CN114338038A - Memory system for block chain data secret inquiry and careless transmission method - Google Patents
Memory system for block chain data secret inquiry and careless transmission method Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
A storage system for block chain data secret query and an accidental transmission method relate to the technical field of data transmission. The method aims to solve the problem that privacy cannot be well protected in block chain data storage and data query at present. The storage system is built based on a block chain technology, light nodes and all nodes form a network layer on a chain and are used for an inquirer to select block chain data, the heavy encryption nodes form a data storage layer under the chain, and the data storage layer under the chain stores a large amount of encryption information; the memory sends the ciphertext to the re-encryption node to be stored in a data storage layer under the chain, and sends the index information to all the nodes to be stored in a block body of a network layer on the chain to form an index information list; and after receiving the issued new block, the re-encryption node performs MapReduce operation once, classifies the data of all the memory users in the new block according to the user names of the memory users, and stores the data in the data storage layer. The method of inadvertent transfer is implemented based on a storage system. The method is mainly used for the secret inquiry of data.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of data transmission.
Background
With the rapid development of the blockchain technology, people pay more and more attention to the privacy protection problem of the blockchain, and at present, research aiming at the privacy protection problem of the blockchain is mainly focused on the identities and transaction contents of two parties of a secure blockchain transaction, so that some blockchain encryption currencies, such as the menlo currency and the zero currency, are generated. After the cryptocurrency completes the transaction on the block chain, the initiator and the receiver of the transaction cannot be known in the whole network, and the documents "li xu east, niu yukun, wei ling bo, and the like. In terms of protection of privacy for users in a Blockchain, documents "CHENG Lichen, LIU Jiqiang, JIN Yi, et al, Account Guarantee Scheme: learning Anonymous Accounts Supervised in Blockchain [ J ]. ACM Transactions On Internet Technology (TOIT),2021,21(1): 1-19" propose to supervise Anonymous Accounts in a Blockchain, thereby protecting individual privacy.
Under the big data era, data becomes an important resource for promoting the development of human society, so that the research on how to store data on a block chain and protect privacy becomes a new development direction. The idea of users storing data on blockchains for transactions and calculations is currently proposed, but there is also a need to address the issue of data management and storage space. In terms of data management, Obour et al propose a data sharing scheme based on blockchain and proxy re-encryption, which uses the processing nodes in the blockchain as proxy servers and encrypts data, and which is resistant to collusion attack while ensuring data security. In the aspect of storage space, Nguyen Binh Truong et al propose a chain-up-chain-down common storage mode, store the data access address of a storage on a chain in an encrypted form, store a large amount of data of a user under the chain, if an inquirer needs to access the user data, the inquirer needs to be granted an access token of the storage and give a third party a real address, and obviously, the system has a risk that the third party leaks the data address and the inquirer information. The document "lujianfu, lisinga, liujing." log security storage and retrieval model based on chain uplink-downlink combination [ J ] computer science, 2020,47(03): 298-. Miyachi et al store medical data on a blockchain and perform privacy protection assessment and analysis on data sharing, storage, access and computation; meanwhile, a modularized mixed privacy protection framework is provided, the framework manages different types of medical data based on privacy information for protecting patients, and information such as electronic cases, consumer gene data and the like is kept secret, but an attacker can deduce personal sensitive information of the users by collecting medical data shared and transmitted by the users.
In summary, privacy protection for blockchain data storage and data query is not completely solved, and when a querier acquires data, the whole network can deduce sensitive information of the querier by querying which data are transmitted on the blockchain. For example, it is very important for the inquiry person to protect privacy if Bob thinks he gets a certain genetic disease, and if a DNA sample known to Alice to have the genetic disease is stored on the block chain, he wants to obtain the DNA sample of Alice for comparison, but Bob does not want to let others know that he has the genetic disease.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the problem that privacy cannot be well protected in the existing block chain data storage and data query.
