CN110677256B - VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation system and method - Google Patents
VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation system and method Download PDFInfo
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
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- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
- H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
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- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
- H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
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- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/46—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for vehicle-to-vehicle communication [V2V]
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Abstract
The invention discloses a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation system and a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation method, and belongs to the technical field of vehicle-mounted network security. The invention utilizes and strengthens the latest vehicle public key infrastructure system to provide the pseudonyms in an on-demand mode, the local trusted authorization authentication center designates a universal fixed interval, all the pseudonyms sent out in the domain have the life time aligned with the clock of the vehicle public key infrastructure system, the pseudonyms can be prevented from being linked based on time information, and all the pseudonyms before the revocation event are kept unlinkable when the revocation event occurs, thereby improving the privacy protection intensity of the vehicle nodes; the CRL fragmentation technology is adopted, the CRL fragments are distributed and transmitted by using the V2V mode, the CRL is acquired by taking a vehicle as the center in a 'publish-subscribe' mode, and the bloom filter is used for providing the certificate for the CRL fragments, so that the CRL fragments can be confirmed quickly, the calculation cost is reduced, the verification efficiency is improved, and the system performance is enhanced.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of vehicle-mounted network security, in particular to a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation system and a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation method.
Background
With the rapid development of the internet of things, the intelligent transportation system attracts wide attention with its huge social interests, and a Vehicle Ad hoc network (VANETs) as an important component of the intelligent transportation system has become a research hotspot in recent years. However, vehicle communication systems are vulnerable to attacks, which may compromise user privacy. The standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2WG and ETSI), the working group (C2C-CC) and the projects (SeVeCom, PRESERVE, CAMP) propose security and privacy solutions. The consensus is reached that V2V/V2I communication is protected using public key cryptography: a set of trusted authority certificate authorities form a Vehicle Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that provides a plurality of anonymous credentials (called pseudonyms) to legitimate vehicles. The vehicle switches from one pseudonym to a pseudonym that has never been used before to achieve unlinkability of digitally signed messages and to enhance the privacy of the V2V/V2I message sender. When harmful behaviors occur in the network, the propagation of the withdrawn pseudonyms and certificates of illegal vehicles among vehicles has important significance for maintaining communication safety. In practical application, the revocation information distribution mode of the illegal vehicles which is most widely applied in the VANETs is a certificate revocation list, and the VPKI finally revokes the vehicles which are misbehaving or are damaged by including serial numbers of unexpired certificates in the CRL.
In the current vehicle revocation method, in order to achieve the purpose of high efficiency, the CRL is mainly improved, for example, the CRL fragmentation technology is adopted, and each CRL fragment is independently delivered; the distribution of CRLs is accelerated in areas of high vehicle density by distributing CRLs in a car-to-car manner. However, the technique of splitting a digitally signed CRL into multiple fragments has the disadvantage of being vulnerable to contamination, and even if modified to sign each CRL fragment, it still has the disadvantage of incurring a significant amount of computational overhead, which for VPKI and receiving vehicles grows linearly with the number of CRL fragments. Furthermore, an attacker can exploit the signature verification delay to forge a CRL segment for a DoS attack, thereby preventing the vehicle from obtaining a genuine CRL segment. Another technique is to compress the CRL using a Bloom Filter (BF), reducing the size of the transmitted CRL. But the size of the CRL grows linearly with the number of revoked pseudonyms and most of the compressed CRLs are likely to be independent of the receiving vehicle. In addition, the technology applies the fog computing to the environment of the Internet of things to distribute revocation information, and the combination of the fog computing and the VANETs is promising, and although some research work is already done, the current method is not mature. In order to realize safe and efficient vehicle revocation in VANETs and solve the problems of easy pollution, DoS attack and the like in the prior art, a bloom filter and a CRL fragmentation technology can be combined to efficiently verify CRL fragments and distribute the CRL fragments in a car-to-car mode. Meanwhile, in order to effectively revoke a group of pseudonyms of the vehicle, a method of revoking a plurality of pseudonyms by a single CRL entry may be adopted to reduce the CRL size.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation system and a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation method.
In order to solve the technical problems, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonymization system, as shown in fig. 1, comprising: the system comprises a local credible authorization authentication center H-TA, an off-site credible authorization authentication center F-TA, a local domain, an off-site region, a plurality of roadside units and a plurality of vehicle units;
the local credible authorization and authentication center H-TA manages a local domain, the other-place credible authorization and authentication center F-TA manages an outer region, the credible authorization and authentication center is connected with the roadside units through wired safety channels and is responsible for managing the roadside units and generating public and private keys of the roadside units for the roadside units, and the local credible authorization and authentication center registers, authenticates and authorizes vehicle units in the local domain and issues long-term certificates (LTC) and bills to legal vehicle units;
the roadside unit is an infrastructure established on the roadside, is connected with the vehicle unit through a wireless network, generates a secret key and a pseudonym for the legally accessed vehicle unit, and is intermediate equipment for the communication between the vehicle unit and the credible authorization authentication center;
the vehicle unit is a communication unit loaded on a vehicle node, switches among different roadside units along with the movement process of the vehicle node, and is responsible for communication between the corresponding vehicle node and the roadside units and between the corresponding vehicle node and other vehicle nodes;
the local and foreign credible authorization authentication centers trust with each other, the credible authorization authentication center trusts with the roadside units, the credible authorization authentication center is completely trusted by the vehicle units, the vehicle units and the roadside units do not trust with each other, the vehicle units do not trust with each other, and the roadside units do not trust with each other.
