CN103916246A - Method and system for preventing cheating during examination based on trusted computing - Google Patents
Method and system for preventing cheating during examination based on trusted computing Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and system for preventing cheating during an examination based on trusted computing. The method and system are achieved based on a TCM credible encryption module, and security mechanisms such as credible guidance, dynamic integrality measurement, credible network connection, asymmetric encryption and decryption and digital signature verification are used. Security guarantees provided by the method and system for an examination scene include the platform security before the examination, the network connection security between a client side and a server, the security of the system environment during the examination and the like, the integrity of an examination operation system and the integrity of an examination system are protected in real time, and cheating behaviors achieved by running malicious software and the like are prevented. By the adoption of the method and system for preventing cheating during the examination based on trusted computing, answers of an examinee are prevented from being tampered on the server side due to collusion between a server administrator and the examinee.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to Networking Education Technology field, relate to a kind of examination anti-cheating method and system, be specifically related to a kind of examination anti-cheating method and system based on credible calculating.
Background technology
Along with the development of the Internet and the variation of the forms of education, a lot of examining bodies and educational institution adopt online testing to examine student.And in the process of online testing, in order to guarantee the validity of online testing, we need to prevent examinee's cheating as much as possible, guarantee that paper and examinee submit to the confidentiality of answer and integrality not to be destroyed.The setting of examination hall supervisor of online testing, can stop to impersonate in tradition examination and examination hall in traditional cheating mode such as whisper to each other.Utilize device for examining to carry out the cheating such as networked realtime communication or operation illegal software and cannot take precautions against.Anti-cheating measure in existing examination system, comprises and utilizes screen locking to make examinee cannot start other programs, utilizes network monitoring to make examinee cannot use real-time Transmission instrument etc.But the pure depended software of these safety measures, is easily crossed and destroys by side.In addition, current existing work is difficult to take precautions against following this cheating: examinee gangs up keeper and distorts and be stored in the answer that server end has been submitted to after examination.
Summary of the invention
In order to improve above anti-cheating and anti-tamper mechanism; the invention provides a kind of examination anti-cheating method and system based on credible calculating; can real-time guard the integrality of examination operating system and examination system; take precautions against cheating such as operation Malware etc., and can prevent that server administrators and student from ganging up at server end and distort examinee's answer of having submitted to.
To achieve these goals, the present invention is by the following technical solutions:
An examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating, comprises the following steps:
1) calculate the digest value of operating system under device for examining safe condition and client and in server end registration, as the canonical reference value of trusted bootstrap; The platform integrity metric value of device for examining is registered to the standard value as server to client integrity verification at server end;
2), before examination, while starting device for examining, whether destroyedly detect operating system integrality, and verify that by server end whether device for examining platform status is credible;
3) the believable device for examining of platform status and server end carry out key agreement and paper distribution;
4) after examination starts, integrity measurement list is measured and write to device for examining by metric module to all data and files that are loaded into internal memory; Meanwhile, the tolerance result to examination system program is write in platform configuration register;
5) stop after examination, platform status register value and integrity measurement list are sent to server end by client, in server end checking examination, whether has cheating;
6), after server end is verified, the answer that client is submitted to examinee is encrypted with private key signature and passes to server end.
Further, in step 1), also comprise and allow the white list program of operation measure and deposit digest value in server end device for examining in examination.
Further, step 2) in, by the digest value of credible platform module (TCM) computing system bottom assembly and examination system program, then contrast with the canonical reference value of trusted bootstrap, if come to the same thing, illustrate that completeness of platform does not have destroyed, otherwise platform key component is destroyed.
Further, step 2) in, each device for examining has the own platform identity key for signing, and server end has obtained the PKI of the platform identity key of each device for examining; Whether server end checking device for examining platform status is credible specifically comprises: client will send to server end after the platform integrity metric value signature of device for examining, server end first utilizes the public key verifications signature of platform identity key, to confirm that integrity measurement value, really from above-mentioned device for examining, then contrasts platform integrity metric value and standard value; Server end can transmit examination paper after proving that device for examining platform status is credible.
Further, in step 3), specifically comprise the following steps:
3 ?1) both sides carry out the negotiation of session key, server end generates symmetric key, after encrypting, sends to client by client private key, after client deciphering, obtains session key;
3 ?2) both sides carry out the negotiation of examinee's identity key, when each examinee participates in each examination, all will produce examinee's identity key, the representative of examinee's identity key is this examinee's of examination identity this time, the PKI that server end will storage examinee identity key;
3 ?3) server end obtains paper information from server security memory module, sends to client after utilizing session key, client is received rear deciphering and is started examination.
