CN114244498A - Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security - Google Patents

Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN114244498A
CN114244498A CN202111511832.6A CN202111511832A CN114244498A CN 114244498 A CN114244498 A CN 114244498A CN 202111511832 A CN202111511832 A CN 202111511832A CN 114244498 A CN114244498 A CN 114244498A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
key
public key
searchable
data
public
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
CN202111511832.6A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
单瑞卿
吴坡
王丹
何德彪
李斌
杜浩瑞
彭聪
贺勇
李蒙
张江南
张博
阮冲
杨文�
宫灿锋
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Zhengzhou Power Supply Co
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Wuhan University WHU
State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Ltd
Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Ltd
Original Assignee
State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Zhengzhou Power Supply Co
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Wuhan University WHU
State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Ltd
Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Zhengzhou Power Supply Co, State Grid Corp of China SGCC, Wuhan University WHU, State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Ltd, Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Ltd filed Critical State Grid Henan Electric Power Co Zhengzhou Power Supply Co
Priority to CN202111511832.6A priority Critical patent/CN114244498A/en
Publication of CN114244498A publication Critical patent/CN114244498A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/045—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/3033—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters details relating to pseudo-prime or prime number generation, e.g. primality test
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Pure & Applied Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Mathematical Optimization (AREA)
  • Mathematical Analysis (AREA)
  • Algebra (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

A dynamic searchable public key encryption method, comprising: generating a global public parameter which can be searched and encrypted according to a key generation center; respectively generating a private key and a public key of a data sender and a data receiver according to the global public parameters; the data sender generates a searchable ciphertext according to the global public parameter, the keyword, the private key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver and uploads the searchable ciphertext to the cloud server; the data receiving party generates a retrieval trapdoor according to the global public parameters, the keywords, the public key of the data sending party and the private key of the data receiving party and uploads the retrieval trapdoor to the cloud server; and the cloud server outputs a target ciphertext in the searchable ciphertext through the retrieval trapdoor according to the global public parameter, the public key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver. According to the method and the device, the public key and the private key of the data sender and the data receiver are used for calculating the key encryption key, and the key is encrypted by using a symmetric encryption algorithm, so that the cloud server cannot guess the information of the key through the token.

Description

Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of information security, and particularly relates to a dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security.
Background
In recent years, cloud computing has attracted more and more attention, and provides a more convenient and economical solution for users to manage data. By migrating local data to the cloud in large quantities, users can reduce the burdensome task of local data management and connect devices to the internet by authorizing access to the data anywhere. Cloud computing technology, as a service platform with powerful computing power, provides an economical, flexible and convenient solution to the ever-increasing storage and computing needs of enterprises and individuals. However, with the popularization of the internet and cloud computing, more and more information leakage events also make information security issues to be of great concern. The traditional data encryption technology effectively ensures the confidentiality of user data and brings new problems. When a user needs to search for data containing a specific keyword, it is difficult for a server to selectively retrieve encrypted data in a cloud storage system. To solve this problem, a searchable encryption technology application is created.
The searchable encryption is a cryptology primitive supporting a user to search keywords on a ciphertext, and can save a large amount of communication and calculation expenses for the user and fully utilize huge calculation resources of a cloud server to search the keywords on the ciphertext. However, the existing keyword retrieval encryption system cannot meet the requirements of a cloud storage environment. The searchable encryption scheme under the symmetric cryptosystem has high retrieval efficiency, but secret retrieval of an untrusted third party cannot be realized, and the security is not high. Asymmetric searchable encryption schemes, while effective in enabling secret retrieval to untrusted third parties, are inefficient.
Generally, many searchable encryptions cannot resist internal keyword guessing attacks, and a server can guess the content of a keyword through collected query tokens to determine the corresponding relationship between the keyword and the query tokens, that is, the server can guess keyword information in ciphertext data by collecting the query tokens, so as to know partial information of the ciphertext file.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the defects in the prior art, the invention aims to ensure that the cloud server cannot guess the information of the keyword and the ciphertext when the keyword query is carried out on the ciphertext, thereby ensuring the safety of the keyword and the ciphertext.
The invention adopts the following technical scheme.
A method for dynamic searchable public key encryption with forward security, the method comprising:
step 1, generating a searchable encrypted global public parameter by a key generation center;
step 2, respectively generating a private key and a public key of a data sender and a private key and a public key of a data receiver according to the global public parameters;
step 3, according to the global public parameters, the set keywords, the private key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver, the data sender generates a searchable ciphertext and uploads the searchable ciphertext to a cloud server;
step 4, according to the global public parameters, the keywords, the public key of the data sender and the private key of the data receiver, the data receiver generates a retrieval trapdoor and uploads the retrieval trapdoor to a cloud server;
and 5, according to the global public parameter and the retrieval trapdoor, the cloud server outputs a target ciphertext in the searchable ciphertext by using the public key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver.