In order to solve the technical problems, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation method is disclosed, the flow of the method is shown in figure 2, and the method comprises the following steps:
step 1: the vehicle unit acquires a local bill generated for the vehicle unit through a roadside unit which is currently authenticated to be legal, the process is shown in figure 3, and then the vehicle unit executes a bill acquisition pseudonym generation protocol with a local trusted authorization and authentication center, wherein during cross-domain operation, the vehicle unit communicates with a foreign trusted authorization and authentication center to acquire a foreign bill;
step 1.1: the vehicle unit generates a pseudonym request interval t according to the pseudonym acquisition strategy used s ,t e ];
Step 1.2: the vehicle unit prepares to send a request and concatenates the ID of the target roadside unit with the random number, calculates a hash value: h (R) ID ||Rnd n-tkt ) Generates a request ζ ← (Id) req ,H(R ID ||Rnd n-tkt ),t s ,t e );
Wherein Id req The ID of the vehicle unit is shown, zeta is a request operator, and n-tkt is a local ticket native ticket;
under the condition of cross-domain operation, connecting the ID of the target foreign trusted authorization authentication center with the random number;
wherein Sign () is a public key signature algorithm;
step 1.4: the vehicle unit will sign, long-term credential, random number and time stampSending the information to a local trusted authorization authentication center;
step 1.5: the local trusted authority certificate authority verifies the validity of the request according to the long-term certificate submitted by the vehicle unit and the corresponding signature,
wherein, Verify () is a public key signature authentication algorithm;
step 1.6: after the local credible authorization authentication center verifies that the vehicle unit is legal, a 'bill identifiable key' (IK) is generated n-tkt ) To bind the ticket to the vehicle's voucher:
step 1.7: the local trusted authority authentication center generates a local ticket for the vehicle unit: x ← H (R) ID ||Rnd n-tkt ),IK n-tkt ,t s ,t e ) And signing the bill to generate an anonymous bill:sendingA vehicle unit;
wherein σ H-TA Representing a signature of the system private key s, Id, generated by the H-TA res For the sequence number of the request message, TS 2 Is a time stamp;
step 1.8: vehicle unit authentication anonymous ticket:and passes the verification equationWhether a verification bill is established or not;
wherein, P pub The system public key generated by the trusted authority authentication center;
in the case of cross-domain operation, the vehicle unit interacts with a foreign trusted authority authentication center and presents foreign tickets to obtain local tickets in the domain in the foreign domain.
Step 2: after the vehicle unit completes the bidirectional authentication with the target roadside unit based on the safe V2I authentication protocol, a pseudonym generation protocol is executed to obtain a pseudonym, and the flow is shown in FIG. 4;
step 2.1: preparation of vehicle Unit for parameters required for generating pseudonymsNumber ofThen sending the request to the roadside unit in a request form;
wherein, t' s ,t' e A start time stamp and an end time stamp for an actual pseudonym request interval when the vehicle unit requests a pseudonym, respectively;
step 2.3: after the roadside unit verifies that the bill of the vehicle unit is legal, the bill passes through a verification equationIf true, check if it is the target roadside unit of the vehicle unit, and then verify the actual period of the pseudonym requested, i.e. [ t' s ,t' e ]Whether it falls within a specified period in the ticket t s ,t e ];
step 2.4: the roadside unit generates a random number: rnd v ← GenRnd (), the roadside unit generates an anonymous identity and a corresponding private key for a vehicle unit:<V i ,sk i >;
wherein, V i ={V i,1 ,V i,2 },V i,1 =x i P, roadside unit selection random numbersk i =s R ·H 2 (V i,2 ) I ═ 1, …, n is the number of pseudonyms distributed by each roadside unit, P ∈ G 1 ,G 1 Is a cyclic addition group, P is G 1 A generator in, P pub Is trusted byAuthorizing the certificate authority to generate system parameters, i.e. system public key, V ID Is the initial pseudonym, s, generated by the trusted authority certificate authority for the vehicle when it registers with the system R Is the private signature key of the roadside unit, H 1 And H 2 Is a hash function selected by the trusted authority authentication center;
next, a 'kana recognizable key' is generated "To bind the pseudonym to the ticket of the vehicle unit:
step 2.5: the wayside unit determines the pseudonym serial number SN by computing a hash value and implicitly associates a set of pseudonyms belonging to each vehicle unit requesting a pseudonym, i.e. when i is 1,when i is {2, …, n }, SN i ←H(SN i-1 ||H i (Rnd v ));
wherein the content of the first and second substances,is that roadside units integrate a gap gamma for releasing CRL CRL BF value of all CRL segments within, CRL V For the version of CRL, the roadside unit may randomly select some pseudonyms as carriers of BF values, and the proportion of the carriers may be set according to different factors, such as the frequency of revocation events and the coverage of deployed roadside units;
step 2.7: roadside unit message (Id) res ,ξ,Rnd v ,nonce+1,TS 4 ) Sent to the vehicle unit, where xi is the private key and pseudonym of the roadside unit to the vehicle unitSigning or encrypting;
step 2.8: after the vehicle unit receives the response message of the roadside unit, the vehicle unit verifies the legality of the pseudonym and the corresponding private key and then passes a verification equationWhether or not to establish verification
And step 3: when the pseudonym needs to be revoked, the trusted authorization authentication center cooperates with the related roadside unit to execute a pseudonym analysis and revocation protocol, and the flow is shown in fig. 5;
step 3.1: the local credible authorization authentication center requests the roadside unit to map the revoked pseudonym to a corresponding bill stored by the roadside unit, namely n-tkt;
the credible authorization authentication center sends a request message to the related roadside units:whereins is the private key of the system selected by the trusted authority certificate authority;
step 3.2: the roadside unit verifies the request with the system public key:the roadside unit then maps the revoked pseudonym to the corresponding ticket:
step 3.3: the roadside unit sends the bill information to a trusted authority authentication center:whereinχ←(Id res ,n-tkt,H i (Rnd v )),s R Is the private key of the roadside unit;
step 3.4: and (3) verifying the response by the trusted authority authentication center: verify (R) ID χ), then passes the verification equationWhether the result is true or not is confirmed to confirm that the roadside unit has correctly resolved the pseudonym into the corresponding bill.
