CN114512983A - Distributed power supply elastic control method for network attack - Google Patents
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
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- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
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- H02J3/00—Circuit arrangements for ac mains or ac distribution networks
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Abstract
The invention discloses a distributed power supply elastic control method for network attack, and belongs to the technical field of micro-grid operation control. The method firstly provides a control protocol for adjusting the quality of a microgrid communication link; secondly, by utilizing the information acquired by each distributed power supply from the neighbor nodes, the damage information received from the adjacent attacked distributed power supplies is effectively discarded through a weighted average subsequence reduction algorithm; and finally, carrying out distributed secondary control to realize frequency and voltage recovery of the system, and achieving the purpose of isolating the attacked distributed power supply, thereby improving the effect of safe operation elasticity of the micro-grid. The control method gives consideration to both a normal communication scene and a network attack scene, has strong robustness, and has important significance for ensuring the safe and stable operation of the micro-grid.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of micro-grid operation control, and particularly relates to a distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attacks.
Technical Field
With the increasing exhaustion of non-renewable resources such as petroleum, coal and the like on the earth and the aggravation of environmental pollution, the research and application of the comprehensive energy system are widely concerned by various national scholars and governments in the world, and more distributed power supplies are connected to a power grid. A microgrid is a controllable electrical system capable of supplying its local loads with available distributed power. The distributed power supply can be of a motor type, such as a synchronous generator, or an inverter type, so as to facilitate integration of emerging resources, such as fuel cells, battery energy storage systems, and solar energy.
Micro-grids make great use of information and communication technology, but this in turn exposes them to cyber threats. Microgrid network security is of paramount importance. In a microgrid control system, both control entities and communication entities may be potential targets of network threats. The targets of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are sensors and control decision units, which in turn destroy data transmitted over communication links, affecting microgrid data integrity. Denial of service (DoS) attacks threaten the availability of services to the communication system. FDI attack can damage the stability of the voltage and the frequency of the microgrid, further leads to cascade faults and power failure of users of the microgrid, slows down the response speed of a control system of the distributed power supply, synchronizes the distributed power supply with values except the actual voltage and frequency reference values, and overloads or violates the thermal limit value of equipment of the microgrid. Therefore, the distributed power supply elastic control strategy and method which have robustness to network attacks are very important, and the method plays a vital role in ensuring the stable and economic operation of the micro-grid.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a distributed power supply elastic control strategy and a distributed power supply elastic control method with robustness to network attack, so that the safety of a power system is improved, and the stable operation of a power grid is ensured.
The invention can be realized by the following technical scheme:
a distributed power elastic control strategy and method with robustness to network attacks are characterized in that the control method comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the steps of 1, obtaining a micro-grid system model and parameters, including obtaining a communication topology structure diagram G of the micro-grid system, a Laplace matrix L corresponding to the communication topology structure diagram G, the number N of distributed power supplies, and the number N of attacked distributed power suppliesNCAnd the like.
in the formula, PiAnd QiRespectively representing the output active power and reactive power, omega, of the ith distributed power supplyniAnd VniRated values, m, representing respectively the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltagePiAnd nQiRespectively represent PiAnd QiSag factor, ωiAnd vo,magiIs the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply.
Wherein the droop coefficient is proportionally calculated based on the active and reactive ratings of the distributed power supply, and is determined according to the following equation:
in the formula, Pmaxi，QmaxiAnd Pmaxj，QmaxjThe active and reactive power ratings of the ith and jth distributed power sources are indicated, respectively.
And step 3: and carrying out distributed secondary control on the microgrid.
Further, the distributed secondary control of the microgrid comprises the following processes:
s1: each distributed power supply exchanges information with a neighbor node;
s2: updating auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to a distributed control protocol;
s3: and carrying out secondary control on the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply to realize frequency and voltage recovery of the distributed power supply under normal conditions and network attacks.