Further, step 1 specifically includes:
step 1.1, according to the safety parameter lambda, 2 circulation groups G with prime number p of order are selected1，G2Constructing a bilinear map e: g1×G1→G2；
Step 1.2, two hash functions are selected, respectively H1：{0，1}*→G1And H2：G2→{0，1}*；
Step 1.3, selecting a symmetric encryption algorithm Enc;
step 1.4, outputting the global public parameter GP＝{G1，G2，p，g，e(g，g)，H1，H2Enc }. Wherein G ∈ G1Is G1E (G, G) is a group G2One element of (1).
Further, step 2 specifically includes:
step 2.1, select 2 integers
Figure BDA0003394812500000021
As the private key of the data sender, the public key of the data sender is
Figure BDA0003394812500000022
Step 2.2, select 2 integers
Figure BDA0003394812500000023
As the private key of the data receiver, the public key of the data receiver is
Figure BDA0003394812500000024
Further, step 3 specifically includes:
step 3.1, the searchable cipher text is C0＝gT，C1＝H2(e(H1(T)r，R2) In which random selection is performed
Figure BDA0003394812500000025
T＝Enc(k，w)，
Figure BDA0003394812500000026
Enc is the symmetric encryption algorithm, w is the keyword, s1Is the private key of the data sender, R1Is the public key of the data receiver.
Further, step 4 specifically includes:
step 4.1, retrieve trapdoors as
Figure BDA0003394812500000031
Wherein T ═ Enc (k, w),
Figure BDA0003394812500000032
enc is the symmetric encryption algorithm, w is the keyword, r1Is the private key of the data receiver, S1Is the public key of the data sender.
Further, step 5 specifically includes:
step 5.1, if H2(e(Tw，C0))＝C1The searchable ciphertext is the target ciphertext that includes the keyword, wherein the searchable ciphertext is C0，C1Said search trapdoor is Tw。
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that:
(1) the public key and the private key of the data sender and the data receiver are used for calculating a keyword encryption key, and the keyword is encrypted by using a symmetric encryption algorithm, so that the cloud server cannot guess the information of the keyword through a token, and the internal attack of the keyword can be resisted. Thus, a dynamic searchable function with forward security is achieved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system model diagram of a dynamic searchable public key encryption scheme with forward security according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a dynamic searchable public key encryption scheme with forward security according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present application is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereby.
FIG. 1 is a system model diagram of a dynamic searchable public key encryption scheme with forward security according to the present invention. The whole system comprises three main bodies, namely a sender, a cloud storage server and a receiver. The method specifically comprises the following steps:
first, system parameters of the whole encryption scheme are generated through a system initialization algorithm. The data sender randomly selects 2 integers
Figure BDA0003394812500000033
Computing the public key as the private key
Figure BDA0003394812500000034
The data receiver randomly selects 2 integers
Figure BDA0003394812500000035
Computing the public key as the private key
Figure BDA0003394812500000036
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0003394812500000037
is a set composed of prime numbers p on Z, and 0 element is removed, namely:
Figure BDA0003394812500000038
the data transmitting party generates a key word encryption key k, calculates a key word cryptograph T ═ Enc (k, w), wherein w is a key word to be searched which is determined in advance, and outputs a cryptograph C0，C1As indicated by the arrow (r) in fig. 1. The data receiver generates a key encryption key k and calculates the keyKey cipher text T, output trapdoor TwAs indicated by arrow (c) in fig. 1. The cloud server receives the trapdoor TwSearchable encryption C0，C1A public key of a data sending party and a public key of a data receiving party, and judging whether the condition H is met2(e(Tw，C0))＝C1If the condition is satisfied, the searchable cipher text is determined to be a target cipher text containing the keyword and output to the data receiving party, as shown by an arrow in fig. 1 c. The process of the invention uses the key of the common negotiation to encrypt the key words and adopts the public key of the receiver to generate the ciphertext, thereby realizing the authentication function. Thereby ensuring the confidentiality and the searchability of the searchable encryption scheme of the invention.