And 4, step 4: the roadside unit executes a CRL construction algorithm and divides the CRL into a plurality of segments, and the flow is shown in FIG. 6;
step 4.1: roadside units are based on each gamma CRL The valid time of the pseudonym of (1) classifies the revoked pseudonym, and then attaches the following data to each group of pseudonyms;
(i) the sequence number SN of the first revoked pseudonym in the implicitly associated pseudonym chain k ;
(iii) The number x of pseudonyms remaining in the batch;
step 4.2: the roadside unit divides the CRL into a plurality of segments according to the maximum bandwidth which can be distributed for the CRL, namely the system parameter B, and N is set as a certain gamma CRL The number of fragments of the inner CRL,whereinIs a certain gamma CRL CRL, size () is the size of CRL;
And 5: the roadside unit continuously broadcasts the BF value of the CRL segment signed by the roadside unit through a wireless data link so as to inform vehicles within a communication range of a new revocation event;
step 6: the vehicle unit executes a CRL subscription algorithm, receives necessary CRL segments corresponding to the actual travel time, and the flow is shown in fig. 7, while the vehicle unit receives the query request of the neighboring vehicle for the missing CRL segments based on the secure V2V authentication protocol, and executes a CRL distribution algorithm, which flows as shown in fig. 8;
step 6.1: the vehicle unit broadcasts to its neighbours a query message signed by it to receive the several r which it wants to obtain during the travel of the vehicle CRL The part of the missing CRL segment corresponding to the internal revocation information;
step 6.2: the vehicle unit verifies the CRL fragment by testing the signed BF value by means of a bloom filter after receiving the fragment;
step 6.3: if the BF test is successful, the segment received by the vehicle unit belongs to a CRL segment generated by the roadside unit, the vehicle unit receives the segment and continues requesting until all required segments are successfully received, otherwise, the vehicle unit discards the segment and continues requesting;
wherein each vehicle passes the obtained serial number SN of the revoked pseudonym when receiving and verifying the CRL segment k Andcalculating hash values x times:i ═ k, k +1, k +2, …, k + x-1, and all revoked pseudonym sequence numbers are calculated.
Step 6.4: meanwhile, when the vehicle unit receives a query request for the missing CRL segment by an adjacent vehicle, after verifying that the signature on the request message is legitimate, the vehicle unit searches its local repository and randomly selects one of the requested segments, and then broadcasts it.
And 7: and performing a pseudonym revocation operation to evict a misbehaving vehicle, which flows as shown in fig. 9, wherein when a pseudonym is resolved across domains, a foreign trusted authority needs to interact with a corresponding local trusted authority, resolve a ticket generated by the foreign trusted authority with the help of the local trusted authority, and perform the pseudonym revocation operation by revoking a long-term credential.
Step 7.1: after all revoked pseudonym serial numbers are calculated, the vehicle unit will no longer communicate with the vehicle unit using the pseudonym whose serial number is in the revoked state;
step 7.2: meanwhile, the roadside unit sends the bill which is correctly analyzed to the corresponding revoked pseudonym to the trusted authorization authentication center, the trusted authorization authentication center cancels all registration information such as the identity certificate of the vehicle unit corresponding to the bill and informs all roadside units that the vehicle unit with the revoked bill does not provide the service of accessing the network any more, thereby thoroughly expelling the vehicle;
step 7.3: the preparation request of the foreign trusted authority authentication center is as follows: ζ ← (Id) req ,n/f-tkt,nonce,TS 7 ) Sending the request message zeta to a local trusted authorization authentication center;
wherein f-tkt is a foreign domain bill, foreign ticket;
step 7.4: the local credible authorization authentication center receives the request message and analyzes the corresponding billAnd a long-term credential that it issues to the vehicle unit;
step 7.5: the local trusted authority certificate authority sends a response message χ to the foreign trusted authority certificate authority,
step 7.6: the response message is received by the non-local credible authorization authentication center and passes through the verification equationWhether the local trusted authority certificate authority is correctly mapped to the long-term certificate of the vehicle unit is confirmed;
step 7.7: when the vehicle unit is misbehaving, the local trusted authority authentication center can directly revoke the long-term certificate of the vehicle unit analyzed in the step 7.4, so as to expel the misbehaving vehicle unit.