Further, each distributed power source in S1 exchanges information with a neighboring node, which means that each distributed power source i has its own angular frequency ωiAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magiSending the distributed power j to the neighbor nodes, and simultaneously acquiring a series of angular frequencies omega from each neighbor nodejAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magjAnd sorted by size.
Further, the updating the auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variable of the distributed power source according to the distributed control protocol in S2 includes the following processes:
setting communication link quality weights between distributed power sources, i.e., weight aijAs follows:
in the formula, deltaiAnd deltajThe power angles of the distributed power sources i and j, respectively. R1And R2A relative power angle threshold is described as an indicator of the health of the microgrid control system. When the power angles of the distributed power sources are relatively close, the microgrid is in a healthy operating state in terms of frequency stability. Therefore, this threshold value is set to a relatively small value. Exponentially as the power angle difference increasesReducing the communication link quality until the power angle difference is greater than R2The communication link quality goes to zero and the flow of information between the two distributed power sources is interrupted. Gamma is a design parameter that adjusts the smoothness and shape of the exponential function, amaxA maximum value representing a parameter communication link quality weight;
comparison of lambda2And η × 4nNCOf (b), wherein λ2The second largest characteristic value of the topological structure diagram of the microgrid communication is eta, which is a parameter factor less than 1 and can provide enough margin for algebraic connectivity to keep the algebraic connectivity above a network safety threshold.
If λ2＜η×4nNCUpdating the auxiliary angular frequency v of the distributed power supply according to the following distributed control protocolωiAnd an auxiliary voltage amplitude vviControl variables:
vvi＝0
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
is a control parameter, δiIs the power angle, v, of the distributed power source i2Is corresponding to the characteristic value lambda2The feature vector of (2).
If λ2≥η×4nNCUpdating the auxiliary angular frequency v of the distributed power supply according to the following distributed control protocolωiAnd an auxiliary voltage amplitude vviControl variables:
in the formula, cωAnd cvAre respectively frequency controlledA system gain and a voltage controlled gain, and wherein the fixed gain of only one of the distributed power sources is non-zero, and gi≥0。RωiAn updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol for the ith distributed power supply is described. The generation mode of the neighbor set is as follows: omega of adjacent distributed power suppliesjAnd vo,magjOmega with oneselfiAnd vo,magiMaking a comparison if n is presentNCMore than or equal to omegajA value of (b), then nNCIs greater than omegajThe value of (d) is discarded. If there is less than nNCIs more than omegajThen these values are discarded. For values less than ωjThe same procedure is applied to discard ωjThe adjacent value. RviUpdated neighbor set in distributed voltage control protocol for ith distributed power supply, generation method and similar RωiSimilarly.
Further, in S3, performing secondary control on the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply is implemented by the following formula:
ωni＝∫(vwi)dt
Vni＝∫(vvi)dt
through the above process, the distributed secondary control can adjust the working frequency omega of the distributed power supplyiAnd terminal voltage amplitude vo,magiReverting to the reference frequency omegarefAnd a reference voltage vref。
The invention relates to an anti-attack distributed cooperative control algorithm based on a hidden layer, which can solve the problem of secondary control of a micro-grid under network attack. Compared with the existing attack-resistant distributed control method, the controller has stronger robustness, can reduce the adverse effects of time-dependent FDI attacks on actuators, sensors and communication links of a control system, and has robustness on state-dependent FDI attacks. Furthermore, the algorithm works even if all distributed power and communications are corrupted.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is an island microgrid architecture diagram of the IEEE 34 bus model;
FIG. 3 is a distributed power specification parameter;
FIG. 4 is a load specification parameter;
FIG. 5 is a diagram of a distributed power communications network;
FIG. 6 is a time diagram of distributed power frequency and active power ratio under control of the present invention;
FIG. 7 is a time diagram of distributed power supply voltage amplitude and reactive power ratio under control of the present invention;
fig. 8 is a time diagram of a distributed power source power angle under control of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The object and effect of the present invention will become more apparent from the following detailed description of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings.
