CN114499881A - Dynamic remote certification scheme suitable for terminal resource access - Google Patents

Dynamic remote certification scheme suitable for terminal resource access Download PDF

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CN114499881A
CN114499881A CN202210086589.6A CN202210086589A CN114499881A CN 114499881 A CN114499881 A CN 114499881A CN 202210086589 A CN202210086589 A CN 202210086589A CN 114499881 A CN114499881 A CN 114499881A
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data
sensor
trusted
verification end
equipment
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王冠
高壮
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Beijing University of Technology
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Beijing University of Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
    • H04L2209/127—Trusted platform modules [TPM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a dynamic remote certification scheme suitable for terminal resource access. With the rapid development of the internet of things technology and the wireless communication technology, the number of mobile terminals has increased dramatically. The massive terminal equipment puts higher requirements on the response time and the safety of the data resource request. In today's complex network environment, how to safely and efficiently access resources is a serious challenge. The invention ensures the credibility of the source of the data in the resource access process by using the credible platform module and the remote certification technology. The TCM is added to the sensor terminal to measure the generated data and the equipment thereof, and the data collected by the sensor terminal is aggregated through the designed aggregation module to form a credible data packet. The verifying end can obtain the data with credible data source according to the credible data packet. The method can dynamically monitor the credibility of the sensor terminal and can well detect the behavior of a malicious third party invading the terminal.

Description

Dynamic remote certification scheme suitable for terminal resource access
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of remote certification of resource access systems, and particularly relates to a remote certification scheme suitable for terminal resource access.
Background
The rapid development of the internet of things technology and the wireless communication technology promotes the rapid increase of mobile terminals. Nowadays, a wide variety of mobile terminal devices can be connected to people or different types of machines. The massive terminal equipment puts higher requirements on the response time and the safety of the data resource request. Resource access has an immaterial position as an important ring in data resource requests. Resource access is a bridge for mutual communication among terminal devices in the environment of the Internet of things, and is the basis of device interaction. In a complex network environment, how to safely and efficiently access resources is a serious challenge.
The remote certification of the terminal resource access system means that the credibility of the sensor terminal is ensured while the terminal accesses resources, the credibility of the equipment is ensured, and the generated data is credible, namely, the source of the sensor data is ensured not to be tampered by a malicious third party. Currently, remote certification schemes for terminal resource access systems are relatively less researched. Among them, research on terminal resource access processes is mainly focused on protecting the integrity and privacy of data during data transmission, rather than on protecting the integrity of devices that generate and collect data.
The focus of existing work is the integrity of the data itself. In many cases, provenance is limited to devices that sign and encrypt data using a valid key from a public key, and then send the data to the cloud for processing. In some privacy-conscious schemes, these data may be further encrypted. However, little attention has been paid to the integrity of the hardware and software stack running on the device. Taha et al introduced a trusted tamper data source detection scheme for cloud or data center environments. They ensure verification of the virtual machine log in order to forensics virtual machine failures. Similar to this work, they utilize trusted computing technology through the use of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). However, they have replaced the non-backward compatible version 2 with the old TPM of the 1.2 standard. The scheme only provides integrity guarantee for the state of the virtual machine generating the log, and cannot provide data integrity guarantee for the embedded device. Existing work rarely certifies the integrity of data generating devices, while existing solutions for device integrity certification are not applicable to sensor devices. In our work, we extend data sourcing guarantees to include devices outside of the cloud environment. For each piece of data generated by a device, we include the device that generated the data and the trustworthiness information of the node that processed the data before sending the data to the cloud application for analysis.
The invention aims to provide a dynamic remote attestation scheme suitable for terminal resource access, the overall architecture of the scheme is shown in fig. 1, and the scheme comprises the following steps:
equipment initialization: the method mainly comprises the steps of registering a Sensor group and gathering equipment used for collecting data to a Verification end, and introducing a Sensor node (sn) and gathering equipment (ce) into the Verification End (VE), so that the Verification end can monitor the credibility of the gathering equipment and the Sensor and prepare for verifying a credible data source subsequently.