Adopt the produced beneficial effect of above-mentioned technical scheme to lie in:
1. in the invention, the pseudonyms are provided in an on-demand mode, the latest vehicle public key infrastructure system is utilized and enhanced, the local trusted authorization authentication center designates a universal fixed interval, all the pseudonyms sent out in the domain have the life cycle aligned with the vehicle public key infrastructure system clock, the pseudonyms can be prevented from being linked based on time information, and all the pseudonyms before a revocation event are kept unlinkable when the revocation event occurs, so that the privacy protection intensity of vehicle nodes is improved;
2. the CRL fragment distribution method adopts a CRL fragmentation technology, utilizes a V2V mode to spread and distribute CRL fragments, obtains the CRL by taking a vehicle as the center in a 'publish-subscribe' mode, and provides authentication symbols for the CRL fragments by utilizing a bloom filter, so that the CRL fragments can be rapidly confirmed, the calculation cost is reduced, the verification efficiency is improved, and the system performance is enhanced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation method of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a vehicle unit acquiring local tickets in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the present invention for implementing a pseudonym generation protocol to obtain pseudonyms;
FIG. 5 is a flowchart of the present invention for generating a pseudonym resolution and revocation protocol by the trusted authorization authentication center in cooperation with a roadside unit;
FIG. 6 is a flow chart of a roadside unit executing a CRL construction algorithm to segment CRLs according to the present invention;
FIG. 7 is a flow chart of a vehicle unit implementing a CRL subscription algorithm in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 8 is a flow chart of the vehicle unit implementing the CRL distribution algorithm of the present invention;
FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a vehicle performing a pseudonymization operation to evict the wrong vehicle according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following detailed description of embodiments of the present invention is provided in connection with the accompanying drawings and examples. The following examples are intended to illustrate the invention but are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
In this embodiment, in the VPKI-based VANETs pseudonymization system, VANETs is a specific application of a mobile ad hoc network and a wireless sensor technology in the field of intelligent transportation, and is a mobile dedicated network. VANETs are mainly composed of Road-Side units (RSUs), On-Board units (OBUs), and trusted authorization and authentication centers (TAs). The RSU is responsible for communication between the OBU and the TA and network access of the OBU. The OBU is a processing unit embedded in the Vehicle and is responsible for communication between the Vehicle and the RSU (Vehicle to Vehicle, V2I) or other Vehicle nodes (Vehicle to Vehicle, V2V). The TA is a trusted third party, generally managed by a government department, and is mainly responsible for identity authentication, Certificate issuance, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) maintenance of each node. The TA and RSU communicate with each other using wired channels, and V2I and V2V communicate with each other via wireless networks in compliance with dsrc (dedicated Short Range communications) protocols. The VANETs can effectively improve traffic management and driving environments and can also provide Location Based Services (LBS) for users, so that intelligent traffic targets such as inter-vehicle cooperative safe driving, traffic decision support, traffic intelligent scheduling, traffic fee charging Service, real-time traffic information release and wireless value-added information Service are achieved.
In the embodiment, the VANETs pseudonym revocation system based on the VPKI comprises a local credible authorization authentication center H-TA, an external credible authorization authentication center F-TA, a local domain, an external region, a plurality of roadside units and a plurality of vehicle units; the system comprises a local trusted authority authentication center H-TA, a local area, a foreign trusted authority authentication center F-TA, a roadside unit, a vehicle unit, a wireless network and a vehicle unit, wherein the local area is managed by the local trusted authority authentication center H-TA, the foreign trusted authority authentication center F-TA manages foreign areas, the trusted authority authentication center is connected with the roadside unit through a wired safe channel, the vehicle unit is connected with the roadside unit through the wireless network, and the trusted authority authentication center is communicated with the vehicle unit through the roadside unit; the two types of credible authorization authentication centers trust with each other, the credible authorization authentication center trusts with the roadside units, the credible authorization authentication center is completely trusted by the vehicle units, the vehicle units and the roadside units do not trust with each other, the vehicle units do not trust with each other, and the roadside units do not trust with each other;
the credible authorization authentication center is responsible for managing the roadside units, generating public and private keys of the roadside units for the roadside units, registering, authenticating and authorizing vehicle units in a local domain and issuing long-term certificates (LTC) and bills to legal vehicle units;
the roadside unit is an infrastructure established at the roadside and generates a secret key and a pseudonymous name for a legally accessed vehicle unit;
the vehicle unit is a communication unit loaded on the vehicle node, switches among different roadside units along with the movement process of the vehicle node, and is responsible for communication between the corresponding vehicle node and the roadside units and between the corresponding vehicle node and other vehicle nodes. The vehicle unit decides when to trigger the pseudonym acquisition procedure based on different parameters, such as the number of valid pseudonyms remaining, the remaining journey duration and the network connectivity. The vehicle unit obtains a local ticket (n-tkt) from a local trusted authority certificate authority to which it belongs, and submits the local ticket to the roadside unit to obtain the pseudonym. When the vehicle is traveling in the foreign domain, the vehicle unit needs to acquire a new pseudonym from the RSU in the foreign domain. The vehicle unit requests a foreign ticket (f-tkt) from its local trusted authorization and authentication center, which generates a new ticket for the vehicle unit according to the foreign ticket as the local ticket of the vehicle unit for the vehicle unit to interact with the roadside unit in the (external) domain to obtain a new pseudonym. The vehicle unit may use the currently valid pseudonym for authentication, and may be able to interact with all roadside units within its local or outside domain to obtain the CRL and execute the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).
As shown in fig. 2, the method for revoking the kanets pseudonym based on VPKI of the present embodiment is as follows.
