
Where the parameters k p and k i are set to 0.01 and 10, respectively, v nom is set to 1pu and the control gains c ω and c v are set to 40. The parameters in the foregoing formula (3) are as follows: r1 is set to pi/50, R2 is set to pi/2, gamma is set to 5, and a max is set to 4.
At the beginning of the simulation, the micro-grid is operated under one droop control. At t=0.6 s, the conventional secondary frequency and voltage control works, and the distributed secondary control of the present invention works at t=0.65 s. At t=0.6 s, an FDI attack is initiated on the distributed power supply DER6, affecting the voltage and frequency recovery of the microgrid, the microgrid frequency and the active power of the distributed power supply such as shown in fig. 6. The critical bus voltage amplitude and reactive power ratio are shown in fig. 7, respectively. After the application of the distributed secondary control of the present invention, the frequency of the distributed power supply is restored to 60Hz and the active power ratio is synchronized to a common value. Furthermore, the active power of the distributed power supply is distributed according to its active power rating. As shown in fig. 7, after the distributed secondary control of the present invention is applied, the critical bus voltage amplitude is restored to 1pu, and the reactive power ratio of the distributed power supply converges to the value before the FDI attack. Fig. 8 shows the power angle change of the distributed power supply, as shown, after taking action with the conventional distributed control, the power angles start to drift away from each other due to the false information shared with the neighbors, and after adopting the distributed secondary control of the present invention, the power angles return to normal.
According to the simulation example of the implementation, after the control method of the invention is adopted, damaged information distributed by the attacked distributed power supply is effectively discarded, frequency and voltage recovery of the system is realized, normal communication scenes and network attack scenes are considered, and further the running elasticity of the micro-grid is improved. The method provided by the invention has a good control effect.
Claims (2)
1. The distributed power supply elasticity control method for the network attack is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
Step 1, acquiring a micro-grid system model and parameters, wherein the steps include acquiring a communication topological structure diagram G of the micro-grid system and a Laplace matrix L corresponding to the communication topological structure diagram G, the number N of distributed power supplies and the number N NC of the distributed power supplies under attack;
And 2, performing primary droop control on the micro-grid, wherein the primary droop control is realized through the following formula:
Wherein P i and Q i represent the output active power and reactive power, ω ni and, respectively, of the ith distributed power supply
V ni represents the rated values of the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltage, respectively, m Pi and n Qi represent the values of P i and Q i, respectively
The vertical coefficients, ω i and v o,magi are the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply;
Wherein the droop factor is calculated proportionally from the active and reactive ratings of the distributed power supply, according to
And (3) determining the formula:
Where P maxi,Qmaxi and P maxj,Qmaxj represent the active and reactive power ratings, respectively, of the ith and jth distributed power sources;
Step 3: carrying out distributed secondary control on the micro-grid;
Further, the distributed secondary control of the micro-grid comprises the following processes:
s1: each distributed power source exchanges information with a neighbor node;
s2: updating auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol;
S3: performing secondary control on the frequency and voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply, and recovering the frequency and voltage of the distributed power supply under normal conditions and network attacks;
Updating the auxiliary angular frequency and the voltage amplitude control variable of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol in the step S2 comprises the following steps:
The quality weight of the communication link between distributed power sources, i.e., weight a ij, is set as follows:
Wherein, delta i and delta j are the power angles of distributed power supplies i and j respectively; r 1 and R 2 describe relative power angle thresholds as indicators reflecting the health of the microgrid control system; as the power angle difference increases, exponentially decreasing the communication link quality until the power angle difference is greater than R 2, the communication link quality becomes zero, and the flow of information between the two distributed power sources is interrupted; gamma is a design parameter, the smoothness and shape of the exponential function is adjusted, and a max represents the maximum value of the parametric communication link quality weights;
Comparing the sizes of lambda 2 and eta x 4n NC, wherein lambda 2 is the second largest characteristic value of the communication topological structure diagram of the micro-grid, eta is a parameter factor smaller than 1, and sufficient margin is provided for algebraic connectivity to keep the algebraic connectivity above a network safety threshold;
If lambda 2<η×4nNC, the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply are updated according to the following distributed control protocol:
vvi＝0
where c λ2 is a control parameter, delta i is the power angle of the distributed power source i, v 2 is a eigenvector corresponding to an eigenvalue lambda 2;
if lambda 2≥η×4nNC, the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply are updated according to the following distributed control protocol:
Where c ω and c v are the frequency control gain and the voltage control gain, respectively, and where the fixed gain of only one distributed power supply is non-zero, and g i≥0;Rωi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the ith distributed power supply; the generation mode of the neighbor set is as follows: comparing ω j and v o,magj of adjacent distributed power supplies to their own ω i and v o,magi, if there are n NC or more values greater than ω j, then n NC values greater than ω j are discarded; if there are less than n NC values greater than ω j, then these values are discarded; for values less than ω j, the same procedure is applied to discard ω j neighbor values; r vi describes updated neighbor sets in the distributed voltage control protocol of the ith distributed power supply, in a similar manner to R ωi;
further, in the step S3, secondary control of the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply is performed by the following formula:
ωni＝∫(vwi)dt
Vni＝∫(vvi)dt
through the above process, the distributed secondary control can restore the operating frequency ω i and the terminal voltage amplitude v o,magi of the distributed power supply to the reference frequency ω ref and the reference voltage v ref.
2. The distributed power supply elasticity control method for network attack according to claim 1, wherein: each distributed power source exchanges information with the neighbor node, specifically: each distributed power source i transmits its own angular frequency ω i and voltage amplitude v o,magi to the distributed power source j of the neighboring node, and simultaneously acquires a series of angular frequency ω j and voltage amplitude v o,magj from the respective neighboring node, and orders them according to their magnitudes.
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| 含多种分布式电源的微电网分层控制策略;黎金英;艾欣;;宁夏电力;20160628(第03期);全文 * |
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