A step of generating a trusted data packet: mainly, data collected by the sensor group are converged and integrated through convergence equipment to form data required by a verification end. And simultaneously measuring the self to form a self measurement value. And integrating the two parts of data, and signing by using TCM to finally generate a trusted data packet.
Verifying the credible data packet: the method mainly utilizes a verifying end to verify whether a received credible data packet is credible or not and whether a data source of the received credible data packet is credible or not.
In the above dynamic remote attestation scheme applicable to terminal resource access, the device initialization step specifically includes:
step 1: and introducing the detailed information in the convergence device into the verification end.
Step 2: for each sensor assigned to a sink device:
step 2.1: the sensor information and the key are sent to the aggregation device, which forwards them to the verification end.
Step 2.2: the sink device stores device information of the sensor.
Step 2.3: the sensors store information needed to communicate with the aggregation device.
Step 2.4: the sensor is added to a mapping list between the aggregation device and the sensor in the verification end.
And step 3: starting the aggregation device and the sensor nodes, the verification end can now monitor the trustworthiness of the aggregation device and the corresponding sensor groups to ensure that they have not been tampered with.
In the above dynamic remote attestation scheme applicable to terminal resource access, the trusted data packet generating step includes:
step 1: and the verification end Ve requests sensor node sn data from the convergence equipment ce.
And 2, step: for each sn of ce managementi：
Step 2.1: ce slave sniRequest the collected datai。
Step 2.2: sniSensing and collecting datai。
Step 2.3: sniMeasuring itself by TCM (TCM) to generate a measurement value quoteiAdding a time stamp T to the metric valuei。
Step 2.4: sniData collected by the sensoriAnd self metric value quoteiBundled into sensor trusted data _ trustedi。
Step 2.5: sniUsing sensor specific priv _ keyiFor the credible data _ trusted of the sensoriAnd (6) signing.
Step 2.6: sniReturn data pair to ce (data _ trusted)i,sigi)。
And step 3: ce from each sensor sniCollecting sensor trusted data _ trustediAnd signature sigiTime stamp T for each sensoriAnd verifying whether the card is legal or not. And if the illegal sensor appears, directly reporting to the verification end Ve.
And 4, step 4: ce will be from each sensor sniCollecting sensor trusted data _ trustediAnd signature sigiAggregating to generate data block data of convergence devicece。
And 5: the ce measures the ce and generates a metric value quoteceAdding a time stamp T to the metric valuece。
Step 6:the ce utilizes the data block data generated in the step 4 and the step 5ceMetric value of self-quoteceGenerating a trusted data packet data _ trustedce。
And 7: ce utilizes unique private key priv _ keyceSigning sig for trusted data packetsce。
And 8: the ce according to the credible data packet data _ trusted in the steps 6 and 7ceAnd signature sigceAnd aggregating into a final trusted data packet trusted _ data _ ce of the aggregation device, where the structure is shown in fig. 2.
And step 9: and the ce sends the trusted data packet of the convergence equipment generated in the step 8 to the verification end Ve.
In the above dynamic remote attestation scheme applicable to terminal resource access, the step of verifying the trusted data packet includes:
step 1: and the verification end Ve receives the trusted data packet trusted _ data _ ce from the convergence device ce.
Step 2: the verification end Ve verifies the signature sig from the ceceAnd a time stamp Tce。
Step 2.1: time stamp T in Ve passing ce data packet at verification endceTo verify its legitimacy.
Step 2.2: the verification end Ve utilizes pub _ keyceTo verify data _ trustedceSig ofceThe effectiveness of (c).
Step 2.3: the verifying end Ve will record the quote according to the verifying end Vece. If Ve verifies, the sink device ce can be considered to be authentic. This ensures that data is being collectedceTime ce is in a trusted state.