Step 1: the vehicle unit acquires a local bill generated for the vehicle unit through a roadside unit which is currently authenticated to be legal, the process is shown in figure 3, and then the vehicle unit executes a bill acquisition pseudonym generation protocol with a local trusted authorization and authentication center, wherein during cross-domain operation, the vehicle unit communicates with a foreign trusted authorization and authentication center to acquire a foreign bill;
step 1.1: the vehicle unit generates a pseudonym request interval t according to the pseudonym acquisition strategy used s ,t e ];
Step 1.2: the vehicle unit prepares to send a request and concatenates the ID of the target roadside unit with the random number, calculates a hash value: h (R) ID ||Rnd n-tkt ) Generate request ζ ← (Id) req ,H(R ID ||Rnd n-tkt ),t s ,t e );
Wherein Id req The ID of the vehicle unit is shown, zeta is a request operator, and n-tkt is a local ticket native ticket;
under the condition of cross-domain operation, connecting the ID of the target foreign trusted authority authentication center with the random number;
wherein Sign () is a public key signature algorithm;
step 1.4: the vehicle unit will sign, long-term credential, random number and time stampSending the information to a local trusted authorization authentication center;
step 1.5: the local trusted authority certificate authority verifies the validity of the request according to the long-term certificate submitted by the vehicle unit and the corresponding signature,
wherein, Verify () is a public key signature authentication algorithm;
step 1.6: after the local credible authorization authentication center verifies that the vehicle unit is legal, a 'bill identifiable key' (IK) is generated n-tkt ) To bind the ticket to the vehicle's voucher:
step 1.7: the local trusted authority authentication center generates a local ticket for the vehicle unit: x ← H (R) ID ||Rnd n-tkt ),IK n-tkt ,t s ,t e ) And signing the bill to generate an anonymous bill:sendingA vehicle unit;
wherein σ H-TA Representing a signature of the system private key s, Id, generated by the H-TA res Being the sequence number, TS, of the request message 2 Is a time stamp;
step 1.8: vehicle unit authentication anonymous ticket:and passes the verification equationWhether a verification bill is established or not;
wherein, P pub The system public key generated by the trusted authority authentication center;
in the case of cross-domain operation, the vehicle unit interacts with a foreign trusted authority authentication center and presents foreign tickets to obtain local tickets in the domain in the foreign domain.
Step 2: after the vehicle unit completes the bidirectional authentication with the target roadside unit based on the safe V2I authentication protocol, a pseudonym generation protocol is executed to obtain a pseudonym, and the flow is shown in FIG. 4;
step 2.1: preparation of parameters required by a vehicle unit for generating a pseudonymThen sending the request to the roadside unit in a request form;
wherein, t' s ,t' e A start time stamp and an end time stamp for an actual pseudonym request interval when the vehicle unit requests a pseudonym, respectively;
step 2.3: after the roadside unit verifies that the bill of the vehicle unit is legal, the roadside unit passes the verification equationIf true, check if it is the target roadside unit of the vehicle unit, and then verify the actual period of the pseudonym requested, i.e. [ t' s ,t' e ]Whether it falls within a specified period in the ticket t s ,t e ];
step 2.4: the roadside unit generates a random number: rnd v And (c) the road side unit generates an anonymous identity and a corresponding private key for the vehicle unit:<V i ,sk i >;
wherein, V i ={V i,1 ,V i,2 },V i,1 =x i P, roadside unit selection random numbersk i =s R ·H 2 (V i,2 ) I ═ 1, …, n is the number of pseudonyms distributed by each roadside unit, P ∈ G 1 ,G 1 Is a cyclic addition group, P is G 1 A generator in, P pub Is a system parameter generated by a trusted authority certificate authority, namely a system public key, V ID Is the initial pseudonym, s, generated by the trusted authority certificate authority for the vehicle when it registers with the system R Is the private signature key of the roadside unit, H 1 And H 2 Is a hash function selected by the trusted authority authentication center;
next, a 'kana recognizable key' is generated "To bind the pseudonym to the ticket of the vehicle unit:
step 2.5: the wayside unit determines the pseudonym serial number SN by computing a hash value and implicitly associates a set of pseudonyms belonging to each vehicle unit requesting a pseudonym, i.e. when i is 1,when i is {2, …, n }, SN i ←H(SN i-1 ||H i (Rnd v ));
wherein the content of the first and second substances,is that roadside units integrate a gap gamma for releasing CRL CRL BF value of all CRL segments within, CRL V For the version of CRL, the roadside unit may randomly select some pseudonyms as carriers of BF values, and the proportion of the carriers may be set according to different factors, such as the frequency of revocation events and the coverage of deployed roadside units;
step 2.7: roadside unit message (Id) res ,ξ,Rnd v ,nonce+1,TS 4 ) Sent to the vehicle unit, where xi is the private key and pseudonym of the roadside unit to the vehicle unitSigning or encrypting;
step 2.8: after the vehicle unit receives the response message of the roadside unit, the vehicle unit verifies the legality of the pseudonym and the corresponding private key and then passes a verification equationWhether or not to establish verification
And step 3: when the pseudonym needs to be revoked, the trusted authorization authentication center cooperates with the related roadside unit to execute a pseudonym analysis and revocation protocol, and the flow is shown in fig. 5;
step 3.1: the local credible authorization authentication center requests the roadside unit to map the revoked pseudonym to a corresponding bill stored by the roadside unit, namely n-tkt;
the credible authorization authentication center sends a request message to the related roadside units:whereins is the private key of the system selected by the trusted authority certificate authority;
step 3.2: the roadside unit verifies the request with the system public key:the roadside unit then maps the revoked pseudonym to the corresponding ticket:
step 3.3: the roadside unit sends the bill information to a trusted authority authentication center:whereinχ←(Id res ,n-tkt,H i (Rnd v )),s R Is the private key of the roadside unit;
step 3.4: and (3) verifying the response by the trusted authority authentication center: verify (R) ID χ), then passes the verification equationWhether the result is true or not is confirmed to confirm that the roadside unit has correctly resolved the pseudonym into the corresponding bill.
