CN114512983A - Distributed power supply elastic control method for network attack - Google Patents

Distributed power supply elastic control method for network attack Download PDF

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CN114512983A
CN114512983A CN202210199061.XA CN202210199061A CN114512983A CN 114512983 A CN114512983 A CN 114512983A CN 202210199061 A CN202210199061 A CN 202210199061A CN 114512983 A CN114512983 A CN 114512983A
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distributed power
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microgrid
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CN114512983B (en
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徐铿
毛冬
张辰
饶涵宇
戚伟强
王越
颜钢锋
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Zhejiang University ZJU
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
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Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H02GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02JCIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
    • H02J3/00Circuit arrangements for AC mains or AC distribution networks
    • H02J3/001Methods to deal with contingencies, e.g. abnormalities, faults or failures
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H02GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02JCIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
    • H02J3/00Circuit arrangements for AC mains or AC distribution networks
    • H02J3/24Arrangements for preventing or reducing oscillations of power in networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H02GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02JCIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
    • H02J3/00Circuit arrangements for AC mains or AC distribution networks
    • H02J3/38Arrangements for parallely feeding a single network by two or more generators, converters or transformers
    • H02J3/388Islanding, i.e. disconnection of local power supply from the network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H02GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02JCIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
    • H02J3/00Circuit arrangements for AC mains or AC distribution networks
    • H02J3/38Arrangements for parallely feeding a single network by two or more generators, converters or transformers
    • H02J3/46Controlling of the sharing of output between the generators, converters, or transformers
    • H02J3/48Controlling the sharing of the in-phase component
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H02GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02JCIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
    • H02J3/00Circuit arrangements for AC mains or AC distribution networks
    • H02J3/38Arrangements for parallely feeding a single network by two or more generators, converters or transformers
    • H02J3/46Controlling of the sharing of output between the generators, converters, or transformers
    • H02J3/50Controlling the sharing of the out-of-phase component
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04SSYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

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Abstract

本发明公开了一种网络攻击的分布式电源弹性控制方法,属于微电网运行控制技术领域。该方法首先提出了一种控制协议,用于调整微电网通信链路的质量;其次利用每个分布式电源从邻居节点获取的信息,通过加权平均子序列缩减算法来有效丢弃从相邻被攻击的分布式电源接收到的损坏信息;最后进行分布式二次控制来实现系统的频率和电压恢复,达到隔离受到攻击的分布式电源的目的,以此提高微电网的安全运行弹性的效果。该控制方法兼顾正常通信场景和网络攻击场景,有很强的鲁棒性,为保证微电网安全稳定运行有重要意义。

Figure 202210199061

The invention discloses a distributed power elastic control method for network attack, which belongs to the technical field of microgrid operation control. The method firstly proposes a control protocol to adjust the quality of the communication link of the microgrid; secondly, using the information obtained by each distributed power source from the neighbor nodes, the weighted average subsequence reduction algorithm is used to effectively discard the attacked neighbors. Finally, the distributed secondary control is performed to realize the frequency and voltage recovery of the system, so as to achieve the purpose of isolating the attacked distributed power supply, so as to improve the effect of the safe operation and elasticity of the microgrid. The control method takes into account both normal communication scenarios and network attack scenarios, and has strong robustness, which is of great significance to ensure the safe and stable operation of the microgrid.

Figure 202210199061

Description

一种网络攻击的分布式电源弹性控制方法A Distributed Power Elasticity Control Method for Network Attacks

技术领域technical field

本发明属于微电网运行控制技术领域,具体涉及一种对网络攻击具有鲁棒性的分布式电源弹性控制策略与方法。The invention belongs to the technical field of microgrid operation control, and in particular relates to a distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attacks.

技术背景technical background

随着地球上石油、煤炭等不可再生资源的日益衰竭,以及环境污染的加剧,综合能源系统的研究与应用受到了世界各国学者和政府的广泛关注,越来越多的分布式电源接入电网。而微电网是一种可控制的电力系统,能够通过可用的分布式电源供应其本地负载。其中分布式电源可以是电机类型,如同步发电机,也可以是逆变器的类型,以方便集成新兴资源,如燃料电池、电池储能系统和太阳能。With the increasing depletion of non-renewable resources such as oil and coal on the earth and the aggravation of environmental pollution, the research and application of integrated energy systems have received extensive attention from scholars and governments around the world, and more and more distributed power sources are connected to the power grid. . A microgrid is a controllable power system capable of supplying its local loads from available distributed power sources. Among them, distributed power sources can be motor types, such as synchronous generators, or inverter types, to facilitate the integration of emerging resources, such as fuel cells, battery energy storage systems, and solar energy.