The block chain data privacy query storage system is built based on a block chain technology, and comprises light nodes, full nodes and heavy encryption nodes;
the light nodes and the full nodes correspondingly form a network layer on the chain, the network layer on the chain is exposed in the full network and used for an inquirer to select block chain data, each block is divided into a block head and a block body, the heavy encryption nodes form a data storage layer under the chain, and the data storage layer under the chain stores a large amount of encryption information;
the light node is responsible for recording the block head of the block chain and promoting the operation of the block chain; the whole node is responsible for recording the information on the whole chain and providing index information in the block body for the inquirer; the re-encryption node is responsible for storing a large amount of data of the data storage layer under the link;
the memory sends the ciphertext to the re-encryption node to be stored in a data storage layer under the chain, and sends the index information to all the nodes to be stored in a block body of a network layer on the chain to form an index information list;
and after receiving the issued new block, the re-encryption node performs MapReduce operation once, classifies the data of all the memory users in the new block according to the user names of the memory users, and stores the data in the data storage layer.
Further, the index information is generated by the storage, and comprises a data title and a ciphertext hash value.
Furthermore, in the process of MapReduce operation, the re-encryption nodes generate each sub-node and perform parallel operation simultaneously, the Map stage is responsible for cutting data, the Shuffle stage performs grouping and sequencing, the Reduce stage performs reduction, the re-encryption nodes summarize finally, and the re-encryption nodes store all data in a data storage layer in a classified manner according to the user names of the storages.
Further, during the MapReduce operation, the re-encryption node backs up data at each branch node in a distributed storage mode.
Further, when the light node records the block head of the block chain, the block head is stored in a distributed mode by the light node.
Further, the block head of the block chain recorded by the light node records the hash value of the previous block head, and also records a random number, a Merkle root hash value and timestamp information.
The block chain data secret inquiry careless transmission method comprises a data storage process and an careless transmission process;
the data storage process comprises the following steps:
the memory uses an elliptic curve encryption algorithm to encrypt the uploaded information to obtain a ciphertext and an identifier, and the ciphertext is converted into a hash value; selecting a title and a sequence number for the ciphertext; a storage person stores a re-encryption node of a storage system for sending a ciphertext to block chain data security query in a data storage layer, and then forms an index message by a user name of the storage person, a serial number, a title, an identifier and a ciphertext hash value of the ciphertext and sends the index message to a full node; the sequence number in the index information is used for being sequentially sent from small to large when the data is transmitted carelessly, the title provides information types for an inquirer, the identifier is used for encrypting a public key of the inquirer, and the ciphertext hash value is used for verifying the data after the data is transmitted carelessly; all the index information is stored in a block body on a chain in a public mode by the full node to form an index information list, meanwhile, each piece of index information is converted into a hash value in sequence, and a root hash value is formed in a Merkle tree data structure mode and stored in a block head;
the process of said inadvertent transmission comprises the steps of:
(1) after determining the serial number of the acquired data, the inquirer encrypts the public key of the inquirer by using the identifier in the index information and sends the public key to the storer;
(2) the storage person combines the private key of the storage person with the encrypted data sent by the inquirer to generate a re-encryption key, and sends the re-encryption key to the re-encryption node;
(3) the re-encryption node receives the ciphertext uploaded by the storage person in the data storage layer, sequentially encrypts the ciphertext for the second time by using the re-encryption key, and then sequentially sends the ciphertext to the inquirer;
(4) and the inquirer finds the secondary encrypted ciphertext sent by the re-encrypted node according to the serial number, and decrypts by using a private key of the inquirer to obtain the original data of the memory.
Further, the process of encrypting the uploaded information by using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm comprises the following steps:
recording the data memory as Alice, and selecting s by AliceAAs a private key, a public key p is generated by means of an elliptic curve cryptography algorithmA＝sAG, encoding the original data into points on the elliptic curve, and then carrying out public key encryption to obtain a down-link ciphertext CiAlice needs to select a random number r each time it encrypts an original dataiWhile using the random number to generate an identifier Ci'。
Further, the process of converting the ciphertext into the hash value is implemented by using an SHA256 hash function. The process of sequentially converting each piece of index information into the hash value is realized by using an SHA256 hash function.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
aiming at the problems, the invention designs an accidental transmission scheme for secretly inquiring the privacy of the user in a block chain by utilizing an elliptic curve encryption algorithm, introduces an agent re-encryption mechanism to transmit data, and combines an on-chain and off-chain cooperative storage mode to improve the user efficiency, reduce the storage space and ensure the data security. According to the scheme, after the inquirer acquires certain data of the storage person, the whole network and the storage person can not know which data the inquirer acquires, and meanwhile, the whole network and the inquirer can not acquire other data of the storage person, so that the privacy of the storage person and the inquirer is well protected.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a Merkle tree data structure;
FIG. 2 is a block chain storage frame;
FIG. 3 is a schematic flow chart of MapReduce framework;
FIG. 4 is a block-chain network layer data storage frame;
fig. 5 is a flow chart illustrating the block chain inadvertent transmission phase.