A flow of applying a distributed power supply flexible control strategy with robustness to network attacks in a microgrid is shown in fig. 1, and specifically includes the following steps:
step 1), obtaining a micro-grid system model and parameters, including obtaining a communication topology structure chart G of the micro-grid system, a corresponding Laplace matrix L, the number N of distributed power supplies and the number N of attacked distributed power suppliesNCAnd the like.
Step 2) carrying out primary droop control on the microgrid according to the formula (1) to maintain the power balance of the microgrid:
in the formula, PiAnd QiRespectively representing the output active power and reactive power, omega, of the ith distributed power supplyniAnd VniRated values, m, representing respectively the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltagePiAnd nQiRespectively represent PiAnd QiThe sag factor. OmegaiAnd vo,magiIs the angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply.
Wherein the droop coefficient is proportionally calculated based on the active and reactive ratings of the distributed power supply, determined according to equation (2):
in the formula, Pmaxi，QmaxiAnd Pmaxj，QmaxjThe active and reactive power ratings of the ith and jth distributed power sources are indicated, respectively.
Step 3): the distributed secondary control of the microgrid comprises the following specific processes:
3-1) each distributed power supply exchanges information with its neighbor nodes, and the specific realization mode is that the distributed power supply i uses its own angular frequency omegaiAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magiSending the distributed power j to the neighbor node, and simultaneously acquiring the angular frequency omega of the distributed power j from the neighbor nodejAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magjAnd angular frequency omega to a series of neighboring nodesjAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magjSorting is performed according to size.
3-2) setting the communication link quality weight between the distributed power sources according to equation (3), i.e. weight aij：
In the formula, deltaiAnd deltajThe power angles of the distributed power sources i and j, respectively. R1And R2A relative power angle threshold is described as an indicator of the health of the microgrid control system. When the power angles of the distributed power sources are relatively close, the microgrid is in a healthy operating state in terms of frequency stability. Therefore, this threshold value is set to a relatively small value. Exponentially decreasing communication link quality as the power angle difference increases until the power angle difference is greater than R2The communication link quality goes to zero and the flow of information between the two distributed power sources is interrupted. Gamma is a design parameter that adjusts the smoothness and shape of the exponential function.
3-3) comparison of lambda2And η × 4nNCAccording to the result, different distributed control protocols are executed.
Wherein λ is2The second largest characteristic value of the topological structure diagram of the microgrid communication is eta, which is a parameter factor less than 1 and can provide enough margin for algebraic connectivity to keep the algebraic connectivity above a network safety threshold.
Case 1: if λ2＜η×4nNCUpdating the auxiliary angular frequency v of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol implemented as the following equations (4) (5)ωiAnd an auxiliary voltage amplitude vviControl variables:
vvi＝0 (5)
in the formula (4), the reaction mixture is,
is a control parameter, δiIs the power angle, v, of the distributed power source i2Is corresponding to the characteristic value lambda2The feature vector of (2).
Case 2: if λ2≥η×4nNCUpdating the auxiliary angular frequency v of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol implemented as the following equations (7) (8)ωiAnd an auxiliary voltage amplitude vviControl variables:
in the formula, cωAnd cvFrequency control gain and voltage control gain, respectively, and wherein the fixed gain of only one of the distributed power supplies is non-zero, and gi≥0。RωiDistributed frequency control of the ith distributed power supply is describedAn updated neighbor set in the protocol. The generation mode of the neighbor set is as follows: omega of adjacent distributed power suppliesjAnd vo,magjCo with oneselfiAnd vo,magiMaking a comparison if n is presentNCMore than or equal to omegajA value of (1), then nNCIs more than omegajThe value of (d) is discarded. If there is less than nNCIs more than omegajThen these values are discarded. For values less than ωjThe same procedure is applied to discard ωjThe adjacent value. RviUpdated neighbor set in distributed voltage control protocol for ith distributed power supply, generation method and similar RωiSimilarly.