Further, step 3-2) in, specifically comprise: client call TCM software stack, generate a pair of TCM public private key pair for signing, utilize the PKI of platform identity key to this key and the timestamp signature obtaining from TCM; The generation time of server end storage key and public key information.
Further, in step 4), while utilizing integrity measurement framework IMA to realize the loading of file, measure the filename of newly-increased record tolerance file in integrity measurement list.
Further, the structure of the record of an integrity measurement list (IML) integrity measurement is as follows: IML=PCR index || SM3 cryptographic Hash (32) || and file or program name; Wherein PCR represents platform configuration register.
Further, in step 5), first both sides carry out remote proving, and server end sends remote proving request, and platform status register value and integrity measurement list are utilized platform identity key signature by client, sends to server end; In server end checking examination, whether there is cheating, specifically comprise the following steps:
5 ?1) whether utilize this metric of public key verifications (being platform status register value and integrity measurement list) of device for examining platform identity key, from device for examining, be not to report an error from device for examining, answer is submitted in rejection to;
5 ?2) authentication manager of server end utilizes the metric in integrity measurement list, expand in order, the platform status register value that expansion is calculated, the platform status register value sending with integrity measurement listserv is compared, if both are not inconsistent, illustrate that platform status register value is tampered, report an error and reject submission answer;
5 ?3) authentication manager according to each integrity measurement list records and allow use program white list, whether comparison has loaded the Procedure and Document outside white list: first compare filename, filename in the list of assumption of complete tolerance, outside white list, reports an error; If program name in white list but cryptographic Hash is inconsistent, illustrate that load document or program suffered to distort, now report an error and refuse.
Further, in step 6), after server end is verified, client is utilized step 3-2) in the TCM private key that the generates answer signature to examinee, and check on one's answers and encrypted signature after pass to server end, server end is received after information, utilize session key deciphering, and utilize the public key verifications signature obtaining, storage is signed and is submitted answer to, and whole examination flow process finishes.
An examination anti-cheating system based on credible calculating, comprising:
Device for examining, described device for examining comprises again:
Client, for examinee login, carries out key agreement, transfer of data with server end and controls examination flow process (comprising examination starts, cancels, termination etc.);
Device for examining secure storage module, for storage key and paper information;
Metric manager, carries out dynamic measurement for calling bottom metric module to device for examining, and writes integrity measurement list;
Device for examining loads tolerance and TCM software stack: call TCM chip and carry out dynamic measurement, utilize key to be encrypted and sign;
Server, described server comprises again:
Examination service routine, for authenticating examinee and device for examining, distribution paper and reception answer;
Server security memory module, for storage key, paper information and the examination answer from client;
Authentication manager, carries out remote proving from platform status register value and the integrity measurement list of client to device for examining for basis;
Server loads tolerance and TCM software stack: utilize TCM chip, be encrypted and sign.
Further, the key of storing in described device for examining secure storage module comprises: from the PKI, examination transmission security key, platform identity key PIK and the TCM private key of client oneself for the transmission of taking an examination of server end; The key of storing in described server security memory module comprises: for private key, the session key of transmission of taking an examination, PIK PKI and the TCM PKI of device for examining.
Beneficial effect of the present invention:
The present invention is based on credible platform module TCM(Trusted Cryptography Module) realize, the security mechanism using comprises: trusted bootstrap, dynamically integrity measurement, trustable network connects, asymmetric encryption and decryption, digital signature authentication etc.This system has covered the safety guarantee that provides of examination scene: the fail safe of system environments etc. in network connection safety between platform security, client and server end before examination, examination process; the integrality of real-time guard examination operating system and examination system, takes precautions against the cheatings such as operation Malware.Preventing that server administrators and student from ganging up at server end distorts examinee's answer of having submitted to.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the examination anti-cheating system structure chart that the present invention is based on credible calculating.
Fig. 2 is the Hook Function schematic diagram that in the present invention, IMA utilizes.
Fig. 3 is the process schematic diagram whether server authentication of the present invention has cheating.
Embodiment
As shown in Figure 1, in device for examining, client is responsible for examinee's login, the mutual and control examination flow process with server end.And device for examining secure storage module is responsible for storage of public keys and paper information.Metric manager is responsible for calling bottom metric module and server end carries out remote proving, and monitors the cheating in examination in real time.Device for examining loading tolerance and TCM software stack are called TCM chip and are carried out dynamic measurement, utilize key to be encrypted and sign.Examination service routine and device for examining in server are mutual, are responsible for authentication examinee and device for examining, and distribution paper and reception answer are in the middle of server security memory module.Authentication manager and device for examining carry out remote proving.Server loads tolerance and TCM software stack: utilize TCM chip, be encrypted and sign.
Examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating comprises following six steps, and each step is described in detail as follows:
The first step: the reference metric value of initialization device for examining.
On device for examining, install after examination system, calculate the hash value of device for examining bottom assembly and examination system program, and be saved in the nonvolatile storage space of TCM, as the canonical reference value of trusted bootstrap.And the integrity measurement value of device for examining is registered to authentication manager by platform credible service.In addition, because examinee in examination can move the legal procedures such as input method, these white list programs need to be measured and deposit digest value in server end authentication manager.
Second step: before trusted bootstrap and examination, whether checking device for examining platform is credible
When system starts, by core tolerance root (core root of trust for measurement) tolerance BIOS, BIOS metric G rub(GRUB is a kind of multiple operating system start-up routine, can be used for selecting the different kernels on operating system partition, also can be used for transmitting start-up parameter to these kernels), Grub metric operations system kernel, writes integrity measurement value platform configuration register PCR(Platform Configuration Register during the course, is called for short PCR).The hash value of TCM chip computing system bottom assembly and examination system program, then contrasts with the canonical reference value that is kept at nonvolatile storage space.If come to the same thing, illustrate that completeness of platform does not have destroyed, otherwise platform key component is destroyed, has potential safety hazard.When trusted bootstrap, TCM deposits the metric of system bottom key component in TCM register PCR5 in, and the metric of examination system program deposits in PCR6, after starting for system.
1. examinee ST1 login examination system, input username & password, application takes an exam.On device for examining, client sends request of data to server end.
2. server is received after request of data, will send remote proving request to client, and remote proving request comprises random number N ounce
a.
3. client is received after remote proving request, and metric manager is called the TCM software stack of bottom, utilizes TCM to quote function as proof, utilizes PIK private key to platform status S
1and Nounce
asign.The following M of data format
1=S
1|| SignPIK(S
1, Nounce
a).
Utilize metric manager that the platform integrity metric value of device for examining (being the value of PCR5, PCR6, PCR12 at this examination system) is registered at server end, the standard value as server to the complete rationality checking of client.When each checking, client will send to server after local PCR value signature, and the first certifying signature of server end, contrasts PCR value and standard value, finally the result is sent to client.Here being used for identifying the PCR5 of completeness of platform and the value of PCR6 is the value that trusted bootstrap tolerance mechanism is preserved, and PCR12 is integrity measurement framework IMA(Integrity Measurement Architecture) load document and file will be expanded in strategy PCR.
The 3rd step: key agreement and transfer of data
Before examination, server end produces the key pair for the encryption of the transmission of taking an examination, and private key is designated as Server_Enc_SK, and PKI is designated as Server_Enc_PK.Server_Enc_PK is kept in the middle of the secure storage module of device for examining by modes such as physical transfer.
Client also has the examination transmission security key Client_Enc_SK of oneself, each device for examining has own platform identity key (the Platform Identity Key for signing in addition, be called for short PIK), testing server has obtained the PIK PKI Client_PIK_PK of each device for examining.We suppose that the PKI of device for examining T1 is Client_PIK_PK
1.
1. the authentication server of server utilizes public key verifications signature Client_PIK_PK
1., to confirm that integrity measurement value is really from device for examining K
1.The device for examining of authentication manager checking is afterwards in trusted status.
2. both sides carry out the negotiation of session key K.Server end generates symmetric key K, and after encrypting by client private key, Ency (K) sends to client.After client deciphering, obtain K.
3. both sides carry out the negotiation of examinee's identity key.When each examinee participates in each examination, all to produce examinee's identity key.Concrete steps are as follows:
Client call TCM software stack, generates a pair of TCM public private key pair Client_EXAM for signing.Utilize the PKI of platform identity key PIK to this key and the timestamp signature obtaining from TCM.Information generated M
2=Client_EXAM_PK||currentTime||SignPIK(Client_EXAM_PK, currentTime).
Server end is received after information, utilizes platform identity key authentication information from device for examining T1.The generation time of key and public key information Client_EXAM_PK are deposited in server security memory module.
4. server end obtains paper information Data from safe storage
test, utilize session key K to encrypt and obtain M
7=Ency (Data), client is received rear deciphering and is started examination.