微电网极大地利用了信息和通信技术,但是这反过来又使它们暴露在网络威胁之下。微电网网络安全是至关重要的。在微电网控制系统中,控制实体和通信实体都可能成为网络威胁的潜在目标。虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击的目标是传感器和控制决策单元,进而破坏通过通信链路传输的数据,影响微电网数据完整性。拒绝服务(DoS)攻击威胁通信系统服务的可用性。FDI攻击会危害微电网电压和频率的稳定性,进而导致微电网用户级联故障和停电,分布式电源的控制系统响应速度变慢,使分布式电源与实际电压和频率参考值以外的值同步,过载或违反微电网设备热限值等问题。因此使用对网络攻击具有鲁棒性的分布式电源弹性控制策略与方法十分重要,对保证微电网的稳定与经济运行有着至关重要的作用。Microgrids make great use of information and communication technologies, but this in turn exposes them to cyber threats. Microgrid cybersecurity is critical. In a microgrid control system, both control entities and communication entities can be potential targets of cyber threats. False data injection (FDI) attacks target sensors and control decision-making units, thereby corrupting data transmitted over communication links and affecting microgrid data integrity. Denial of service (DoS) attacks threaten the availability of communications system services. FDI attacks can jeopardize the stability of microgrid voltage and frequency, leading to cascading failures and outages for microgrid users, slowing down the response of the DG control system, and synchronizing the DG with values other than the actual voltage and frequency reference values , overloading or violating microgrid equipment thermal limits. Therefore, it is very important to use distributed power elastic control strategies and methods that are robust to network attacks, and play a vital role in ensuring the stability and economic operation of microgrids.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明针对现有技术的不足,提出了一种对网络攻击具有鲁棒性的分布式电源弹性控制策略与方法,从而提高电力系统的安全性,保证电网的稳定运行。Aiming at the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention proposes a distributed power elastic control strategy and method that is robust to network attacks, thereby improving the security of the power system and ensuring the stable operation of the power grid.

本发明可以通过如下的技术方案实现:The present invention can be achieved through the following technical solutions:

一种对网络攻击具有鲁棒性的分布式电源弹性控制策略与方法,其特征在于,所述控制方法包括以下步骤:A distributed power elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attacks, characterized in that the control method comprises the following steps:

步骤1:获取微电网系统模型与参数,包括获取微电网系统的通信拓扑结构图G及其对应的拉普拉斯矩阵L,分布式电源个数N,遭受攻击的分布式电源个数nNC等。Step 1: Obtain the microgrid system model and parameters, including obtaining the communication topology diagram G of the microgrid system and its corresponding Laplace matrix L, the number of distributed power sources N, and the number of attacked distributed power sources n NC Wait.

步骤2:对微电网进行一次下垂控制,通过如下公式实现:Step 2: Perform a droop control on the microgrid, which is realized by the following formula:

Figure BDA0003528481490000021
Figure BDA0003528481490000021

式中,Pi和Qi分别表示第i个分布式电源的输出有功功率和无功功率,ωni和Vni分别表示输出交流电压的频率和幅值的额定值,mPi和nQi分别表示Pi和Qi下垂系数,ωi和vo,magi为分布式电源的输出电压的角频率和幅值。In the formula, Pi and Qi represent the output active power and reactive power of the i -th distributed power source , respectively, ω ni and V ni represent the rated value of the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltage, respectively, m Pi and n Qi respectively Indicates the droop coefficients of P i and Q i , ω i and v o,magi are the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply.

其中下垂系数是根据分布式电源的有功和无功额定值按比例计算的,按照下式确定:The droop factor is calculated proportionally according to the active and reactive power ratings of the distributed power supply, and is determined according to the following formula:

Figure BDA0003528481490000022
Figure BDA0003528481490000022

式中,Pmaxi,Qmaxi和Pmaxj,Qmaxj分别表示第i和第j个分布式电源的有功功率和无功功率额定值。In the formula, P maxi , Q maxi and P maxj , Q maxj represent the active power and reactive power ratings of the i-th and j-th distributed power sources, respectively.

步骤3:对微电网进行分布式二次控制。Step 3: Perform distributed secondary control on the microgrid.

进一步的,所述微电网的分布式二次控制,包括以下过程:Further, the distributed secondary control of the microgrid includes the following processes:

S1:每个分布式电源与邻居节点交换信息;S1: Each distributed power source exchanges information with its neighbor nodes;

S2:根据分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率和电压幅值控制变量;S2: Update the auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power source according to the distributed control protocol;

S3:进行分布式电源的频率和电压幅值二次控制,实现正常情况和网络攻击下分布式电源的频率和电压恢复。S3: Carry out the secondary control of the frequency and voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply, and realize the frequency and voltage recovery of the distributed power supply under normal conditions and network attacks.