Detailed Description
In order that the objects, aspects and advantages of the invention will become more apparent, the invention will be described by way of example only, and in connection with the accompanying drawings. It is to be understood that such description is merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. It should be noted that, in order to avoid obscuring the present invention with unnecessary details, only the structures and/or processing steps closely related to the scheme according to the present invention are shown in the drawings, and other details not so relevant to the present invention are omitted.
Before the present invention is explained in detail, some matters involved in the invention will be explained first:
protocol for oblivious transfer: an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol is a basic tool for cryptography, and ensures that after a receiver acquires certain data of a sender, the sender does not know which data the receiver acquires and cannot acquire other data of the sender, and the most studied at present is
And (4) protocol.
Merkle tree data structure: the Merkle tree data structure is mainly used for rapidly summarizing and checking the integrity of data, carrying out hash operation on data packets, carrying out continuous recursive operation upwards to generate new hash nodes, and finally only leaving a Merkle root hash value, as shown in fig. 1. The Merkle tree has the characteristics of non-falsification, verifiability, high efficiency and the like, and is applied to a block chain, so that the operation efficiency and the expandability of the block chain are greatly improved.
The first embodiment is as follows:
the embodiment is a storage system for block chain data security query.
The invention relates to an inadvertent transmission method for block chain data privacy query, which is realized based on a storage system for block chain data privacy query, and firstly, a storage system for block chain data privacy query is explained, which comprises the following specific steps:
improved blockchain storage framework: because data occupies a large amount of space when being synchronized on a block chain, the invention designs a storage frame for storing index information on the chain and storing original data under the chain according to the storage idea of combining the chain and the chain, thereby releasing a large amount of storage space on the block chain. The block chain is divided into a network layer and a data storage layer, and the network layer on the chain is exposed in the whole network and used for an inquirer to select block chain data; the data store layer below the chain stores a large amount of encrypted information, as shown in FIG. 2.
In fig. 2, the index information is generated by a storage, which includes a data header, a ciphertext hash value, and the like, and the storage sends the ciphertext to the re-encryption node to be stored in the data storage layer under the chain, and sends the index information to all nodes to be stored in the block body of the network layer on the chain to form an index information list. The framework has three types of nodes, namely a light node, a full node and a heavy encryption node. The light node is responsible for recording the block head of the block chain and promoting the operation of the block chain; the whole node is responsible for recording information on the whole chain, including a block head and a block body, and providing index information in the block body for an inquirer; the re-encryption node is responsible for storing a large amount of data of the data storage layer down the chain.
MapReduce-based data storage model: MapReduce is a programming model used for parallel operation of large-scale data sets, thereby improving the computational efficiency. After receiving the issued new block, the re-encryption node performs a MapReduce operation once, classifies data of all the depositors in the new block according to the user names of the depositors, and stores the data in the data storage layer, so that the time for screening the data of the depositors is saved when the inadvertent transmission stage is completed, and a MapReduce framework flow is provided in fig. 3.
In the process of executing MapReduce, the re-encryption nodes generate each sub-node and perform parallel operation simultaneously, the Map stage is responsible for cutting data, the Shuffle stage performs grouping and sequencing, the Reduce stage performs reduction, the re-encryption nodes perform summarization, and the re-encryption nodes store all data in a data storage layer according to the user names of the storages in a classified manner. The data are backed up at each sub-node corresponding to the re-encryption node by the re-encryption node in a distributed storage mode, and the sub-node compares and verifies the ciphertext after hashing with the ciphertext hash value in the index information on the chain, so that the availability and the integrity of the data are ensured.
The second embodiment is as follows:
the implementation mode is an accidental transmission method for block chain data security query, and is realized based on a storage system for block chain data security query.