And 4, step 4: the roadside unit executes a CRL construction algorithm and divides the CRL into a plurality of segments, and the flow is shown in FIG. 6;
step 4.1: roadside units are based on each gamma CRL The valid time of the pseudonym of (1) classifies the revoked pseudonym, and then attaches the following data to each group of pseudonyms;
(iv) the sequence number SN of the first revoked pseudonym in the implicitly associated pseudonym chain k ;
(vi) The number x of pseudonyms remaining in the batch;
step 4.2: the roadside unit divides the CRL into a plurality of segments according to the maximum bandwidth which can be distributed for the CRL, namely the system parameter B, and N is set as a certain gamma CRL The number of fragments of the inner CRL,whereinIs a certain gamma CRL CRL, size () is the size of CRL;
And 5: the roadside unit continuously broadcasts the BF value of the CRL segment signed by the roadside unit through a wireless data link so as to inform vehicles within a communication range of a new revocation event;
step 6: the vehicle unit executes a CRL subscription algorithm, receives necessary CRL segments corresponding to the actual travel time, and the flow is shown in fig. 7, while the vehicle unit receives the query request of the neighboring vehicle for the missing CRL segments based on the secure V2V authentication protocol, and executes a CRL distribution algorithm, which flows as shown in fig. 8;
step 6.1: the vehicle unit broadcasts to its neighbours a query message signed by it to receive the several r which it wants to obtain during the travel of the vehicle CRL The part of the missing CRL segment corresponding to the internal revocation information;
step 6.2: the vehicle unit verifies the CRL fragment by testing the signed BF value by means of a bloom filter after receiving the fragment;
step 6.3: if the BF test is successful, the segment received by the vehicle unit belongs to the CRL segment generated by the roadside unit, the vehicle unit will accept the segment and continue the request until all required segments are successfully received, otherwise it will discard the segment and continue the request;
wherein each vehicle passes the obtained serial number SN of the revoked pseudonym when receiving and verifying the CRL segment k Andcalculating hash values x times:i ═ k, k +1, k +2, …, k + x-1, and all revoked pseudonym sequence numbers are calculated.
Step 6.4: meanwhile, when the vehicle unit receives a query request for the missing CRL segment by an adjacent vehicle, after verifying that the signature on the request message is legitimate, the vehicle unit searches its local repository and randomly selects one of the requested segments, and then broadcasts it.
And 7: and performing a pseudonym revocation operation to evict a misbehaving vehicle, which flows as shown in fig. 9, wherein when a pseudonym is resolved across domains, a foreign trusted authority needs to interact with a corresponding local trusted authority, resolve a ticket generated by the foreign trusted authority with the help of the local trusted authority, and perform the pseudonym revocation operation by revoking a long-term credential.
Step 7.1: after all revoked pseudonym serial numbers are calculated, the vehicle unit will no longer communicate with the vehicle unit using the pseudonym whose serial number is in the revoked state;
step 7.2: meanwhile, the roadside unit sends the bill which is correctly analyzed to be corresponding to the revoked pseudonym to the trusted authorization authentication center, the trusted authorization authentication center cancels all registration information such as the identity voucher of the vehicle unit corresponding to the bill and informs all roadside units that the vehicle unit with the revoked bill is not provided with the service of accessing the network, thereby completely expelling the vehicle;
step 7.3: the preparation request of the foreign trusted authority authentication center is as follows: ζ ← (Id) req ,n/f-tkt,nonce,TS 7 ) Sending the request message zeta to a local trusted authorization authentication center;
wherein f-tkt is a foreign domain bill, foreign ticket;
step 7.4: the local credible authorization authentication center receives the request message and analyzes the corresponding billAnd a long-term credential that it issues to the vehicle unit;
and 7.5: the local trusted authority certificate authority sends a response message χ to the foreign trusted authority certificate authority,
step 7.6: the response message is received by the non-local credible authorization authentication center and passes through the verification equationWhether the local trusted authority certificate authority is correctly mapped to the long-term certificate of the vehicle unit is confirmed;
step 7.7: when the vehicle unit is misbehaving, the local trusted authority authentication center can directly revoke the long-term certificate of the vehicle unit analyzed in the step 7.4, so as to expel the misbehaving vehicle unit.