进一步的,所述S1中每个分布式电源与邻居节点交换信息,指的是每个分布式电源i将自己的角频率ωi和电压幅值vo,magi发送给邻居节点的分布式电源j,同时从各个邻居节点获取一系列角频率ωj和电压幅值vo,magj,并根据大小进行排序。Further, in the S1, each distributed power source exchanges information with its neighbor nodes, which means that each distributed power source i sends its own angular frequency ω i and voltage amplitude v o, magi to the distributed power source of the neighbor node. j, simultaneously obtain a series of angular frequencies ω j and voltage amplitudes v o,magj from each neighbor node, and sort them according to size.

进一步的,所述S2中根据分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率和电压幅值控制变量包括以下过程:Further, updating the auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol in S2 includes the following processes:

设置分布式电源之间的通信链路质量权重,即权重aij,如下所示:Set the quality weight of the communication link between distributed power sources, that is, the weight a ij , as follows:

Figure BDA0003528481490000031
Figure BDA0003528481490000031

式中,δi和δj分别为分布式电源i和j的功率角。R1和R2描述了相对功率角阈值,作为反映微电网控制系统健康状况的指标。当分布式电源的功率角相对接近时,微电网在频率稳定性方面处于健康运行状态。因此,这个阈值设置为一个相对较小的值。随着功率角差值的增大,以指数形式降低通信链路质量,直到功率角差值大于R2,通信链路质量变为零,两个分布式电源之间的信息流动被中断。γ是一个设计参数,调整该指数函数的平滑和形状,amax表示参数通信链路质量权重的最大值;In the formula, δ i and δ j are the power angles of distributed power sources i and j, respectively. R 1 and R 2 describe the relative power angle threshold as an indicator reflecting the health of the microgrid control system. When the power angles of the distributed power sources are relatively close, the microgrid is in a healthy operating state in terms of frequency stability. Therefore, this threshold is set to a relatively small value. As the power angle difference increases, the communication link quality is degraded exponentially until the power angle difference is greater than R 2 , the communication link quality becomes zero, and the information flow between the two distributed power sources is interrupted. γ is a design parameter that adjusts the smoothness and shape of the exponential function, and a max represents the maximum value of the parameter communication link quality weight;

比较λ2和η×4nNC的大小,其中λ2为微电网通信拓扑结构图的第二大特征值,η是一个小于1的参数因子,可以为代数连通性提供足够的余量,使其保持在网络安全阈值以上。Compare the sizes of λ 2 and η × 4n NC , where λ 2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the microgrid communication topology graph, and η is a parameter factor less than 1, which can provide sufficient margin for algebraic connectivity to make it Stay above cybersecurity thresholds.

如果λ2<η×4nNC,根据如下分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率vωi和辅助电压幅值vvi控制变量:If λ 2 <η×4n NC , update the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply according to the following distributed control protocol:

Figure BDA0003528481490000032
Figure BDA0003528481490000032

vvi=0 vvi = 0

式中,

Figure BDA0003528481490000033
是一个控制参数,δi是分布式电源i的功率角,v2是对应于特征值λ2的特征向量。In the formula,
Figure BDA0003528481490000033
is a control parameter, δi is the power angle of the distributed power source i , and v2 is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ2 .

如果λ2≥η×4nNC,根据如下分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率vωi和辅助电压幅值vvi控制变量:If λ 2 ≥η×4n NC , update the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power generation according to the following distributed control protocol:

Figure BDA0003528481490000034
Figure BDA0003528481490000034

Figure BDA0003528481490000035
Figure BDA0003528481490000035

式中,cω和cv分别为频率控制增益和电压控制增益,并且其中只有一个分布式电源的固定增益是不为零的,且gi≥0。Rωi描述了第i个分布式电源的分布式频率控制协议中更新的邻集。该邻集的产生方式为:将相邻分布式电源的ωj和vo,magj与自己的ωi和vo,magi进行比较,如果有nNC个或以上大于ωj的值,则nNC个大于ωj的值被丢弃。如果有少于nNC个大于ωj的值,则这些值都被丢弃。对于小于ωj的值,应用同样的过程来丢弃ωj邻近值。Rvi描述了第i个分布式电源的分布式电压控制协议中更新的邻集,产生方式和类似Rωi类似。In the formula, c ω and c v are the frequency control gain and the voltage control gain respectively, and there is only one fixed gain of the distributed power source that is not zero, and g i ≥ 0. R ωi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the ith distributed power source. The adjacency set is generated by comparing ω j and v o,magj of adjacent distributed power sources with its own ω i and v o,magi , if there are n NC or more values greater than ω j , then n NC values greater than ω j are discarded. If there are less than n NC values greater than ω j , these values are discarded. For values smaller than ω j , the same procedure is applied to discard the neighboring values of ω j . Rvi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed voltage control protocol of the i-th distributed power source, and is generated in a similar way to R ωi .