The block chain data privacy query oblivious transmission method of the embodiment comprises a data storage part and an oblivious transmission part;
in the data storage part, after classifying the data encrypted by the storage person by the re-encryption node by adopting MapReduce, storing the data in the data storage layer under the chain in a distributed manner, and ensuring the integrity of the data; the whole node stores the index information sent by the storage person in the block body on the chain, so that the inquirer can find the data wanted by the inquirer according to the index information, and the data cannot be tampered randomly no matter the storage person or each node (light node, whole node and heavy encryption node), thereby ensuring the reliability and verifiability of the data. In the part of the accidental transmission, after the inquirer and the storer carry out the accidental transmission through the re-encryption node, all the nodes and the storer cannot know which data the inquirer acquires, and meanwhile, the private key and the original data of the storer cannot be leaked.
On-chain-off-chain data storage: each block in the network layer on the link is divided into a block head and a block body, the block head is stored in a distributed mode through a light node, and the hash value of the previous block head is recorded in the block head to prevent data from being tampered; in addition, the block header also records information such as a random number, a Merkle tree root hash value, a time stamp and the like. The index information is stored in the block body to form an index information list, the index information list is arranged from left to right and is recorded by all nodes, so that an inquirer can find the data which the inquirer wants according to the index information list in the block body. Fig. 4 shows the data structure of each block in the network layer of the block chain.
And the storer encrypts the uploaded information by using an elliptic curve encryption algorithm to obtain a ciphertext and an identifier, converts the ciphertext into a hash value by using an SHA256 hash function, and selects a title and a sequence number for the ciphertext. The storage person sends the ciphertext to the re-encryption node to be stored in the data storage layer, and then forms an index message by the user name of the storage person, the sequence number, the title, the identifier and the ciphertext hash value of the ciphertext and sends the index message to all nodes. The sequence number in the index information is used for being sequentially sent from small to large when the data is transmitted carelessly, the title provides information types for the inquirer, the identifier is used for encrypting the public key of the inquirer, and the ciphertext hash value is used for verifying the data after the data is transmitted carelessly. All the index information is stored in the block body on the chain in a public mode by the full nodes to form an index information list, meanwhile, each piece of index information is sequentially converted into a hash value by an SHA256 hash function, and a root hash value is formed in a Merkle tree data structure mode and stored in the block head.
Inadvertent transmission: the re-encryption node encrypts the ciphertext for the second time, so that a storage person does not need to provide a private key, an inquirer can decrypt the ciphertext encrypted for the second time only by using the private key of the inquirer, and the interaction process comprises the following four steps:
(1) after determining the serial number of the acquired data, the inquirer encrypts the public key of the inquirer by using the identifier in the index information and sends the public key to the storer;
(2) the storage person combines the private key of the storage person with the encrypted data sent by the inquirer to generate a re-encryption key, and sends the re-encryption key to the re-encryption node;
(3) the re-encryption node receives the ciphertext uploaded by the storage person in the data storage layer, sequentially encrypts the ciphertext for the second time by using the re-encryption key, and then sequentially sends the ciphertext to the inquirer;
(4) and the inquirer finds the secondary encrypted ciphertext sent by the re-encrypted node according to the serial number, and decrypts by using a private key of the inquirer to obtain the original data of the memory. The whole process is that the storage person does not know which data the inquirer obtains, and the specific process is as shown in fig. 5.
In the whole process, after the inquirer obtains the data, whether the original data is correct or not can be verified, the public key of the storer is used for encrypting the original data, then the hash value is obtained, then the hash value is compared with the ciphertext hash value in the index information, and if the hash value is equal, the verification is successful.
The specific protocol design is as follows:
assuming that Alice is a data storage and Bob is a querier, Bob wants to acquire some data stored by Alice on the blockchain, but does not want the whole network and Alice to know which data they have acquired. The protocol is divided into a data storage phase and an oblivious transmission phase, Alice executes the data storage phase under the normal operation of the block chain, and Bob executes the oblivious transmission phase when needing to acquire data on the block chain. In the whole protocol process, an elliptic curve encryption algorithm is adopted for encryption and decryption, and all data are encoded to points on an elliptic curve for operation. The symbolic meanings are shown in Table 1, where all i e (1,2,3 … n).