And step 3: the verification end Ve continues to verify the dataceEach (data _ strusted)i,sigi) Data pair:
step 3.1: the verification end Ve verifies each sensor sniWhether it is in the mapping list of the current sink device ce. If the node is not in the current mapping list, subsequent verification is not needed, and the node can be directly judged to be a malicious sensor node.
Step 3.2: the verifying end Ve utilizes each sniPub _ key trustSignature sig of data _ regulatediThe effectiveness of (c).
Step 3.3: each sensor sn according to which the verifying end Ve will recordiQuote ofiTo verify that the sensor is authentic. If Ve verifies, the current sensor sn can be considered asiIs trusted and the data it acquires is trusted. This ensures that data is being collectediTime sensor sniIn a trusted state.
Step 3.4: if the verification results according to the steps 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are successful, the verifying end Ve can trust the data of the sensor, and the verifying end Ve can use the data reported by the sensor node.
The invention has the following advantages: by introducing the trusted platform module between the verification end and the sensor device, the integrity and privacy of data are guaranteed, and meanwhile, the integrity of the sensor device is further guaranteed. The scheme can ensure that the data acquired from the sensing equipment is usable and reliable, and verifies whether the equipment for generating and aggregating the data is correct and has not been tampered. In addition, the scheme also detects the condition that the equipment is tampered when the equipment reports data, so that the true sensor data is prevented from being polluted by using potential malicious data. In addition, the scheme aims at measuring the multiple factors of the sensor equipment simultaneously and carries out integrity verification in the data interaction process every time, and the dynamic certification mode solves the problem that the reliability is reduced along with time caused by the static certification of the traditional remote certification.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is an overall architecture diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a diagram of a converged device trusted data packet architecture of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention aims to provide a dynamic remote attestation scheme suitable for terminal resource access, the overall architecture of the scheme is shown in fig. 1, and the scheme comprises a device initialization stage, a trusted data packet generation stage and a trusted data packet verification stage. The above three phases will be described in detail below:
first, device initialization phase
The stage is mainly to register a Sensor group and Convergence equipment used for collecting data to a Verification end, and introduce a Sensor node (sn) and Convergence equipment (ce) into the Verification End (VE), so that the Verification end can monitor the credibility of the Convergence equipment and the Sensor and prepare for verifying a credible data source subsequently. The method mainly comprises the following implementation steps:
step 1: and introducing the detailed information in the convergence device into the verification end.
Step 1.1: the convergence device ce obtains the system number 0 process logical address by using the kernel symbol table and converts the system number 0 process logical address into a physical address. Then, the convergence device obtains its code segment cs by using the double linked list structure in the memory and taking the process No. 0 as the starting point through the physical address of the process No. 0ceInterrupt vector table ivtceAnd system call meter sctce。
Step 1.2: code segment cs of convergence device by TCMceInterrupt vector table ivtceAnd system call meter sctceIdentification di of the sensor deviceceNetwork identification dniceNetwork protocol npceAnd measuring, forming a reference library of the convergence equipment by the obtained values, and storing the reference library in the verification end. The benchmark value is calculated as follows, measure represents the metric function:
quotece＝measure(csce,ivtce,sctce,dice,dnice,npce) (1)
step 1.3: and introducing the device identification, the public key and the sensor mapping list of the convergence device into a verification end.
Step 2: for each sensor assigned to a sink device:
step 2.1: the sensor metric value and the key are sent to the aggregation device, and the aggregation device forwards the sensor metric value and the key to the verification end.
