WO2022082893A1

WO2022082893A1 - Privacy blockchain-based internet of vehicles protection method, and mobile terminal

Info

Publication number: WO2022082893A1
Application number: PCT/CN2020/127985
Authority: WO
Inventors: 孔庆磊; 尹峰; 崔曙光
Original assignee: 香港中文大学（深圳）
Priority date: 2020-10-22
Filing date: 2020-11-11
Publication date: 2022-04-28
Also published as: CN112367305A; CN112367305B

Abstract

The present application provides a privacy blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles protection method, and a mobile terminal. Said method comprises: performing initialization processing on the basis of a homomorphic encryption algorithm; acquiring service request stage information between a user and a service provider; collecting data between the user and the service provider on the basis of the blockchain technology; and implementing query of the service provider to user data on the basis of an oblivious transfer protocol. A system is initialized on the basis of the homomorphic encryption algorithm, and data is published, so as to ensure confidentiality of the data published on a blockchain; information between the user and the service provider is acquired in a service request stage; in a data query stage, the data between the user and the service provider is collected on the basis of the blockchain technology; and at a data acquisition stage, a target ciphertext is acquired using the oblivious transfer protocol, so that query of the service provider to user data is implemented, and the privacy of Internet of Vehicles data and the accuracy of data verification can be ensured.

Description

A method and mobile terminal for protecting the Internet of Vehicles based on privacy blockchain

technical field

The present application relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles, and in particular to a method for protecting Internet of Vehicles and a mobile terminal based on a privacy blockchain.

Background technique

In recent years, in view of the security and privacy protection issues in the Internet of Vehicles and in-vehicle sensor networks, experts and scholars from the communication industry, computer science majors, and the field of network security have carried out efforts to protect the security of the Internet of Vehicles and the data privacy involved. A lot of research work. Because the value of data collected by in-vehicle sensors is related to geographic location and time information, and location information includes sensitive personal information of users, such as work and home addresses, personal preferences and habits, and social relationships. In the existing research, aiming at the protection of data privacy in the Internet of Vehicles architecture, the following key technologies are mainly covered:

1) Anonymization technology. Anonymous privacy protection technology requires that the distribution of sensitive attribute values in all equivalence classes is the same as the probability distribution of all data in the data set, that is, when the sensitive attribute values of the target user do not change, the attacker cannot obtain private information from the data set.

2) Differential privacy technology. Differential privacy techniques aim to provide a way to maximize the accuracy of data query results while minimizing the chance of identifying its records when querying a dataset. That is, by adding random noise to ensure that the data query is publicly visible, and the query results of the information will not vary from individual to individual.

3) Data encryption technology. Among many security strategies, encryption technology can ensure the security and privacy of related data between user devices or processes in malicious environments. The existing encryption data protection strategies mainly focus on the data transmission stage, the data storage stage and the data processing stage.

The inventor of the present application found in the long-term research and development that although the blockchain technology can be used in a decentralized way, the Internet of Vehicles data collected by the vehicle sensors can be distributed in a distributed manner to achieve the purpose of preventing tampering. In terms of identity privacy/location privacy sensitive data collected in the network: If all participants can directly view the data recorded in the blockchain public ledger, then storing the data related to the Internet of Vehicles on the blockchain will lead to related vehicles/ User privacy exposed. The data privacy leakage includes two aspects: the first aspect is that the data collected by the vehicle is strongly related to the location information, and the user's trajectory pattern, personal preferences and health status and other personal privacy information can be inferred from the location information; the second aspect is It is the association between the recorded data and the collected users. According to the association between the recorded data transactions in the blockchain, it is still possible to infer the frequency of the generation of individual collected user data. At the same time, since the blockchain technology itself can guarantee the immutability of data but cannot guarantee the authenticity of the data, the participants of the system need to verify the accuracy of the data recorded in the chain.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present application provides a method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles and a mobile terminal based on a privacy blockchain, so as to solve the problems in the prior art that the data of the Internet of Vehicles based on the blockchain technology cannot guarantee privacy and cannot verify the accuracy of the data.

