CN101477602A - Remote proving method in trusted computation environment - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention provides a method for remote attestation in a trusted computing environment. The method is characterized in that secure session key is adopted for encrypting the metric value and the metric log of trusted platform to be verified, and signs for encryption result data. The method is based on a security chip TPM/TCM; the adopted remote attestation framework comprises three parts: an integrity measuring mechanism, a reporting mechanism and a validation mechanism, which are achieved by an integrity measuring agency, a report agency and a verification requestor, wherein, the measuring agency, the report agency and the verification requestor are installed in the trusted platform to be verified. The method ensures that the authenticity of the integrity measuring value and the measuring log and the privacy of the platform are kept; the replay attack, impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack are effectively prevented; the method is used for proving to the verification requestor that the running environment of the platform is credible, or used for self-test of the platform running environment; the method can be used for not only proving to the requestor that the platform running environment is credible, but also the self-test of the platform running environment; and the method is more suitable for a fair and open network environment.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of method of trusted computation environment medium-long range proof, belong to computer information safe Trusted Computing field.
Background technology
Distributed Application is more and more higher to the security requirement of the computing platform under the open system environment, comprise numerous interests and security conflicts side in the Distributed Application, therefore set up the mutual trust between platform, prove the credible big active demand that has become current information safety of computing environment.On the other hand, operation has the computing platform of rogue program code to show attack arbitrarily, attacks (Byzantine attack) as Byzantium, and this makes the static state that can't keep permanent between the platform trust.At present, general thinking is to use remote proving to identify the software arrangements and the state of remote platform operation, to such an extent as to the computing environment state detects impaired participation platform, guarantees the proper communication between the platform of credible running environment.Trusted Computing tissue T CG (Trusted ComputingGroup) has formulated credible calculating platform, trusted storage and a series of related specifications such as trustable network is connected, its method is that special-purpose safety chip TPM (TrustedPlatform Module is installed on host platform, mobile platform and embedded platform, credible platform module), solve foundation and the proof problem that credible calculating platform is trusted as system's root of trust.China has also formulated credible password module TCM (TrustedCryptography Module) relevant criterion with independent intellectual property right, and domestic IT vendor develops the safety chip of supporting the TCM standard in succession.Similar with TPM standard and chip, TCM standard and chip are supported the proof of credible calculating platform computing environment equally.At this, with the security function general designation remote proving of this proof platform credible state of TPM/TCM (RemoteAttestation, RA).
Remote proving RA is that a side who sends the checking request promptly verifies the requestor, and checking is also confirmed the identity of remote platform and the process of platform state configuration information.RA with the tolerance of integrality, store and be reported as the basis, wherein, the metric that integrity measurement and storage are meant calculating unit writes down this incident to metrics logs, and metric is charged among the platform configuration register PCR; Integrity report is meant that credible calculating platform provides the process of platform or part integrity measurement value to the checking requestor.During report integrity measurement value, platform identity key reply integrity measurement value digital signature.The credibility that the checking requestor judges this platform by the validity and the verification integrity measurement value of certifying signature.
Remote proving is important one of the studying a question in Trusted Computing field.Remote proving scheme under the TCG framework has obtained the extensive concern of lot of domestic and foreign scholar, research institution, the integrity measurement framework IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) that comparatively typically has IBM research institute to propose in numerous achievements in research.Existing remote proving scheme all is to send the checking request by the checking requestor, tolerance and proof is lack of consistency and extensibility, can not guarantee the authenticity of integrity measurement value and the privacy of platform, lack strick precaution ability Replay Attack, impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to be to improve the remote proving mechanism that Trusted Computing tissue T CG is proposed in credible platform module TPM standard, the method that a kind of new trusted computation environment medium-long range proves is proposed, this method is to adopt session encryption key that the integrity measurement value and the metrics logs that are verified credible platform are encrypted, and to the encrypted result digital signature, assurance is verified integrity measurement value and the authenticity of metrics logs and the privacy of platform of credible platform, can effectively take precautions against Replay Attack, impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack, can be used for proving that to the checking requestor platform running environment is believable, also can be used for self detecting of platform running environment.