Step 2.1.1: the sensor device obtains the logical address of the process 0 of the system and converts the logical address into the physical address by using the kernel symbol table, and obtains the code segment cs of the sensor device by using the physical address of the process 0 by using the double linked list structure in the memoryiInterrupt vector table ivtiAnd a system call meter sctiIdentification di of the sensor deviceiNetwork identification dniiNetwork protocol npi。
Step 2.1.2: using TCM to map code segments cs of a sensor deviceiAn interrupt vector table ivtiAnd system call meter sctiIdentification di of the sensor deviceiNetwork identification dniiNetwork protocol npiThe time taken at each time the sensor collects dataiAnd measuring, forming a reference value of the sensor equipment by using the obtained value, and storing a reference library forming the sensor equipment into the verification end. The formula is as follows:
quotei＝measure(csi,ivti,scti,dii,dnii,npi,ati) (2)
step 2.1.3: and sending the device identification and the public key of each sensor to the aggregation device, and storing and forwarding the device identification and the public key to the verification end by the aggregation device.
Step 2.2: the aggregation device stores information about the sensors.
Step 2.3: the sensors store information needed to communicate with the aggregation device.
Step 2.4: the sensor is added to a mapping list between the aggregation device and the sensor in the verification end.
And step 3: starting the aggregation device and the sensor nodes, the verification end can now monitor the trustworthiness of the aggregation device and the corresponding sensor groups to ensure that they have not been tampered with.
Second, trusted data packet generation stage
In the stage, data collected by the sensor group is converged and integrated through convergence equipment to form data required by the verification end. And measuring the self to form a self measurement value. And integrating the two parts of data, and signing by using TCM to finally generate a trusted data packet. The method mainly comprises the following implementation steps:
step 1: and the verification end Ve requests sensor node sn data from the convergence equipment ce.
Step 2: for each sn of ce managementi：
Step 2.1: ce slave sniRequest the collected datai。
Step 2.2: sniSensing and collecting datai。
Step 2.3: sniMeasuring itself by TCM (System software and configuration) to generate a measurement value quoteiAdding a time stamp T to the metric valuei。
Step 2.3.1: sniCode segment cs for executing itself by TCMiInterrupt vector table ivtiAnd system call meter sctiPerforming a measurement, identification di of the sensor deviceiNetwork identification dniiNetwork protocol npiThe time taken for each time the sensor collects data atiThe time stamp T is attached to the metric value at the same time as shown in the following equationi。
quotei＝measure(csi,ivti,scti,dii,dnii,npi,ati) (3)
Step 2.4: sniData collected by the sensoriAnd self metric value quoteiBundled into sensor credible data _ trustedi. The specific calculation method is as follows:
data_trustedi＝datai+quotei+Ti (4)
step 2.5: sniUsing sensor specific priv _ keyiFor the credible data _ trusted of the sensoriAnd (6) signing. The specific signature mode is as follows, sign represents a metric function:
sigi＝sign(data_trustedi,priv_keyi) (5)
step 2.6: sniReturn to ceData pair (data _ strusted)i,sigi)。
And step 3: ce from each sensor sniCollecting sensor trusted data _ trustediAnd signature sigiTime stamp T for each sensoriAnd verifying whether the card is legal or not. And if the illegal sensor appears, directly reporting to the verification end Ve.
And 4, step 4: ce will be from each sensor sniCollecting sensor trusted data _ trustediAnd signature sigiAggregating to generate data block data of convergence devicece. The following formula is shown in detail:
datace＝[(data_trusted0,sig0),(data_trusted1,sig1),…(data_trustedn,sign)] (6)
and 5: ce uses TCM to converge the code segment cs of the deviceceInterrupt vector table ivtceAnd system call meter sctceIdentification di of the sensor deviceceNetwork identification dniceNetwork protocol npceMetric generation metric value quoteceAdding a time stamp T to the metric valuece. The formula is as follows:
quotece＝measure(csce,ivtce,sctce,dice,dnice,npce) (7)
step 6: the ce utilizes the data block data generated in the step 4 and the step 5ceMetric value of self-quoteceGenerating a trusted data packet data _ trustedce. The calculation method is shown as the following formula:
data_trustedce＝datace+quotece+Tce (8)
and 7: ce utilizes unique private key priv _ keyceSigning sig for trusted data packetsce. The calculation method is shown as the following formula:
sigce＝sign(data_trustedce,priv_keyce) (9)
and 8: ce according to step 6 andtrusted data packet data _ trusted in step 7ceAnd signature sigceAnd aggregating into a final trusted data packet trusted _ data _ ce of the aggregation device, where the structure is shown in fig. 2. The data structure is as follows:
trusted_data_ce＝(data_trustedce,sigce) (10)
and step 9: and the ce sends the trusted data packet of the convergence equipment generated in the step 8 to the verification end Ve.