In order to solve the above technical problems, a technical solution adopted in this application is to provide a method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles based on a privacy blockchain, the method comprising: performing initialization processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm; obtaining information between users and service providers; The data between the user and the service provider is collected based on the blockchain technology; the data query of the user by the service provider is realized based on the casual transmission protocol.

In order to solve the above technical problems, another technical solution adopted in the present application is to provide a mobile terminal, the mobile terminal includes a processor and a memory coupled to each other, the memory is used for storing a computer program, and the processor is used for The computer program is loaded and executed.

In order to solve the above technical problem, another technical solution adopted in the present application is to provide a computer storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and the computer program is used to implement the steps of any one of the methods in the above embodiments.

The beneficial effects of the present application are: different from the situation in the prior art, the present application provides a method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles and a mobile terminal based on a privacy blockchain, and the method includes: performing initialization processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm; Service request stage information between service providers; data collection between users and service providers based on blockchain technology; data query from service providers to users based on inadvertent transmission protocols. The system is initialized based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the data is released to ensure the confidentiality of the data published on the blockchain. In the service request stage, the information between the user and the service provider is obtained. In the data query stage, based on The blockchain technology collects data between users and service providers. At the data acquisition terminal, the target ciphertext is acquired by using the inadvertent transmission protocol, so that the service provider can query the user's data, which solves the problem of the existing technology. The data of the Internet of Vehicles cannot guarantee privacy and cannot verify the accuracy of the data.

Description of drawings

In order to illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the application more clearly, the following briefly introduces the drawings used in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the application. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can also be obtained from these drawings without any creative effort, wherein:

1 is a schematic flowchart of an embodiment of a privacy blockchain-based vehicle networking protection method of the present application;

2 is a schematic flowchart of another embodiment of a privacy blockchain-based vehicle networking protection method of the present application;

Fig. 3 is the structural representation when Bloom filter carries out data storage;

Fig. 4 is the structural schematic diagram when Bloom filter carries out data query;

FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a mobile terminal of the present application.

Detailed ways

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, but not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work fall within the protection scope of the present application.

It should be noted that if there are descriptions involving "first", "second", etc. in the embodiments of this application, the descriptions of "first", "second", etc. are only used for description purposes, and should not be construed as instructions or Implicit their relative importance or implicitly indicate the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature delimited with "first", "second" may expressly or implicitly include at least one of that feature. In addition, the technical solutions between the various embodiments can be combined with each other, but must be based on the realization by those of ordinary skill in the art. When the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or cannot be realized, it should be considered that the combination of such technical solutions does not exist. , is not within the scope of protection claimed in this application.

Please refer to FIG. 1. FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of an embodiment of a method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles based on a privacy blockchain of the present application. The method disclosed in this embodiment includes the following steps:

S11: Perform initialization processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm.

Homomorphic encryption technology (Homomorphic Encryption) has the property of addition homomorphism and multiplication of homomorphism.

The additive homomorphic property means that the product of two ciphertexts will be decrypted as the sum of their corresponding plaintexts, which can be expressed by formula (1):

D(E(m ₁ )*E(m ₂ )mod n ² )=m ₁ +m ₂ mod n (1)

Among them, m ₁ is the first plaintext, m ₂ is the second plaintext, E is the encryption function, D is the decryption function, and n is the product of two large prime numbers p ₁ and p ₂ .

The number multiplication homomorphism property is available, and the formula (2) expresses:

Using homomorphic encryption technology, operations in the ciphertext domain are equivalent to operations in the plaintext domain. This property makes it possible to process, analyze or retrieve data in the ciphertext domain. That is, without decrypting any ciphertext, the operation can still be performed on the corresponding plaintext, so that the encrypted information can still be deeply and infinitely analyzed and processed.