This method is based on safety chip TPM/TCM, the remote proving framework that is adopted is made up of integrity measurement mechanism, report mechanism and authentication mechanism three parts, finished by integrity measurement agency, report agency and checking requestor respectively, its vacuum metrics agency, report agency and safety chip are installed in the credible platform that is verified.An effective letter of identity is arranged in the credible platform that is verified, and its binding is verified the identity key PIK of credible platform
PubWherein,
(1) tolerance agency: the object of decision tolerance, measuring period and Maintenance Measurement value how safely.Its major function is the metric of calculating unit, writes down this tolerance incident in metrics logs, and metric is charged in the safety chip among the corresponding platform configuration register PCR.The method of charging to is: new PCR value=cryptographic Hash algorithm (former PCR value || metric).Metrics logs includes but not limited at least: tolerance person's information, by tolerance person's information, former PCR value, metric, new PCR value, deadline.Metrics logs has been represented the integrity measurement history that is verified credible platform.
(2) report agency: the integrity measurement value that platform or part parts are provided to the checking requestor, according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm), generate session encryption key, to the calculation of correlation log information encryption of specifying the PCR value and specifying PCR, and usage platform identity key PIK
PubPairing private key PIK
PrvTo the encrypted result digital signature, the result that will sign sends to the checking requestor.
(3) checking requestor: send the checking request to being verified credible platform, to the response results usage platform identity key PIK that receives
PubThe signature and the deciphering of checking PCR value and metrics logs.By metrics logs, the whole integrity measurement process of reconstruct is also calculated Hash Value, and the PCR value of final PCR value with deciphering compared.If both are identical, then can confirm to be verified the credibility of credible platform; If both differences can draw the state that is verified credible platform and change, can not confirm its credibility.
Concrete remote proving process is:
(1) checking requestor C generates the timestamp N that can not expect
C, to C and N
CDigital signature sends checking request message C, N then
C,
Give and be verified credible platform A;
(2) receive the checking request message of C after, the validity and the legitimacy of the A request CA of trusted third party checking C certificate;
(3) after certification authentication was passed through, CA sent to A with the public key certificate of C;
(4) A utilizes the PKI PUB of C
CCertifying signature
In C and N
CWhether with message in unsigned C and N
CIdentical respectively.If identical, then generate the timestamp N that can not expect
A, and N
CGenerate session encryption key SK according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm).
A obtains value of specifying PCR and the calculation of correlation daily record ML that specifies PCR from safety chip TPM/TCM, and with session encryption key SK PCR value and metrics logs ML is encrypted, and obtains encrypted result enc{PCR, ML}
SK, and usage platform identity key PIK
PubPairing private key PIK
PrvTo identify label A, can not stab N expeced time
A, N
C+ 1 and encrypted result enc{PCR, ML}
SKDigital signature sends following message to C:
(5) receive the response message of A after, C is by the validity and the legitimacy of CA checking A platform letter of identity;
(6) after certification authentication was passed through, C utilized A platform identity key PIK
PubA in the certifying signature and N
AWhether with message in unsigned A and N
AIdentical respectively, and inspection N wherein
CWith the N that is sent
CWhether mate.
If N
CCoupling, C utilizes N
AAnd N
CGenerate session encryption key SK according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm), deciphering enc{PCR, ML}
SK, obtain PCR value and metrics logs ML.
C calculates final PCR value according to the whole integrity measurement process of metrics logs ML reconstruct, and the PCR value that obtains with deciphering compares.If both are identical, can confirm that then it is believable being verified credible platform; Otherwise, just think that it is incredible being verified credible platform.
The wood beneficial effect of the invention is: can not effectively take precautions against Replay Attack for what exist in the credible platform remote proving mechanism of solution based on integrity verification, the defective of impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack, patent of the present invention proposes a kind of new remote certification method, adopt session encryption key that the integrity measurement value and the metrics logs that are verified credible platform are encrypted, and to the encrypted result digital signature, assurance is verified integrity measurement value and the authenticity of metrics logs and the privacy of platform of credible platform, not only can effectively take precautions against above-mentioned attack pattern, and can be used for proving that to the checking requestor platform running environment is believable, and can be used for self detecting of platform running environment, be more suitable in justice, open network environment.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is system's composition diagram,
Fig. 2 is the remote proving procedure chart.