The 4th step: examination process control
After examination starts, examination system client need to be monitored examinee and whether use illegal program, for example immediate communication tool and browser.And whether load malicious script and destroyed operating system integrality.Utilize dynamic measurement module herein, integrity measurement list is measured and write to all data and files that are loaded into internal memory.In dynamic measurement module, record the white list program that allows use, such as input method etc.Once the program that metric module discovery loads or data, not within the scope of white list, can be notified examination system client, cancel in time and take an examination and report to testing server.Meanwhile, metric module writes the tolerance result to program in the middle of platform configuration register (Platform Configuration Register is called for short PCR).
We utilize the integrality of IMA tolerance examination system client.And utilize IMA when examination monitoring whether to use illegal program.IMA can accurately measure the needed file of decision-making assembly, program information; Metric is expanded into PCR, after access finishes, client proves the credible of the process of taking an examination by the mode of remote proving simultaneously.System loads data file or can operating file in, the SM3 informative abstract of 32 bytes of IMA calculation document is also saved in the middle of integrality list.Integrality list records filename and the metric of each IMA while measuring.Meanwhile, the digest value calculating is expanded to PCR by IMA.
Kernel is to call IMA according to the tactful tolerance that realizes operational system of tolerance by the mode of Hook Function.Therefore, all programs and file all can, through excess vol, can not be walked around detection before opening and carrying out.IMA kernel has mainly been realized the Hook Function of three generic operations, as shown in Figure 2:
1) operation executable file is measured the file loading before operating file.
2) opening operation of file, carry out last opening operation advance style of writing part tolerance, tolerance before, carry out the judgement whether file can be measured.
3) memory-mapped operation, IMA measures the memory-mapped of attribute-executable at present.
IMA, in Hook Function, realizes the tolerance to binary file, and metric is write to integrity measurement list IML(Integrity Measurement List).Article one, the structure of the record of IML integrity measurement is as follows: IML=PCR index || SM3 cryptographic Hash (32) || and file or program name.
The 5th step, after examination, server end checking examination process is credible.
Stop after examination, first both sides carry out remote proving, and server end sends remote proving request, and platform status register value and integrity measurement list are utilized platform identity key signature by client, sends to server end.
Server end receives after metric, and the step of authentication manager checking metric as shown in Figure 3.First utilize the PKI Client_PIK_PK of device for examining platform identity key to verify that whether this metric is from device for examining.Be not to report an error from device for examining, answer is submitted in rejection to.
Authentication manager utilizes the metric in IML, expands in order, and extended operation is as follows: PCR
12=hash (PCR
12|| file cryptographic Hash).The PCR that expansion is calculated
12value, with IML server send PCR12 compare.Suppose that both are not inconsistent, illustrate that IML is tampered, report an error and reject submission answer.
Authentication manager is according to each IML record and allow the program white list using, and whether comparison has loaded the Procedure and Document outside white list.First compare filename, suppose that filename in IML, outside white list, reports an error; If program name in white list but cryptographic Hash is inconsistent, illustrate that load document or program suffered to distort, now report an error and refuse.
The 6th step, submits examinee's answer to
After authentication manager is verified, client is utilized the answer signature of TCM private key Client_EXAM_SK to examinee, and checks on one's answers and encrypted signature.M
3=Ency
k(Data
ans||Sign
Client_EXAM(Data
ans))
Server end is received after information, utilizes session key K deciphering, and utilizes the Client_EXAM public key verifications signature obtaining, and signature and submission answer are left in the middle of server security memory module, and whole examination flow process finishes.
Claims (10)
1. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating, comprises the following steps:
1) calculate the digest value of operating system under device for examining safe condition and client and in server end registration, as the canonical reference value of trusted bootstrap; The platform integrity metric value of device for examining is registered to the standard value as server to client integrity verification at server end;
2), before examination, while starting device for examining, whether destroyedly detect operating system integrality, and verify that by server end whether device for examining platform status is credible;
3) the believable device for examining of platform status and server end carry out key agreement and paper distribution;
4) after examination starts, integrity measurement list is measured and write to device for examining by metric module to all data and files that are loaded into internal memory; Meanwhile, the tolerance result to examination system program is write in platform configuration register;
5) stop after examination, platform status register value and integrity measurement list are sent to server end by client, in server end checking examination, whether has cheating;
6), after server end is verified, the answer that client is submitted to examinee is encrypted with private key signature and passes to server end.
2. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, in step 1), also comprises and allows the white list program of operation measure and deposit digest value in server end device for examining in examination.
3. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, step 2) in, by the digest value of credible platform module computing system bottom assembly and examination system program, then contrast with the canonical reference value of trusted bootstrap, if come to the same thing, illustrate that completeness of platform does not have destroyed, otherwise platform key component is destroyed.
4. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that step 2) in, each device for examining has the own platform identity key for signing, and server end has obtained the PKI of the platform identity key of each device for examining; Whether server end checking device for examining platform status is credible specifically comprises: client will send to server end after the platform integrity metric value signature of device for examining, server end first utilizes the public key verifications signature of platform identity key, to confirm that integrity measurement value, really from above-mentioned device for examining, then contrasts platform integrity metric value and standard value; Server end can transmit examination paper after proving that device for examining platform status is credible.
5. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, in step 3), specifically comprises the following steps:
3-1) both sides carry out the negotiation of session key, and server end generates symmetric key, after encrypting, send to client by client private key, after client deciphering, obtain session key;
3-2) both sides carry out the negotiation of examinee's identity key, when each examinee participates in each examination, all will produce examinee's identity key, and the representative of examinee's identity key is this examinee's of examination identity this time, and server end is by the PKI of storage examinee identity key;
3-3) server end obtains paper information from server security memory module, sends to client after utilizing session key, and client is received rear deciphering and started examination.
6. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 5, it is characterized in that, step 3-2) in, specifically comprise: client call TCM software stack, generate a pair of TCM public private key pair for signing, utilize the PKI of platform identity key to this key and the timestamp signature obtaining from TCM; The generation time of server end storage key and public key information.
7. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, in step 4), while utilizing integrity measurement framework IMA to realize the loading of file, measures the filename of newly-increased record tolerance file in integrity measurement list; Article one, the structure of the record of integrity measurement list IML integrity measurement is as follows: IML=PCR index || SM3 cryptographic Hash (32) || and file or program name; Wherein PCR represents platform configuration register.
8. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, in step 5), first both sides carry out remote proving, server end sends remote proving request, platform status register value and integrity measurement list are utilized platform identity key signature by client, sends to server end; In server end checking examination, whether there is cheating, specifically comprise the following steps:
Whether from device for examining, be not from device for examining report an error, answer is submitted in rejection to if 5-1) utilizing platform status register value and integrity measurement list described in the public key verifications of device for examining platform identity key;
5-2) authentication manager of server end utilizes the metric in integrity measurement list, expand in order, the platform status register value that expansion is calculated, the platform status register value sending with integrity measurement listserv is compared, if both are not inconsistent, illustrate that platform status register value is tampered, report an error and reject submission answer;
5-3) authentication manager is according to the program white list of each integrity measurement list records and permission use, whether comparison has loaded the Procedure and Document outside white list: first compare filename, filename in the list of assumption of complete tolerance, outside white list, reports an error; If program name in white list but cryptographic Hash is inconsistent, illustrate that load document or program suffered to distort, now report an error and refuse.
9. the examination anti-cheating method based on credible calculating as claimed in claim 6, it is characterized in that, in step 6), after server end is verified, client is utilized the answer signature of the TCM private key generating in step 3) to examinee, and check on one's answers and encrypted signature after pass to server end, server end is received after information, utilizes session key deciphering, and utilizes the public key verifications signature obtaining, storage signature and submission answer, whole examination flow process finishes.
10. the examination anti-cheating system based on credible calculating, comprising:
Device for examining, described device for examining comprises again:
Client, for examinee's login, carries out key agreement, transfer of data and controls examination flow process with server end;
Device for examining secure storage module, for storage key and paper information;
Metric manager, carries out dynamic measurement for calling bottom metric module to device for examining, and writes integrity measurement list;
Device for examining loads tolerance and TCM software stack: call TCM chip and carry out dynamic measurement, utilize key to be encrypted and sign;
Server, described server comprises again:
Examination service routine, for authenticating examinee and device for examining, distribution paper and reception answer;
Server security memory module, for storage key, paper information and the examination answer from client;
Authentication manager, carries out remote proving from platform status register value and the integrity measurement list of client to device for examining for basis;
Server loads tolerance and TCM software stack: utilize TCM chip, be encrypted and sign.
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| CN108924167B (en) * | 2018-09-06 | 2020-12-01 | 贵阳信息技术研究院（中科院软件所贵阳分部） | Block chain-based network question setting and answering method incapable of being tampered |
| CN111083096A (en) * | 2018-10-22 | 2020-04-28 | 塔塔咨询服务有限公司 | Method and system for securely distributing content in an examination |
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| CN112765580A (en) * | 2021-01-22 | 2021-05-07 | 电子科技大学 | Method and system for protecting and preventing repudiation of examination questions in online examination |
| CN112765580B (en) * | 2021-01-22 | 2022-09-13 | 电子科技大学 | Method and system for protecting and preventing repudiation of examination questions in online examination |
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