The system initializes the terminal, performs initialization processing based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm, and can obtain the public key, private key and other information required in the blockchain.

Blockchain technology (Blockchain), the block chain is mainly composed of three parts, including transactions, blocks and consensus mechanisms.

Transaction: Refers to an operation on the ledger, resulting in a change of the state in the ledger (such as adding a transfer record). Transactions can only take place between designated users signed with each user's private key. Transaction records are stored in blocks and cannot be altered or forged after being confirmed by the authentication process. In order to complete the transaction, it needs to be approved by the proof of consensus mechanism, which takes some time.

Block: Records transactions and status results that occurred within a period of time, which is a consensus on the current ledger status. Each block is linked in sequence according to the transaction history. Each block has information linked to the previous block, so it is easy to judge whether it has been tampered with. Blocks that have been tampered with disappear from the network after the confirmation process.

Consensus: There are many ways to achieve blockchain consensus, such as:

1. POW (Proof of Work, Proof of Work), that is, a means of deliberately making all individuals who want to connect to a computer system perform time-consuming work to protect the system from malicious connections who attempt to attack the system.

2. POS (Proof of Stake, Proof of Stake), that is, the method of Proof of Stake does not consume computer resources but generates blocks through the stake it holds.

3. PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) is an algorithm developed for the execution environment of a distributed system based on state machine copy replication, aiming to allow most of the honest nodes in the system to cover malicious nodes or invalid nodes the behavior of.

S12: Acquire the service request stage information between the user and the service provider.

In the service request stage, the user requests the service from the service provider, and the identity-based encryption signature scheme verifies the user. When the verification result is correct, the service provider receives the user's service request.

S13: Collect data between users and service providers based on blockchain technology.

In the data collection stage, the blockchain technology based on proof of stake as a consensus mechanism is used to publish the aggregated results of the ciphertext data and signatures of the user's driving behavior. The vehicle data in the blockchain is encrypted and published. When the block is generated, the participating generation nodes ensure the correctness of the published data through signature verification.

S14: Realize the data query of the user by the service provider based on the inadvertent transmission protocol.

In the data query stage, the service provider can query the data recorded by the user on the blockchain, and use the inadvertent transmission protocol to obtain the verification and aggregation results, so as to realize the service provider's data query on the user.

The present application provides a method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles based on privacy blockchain, the method includes: initializing processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm; obtaining service request stage information between a user and a service provider; Data collection with service providers; based on inadvertent transmission protocol to realize service provider's data query of users. The system is initialized based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the data is released to ensure the confidentiality of the data released on the blockchain. In the service request stage, the information between the user and the service provider is obtained. In the data query stage, based on Blockchain technology collects data between users and service providers. At the data acquisition terminal, inadvertent transmission protocols are used to obtain the target ciphertext, so that service providers can query users' data and ensure the data of the Internet of Vehicles. Privacy and Verification of Data Accuracy.

On the basis of the above embodiments, please refer to FIG. 2 , which is a schematic flowchart of another embodiment of a privacy blockchain-based vehicle networking protection method of the present application. The method disclosed in this embodiment includes the following steps:

S21: Perform initialization processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm.

In this embodiment, an identity-based signature technology (Identity-based Signature, IBS) is used.

In the traditional public key infrastructure (Public Key Infrastructure, PKI), the security system guarantee between the public key and the user identity is realized by the certificate, and its essence is to use the authoritative organization to sign the user. However, this management system has various problems related to certificate management: certificate revocation, certificate storage and certificate distribution, etc. These processes consume a lot of bandwidth resources and computing resources.