Claims (5)
1. A VANETs pseudonym revocation method based on VPKI is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: the vehicle unit acquires a local bill generated for the vehicle unit through a roadside unit which is currently authenticated to be legal, and then executes a bill acquisition pseudonym generation protocol with a local trusted authorization authentication center, wherein during cross-domain operation, the vehicle unit communicates with a foreign trusted authorization authentication center to acquire a foreign bill, and the process is as follows:
step 1.1: the vehicle unit generates a pseudonym request interval t according to the pseudonym acquisition strategy used s ,t e ];
Step 1.2: the vehicle unit prepares to send a request and concatenates the ID of the target roadside unit with the random number, calculates a hash value: h (R) ID ||Rnd n-tkt ) Generate request ζ ← (Id) req ,H(R ID ||Rnd n-tkt ),t s ,t e );
Wherein Id req Zeta is a request operator, and n-tkt is a local bill native ticket;
under the condition of cross-domain operation, connecting the ID of the target foreign trusted authority authentication center with the random number;
wherein Sign () is a public key signature algorithm;
step 1.4: the vehicle unit is toSignature, long-term credential, random number and timestampLTC v ,nonce,TS 1 ) Sending the information to a local trusted authorization authentication center;
step 1.5: the local trusted authority certificate authority verifies the validity of the request according to the long-term certificate submitted by the vehicle unit and the corresponding signature,
wherein, Verify () is a public key signature authentication algorithm;
step 1.6: after the local credible authorization authentication center verifies that the vehicle unit is legal, a 'bill identifiable key' IK is generated n-tkt To bind the ticket to the vehicle's voucher:
step 1.7: the local trusted authority authentication center generates a local ticket for the vehicle unit: x ← H (R) ID ||Rnd n-tkt ),IK n-tkt ,t s ,t e ) And signing the bill to generate an anonymous bill:sendingA vehicle unit;
wherein σ H-TA Representing a signature of the system private key s, Id, generated by the H-TA res For responding to ID, TS, of a message 2 The time stamp is, and the H-TA is a local credible authorization authentication center;
step (ii) of1.8: vehicle unit authentication anonymous ticket:and passes the verification equationWhether a verification bill is established or not;
wherein, P pub The system public key generated by the trusted authority authentication center;
in the case of cross-domain operation, the vehicle unit interacts with a foreign trusted authority and presents foreign tickets to obtain local tickets in the domain in the foreign domain;
and 2, step: after the vehicle unit completes the bidirectional authentication with the target roadside unit based on the safe V2I authentication protocol, a pseudonym generation protocol is executed to obtain a pseudonym;
the process of performing the pseudonym generation protocol to obtain the pseudonym is as follows:
step 2.1: preparation of parameters required by a vehicle unit for generating a pseudonymThen sending the request to the roadside unit in a request form;
wherein, t' s ,t' e Respectively a start time stamp and an end time stamp of the actual pseudonym request interval when a vehicle unit requests a pseudonym, TS 3 Is a time stamp;
step 2.3: after the roadside unit verifies that the bill of the vehicle unit is legal, the bill passes through a verification equationIf it is established, checking whether it is the target roadside unit of the vehicle unit, and then verifying the requestOf pseudonyms, i.e. [ t' s ,t' e ]Whether it falls within a specified period in the ticket t s ,t e ];
step 2.4: the roadside unit generates a random number: rnd v ← GenRnd (), the roadside unit generates an anonymous identity and a corresponding private key for a vehicle unit:<V i ,sk i >;
wherein, V i ={V i,1 ,V i,2 },V i,1 =x i P, roadside unit selection random numbersk i =s R ·H 2 (V i,2 ) I ═ 1, …, n is the number of pseudonyms distributed by each roadside unit, P ∈ G 1 ,G 1 Is a cyclic addition group, P is G 1 A generator in, P pub Is a system parameter generated by a trusted authority certificate authority, namely a system public key, V ID Is the initial pseudonym, s, generated by the trusted authority certificate authority for the vehicle when it registers with the system R Is the private signature key of the roadside unit, H 1 And H 2 Is a hash function selected by the trusted authority authentication center;
next, a "kana recognizable key" is generated "To bind the pseudonym to the ticket of the vehicle unit:whereinAnda start time stamp and an end time stamp, H, respectively, for the request interval of the ith pseudonym i (Rnd v ) The hash value corresponding to the ith pseudonym;
step 2.5: the wayside unit determines the pseudonym serial number SN by computing a hash value and implicitly associates a set of pseudonyms belonging to each vehicle unit requesting a pseudonym, i.e. when i is 1,when it is, SN i ←H(SN i-1 ||H i (Rnd v ));
wherein, the first and the second end of the pipe are connected with each other,is that roadside units integrate a gap gamma for releasing CRL CRL BF value of all CRL segments within, CRL V For the version of CRL, the roadside unit randomly selects some pseudonyms as the carriers of BF values, and the proportion of the carriers is set according to different factors;
step 2.7: roadside unit message (Id) res ,ξ,Rnd v ,nonce+1,TS 4 ) Sent to the vehicle unit, where xi is the private key and pseudonym of the roadside unit to the vehicle unitPerforming signature or encryption, TS 4 Is a time stamp, Id res An ID of the response message;
step 2.8: after the vehicle unit receives the response message of the roadside unit, the vehicle unit verifies the legality of the pseudonym and the corresponding private key and then passes a verification equationWhether or not toEstablishment verificationAnd step 3: when the pseudonym needs to be cancelled, the credible authorization authentication center cooperates with the related roadside unit to execute a pseudonym analysis and cancellation protocol;
and 4, step 4: the roadside unit executes a CRL construction algorithm and divides the CRL into a plurality of segments by the following process:
step 4.1: roadside units are based on each gamma CRL The valid time of the pseudonym of (1) classifies the revoked pseudonym, and then attaches the following data to each group of pseudonyms;
(i) the sequence number SN of the first revoked pseudonym in the implicitly associated pseudonym chain k ;
(ii) Hash value H k (Rnd v );
(iii) The number x of pseudonyms remaining in the batch;