Third, verifying credible data packet stage
In this stage, the verifying end is mainly used to verify whether the received trusted data packet is trusted or not and whether the data source is trusted or not. The method mainly comprises the following implementation steps:
step 1: and the verification end Ve receives the trusted data packet trusted _ data _ ce from the convergence equipment ce.
Step 2: the verification end Ve verifies the signature sig from the ceceAnd a time stamp Tce。
Step 2.1: time stamp T in Ve passing ce data packet at verification endceTo verify its legitimacy.
Step 2.2: the verification end Ve utilizes pub _ keyceTo verify data _ trustedceSig ofceThe effectiveness of (c).
Step 2.3: verifying the quote sent by the aggregation equipment by the Ve according to the aggregation equipment reference library stored by the Vece. If Ve verifies, the sink device ce can be considered to be authentic. This ensures that data is being collectedceTime ce is in a trusted state.
And step 3: the verification end Ve continues to verify the dataceEach (data _ strusted)i,sigi) Data pair:
step 3.1: the verification end Ve verifies each sensor sniWhether it is in the mapping list of the current sink device ce. If the node is not in the current mapping list, subsequent verification is not needed, and the node can be directly judged to be a malicious sensor node.
Step 3.2: the validation end Ve utilizes each sniSignature sig of pub _ key trusted data _ trustediThe effectiveness of (c).
Step 3.3: the verification end Ve verifies each sensor sn according to the stored sensor equipment reference libraryiQuote ofiWhether it is authentic. If Ve verifies, the current sensor sn can be considered asiIs trusted and the data it acquires is trusted. This ensures that data is being collectediTime sensor sniIn a trusted state.
Step 3.4: if the verification results according to the steps 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are successful, the verifying end Ve can trust the data of the sensor, and the verifying end Ve can use the data reported by the sensor node.

Claims (4)

1. A dynamic remote attestation scheme adapted for terminal resource access, comprising the steps of:
equipment initialization: registering a Sensor group and Convergence equipment used for collecting data to a verification end, introducing a Sensor node (sn) and Convergence equipment (ce) into the Verification End (VE), and enabling the verification end to monitor the credibility of the Convergence equipment and the Sensor to prepare for verifying a credible data source subsequently;
a step of generating a trusted data packet: the data collected by the sensor group is converged and integrated through convergence equipment to form data required by a verification end; simultaneously measuring the self to form a self measurement value; integrating the two parts of data, and signing by using TCM to finally generate a trusted data packet;
and verifying the trusted data packet: the verifying end is used for verifying whether the received credible data packet is credible or not and whether the data source is credible or not.