The design goal of the identity-based cryptographic algorithm is to ensure the security of information exchange and verify each other without the need to exchange public and private keys, save the key directory, and use a third party to provide authentication services. between the signatures. The identity-based signature scheme is a set of polynomial-time algorithms with security parameter k, which can be used by formula (3)

express:

IBS=(Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) (3)

Among them, Setup is an input security parameter of k bits, and a master public key/master private key pair (mpk, msk) is generated. KeyGen takes the input msk and identity id ∈ {0, 1} ^* , returns a private key usk corresponding to the user id, and securely sends usk to the user. Sign takes the input key usk and the message m∈{0,1} ^* , and returns a signature σ to the message m. Verify takes input mpk, id, m and σ, if σ is valid for id, m; then returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.

In a specific embodiment, the following steps S211-S216 are included:

S211: Presetting the first security parameter, the trusted organization initializes the homomorphic encryption system, generates two large prime numbers, and calculates the public key according to the two large prime numbers.

Based on a given first security parameter k, a trusted authority initializes the Modified (improved) Paillier homomorphic encryption system, generates two large prime numbers p ₁ , p ₂ , and calculates the public key (n=p ₁ *p ₂ , g=μ ² mod n ² ), where

μ is a random number, g is an element,

represents a finite commutative group modulo n ² .

S212: Preset the second security parameter to generate a bilinear parameter.

Based on another given second security parameter k ₁ , bilinear parameters are generated: (q, P, G, _GT , H, e).

S213: Generate a system public key, an identity-based private key, and a system public parameter according to the hash function and the preset system private key.

Choose a hash function

in,

Denotes a finite commutative group of representation modulo q. pick a random number

As the system private key, and generate the system public key pk _s =gs ^∈G . compute the identity-based private key,

The output system public parameters are

G, G _T are multiplicative cyclic groups of order q, q is a large prime number; P is the generator of G; pk _s is the public key of the system; g ^s is the exponential operation; id _t is the identity of the trusted organization operator; e is the bilinear mapping operation.

S214: Generate a Bloom filter.

Bloom filter technology (Bloom Filter) is a random data structure with high space efficiency.

Please refer to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 together. FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the structure when the Bloom filter performs data storage, and FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the structure when the Bloom filter performs data query. The length of the bit string is b, and the number of hash functions H is k.

Data storage: In the initial state, Bloom Filter is a bit array containing m bits, and each bit is set to 0. In order to express a set of n elements such as S = {x ₁ , x ₂ , ..., x _n }, Bloom Filter uses k independent hash functions, which respectively map each element in the set to { 1, 2, ..., m} in the range. For any element x, the position h _i (x) of the ith hash function map will be set to 1 (1≤i≤k). Note that if a position is set to 1 multiple times, only the first time will work. For example, in Figure 2, there are two hash functions that select the same bit position (fifth from the left).

Data query: When judging whether y belongs to this set, we apply the hash function k times to the element y. If all h _i (y) are set to 1 (1≤i≤k), then we consider y to be a set element in S, otherwise it is considered that y is not an element in the set. In Figure 3, y ₁ is not an element in the set. y ₂ belongs to this set under the premise of a certain false alarm probability.

S215: Generate the service provider public key and the service provider private key between the trusted authority and the service provider identity.

The trusted authority sends the identity-based first private key of the service provider's identity, and uses the first random number as the second private key to generate the first public key. The first secret random number chosen by the service provider identity secret.

Specifically, for a service provider id _a (identity), the trusted authority computes the identity-based first private key,

and will

Sent to service provider id _a . At the same time, select the first random number

as the second private key and generate the first public key

On the other hand, the service provider id _a secretly chooses a random number t _a .

S216: Generate the user public key and the user private key between the trusted authority and each user.

Generate a series of anonymous functions and anonymous identities based on the hash chain. The user identity sends the anonymous identity to the trusted authority to generate the first signature. The user identity obtains the identity-based third private key sent by the trusted authority. The user identity uses the second random number as the fourth private key and generates a second public key associated with the fourth private key.