TABLE 1 protocol symbol meanings
And (3) protocol construction: suppose that user Alice owns the original data m1,m2,m3…mnPublic key pAAnd a private key sARandom number ri. Bob owns the public key pBAnd a private key sB. And storing the data into the block chain by the Alice by using the private key and the random number, initiating an application when the Bob needs to inquire the data, and starting to interact with the Alice after the identity is verified. The pseudo code algorithm for protocol 1 is as follows:
protocol 1: scheme for inadvertent transmission of block chain secret data queries
A data encryption stage:
alice selects sAAs a private key, a public key p is generated by means of an elliptic curve cryptography algorithmA＝sAG, encoding the original data into points on the elliptic curve, and then carrying out public key encryption to obtain a ciphertext CiAlice whenever encrypting a piece of original dataA random number r needs to be selectediWhile using the random number to generate an identifier Ci' the encryption process is as follows:
and (3) data security query stage:
the first step is as follows: bob selects a random number sBAs private key, a public key p is generatedB＝sBG. Bob calculates X ═ C 'by using identifier and sequence number X in index information'x+pBThen sending X to Alice;
the second step is that: alice calculates K ═ sAX obtains the re-encryption key and sends K to the re-encryption node;
the third step: the heavy encryption node finds all ciphertexts C of Alice in the storage layer under the chainiSequentially computing W using the re-encryption key Ki＝K-CiAnd W isiReturning to Bob;
the fourth step: bob finds the corresponding W by the serial numberx(i.e., i takes x) using the private key sBAnd Alice's public key pACalculating Mx＝sB·pA-WxAnd obtaining the Alice original data.
The protocol is ended.
And (3) correctness analysis:
(1) the fourth step, when the decryption result is correct, Bob pairs WxThe decryption process is performed as follows:
Mx＝sB·pA-Wx＝sB·sA·G-K+Cx
＝sB·sA·G-sA·C'x-sA·pB+Cx.
＝sB·sA·G-sA·rx·G-sA·sB·G+Mx+rx·sA·G＝Mx
(2) bob cannot decrypt other data of Alice, assumingBob selects the y-th secondary encrypted ciphertext WyDecryption is performed, since y ≠ x, so ry≠rxThe decryption process is as follows:
(3) bob and the re-encryption node cannot obtain Alice's private key because K is known as sA(C'x+pB) K, p inB、C'iCannot push out sAIs known as Wi＝K-Ci＝sA·pB+sA·ri·G-Mi-ri·sA·G＝sA·sB·G-MxW ini、K、pB、ri·G、Mi、sBG, s cannot be deduced from any equationAThe value of (c).
(4) In the second step, after receiving the encrypted data X sent by Bob, Alice can use the identifier to sequentially calculate Pi＝X-CiThe public key of Bob is obtained through decryption, but the public key of Bob is not known when n data are obtained, and the probability that each data has 1/n is the public key of Bob, so that the data obtained by Alice cannot be distinguished, and the privacy is good.
At present, the prevention of private data leakage becomes a research hotspot of block chain privacy protection, the privacy protection of data is not limited to original data, access data of an inquirer also needs to be kept secret, and an accidental transmission protocol can solve the problems. The invention firstly improves the traditional block chain data chain up-chain down storage mode, secondly designs an inadvertent transmission scheme for block chain data secret query by utilizing an elliptic curve encryption algorithm, and realizes the privacy protection of a block chain data storage person and a block chain data query person. Through analysis, the scheme designed by the invention has high calculation efficiency and small occupied storage space, and meanwhile, the data has the advantages of completeness, reliability, verifiability and the like, and has practical value.
The foregoing shows and describes the general principles and broad features of the present invention and advantages thereof. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, which are described in the specification and illustrated only to illustrate the principle of the present invention, but that various changes and modifications may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, which fall within the scope of the invention as claimed. The scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and equivalents thereof.