2. The dynamic remote attestation scheme adapted to terminal resource access of claim 1, wherein the device initialization step specifically comprises:
step 1: introducing detailed information in the convergence device ce into a verification end;
step 1.1: acquiring system No. 0 process logic by using kernel symbol table by sink device ceEditing the address and converting the address into a physical address; then, the convergence device obtains its code segment cs by using the double linked list structure in the memory and taking the process No. 0 as the starting point through the physical address of the process No. 0ceInterrupt vector table ivtceAnd system call meter sctce；
Step 1.2: code segment cs of convergence device by TCMceAn interrupt vector table ivtceAnd system call meter sctceIdentification di of the sensor deviceceNetwork identification dniceNetwork protocol npceMeasuring, forming a reference library of the convergence equipment by the obtained values, and storing the reference library in a verification end; the reference value calculation formula is as follows:
quotece＝measure(csce，ivtce，sctce，dice，dnice，npce) (1)
step 1.3: introducing a device identifier, a public key and a sensor mapping list of the convergence device into a verification end;
step 2: for each sensor assigned to a sink device:
step 2.1: the sensor measurement value and the key are sent to the convergence equipment, and the convergence equipment forwards the sensor measurement value and the key to the verification end;
step 2.1.1: the sensor device obtains the logical address of the process 0 of the system and converts the logical address into the physical address by using the kernel symbol table, and obtains the code segment cs of the sensor device by using the physical address of the process 0 by using the double linked list structure in the memoryiInterrupt vector table ivtiAnd system call meter scti；
Step 2.1.2: using TCM to map code segments cs of a sensor deviceiInterrupt vector table ivtiAnd system call meter sctiIdentification di of the sensor deviceiNetwork identification dniiNetwork protocol npiThe time taken for each time the sensor collects data atiMeasuring, forming a reference value of the sensor equipment by the obtained value, and storing a reference library of the sensor equipment into a verification end; the reference value calculation formula is as follows:
quotei＝measure(csi，ivti，scti，dii，dnii，npi，ati) (2)
step 2.1.3: sending the device identification and the public key of each sensor to the aggregation device, and storing and forwarding the device identification and the public key to the verification end by the aggregation device;
step 2.2: the aggregation device stores information about the sensors;
step 2.3: the sensor stores information required for communication with the aggregation equipment;
step 2.4: the sensor is added into a mapping list between the aggregation equipment and the sensor in the verification end;
and step 3: starting the aggregation equipment and the sensor nodes, and monitoring the credibility of the aggregation equipment and the corresponding sensor group by the verification end to ensure that the aggregation equipment and the corresponding sensor group are not tampered.
3. The dynamic remote attestation scheme adapted to terminal resource access of claim 1, wherein the trusted data packet generating step specifically comprises:
step 1: the method comprises the steps that a verification end Ve requests sensor node sn data from a convergence device ce;
step 2: for each sn of ce managementi：
Step 2.1: ce slave sniRequest the collected datai；
Step 2.2: sniSensing and collecting datai；
Step 2.3: sniMeasuring the self by utilizing TCM to generate a measurement value quoteiAdding a time stamp T to the metric valuei；
Step 2.3.1: sniCode segment cs for executing itself by TCMiInterrupt vector table ivtiAnd system call meter sctiIdentification di of the sensor deviceiNetwork identification dniiNetwork protocol npiThe time taken for each time the sensor collects data atiAs shown in the following formula, measure represents a metric function; all in oneTime-to-metric value appending a timestamp Ti；
quotei＝measure(csi，ivti，scti，dii，dnii，npi，ati) (3)
Step 2.4: sniData collected by the sensoriAnd self metric value quoteiBundled into sensor trusted data _ trustedi(ii) a The specific calculation method is as follows:
data_trustedi＝datai+quotei+Ti (4)
step 2.5: sniUsing sensor specific priv _ keyiFor the credible data _ trusted of the sensoriCarrying out signature; the specific signature mode is as follows:
sigi＝sign(data_trustedi，priv_keyi) (5)
step 2.6: sniReturning data pair (data _ strusted) to cei，sigi)；