Specifically, for each user id _v , use a hash chain to generate a series of anonymous H ^m (s _i )=H(H(...H(s _i ))), and generate anonymous identities pid _i,j =H ^m+1-j (s _i ), j∈{1,2,...,m}, where m is the length of the hash chain. At the same time, the user sends the anonymous identity pid _i,1 to the trusted authority, and generates a first signature σ _i =pid _i,j /(s+H(id _t ))·P∈G. On the other hand, the trusted authority will put the third private key

sent to the user. User id _i selects the second random number

as the fourth private key, and generate the corresponding second public key

S22: Acquire the service request stage information between the user and the service provider.

In a specific embodiment, the following steps S221-S224 are included:

S221: The user identity generates a first signature pair according to the anonymous identity and the third random number, and generates a service request message according to the first signature pair.

When the user id _i wants to request service from the service provider id _a , the user id _i uses the anonymous identity pid _i,j to select the third random number

Generate the corresponding first signature pair

As shown in formula (4):

User id _i generates and sends a service request message

to the service provider id _a .

S222: The user identity sends a service request message to the service provider identity.

User id _i generates and sends a service request message

to the service provider id _a .

S223: The user identity verifies the correctness of the anonymous identity and the first signature, and performs bilinear calculation to obtain the calculation result.

User id _i verifies the correctness of (pid _{i, j} , σ _i ), and calculates formula (5):

S224: If the calculation result is correct, the service provider identity accepts the service request.

If the formula (5) is calculated correctly, the service provider id _a accepts the service request sent by the user identity.

S23: Collect data between users and service providers based on blockchain technology.

In a specific embodiment, the following steps S231-S238 are included:

S231: The user identity selects a fourth random number to generate a ciphertext to encrypt the vehicle data.

In order to encrypt the vehicle data data _i , the user id _i selects a fourth random number

Generate ciphertext, as shown in formula (6):

S232: The user identity selects the fifth random number to generate the second signature pair of the vehicle data, so as to ensure the correctness of the vehicle data.

In order to ensure the correctness of the data data _i , the user id _i selects a random number

And generate the second signature pair, as shown in formula (7):

S233: The user identity sends the second signature pair to the vehicle identity, and verifies the authenticity of the second signature pair.

user id _i will sign

sent to the vehicle id _v , as shown in equation (8), and verify its authenticity:

S234: The vehicle identity generates a vehicle message according to the ciphertext and the second signature pair, and sends the vehicle message to the service provider identity.

When the verification result is true, the vehicle id _v generates the vehicle message according to the ciphertext and the second signature pair

and send it to the service provider id _a .

S235: The service provider identity performs merge processing on the anonymous identity and the second signature pair.

The service provider id _a combines the anonymous identities pid _{i, j} and the second signature of the data data _i , as shown in formula (9):

S236: The service provider identity collects the vehicle data of the at least one user identity, publishes the vehicle data of the at least one user identity and the second signature on the block based on the inadvertent transmission protocol, and the service provider identity inserts the anonymous identity of the at least one user identity into the block. Bloom filter.

The service provider id _a collects the vehicle data of k users, and uses the OT (Oblivious Transfer) protocol to publish the vehicle data and signatures of multiple users on the block. At the same time, the service provider id _a inserts the anonymous data of the k users into the block. Bloom filter BF _a , anonymous data retrieval by Bloom filter. Among them, the Bloom filter performs preliminary user positioning, and the OT protocol performs content acquisition.

S237: The service provider identity generates a new transaction in each vehicle data release cycle, and sends the transaction to the service provider identity.

In each data release cycle, the service provider id _a generates a new transaction and sends the new transaction to all service providers, as shown in Table 1, where c is the user ciphertext. The transaction includes a first subject including a first timestamp and a service provider identity.

Table I

S238: The service provider identity uses the consensus mechanism to generate a new block.

All service providers use the consensus mechanism to generate new blocks, as shown in Table 2. The block includes a second body, and the second body includes a second timestamp, the identity of the primary service provider, a digest of the previous block, and a proof of stake.

Table II

S24: Realize the data query of the user by the service provider based on the inadvertent transmission protocol.