Claims (10)
1. The storage system for block chain data secret query is characterized in that the storage system is built based on a block chain technology, and the storage system built based on the block chain technology comprises light nodes, full nodes and heavy encryption nodes;
the light nodes and the full nodes correspondingly form a network layer on the chain, the network layer on the chain is exposed in the full network and used for an inquirer to select block chain data, each block is divided into a block head and a block body, the heavy encryption nodes form a data storage layer under the chain, and the data storage layer under the chain stores a large amount of encryption information;
the light node is responsible for recording the block head of the block chain and promoting the operation of the block chain; the whole node is responsible for recording the information on the whole chain and providing index information in the block body for the inquirer; the re-encryption node is responsible for storing a large amount of data of the data storage layer under the link;
the memory sends the ciphertext to the re-encryption node to be stored in a data storage layer under the chain, and sends the index information to all the nodes to be stored in a block body of a network layer on the chain to form an index information list;
and after receiving the issued new block, the re-encryption node performs MapReduce operation once, classifies the data of all the memory users in the new block according to the user names of the memory users, and stores the data in the data storage layer.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the index information is generated by a storage user and includes a data header and a ciphertext hash value.
3. The system according to claim 2, wherein during MapReduce operation, the re-encryption node generates each sub-node and performs parallel operation simultaneously, and the Map stage is responsible for cutting data, the Shuffle stage performs grouping and sorting, the Reduce stage performs reduction, and finally the re-encryption node performs summarization, and finally the re-encryption node stores all data in the data storage layer according to the user name of the storage user.
4. The system according to claim 3, wherein the re-encryption node further backs up data at each sub-node by distributed storage during the MapReduce operation.
5. The system of claim 4, wherein the light node records the block header of the blockchain, and the block header is stored in a distributed manner by the light node.
6. The system according to claim 5, wherein the light node records a hash value of a previous blockhead in the blockhead of the blockchain, and further records a random number, a Merkle tree root hash value, and timestamp information.
7. The block chain data secret inquiry careless transmission method is characterized by comprising a data storage process and an careless transmission process;
the data storage process comprises the following steps:
the memory uses an elliptic curve encryption algorithm to encrypt the uploaded information to obtain a ciphertext and an identifier, and the ciphertext is converted into a hash value; selecting a title and a sequence number for the ciphertext; a storage person sends a ciphertext to a re-encryption node of a storage system for block chain data secret query according to any one of claims 1 to 6, stores the re-encryption node in a data storage layer, and then forms an index message by a user name of the storage person, a sequence number, a title, an identifier and a ciphertext hash value of the ciphertext and sends the index message to a full node; the sequence number in the index information is used for being sequentially sent from small to large when the data is transmitted carelessly, the title provides information types for an inquirer, the identifier is used for encrypting a public key of the inquirer, and the ciphertext hash value is used for verifying the data after the data is transmitted carelessly; all the index information is stored in a block body on a chain in a public mode by the full node to form an index information list, meanwhile, each piece of index information is converted into a hash value in sequence, and a root hash value is formed in a Merkle tree data structure mode and stored in a block head;
the process of said inadvertent transmission comprises the steps of:
(1) after determining the serial number of the acquired data, the inquirer encrypts the public key of the inquirer by using the identifier in the index information and sends the public key to the storer;
(2) the storage person combines the private key of the storage person with the encrypted data sent by the inquirer to generate a re-encryption key, and sends the re-encryption key to the re-encryption node;
(3) the re-encryption node receives the ciphertext uploaded by the storage person in the data storage layer, sequentially encrypts the ciphertext for the second time by using the re-encryption key, and then sequentially sends the ciphertext to the inquirer;
(4) and the inquirer finds the secondary encrypted ciphertext sent by the re-encrypted node according to the serial number, and decrypts by using a private key of the inquirer to obtain the original data of the memory.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the encrypting the uploaded information using elliptic curve cryptography comprises:
recording the data memory as Alice, and selecting s by AliceAAs a private key, a public key p is generated by means of an elliptic curve cryptography algorithmA＝sAG, encoding the original data into points on the elliptic curve, and then carrying out public key encryption to obtain a down-link ciphertext CiAlice needs to select a random number r each time it encrypts an original dataiWhile using the random number to generate an identifierC'i。
9. The method for the oblivious transmission of a blockchain data privacy query according to claim 7 or 8, wherein the process of converting the ciphertext into the hash value is implemented by using an SHA256 hash function.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the step of sequentially converting each index into a hash value is performed using SHA256 hash function.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN115208630A (en) * | 2022-06-15 | 2022-10-18 | 网易（杭州）网络有限公司 | Block chain based data acquisition method and system and block chain system |
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