And step 3: ce from each sensor sniCollecting sensor trusted data _ trustediAnd signature sigiTime stamp T for each sensoriVerifying whether the card is legal or not; if an illegal sensor appears, directly reporting to a verification end Ve;
and 4, step 4: ce will be from each sensor sniCollecting sensor trusted data _ trustediAnd signature sigiAggregating to generate data block data of convergence devicece(ii) a The following formula is shown in detail:
datace＝[(data_trusted0，sig0)，(data_trusted1，sig1)，...(data_trustedn，sign)] (6)
and 5: ce uses TCM to converge the code segment cs of the deviceceInterrupt vector table ivtceAnd system call meter sctceIdentification di of the sensor deviceceNetwork identification dniceNetwork protocol npcePerforming metric generationMetric value quoteceAdding a time stamp T to the metric valuece(ii) a The formula is as follows:
quotece＝measure(csce，ivtce，sctce，dice，dnice，npce) (7)
step 6: the ce utilizes the data block data generated in the step 4 and the step 5ceMetric value of self-quoteceGenerating a trusted data packet data _ trustedce(ii) a The calculation method is shown as the following formula:
data_trustedce＝datace+quotece+Tce (8)
and 7: ce utilizes unique private key priv _ keyceSigning sig for trusted data packetsce(ii) a The calculation method is shown in the following formula:
sigce＝sign(data_trustedce，priv_keyce) (9)
and 8: the ce according to the credible data packet data _ trusted in the steps 6 and 7ceAnd signature sigceAggregating to form a final trusted data packet trusted _ data _ ce of the convergence equipment; the data structure is as follows:
trusted_data_ce＝(data_trustedce，sigce) (10)
and step 9: and the ce sends the trusted data packet of the convergence equipment generated in the step 8 to the verification end Ve.
4. The dynamic remote attestation scheme adapted to terminal resource access of claim 1, wherein the step of verifying the trusted data packet specifically comprises:
step 1: the verification end Ve receives the trusted data packet trusted _ data _ ce from the convergence equipment ce;
step 2: the verification end Ve verifies the signature sig from the ceceAnd a time stamp Tce；
Step 2.1: time stamp T in Ve passing ce data packet at verification endceTo verify its validity;
step 2.2: the verification end Ve utilizes pub _ keyceTo verify data _ trustedceSig ofceThe effectiveness of (a);
step 2.3: verifying the quote sent by the aggregation equipment by the Ve according to the aggregation equipment reference library stored by the Vece(ii) a If Ve passes the verification, the convergence device ce is considered to be credible; this ensures that data is being collectedceThe time ce is in a trusted state;
and step 3: the verification end Ve continues to verify the dataceEach (data _ strusted)i，sigi) Data pair:
step 3.1: the verification end Ve verifies each sensor sniWhether the current convergence device ce is in the mapping list of the current convergence device ce; if the node is not in the current mapping list, subsequent verification is not needed, and the node is directly judged to be a malicious sensor node;
step 3.2: the verifying end Ve utilizes each sniSignature sig of pub _ key trusted data _ trustediThe effectiveness of (a);
step 3.3: the verification end Ve verifies each sensor sn according to the stored sensor equipment reference libraryiQuote ofiWhether the information is credible; if Ve verifies, the current sensor sn is considered to beiIs authentic, the data it acquires is authentic; this ensures that data is being collectediTime sensor sniIn a trusted state;
step 3.4: and if the verification results according to the steps 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are successful, the verification end Ve trusts the data of the sensor, and the verification end Ve uses the data reported by the sensor node.
CN202210086589.6A 2022-01-25 2022-01-25 Dynamic remote certification scheme suitable for terminal resource access Pending CN114499881A (en)

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Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101477602A (en) * 2009-02-10 2009-07-08 浪潮电子信息产业股份有限公司 Remote proving method in trusted computation environment
US20110320823A1 (en) * 2010-06-25 2011-12-29 Microsoft Corporation Trusted sensors
WO2021176134A1 (en) * 2020-03-03 2021-09-10 Nokia Technologies Oy Trusted data provenance

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101477602A (en) * 2009-02-10 2009-07-08 浪潮电子信息产业股份有限公司 Remote proving method in trusted computation environment
US20110320823A1 (en) * 2010-06-25 2011-12-29 Microsoft Corporation Trusted sensors
WO2021176134A1 (en) * 2020-03-03 2021-09-10 Nokia Technologies Oy Trusted data provenance

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