The reference numeral explanation:
Checking requestor: C: identify label
N
C: what C generated can not stab expeced time
PUB
C, PRV
C: the public private key pair that C holds
Be verified credible platform: A: identify label
N
A: what A generated can not stab expeced time
PIK
Pub, PIK
Prv: the public private key pair that A holds
PCR: platform configuration register, preserve the integrity measurement value
ML: integrity measurement daily record
Trusted third party: CA
Session key: SK, according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm) generating run:
Digital signature: sig
Encrypt: enc, use symmetric encipherment algorithm to encrypt.
Embodiment
Below by specific embodiment and accompanying drawing the present invention is described in detail.
The present invention is a kind of method of trusted computation environment medium-long range proof, be to adopt safety chip TPM/TCM, utilization is verified credible platform and verifies can not stabbing expeced time that the requestor produced, generate session encryption key, the integrity measurement value and the metrics logs that are verified credible platform are encrypted, and to identify label, can not stab expeced time, the encrypted result digital signature, to guarantee to be verified integrity measurement value and the authenticity of metrics logs and the privacy of platform of credible platform; By metrics logs, checking requestor reconstruct is verified the integrity measurement process of credible platform, and calculating is also compared the integrity measurement value, realizes being verified the remote proving of credible platform,
Method of the present invention comprises being verified credible platform A and checking requestor C, wherein is verified credible platform A safety chip TPM/TCM, tolerance agency and report agency is installed, wherein:
What (1) checking request: C generated 160 or 256 can not stab N expeced time
C, to C and N
CDigital signature sends the checking request message then
Give and be verified credible platform A;
(2) credentials check: after receiving the checking request message of C, the validity and the legitimacy of the A request CA of trusted third party checking C certificate;
(3) certificate sends: after certification authentication was passed through, CA sent to A with the public key certificate of C;
(4) tolerance report: A utilizes the PKI PUB of C
CCertifying signature
In C and N
CWhether with message in unsigned C and N
CIdentical respectively.If identical, what then generate 160 or 256 can not stab N expeced time
A, and N
CGenerate 160 or 256 s' session encryption key SK according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm).
A obtains value of specifying PCR and the calculation of correlation daily record ML that specifies PCR from safety chip TPM/TCM, and with session encryption key SK PCR value and metrics logs ML is encrypted, and obtains encrypted result enc{PCR, ML}
SK, and usage platform identity key PIK
PubPairing private key PIK
PrvTo identify label A, can not stab N expeced time
A, N
C+ 1 and encrypted result enc{PCR, ML}
SKDigital signature sends following message to C:
(5) credentials check: after receiving the response message of A, C is by the validity and the legitimacy of CA checking A platform letter of identity;
(6) remote proving: after certification authentication was passed through, C utilized A platform identity key PIK
PubA and N in the certifying signature
AWhether with message in unsigned A and N
AIdentical respectively, and inspection N wherein
CWith the N that is sent
CWhether mate.
If N
CCoupling, C utilizes N
AAnd N
CGenerate session encryption key SK according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm), deciphering enc{PCR, ML}
SK, obtain PCR value and metrics logs ML.
C calculates final PCR value according to the whole integrity measurement process of metrics logs ML reconstruct, and the PCR value that obtains with deciphering compares.If both are identical, can confirm that then it is believable being verified credible platform; Otherwise, just think that it is incredible being verified credible platform.
11) checking requestor C calculates final PCR value according to the whole integrity measurement process of metrics logs ML reconstruct, and the PCR value that obtains with deciphering compares, and both are identical, confirms that then it is believable being verified credible platform; Otherwise, just think that it is incredible being verified credible platform.