进一步的,所述S3中进行分布式电源的频率和电压幅值二次控制,通过下式实现:Further, the frequency and voltage amplitude secondary control of the distributed power supply is performed in the S3, which is realized by the following formula:

ωni=∫(vwi)dtω ni =∫(v wi )dt

Vni=∫(vvi)dtV ni =∫(v vi )dt

通过以上过程,该分布式二次控制可以将分布式电源的工作频率ωi和端子电压幅值vo,magi恢复为参考频率ωref和参考电压vrefThrough the above process, the distributed secondary control can restore the operating frequency ω i and the terminal voltage amplitude vo ,magi of the distributed power source to the reference frequency ω ref and the reference voltage v ref .

该发明是一种基于隐层的抗攻击分布式协同控制算法,可以解决微电网在网络攻击下的二次控制问题。与现有的抗攻击分布式控制方法相比,所提出的控制器具有更强的鲁棒性,可以减轻时间相关的FDI攻击对控制系统的执行器、传感器和通信链路的不利影响,并且对状态相关的FDI攻击具有鲁棒性。此外,即使所有分布式电源和通信都受到破坏,该算法也适用。The invention is an anti-attack distributed collaborative control algorithm based on a hidden layer, which can solve the secondary control problem of a microgrid under network attacks. Compared with existing attack-resistant distributed control methods, the proposed controller is more robust and can mitigate the adverse effects of time-dependent FDI attacks on the actuators, sensors, and communication links of the control system, and Robust to state-dependent FDI attacks. Furthermore, the algorithm works even if all distributed power sources and communications are compromised.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1是本发明的流程图;Fig. 1 is the flow chart of the present invention;

图2是IEEE 34总线模型的孤岛微电网结构图;Fig. 2 is the island microgrid structure diagram of IEEE 34 bus model;

图3是分布式电源规格参数;Figure 3 shows the specifications and parameters of the distributed power supply;

图4是负载规格参数;Figure 4 is the load specification parameters;

图5是分布式电源通信网络图;Fig. 5 is a distributed power communication network diagram;

图6是本发明控制下的分布式电源频率和有功功率比的时刻图;Fig. 6 is the time chart of the frequency of the distributed power supply and the active power ratio under the control of the present invention;

图7是本发明控制下的分布式电源电压幅值和无功功率比的时刻图;Fig. 7 is the time chart of the voltage amplitude and reactive power ratio of the distributed power supply under the control of the present invention;

图8是本发明控制下的分布式电源功率角的时刻图。FIG. 8 is a timing chart of the power angle of the distributed power source under the control of the present invention.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

下面根据附图详细说明本发明,使本发明的目的和效果变得更加明显。Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings to make the objects and effects of the present invention more apparent.

一种对网络攻击具有鲁棒性的分布式电源弹性控制策略应用在微电网中的流程如图1所示,具体包括如下步骤:The process of applying a distributed power elastic control strategy robust to network attacks in a microgrid is shown in Figure 1, which includes the following steps:

步骤1):获取微电网系统模型与参数,包括获取微电网系统的通信拓扑结构图G及其对应的拉普拉斯矩阵L,分布式电源个数N,遭受攻击的分布式电源个数nNC等。Step 1): Obtain the microgrid system model and parameters, including obtaining the communication topology diagram G of the microgrid system and its corresponding Laplacian matrix L, the number of distributed power sources N, and the number of attacked distributed power sources n NC et al.

步骤2)按照式(1)对微电网进行一次下垂控制,维持微电网的功率平衡:Step 2) Perform primary droop control on the microgrid according to formula (1) to maintain the power balance of the microgrid:

Figure BDA0003528481490000051
Figure BDA0003528481490000051

式中,Pi和Qi分别表示第i个分布式电源的输出有功功率和无功功率,ωni和Vni分别表示输出交流电压的频率和幅值的额定值,mPi和nQi分别表示Pi和Qi下垂系数。ωi和vo,magi为分布式电源的输出电压的角频率和幅值。In the formula, Pi and Qi represent the output active power and reactive power of the i -th distributed power source , respectively, ω ni and V ni represent the rated value of the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltage, respectively, m Pi and n Qi respectively represents the Pi and Qi droop coefficients. ω i and v o,magi are the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply.

其中下垂系数是根据分布式电源的有功和无功额定值按比例计算的,按照式(2)确定:The droop coefficient is calculated proportionally according to the active and reactive power ratings of the distributed power supply, and is determined according to formula (2):

Figure BDA0003528481490000052
Figure BDA0003528481490000052

式中,Pmaxi,Qmaxi和Pmaxj,Qmaxj分别表示第i和第j个分布式电源的有功功率和无功功率额定值。In the formula, P maxi , Q maxi and P maxj , Q maxj represent the active power and reactive power ratings of the i-th and j-th distributed power sources, respectively.