3-4) carrying out secondary control on the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply, and realizing the secondary control by the following formulas (9) and (10)
ωni＝∫(vwi)dt (9)
Vni＝∫(vvi)dt (10)
The effectiveness of the invention is proved by simulation experiments.
The simulation is tested by adopting an IEEE 34 bus model, and an island microgrid structure is shown in figure 2 and integrates 6 distributed power supplies which are marked as DER in the figure. Figures 3 and 4 provide specifications for distributed power and loads, respectively. The microgrid was operated at a frequency of 60Hz and a nominal line-to-line voltage of 24.9 kV. The distributed power supply is integrated on a feeder line through a Y-Y transformer, the rated voltage is 480V/24.9kV, and the rated power is 400 kVA.
A communication network diagram for a distributed power supply is shown in fig. 5. Set up g1＝1，ωref＝2π×60rad/s。vrefThe calculation was performed using the formula (11).
vref＝kp(vnom-vc,mag)+ki∫(vnom-vc,mag)dt (11)
In the formula, the parameter kpAnd kiSet to 0.01 and 10, v, respectivelynomSet to 1pu, control gain cωAnd cvSet to 40. The parameters in the formula (3) are as follows: r1 is set to pi/50, R2 is set to pi/2, gamma is set to 5, amaxIs arranged as4。
When the simulation is started, the micro-grid is operated under one-time droop control. The conventional secondary frequency and voltage control works when t is 0.6s, and the distributed secondary control of the present invention works when t is 0.65 s. At t ═ 0.6s, an FDI attack is launched on the distributed power supply DER6, affecting the voltage and frequency recovery of the microgrid, the microgrid frequency and the active power ratio of the distributed power supply being as shown in fig. 6. The critical bus voltage amplitude and reactive power ratio are shown in fig. 7, respectively. After the distributed secondary control of the invention is applied, the frequency of the distributed power supply is restored to 60Hz and the active power ratio is synchronized to a common value. In addition, the active power of the distributed power supply is distributed according to its active power rating. As shown in fig. 7, after the distributed secondary control of the present invention is applied, the critical bus voltage amplitude is restored to 1pu, and the reactive power ratio of the distributed power source converges to the value before the FDI attack. Fig. 8 shows the power angle change of a distributed power supply, and as shown in the figure, after the action of the conventional distributed control, the power angles start to drift away from each other due to the false information shared with the neighbors, and when the distributed secondary control of the present invention is adopted, the power angles return to normal.
According to the simulation example of the implementation, after the control method is adopted, the damage information distributed by the attacked distributed power supply is effectively discarded, the frequency and voltage recovery of the system is realized, a normal communication scene and a network attack scene are considered, and the operation elasticity of the micro-grid is further improved. The method provided by the invention has a good control effect.