Claims (4)
1. the method for trusted computation environment medium-long range proof, it is characterized in that, adopt session encryption key that the integrity measurement value and the metrics logs that are verified credible platform are encrypted, and to the encrypted result digital signature, assurance is verified integrity measurement value and the authenticity of metrics logs and the privacy of platform of credible platform, with effective strick precaution Replay Attack, impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack, can be used for proving that to the checking requestor platform running environment is believable or is used for self detecting of platform running environment, this method is based on safety chip TPM/TCM, the remote proving framework that is adopted is by integrity measurement mechanism, report mechanism and authentication mechanism three parts are formed, act on behalf of by integrity measurement respectively, report agency and checking requestor finish, its vacuum metrics agency, report agency and safety chip are installed in the credible platform that is verified, an effective letter of identity is arranged in the credible platform that is verified, and its binding is verified the identity key PIK of credible platform
Pub, wherein,
(1) tolerance agency: the object of decision tolerance, measuring period and Maintenance Measurement value how safely, its function is the metric of calculating unit, write down this tolerance incident in metrics logs, and metric charged in the safety chip among the corresponding platform configuration register PCR, the method of charging to is: new PCR value=cryptographic Hash algorithm, metrics logs includes but not limited at least: tolerance person's information, by tolerance person's information, former PCR value, metric, new PCR value, deadline, and metrics logs has been represented the integrity measurement history that is verified credible platform;
(2) report agency: the integrity measurement value that platform or part parts are provided to the checking requestor, according to set key schedule, generate session encryption key, to the calculation of correlation log information encryption of specifying the PCR value and specifying PCR, and usage platform identity key PIK
PubPairing private key PIK
PrvTo the encrypted result digital signature, the result that will sign sends to the checking requestor;
(3) checking requestor: send the checking request to being verified credible platform, to the response results usage platform identity key PIK that receives
PubThe signature and the deciphering of checking PCR value and metrics logs, by metrics logs, the whole integrity measurement process of reconstruct is also calculated Hash Value, and the PCR value of final PCR value with deciphering compared, and both are identical, then confirm to be verified the credibility of credible platform; If both differences draw the state that is verified credible platform and change, can not confirm its credibility;
Concrete remote proving step is:
(1) checking requestor C generates the timestamp N that can not expect
C, to C and N
CDigital signature sends checking request message C, N then
C,
Give and be verified credible platform A;
(2) receive the checking request message of C after, the validity and the legitimacy of the A request CA of trusted third party checking C certificate;
(3) after certification authentication was passed through, CA sent to A with the public key certificate of C;
(4) A utilizes the PKI PUB of C
CCertifying signature
In C and N
CWhether with message in unsigned C and N
CIdentical respectively, if identical, then generate the timestamp N that can not expect
A, and N
CGenerate session encryption key SK according to set key schedule (as the DH algorithm);
A obtains value of specifying PCR and the calculation of correlation daily record ML that specifies PCR from safety chip TPM/TCM, and with session encryption key SK PCR value and metrics logs ML is encrypted, and obtains encrypted result enc{PCR, ML}
SK, and usage platform identity key PIK
PubPairing private key PIK
PrvTo identify label A, can not stab N expeced time
A, N
C+ 1 and encrypted result enc{PCR, ML}
SKDigital signature sends following message to C:
(5) receive the response message of A after, C is by the validity and the legitimacy of CA checking A platform letter of identity;
(6) after certification authentication was passed through, C utilized A platform identity key PIK
PubA in the certifying signature and N
AWhether with message in unsigned A and N
AIdentical respectively, and inspection N wherein
CWith the N that is sent
CWhether mate;
If N
CCoupling, C utilizes N
AAnd N
CGenerate session encryption key SK according to set key schedule, deciphering enc{PCR, ML}
SK, obtain PCR value and metrics logs ML;
C calculates final PCR value according to the whole integrity measurement process of metrics logs ML reconstruct, and the PCR value that obtains with deciphering compares.If both are identical, confirm that then it is believable being verified credible platform; Otherwise, just think that it is incredible being verified credible platform.
2, method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, be verified the integrity measurement process of credible platform, comprise integrity measurement mechanism, report mechanism and authentication mechanism, finished by integrity measurement agency, report agency and checking requestor respectively, its vacuum metrics agency, report agency and safety chip TPM/TCM are installed in and are verified in the credible platform.
3, method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, the object of tolerance agency decision tolerance, measuring period and Maintenance Measurement value how safely, its major function is the metric of calculating unit, write down this tolerance incident in metrics logs, and metric is charged in the safety chip TPM/TCM among the corresponding platform configuration register PCR.
4, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, metrics logs includes, but not limited to tolerance person's information, by tolerance person's information, former PCR value, metric, new PCR value, deadline.
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