步骤3):对微电网进行分布式二次控制,具体包括以下过程:Step 3): perform distributed secondary control on the microgrid, which specifically includes the following processes:

3-1)每个分布式电源与其邻居节点交换信息,具体实现方式是分布式电源i将自己的角频率ωi和电压幅值vo,magi发送给邻居节点的分布式电源j,同时从邻居节点分布式电源j处获取其角频率ωj和电压幅值vo,magj,并对一系列邻居节点的角频率ωj和电压幅值vo,magj根据大小进行排序。3-1) Each distributed power source exchanges information with its neighbor nodes. The specific implementation method is that the distributed power source i sends its own angular frequency ω i and voltage amplitude v o, magi to the distributed power source j of the neighbor node, and at the same time from the distributed power source j of the neighbor node. The angular frequency ω j and the voltage amplitude v o,magj of the neighbor node distributed power source j are obtained, and the angular frequency ω j and the voltage amplitude v o ,magj of a series of neighbor nodes are sorted according to the size.

3-2)按照式(3)设置分布式电源之间的通信链路质量权重,即权重aij3-2) According to formula (3), set the quality weight of the communication link between distributed power sources, that is, the weight a ij :

Figure BDA0003528481490000053
Figure BDA0003528481490000053

式中,δi和δj分别为分布式电源i和j的功率角。R1和R2描述了相对功率角阈值,作为反映微电网控制系统健康状况的指标。当分布式电源的功率角相对接近时,微电网在频率稳定性方面处于健康运行状态。因此,这个阈值设置为一个相对较小的值。随着功率角差值的增大,以指数形式降低通信链路质量,直到功率角差值大于R2,通信链路质量变为零,两个分布式电源之间的信息流动被中断。γ是一个设计参数,调整该指数函数的平滑和形状。In the formula, δ i and δ j are the power angles of distributed power sources i and j, respectively. R 1 and R 2 describe the relative power angle threshold as an indicator reflecting the health of the microgrid control system. When the power angles of the distributed power sources are relatively close, the microgrid is in a healthy operating state in terms of frequency stability. Therefore, this threshold is set to a relatively small value. As the power angle difference increases, the communication link quality is degraded exponentially until the power angle difference is greater than R 2 , the communication link quality becomes zero, and the information flow between the two distributed power sources is interrupted. γ is a design parameter that adjusts the smoothness and shape of this exponential function.

3-3)比较λ2和η×4nNC的大小,根据结果执行不同的分布式控制协议。3-3) Compare the sizes of λ 2 and η × 4n NC , and execute different distributed control protocols according to the results.

其中λ2为微电网通信拓扑结构图的第二大特征值,η是一个小于1的参数因子,可以为代数连通性提供足够的余量,使其保持在网络安全阈值以上。where λ2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the microgrid communication topology graph, and η is a parameter factor less than 1 that can provide enough margin for algebraic connectivity to keep it above the network security threshold.

情况1:如果λ2<η×4nNC,根据如下式(4)(5)执行分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率vωi和辅助电压幅值vvi控制变量:Case 1: If λ 2 <η×4n NC , execute the distributed control protocol according to the following equations (4) and (5) to update the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and the auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi of the distributed power supply:

Figure BDA0003528481490000061
Figure BDA0003528481490000061

vvi=0 (5) vvi = 0 (5)

式(4)中,

Figure BDA0003528481490000062
是一个控制参数,δi是分布式电源i的功率角,v2是对应于特征值λ2的特征向量。In formula (4),
Figure BDA0003528481490000062
is a control parameter, δi is the power angle of the distributed power source i , and v2 is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ2 .

情况2:如果λ2≥η×4nNC,根据如下式(7)(8)执行分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率vωi和辅助电压幅值vvi控制变量:Case 2: If λ 2 ≥η×4n NC , execute the distributed control protocol according to the following equations (7) (8) to update the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power generation:

Figure BDA0003528481490000063
Figure BDA0003528481490000063

Figure BDA0003528481490000064
Figure BDA0003528481490000064

式中,cω和cv分别为频率控制增益和电压控制增益,并且其中只有一个分布式电源的固定增益是不为零的,且gi≥0。Rωi描述了第i个分布式电源的分布式频率控制协议中更新的邻集。该邻集的产生方式为:将相邻分布式电源的ωj和vo,magj与自己的ωi和vo,magi进行比较,如果有nNC个或以上大于ωj的值,则nNC个大于ωj的值被丢弃。如果有少于nNC个大于ωj的值,则这些值都被丢弃。对于小于ωj的值,应用同样的过程来丢弃ωj邻近值。Rvi描述了第i个分布式电源的分布式电压控制协议中更新的邻集,产生方式和类似Rωi类似。In the formula, c ω and c v are the frequency control gain and the voltage control gain respectively, and there is only one fixed gain of the distributed power source that is not zero, and g i ≥ 0. R ωi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the ith distributed power source. The adjacency set is generated by comparing ω j and v o,magj of adjacent distributed power sources with its own ω i and v o,magi , if there are n NC or more values greater than ω j , then n NC values greater than ω j are discarded. If there are less than n NC values greater than ω j , these values are discarded. For values smaller than ω j , the same procedure is applied to discard the neighboring values of ω j . Rvi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed voltage control protocol of the i-th distributed power source, and is generated in a similar way to R ωi .

3-4)对分布式电源的频率和电压幅值进行二次控制,通过下式(9)(10)实现3-4) Secondary control of the frequency and voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply is realized by the following formulas (9) and (10)

ωni=∫(vwi)dt (9)ω ni =∫(v wi )dt (9)

Vni=∫(vvi)dt (10)V ni =∫(v vi )dt (10)

通过仿真实验来证明本发明的有效性。The effectiveness of the present invention is proved by simulation experiments.

仿真采用IEEE 34总线模型进行测试,孤岛微电网结构如图2所示,集成了6个分布式电源,图中标记为DER。图3和图4分别提供了分布式电源和负载的规格。微电网以60Hz的频率运行,标称线间电压为24.9kV。分布式电源通过Y-Y变压器集成到馈线上,额定电压为480V/24.9kV,额定功率为400kVA。The simulation is tested using the IEEE 34 bus model. The structure of the island microgrid is shown in Figure 2, which integrates 6 distributed power sources, which are marked as DER in the figure. Figures 3 and 4 provide the specifications for the distributed source and load, respectively. The microgrid operates at a frequency of 60Hz with a nominal line-to-line voltage of 24.9kV. The distributed power source is integrated into the feeder through a Y-Y transformer, with a rated voltage of 480V/24.9kV and a rated power of 400kVA.

分布式电源的通信网络图如图5所示。设置g1=1,ωref=2π×60rad/s。vref使用按照式(11)进行计算。The communication network diagram of distributed power supply is shown in Figure 5. Set g 1 =1, ω ref =2π×60rad/s. The use of vref is calculated according to Equation (11).

vref=kp(vnom-vc,mag)+ki∫(vnom-vc,mag)dt (11)v ref =k p (v nom -v c,mag )+k i ∫(v nom -v c,mag )dt (11)

式中,参数kp和ki分别设置为0.01和10,vnom设置为1pu,控制增益cω和cv设置为40。前面式(3)中参数如下:R1设置为π/50,R2设置为π/2,γ设置为5,amax设置为4。In the formula, the parameters k p and k i are set to 0.01 and 10, respectively, v nom is set to 1 pu, and the control gains c ω and cv are set to 40. The parameters in the previous formula (3) are as follows: R1 is set to π/50, R2 is set to π/2, γ is set to 5, and a max is set to 4.

仿真开始时,微电网运行在一次下垂控制下。在t=0.6s时,传统的二次频率和电压控制起作用,本发明的分布式二次控制在t=0.65s时起作用。在t=0.6s,对分布式电源DER6发起FDI攻击,影响微电网的电压和频率恢复,微电网频率和分布式电源的有功功率比如图6所示。临界母线电压幅值和无功功率比分别如图7所示。在应用本发明的分布式二次控制后,分布式电源的频率恢复到60Hz,和有功功率比同步到一个公共值。此外,分布式电源的有功功率根据其有功功率额定值进行分配。如图7所示,在应用本发明的分布式二次控制后,临界母线电压幅值恢复到1pu,分布式电源的无功功率比收敛到FDI攻击前的值。图8显示了分布式电源的功率角变化,如图所示,在传统的分布式控制采取行动后,由于存在与邻居共享的虚假信息,功率角开始彼此漂移,当采用本发明的分布式二次控制后,功率角恢复正常。At the start of the simulation, the microgrid operates under primary droop control. At t=0.6s, the traditional secondary frequency and voltage control works, and the distributed secondary control of the present invention works at t=0.65s. At t=0.6s, an FDI attack is launched on the distributed power source DER6, which affects the voltage and frequency recovery of the microgrid. The frequency of the microgrid and the active power of the distributed power source are shown in Figure 6. The critical bus voltage amplitude and reactive power ratio are shown in Figure 7, respectively. After applying the distributed secondary control of the present invention, the frequency of the distributed power source is restored to 60 Hz, and the active power ratio is synchronized to a common value. In addition, the active power of a DG is distributed according to its active power rating. As shown in FIG. 7 , after applying the distributed secondary control of the present invention, the critical bus voltage amplitude is restored to 1pu, and the reactive power ratio of the distributed power source converges to the value before the FDI attack. Figure 8 shows the power angle variation of the distributed power source, as shown in the figure, after the traditional distributed control takes action, the power angles start to drift from each other due to the presence of false information shared with neighbors, when the distributed two of the present invention is adopted. After the first control, the power angle returns to normal.