step 4.2: the roadside unit divides the CRL into a plurality of segments according to the maximum bandwidth which can be distributed for the CRL, namely the system parameter B, and N is set as a certain gamma CRL The number of fragments of the inner CRL,whereinIs a certain gamma CRL CRL, size () is the size of CRL;
and 5: the roadside unit continuously broadcasts the BF value of the CRL segment signed by the roadside unit through a wireless data link so as to inform vehicles within a communication range of a new revocation event;
and 6: the vehicle unit executes a CRL subscription algorithm, receives necessary CRL fragments corresponding to the actual travel time of the vehicle unit, simultaneously receives a query request of an adjacent vehicle for the missing CRL fragments based on a safe V2V authentication protocol, and executes a CRL distribution algorithm;
the vehicle unit executes a CRL subscription algorithm, and the process of receiving necessary CRL segments corresponding to its actual travel time is as follows:
step 6.1: the vehicle unit broadcasts to its neighbours a query message signed by it to receive the several r which it wants to obtain during the travel of the vehicle CRL The part of the missing CRL segment corresponding to the internal revocation information;
step 6.2: after receiving the CRL segment, the vehicle unit tests the signed BF value through a bloom filter to verify the segment, if the BF test is successful, the segment received by the vehicle unit belongs to the CRL segment generated by the roadside unit, and the vehicle unit receives the segment and continues to request until all required segments are successfully received, otherwise, the vehicle unit discards the segment and continues to request;
wherein each vehicle passes the obtained serial number SN of the revoked pseudonym when receiving and verifying the CRL segment k And H k (Rnd v ) Calculating hash values x times: SN (service provider) i+1 =H(SN i ||H(H i (Rnd v ) I) { k, k +1, k +2, …, k + x-1}, calculating all revoked pseudonym sequence numbers;
and 7: and executing a pseudonym revocation operation to expel vehicles with illegal behaviors, wherein when the pseudonym is analyzed across domains, the foreign trusted authorization and authentication center needs to interact with the corresponding local trusted authorization and authentication center, analyzes the bill generated by the foreign trusted authorization and authentication center with the help of the local trusted authorization and authentication center, and executes the pseudonym revocation operation by revoking the long-term voucher.
2. A VPKI-based VANETs pseudonymization method according to claim 1, characterized in that the procedure of step 3 is as follows:
step 3.1: the local credible authorization authentication center requests the roadside unit to map the revoked pseudonym to a corresponding bill stored by the roadside unit, namely n-tkt;
the credible authorization authentication center sends a request message to the related roadside units:whereins is a private key of the system selected by the trusted authority certificate authority, TS 5 Is a time stamp;
step 3.2: the roadside unit verifies the request with the system public key:the roadside unit then maps the revoked pseudonym to the corresponding ticket:wherein Resolve () is a method to withdraw pseudonyms;
step 3.3: the roadside unit sends the bill information to a trusted authority authentication center:whereinχ←(Id res ,n-tkt,H i (Rnd v )),s R Is the private key of the roadside Unit, TS 6 Is a time stamp;
3. The VPKI-based VANETs pseudonym revocation method according to claim 1, wherein in step 6, the vehicle unit receives a query request of a neighboring vehicle for the missing CRL segment based on the secure V2V certification protocol, and the process of executing the CRL distribution algorithm is as follows:
when the vehicle unit receives a query request from a neighboring vehicle for the missing CRL segment, after verifying that the signature on the request message is legitimate, the vehicle unit searches its local repository and randomly selects one of the requested segments and then broadcasts it.
4. The VPKI-based VANETs pseudonymization method according to claim 1, wherein the step 7 is performed to perform pseudonymization, and the process of expelling misbehaving vehicles is as follows:
step 7.1: after all revoked pseudonym serial numbers are calculated, the vehicle unit will no longer communicate with the vehicle unit using the pseudonym whose serial number is in the revoked state;
step 7.2: meanwhile, the roadside unit sends the bill which is correctly analyzed to correspond to the revoked pseudonym to the trusted authorization authentication center, the trusted authorization authentication center logs out all the registration information of the vehicle unit corresponding to the bill, and informs all the roadside units that the vehicle unit holding the revoked bill does not provide the service of accessing the network any more, so that the vehicle is completely expelled.
5. The VPKI-based VANETs pseudonymization method according to claim 1, wherein in step 7, the external trusted authority certificate authority needs to interact with the corresponding local trusted authority certificate authority, and the ticket generated by the external trusted authority certificate authority is parsed with the help of the local trusted authority certificate authority, and the process of performing pseudonymization operation by revoking the long-term credential is as follows:
step 7.3: the preparation request of the foreign trusted authority authentication center is as follows: ζ ← (Id) req ,n/f-tkt,nonce,TS 7 ) Sending the request message zeta to a local trusted authorization authentication center;
wherein f-tkt is foreign bill, foreign note, TS 7 Is a time stamp;
step 7.4: the local credible authorization authentication center receives the request message and analyzes the corresponding billAnd a long-term credential that it issues to the vehicle unit;
step 7.5: the local trusted authority certificate authority sends a response message χ to the foreign trusted authority certificate authority,wherein, TS 8 Is a time stamp;
step 7.6: the response message is received by the non-local credible authorization authentication center and passes through the verification equationWhether the local trusted authority certificate authority is correctly mapped to the long-term certificate of the vehicle unit is confirmed;
step 7.7: when the vehicle unit is misbehaving, the local trusted authority authentication center can directly revoke the long-term certificate of the vehicle unit analyzed in the step 7.4, so as to expel the misbehaving vehicle unit.
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