In a specific embodiment, the following steps S241-S242 are included:

S241: The service provider identity inserts the past anonymous identity of the queried user into the blockchain to obtain at least one past transaction.

For example, if the service provider id _b wants to query the data recorded on the chain for a given user id _i , the service provider id _b first uses the past anonymity of the user id _i {pid _{i, 1} , ..., pid _{i, j} } Insert the blockchain and find the corresponding transaction.

S242: Obtain at least one ciphertext group and signature group associated with the past transaction based on the inadvertent transmission protocol, and obtain and verify the aggregation result.

Obtain the corresponding ciphertext using the inadvertent transmission protocol

and the corresponding signature

and get and verify aggregated results

In the technical solution disclosed in this application, in order to realize the privacy collection and data aggregation of vehicle sensor data, a Modified Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm and an identity-based encryption signature scheme are designed to realize the privacy data protection and verifiability of vehicle data. sex. At the same time, according to the aggregated results, a user's driving behavior and habits can be reflected; using blockchain technology based on proof of stake as a consensus mechanism to publish the aggregated results of the ciphertext data and signatures of the user's driving behavior, and generate them in blocks , the participating generation nodes ensure the correctness of the published data through signature verification.

For the Internet of Vehicles blockchain scenario, it has the following technical effects: First, the data recorded on the blockchain needs to maintain the confidentiality of the data in the blockchain on the one hand, which ensures the privacy of the shared data content; The data of the Internet of Vehicles is related to the interests of customers in traffic safety, which ensures the authenticity of the data shared on the blockchain; thirdly, the data of the target producer can be found on the blockchain without revealing the data producer.

This embodiment publishes data based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm, which can ensure the confidentiality of the published data on the chain; an identity-based encryption signature scheme is used to verify the correctness of the published data; anonymized data is performed through a Bloom filter Retrieval; use inadvertent transmission protocol to obtain the target ciphertext.

The present application provides a method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles based on privacy blockchain, the method includes: initializing processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm; obtaining service request stage information between a user and a service provider; Data collection with service providers; based on inadvertent transmission protocol to realize service provider's data query of users. The system is initialized based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the data is released to ensure the confidentiality of the data published on the blockchain. In the service request stage, the information between the user and the service provider is obtained. In the data query stage, based on Blockchain technology collects data between users and service providers. At the data acquisition terminal, inadvertent transmission protocols are used to obtain the target ciphertext, so that service providers can query users' data and ensure the data of the Internet of Vehicles. Privacy and Verification of Data Accuracy.

Corresponding to the above method, the present application proposes a mobile terminal. Please refer to FIG. 5 , which is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a mobile terminal of the present application. The mobile terminal 100 disclosed in the present application includes a memory 12 and a processor 14 coupled to each other, the memory 12 is used for storing a computer program, and the processor 14 is used for executing the computer program to implement the steps of any of the methods in the foregoing embodiments.

Specifically, processor 14 is used to:

Initialization processing based on homomorphic encryption algorithm.

Get service request stage information between user and service provider.

The data between users and service providers is collected based on blockchain technology.

The service provider's data query to the user is realized based on the casual transmission protocol.

The mobile terminal 100 in this embodiment ensures the privacy of the Internet of Vehicles data and the accuracy of the verification data.

In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the systems, devices and methods disclosed in this application may be implemented in other ways. For example, the device implementations described above are only illustrative. For example, the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other divisions. For example, multiple units or components may be Incorporation may either be integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not implemented. On the other hand, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.

The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this implementation manner.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically alone, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware, or may be implemented in the form of software functional units.

The integrated unit, if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the present application can be embodied in the form of software products in essence, or the parts that contribute to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solutions, and the computer software products are stored in a storage medium , including several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) or a processor (processor) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, Read-Only Memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), Random Access Memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes .

The above are only the embodiments of the present application, and are not intended to limit the scope of the patent of the present application. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made by using the contents of the description and drawings of the present application, or directly or indirectly applied in other related technical fields, All are similarly included in the scope of patent protection of the present application.