从本实施的仿真例子可以看出,采用本发明的控制方法后,有效地丢弃了被攻击的分布式电源分发的损坏信息,实现了系统的频率和电压恢复,兼顾正常通信场景和网络攻击场景,进而提高微电网的运行弹性。本发明提出的方法有很好的控制效果。It can be seen from the simulation example of this implementation that after the control method of the present invention is adopted, the damage information distributed by the attacked distributed power source is effectively discarded, the frequency and voltage recovery of the system is realized, and both the normal communication scene and the network attack scene are taken into consideration. , thereby improving the operational flexibility of the microgrid. The method proposed by the present invention has good control effect.

Claims (2)

1.一种网络攻击的分布式电源弹性控制方法,其特征在于,所述控制方法包括以下步骤:1. A distributed power elastic control method for network attack, characterized in that, the control method comprises the following steps: 步骤1:获取微电网系统模型与参数,包括获取微电网系统的通信拓扑结构图G及其对应的拉普拉斯矩阵L,分布式电源个数N,遭受攻击的分布式电源个数nNCStep 1: Obtain the microgrid system model and parameters, including obtaining the communication topology diagram G of the microgrid system and its corresponding Laplace matrix L, the number of distributed power sources N, and the number of attacked distributed power sources n NC ; 步骤2:对微电网进行一次下垂控制,通过如下公式实现:Step 2: Perform a droop control on the microgrid, which is realized by the following formula:
Figure FDA0003528481480000011
Figure FDA0003528481480000011
式中,Pi和Qi分别表示第i个分布式电源的输出有功功率和无功功率,ωni和Vni分别表示输出交流电压的频率和幅值的额定值,mPi和nQi分别表示Pi和Qi下垂系数,ωi和vo,magi为分布式电源的输出电压的角频率和幅值;In the formula, Pi and Qi represent the output active power and reactive power of the i -th distributed power source , respectively, ω ni and V ni represent the rated value of the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltage, respectively, m Pi and n Qi respectively represents the droop coefficients of P i and Q i , ω i and v o, magi are the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply; 其中下垂系数是根据分布式电源的有功和无功额定值按比例计算的,按照下式确定:The droop factor is calculated proportionally according to the active and reactive power ratings of the distributed power supply, and is determined according to the following formula:
Figure FDA0003528481480000012
Figure FDA0003528481480000012
式中,Pmaxi,Qmaxi和Pmaxj,Qmaxj分别表示第i和第j个分布式电源的有功功率和无功功率额定值;In the formula, P maxi , Q maxi and P maxj , Q maxj represent the active power and reactive power ratings of the i-th and j-th distributed power sources, respectively; 步骤3:对微电网进行分布式二次控制;Step 3: Perform distributed secondary control on the microgrid; 进一步的,所述微电网的分布式二次控制,包括以下过程:Further, the distributed secondary control of the microgrid includes the following processes: S1:每个分布式电源与邻居节点交换信息;S1: Each distributed power source exchanges information with its neighbor nodes; S2:根据分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率和电压幅值控制变量;S2: Update the auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power source according to the distributed control protocol; S3:进行分布式电源的频率和电压幅值二次控制,实现正常情况和网络攻击下分布式电源的频率和电压恢复;S3: Carry out the secondary control of the frequency and voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply, and realize the frequency and voltage recovery of the distributed power supply under normal conditions and network attacks; 所述S2中根据分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率和电压幅值控制变量包括以下过程:The step of updating the auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol in S2 includes the following processes: 设置分布式电源之间的通信链路质量权重,即权重aij,如下所示:Set the quality weight of the communication link between distributed power sources, that is, the weight a ij , as follows:
Figure FDA0003528481480000021
Figure FDA0003528481480000021