Claims (2)
1. A distributed power supply elastic control method for network attack is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the method comprises the steps of 1, obtaining a micro-grid system model and parameters, including obtaining a communication topology structure diagram G of the micro-grid system, a Laplace matrix L corresponding to the communication topology structure diagram G, the number N of distributed power supplies, and the number N of attacked distributed power suppliesNC；
Step 2, carrying out primary droop control on the micro-grid, and realizing the droop control through the following formula:
in the formula, PiAnd QiRespectively representing the output active power and reactive power, omega, of the ith distributed power supplyniAnd VniRated values, m, representing respectively the frequency and amplitude of the output AC voltagePiAnd nQiRespectively represent PiAnd QiSag factor, ωiAnd vo,magiThe angular frequency and amplitude of the output voltage of the distributed power supply;
wherein the droop coefficient is proportionally calculated based on the active and reactive ratings of the distributed power supply, and is determined according to the following equation:
in the formula, Pmaxi，QmaxiAnd Pmaxj，QmaxjRespectively representing active power and reactive power rated values of the ith and jth distributed power supplies;
and 3, step 3: carrying out distributed secondary control on the microgrid;
further, the distributed secondary control of the microgrid comprises the following processes:
s1: each distributed power supply exchanges information with a neighbor node;
s2: updating auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to a distributed control protocol;
s3: carrying out secondary control on the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply to realize frequency and voltage recovery of the distributed power supply under normal conditions and network attacks;
updating the auxiliary angular frequency and voltage amplitude control variables of the distributed power supply according to the distributed control protocol in the step S2 includes the following processes:
setting communication link quality weights between distributed power sources, i.e., weight aijAs follows:
in the formula, deltaiAnd deltajPower angles of distributed power sources i and j, respectively; r1And R2A relative power angle threshold is described as an index reflecting the health condition of the microgrid control system; exponentially decreasing communication link quality as the power angle difference increases until the power angle difference is greater than R2The communication link quality becomes zero and the flow of information between the two distributed power sources is interrupted; gamma is a design parameter that adjusts the smoothness and shape of the exponential function, amaxA maximum value representing a parameter communication link quality weight;
comparison of lambda2And η × 4nNCOf (b), wherein λ2The second big characteristic value of the micro-grid communication topology structure diagram is provided, eta is a parameter factor smaller than 1, and enough margin is provided for algebraic connectivity so that the algebraic connectivity can be kept above a network safety threshold;
if λ2＜η×4nNCUpdating the auxiliary angular frequency v of the distributed power supply according to the following distributed control protocolωiAnd an auxiliary voltage amplitude vviControl variables:
vvi＝0
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
is a control parameter, δiIs the power angle, v, of the distributed power source i2Is corresponding to the characteristic value lambda2The feature vector of (2);
if λ is2≥η×4nNCUpdating the auxiliary angular frequency v of the distributed power supply according to the following distributed control protocolωiAnd an auxiliary voltage amplitude vviControl variables:
in the formula, cωAnd cvFrequency control gain and voltage control gain, respectively, and wherein the fixed gain of only one of the distributed power supplies is non-zero, and gi≥0；RωiAn updated neighbor set in the distributed frequency control protocol of the ith distributed power supply is described; the generation mode of the neighbor set is as follows: omega of adjacent distributed power suppliesjAnd vo,magjOmega with oneselfiAnd vo,magiMaking a comparison if n is presentNCMore than or equal to omegajA value of (1), then nNCIs more than omegajThe value of (d) is discarded; if there is less than nNCIs more than omegajThe values of (c), then the values are discarded; for values less than ωjThe same procedure is applied to discard ωjA proximity value; rviUpdated neighbor set in distributed voltage control protocol for ith distributed power supply, generation method and similar RωiSimilarly;
further, in S3, performing secondary control on the frequency and the voltage amplitude of the distributed power supply is implemented by the following formula:
ωni＝∫(vwi)dt
Vni＝∫(vvi)dt
through the above process, the distributed secondary control can adjust the working frequency omega of the distributed power supplyiAnd terminal voltage amplitude vo,magiReverting to the reference frequency omegarefAnd a reference voltage vref。
2. The distributed power supply flexible control method for network attack according to claim 1, wherein the distributed power supply flexible control method for network attack is characterized in thatThe method comprises the following steps: each distributed power supply exchanges information with a neighbor node, and the information exchange method specifically comprises the following steps: each distributed power source i will have its own angular frequency ωiAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magiSending the distributed power j to the neighbor nodes, and simultaneously acquiring a series of angular frequencies omega from each neighbor nodejAnd the voltage amplitude vo,magjAnd sorted by size.
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| CN115276038A (en) * | 2022-08-05 | 2022-11-01 | 浙江大学 | Distributed alternating current micro-grid frequency recovery method and system |
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