Claims

A method for protecting the Internet of Vehicles based on a privacy blockchain, characterized in that the method includes:

Initialize processing based on homomorphic encryption algorithm;

Obtain service request stage information between the user and the service provider;

Collect data between the user and the service provider based on blockchain technology;

The data query of the user by the service provider is implemented based on a casual transfer protocol.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of performing initialization processing based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm comprises:

Presetting the first security parameter, the trusted organization initializes the homomorphic encryption system, generates two large prime numbers, and calculates the public key according to the two large prime numbers;

Preset the second security parameter to generate bilinear parameters;

According to the hash function and the preset system private key, generate the system public key, identity-based private key and system public parameters;

generate bloom filter;

generating a service provider public key and a service provider private key between the trusted authority and the service provider identity;

A user public key and a user private key between the trusted authority and each of the users are generated.
The method according to claim 2, wherein the step of generating a service provider public key and a service provider private key between the trusted authority and the service provider identity comprises:

The trusted organization sends the identity-based first private key of the service provider identity, and uses the first random number as the second private key to generate the first public key;

The first secret random number secretly selected by the service provider identity.
The method according to claim 3, wherein the step of generating a user public key and a user private key between the trusted authority and each of the users comprises:

Generate a series of anonymous functions and anonymous identities based on the hash chain;

The user identity sends the anonymous identity to the trusted authority to generate a first signature;

The user identity obtains the identity-based third private key sent by the trusted authority;

The user identity uses the second random number as a fourth private key, and generates a second public key associated with the fourth private key.
The method according to claim 4, wherein the step of obtaining the service request stage information between the user and the service provider comprises:

The user identity generates a first signature pair according to the anonymous identity and the third random number, and generates a service request message according to the first signature pair;

the user identity sends the service request message to the service provider identity;

The user identity verifies the correctness of the anonymous identity and the first signature, and performs bilinear calculation to obtain a calculation result;

If the calculation result is correct, the service provider identity accepts the service request.
The method according to claim 5, wherein the step of collecting data between the user and the service provider based on the blockchain technology comprises:

The user identity selects a fourth random number to generate ciphertext to encrypt vehicle data;

The user identity selects a fifth random number to generate a second signature pair of the vehicle data, so as to ensure the correctness of the vehicle data;

the user identity sends the second signature pair to the vehicle identity and verifies the authenticity of the second signature pair;

the vehicle identity generates a vehicle message according to the ciphertext and the second signature pair, and sends the vehicle message to the service provider identity;

The service provider identity is combined with the anonymous identity and the second signature pair;

The service provider identity collects the vehicle data of at least one of the user identities, publishes the vehicle data of at least one of the user identities and the second signature on a block based on an oblivious transfer protocol, the service a provider identity inserts an anonymous identity of at least one of said user identities into said bloom filter;

The service provider identity generates a new transaction in each release cycle of the vehicle data, and sends the transaction to the service provider identity;

The service provider identity generates new blocks using a consensus mechanism.
The method of claim 6, wherein the transaction includes a first subject, the first subject includes a first timestamp and the service provider identity; the block includes a second subject, the The second subject includes the second timestamp, the identity of the main service provider, the previous block digest and the proof of rights and interests.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of realizing the data query of the user by the service provider based on a casual transmission protocol comprises:

The service provider identity inserts the queried past anonymous identity of the user into the blockchain to obtain at least one past transaction;

Obtain at least one ciphertext group and signature group associated with the past transaction based on the inadvertent transmission protocol, and obtain and verify an aggregated result.
A mobile terminal, characterized in that the mobile terminal includes a processor and a memory coupled to each other, the memory is used for storing a computer program, and the processor is used for loading and executing the computer program.
A computer storage medium on which a computer program is stored, characterized in that the computer program is used to implement the steps of the method in any one of the preceding claims 1-8.