式中,δi和δj分别为分布式电源i和j的功率角;R1和R2描述了相对功率角阈值,作为反映微电网控制系统健康状况的指标;随着功率角差值的增大,以指数形式降低通信链路质量,直到功率角差值大于R2,通信链路质量变为零,两个分布式电源之间的信息流动被中断;γ是一个设计参数,调整该指数函数的平滑和形状,amax表示参数通信链路质量权重的最大值;In the formula, δ i and δ j are the power angles of the distributed power sources i and j, respectively; R 1 and R 2 describe the relative power angle thresholds, which are used as indicators to reflect the health status of the microgrid control system; as the power angle difference increases, Increase, reduce the quality of the communication link exponentially, until the power angle difference is greater than R 2 , the quality of the communication link becomes zero, and the information flow between the two distributed power sources is interrupted; γ is a design parameter, adjust the The smoothness and shape of the exponential function, a max represents the maximum value of the quality weight of the parameter communication link; 比较λ2和η×4nNC的大小,其中λ2为微电网通信拓扑结构图的第二大特征值,η是一个小于1的参数因子,为代数连通性提供足够的余量,使其保持在网络安全阈值以上;Compare the sizes of λ2 and η×4n NCs , where λ2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the microgrid communication topology graph, and η is a parameter factor less than 1 that provides enough margin for the algebraic connectivity to keep it above the cybersecurity threshold; 如果λ2<η×4nNC,根据如下分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率vωi和辅助电压幅值vvi控制变量:If λ 2 <η×4n NC , update the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power supply according to the following distributed control protocol:
Figure FDA0003528481480000022
Figure FDA0003528481480000022
vvi=0 vvi = 0 式中,
Figure FDA0003528481480000023
是一个控制参数,δi是分布式电源i的功率角,v2是对应于特征值λ2的特征向量;
In the formula,
Figure FDA0003528481480000023
is a control parameter, δ i is the power angle of the distributed power source i, and v 2 is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ 2 ;
如果λ2≥η×4nNC,根据如下分布式控制协议更新分布式电源的辅助角频率vωi和辅助电压幅值vvi控制变量:If λ 2 ≥η×4n NC , update the auxiliary angular frequency v ωi and auxiliary voltage amplitude v vi control variables of the distributed power generation according to the following distributed control protocol:
Figure FDA0003528481480000024
Figure FDA0003528481480000024
Figure FDA0003528481480000025
Figure FDA0003528481480000025
式中,cω和cv分别为频率控制增益和电压控制增益,并且其中只有一个分布式电源的固定增益是不为零的,且gi≥0;Rωi描述了第i个分布式电源的分布式频率控制协议中更新的邻集;该邻集的产生方式为:将相邻分布式电源的ωj和vo,magj与自己的ωi和vo,magi进行比较,如果有nNC个或以上大于ωj的值,则nNC个大于ωj的值被丢弃;如果有少于nNC个大于ωj的值,则这些值都被丢弃;对于小于ωj的值,应用同样的过程来丢弃ωj邻近值;Rvi描述了第i个分布式电源的分布式电压控制协议中更新的邻集,产生方式和类似Rωi类似;In the formula, c ω and c v are the frequency control gain and the voltage control gain respectively, and there is only one fixed gain of the distributed power source is not zero, and g i ≥ 0; R ωi describes the i-th distributed power source The updated adjacency set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the NC or more values greater than ω j , then n NC values greater than ω j are discarded; if there are less than n NC values greater than ω j , these values are discarded; for values less than ω j , apply The same process is used to discard the adjacent values of ω j ; R vi describes the updated neighbor set in the distributed voltage control protocol of the i-th distributed power source, and the generation method is similar to that of R ωi ; 进一步的,所述S3中进行分布式电源的频率和电压幅值二次控制,通过下式实现:Further, the frequency and voltage amplitude secondary control of the distributed power supply is performed in the S3, which is realized by the following formula: ωni=∫(vwi)dtω ni =∫(v wi )dt Vni=∫(vvi)dtV ni =∫(v vi )dt 通过以上过程,该分布式二次控制可以将分布式电源的工作频率ωi和端子电压幅值vo,magi恢复为参考频率ωref和参考电压vrefThrough the above process, the distributed secondary control can restore the operating frequency ω i and the terminal voltage amplitude vo ,magi of the distributed power source to the reference frequency ω ref and the reference voltage v ref .
2.根据权利要求1所述的一种网络攻击的分布式电源弹性控制方法,其特征在于:所述的所述每个分布式电源与邻居节点交换信息,具体为:每个分布式电源i将自己的角频率ωi和电压幅值vo,magi发送给邻居节点的分布式电源j,同时从各个邻居节点获取一系列角频率ωj和电压幅值vo,magj,并根据大小进行排序。2 . The method for elastic control of distributed power supply for network attacks according to claim 1 , wherein: each distributed power supply exchanges information with neighbor nodes, specifically: each distributed power supply i Send its own angular frequency ω i and voltage amplitude v o,magi to the distributed power supply j of neighbor nodes, and obtain a series of angular frequency ω j and voltage amplitude v o,magj from each neighbor node at the same time, and carry out according to the size. sort.
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