TABLE 1
Figure BDA0003394812500000041
For clarity of illustration of the method described in the embodiments of the present disclosure, the following detailed description is made with reference to table 1, and mainly includes the following steps:
step 1, generating a global public parameter according to a Key Generation Center (KGC). The step 1 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1.1, according to the safety parameter lambda, 2 circulation groups G with prime number p of order are selected1，G2Constructing a bilinear map e: g1×G1→G2. Wherein the safety parameter λ represents the group G1，G2The number of the elements in (b) is, optionally, the security parameter λ generally takes numbers of 128, 256, etc. Preferably, the prime number is about 2 times the size of λ. Group G1，G2To satisfy any arbitrary grouping of bilinear maps.
Step 1.2, two hash functions are selected, respectively H1：{0，1}*→G1And H2：G2→{0，1}*(ii) a With H1For example, it represents that a 0, 1 bit string is passed through a hash function H1Mapping to group G1A certain element of (1).
Step 1.3, selecting a symmetric encryption algorithm Enc, wherein the Enc can be any symmetric encryption algorithm;
step 1.4, outputting global public parameters GP＝{G1，G2，p，g，e(g，g)，H1，H2Enc }. Wherein G ∈ G1Is G1E (G, G) is a group G2Of a randomly selected one of the elements. It should be noted that, the generator is for a cyclic group, and if the group is a cyclic group, the cyclic group can be generated by an element. This element is called the generator of the group. And elements are for a common set. Where e is a bilinear map, and e (g, g) represents e or a binary map.
Step 2, according to the global public parameter GP＝{G1，G2，p，g，e(g，g)，H1，H2Enc, generating a public key and a private key. The step 2 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 2.1, the data sender randomly selects 2 integers
Figure BDA0003394812500000051
Computing the public key as the private key
Figure BDA0003394812500000052
Figure BDA0003394812500000053
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00033948125000000512
is to solve s for the element g in the group1The power of the results.
Step 2.2, the data receiver randomly selects 2 integers
Figure BDA0003394812500000054
Computing the public key as the private key
Figure BDA0003394812500000055
Figure BDA0003394812500000056
And 3, generating a searchable cipher text according to the keyword to be retrieved, the private key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver, wherein the step is executed by the data sender.
Step 3.1, the data sender generates a key encryption key
Figure BDA0003394812500000057
Step 3.2, the key ciphertext T ═ Enc (k, w) is computed using the selected symmetric encryption function.
Step 3.3, random number is selected randomly
Figure BDA0003394812500000058
Outputting searchable cipher text C0＝gr，C1＝H2(e(H1(T)r，R2))。
And 4, generating a retrieval trapdoor according to the keyword to be retrieved, the private key of the data receiving party and the public key of the data sending party, wherein the step is executed by the data receiving party.
Step 4.1, the data sender generates a key encryption key
Figure BDA0003394812500000059
Step 4.2, the key ciphertext T ═ Enc (k, w) is computed using the selected symmetric encryption function.
Step 4.3, output retrieval trapdoor
Figure BDA00033948125000000510
Step 5, inputting and searching the trapdoor TwSearchable encryption C0，C1And outputting the target ciphertext from the searchable ciphertext. The method specifically comprises the following steps: if H is present2(e(Tw，C0))＝C1Then the searchable encryption text contains the key, otherwise the searchable encryption text does not contain the key. More specifically, for example, the searchable encryption text includesThe 4 sub-files are id1, id2, id3 and id4, and only the file id1 and id3 contain the keyword w, then only the two file ids 1 and id3 are finally output. The following equation verifies the correctness of the scheme:
Figure BDA00033948125000000511
Figure BDA00033948125000000513
Figure BDA0003394812500000061
the above tables and detailed descriptions of the specific steps are summarized below. The result is shown in FIG. 2, which includes the following steps.
Step 1, generating a searchable encrypted global public parameter by a key generation center;
step 2, respectively generating a private key and a public key of a data sender and a private key and a public key of a data receiver according to the global public parameters;
step 3, according to the global public parameters, the set keywords, the private key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver, the data sender generates a searchable ciphertext and uploads the searchable ciphertext to a cloud server;
step 4, according to the global public parameters, the keywords, the public key of the data sender and the private key of the data receiver, the data receiver generates a retrieval trapdoor and uploads the retrieval trapdoor to a cloud server;
and 5, according to the global public parameter and the retrieval trapdoor, the cloud server outputs a target ciphertext in the searchable ciphertext by using the public key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver.
The present applicant has described and illustrated embodiments of the present invention in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, but it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the above embodiments are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention, and the detailed description is only for the purpose of helping the reader to better understand the spirit of the present invention, and not for limiting the scope of the present invention, and on the contrary, any improvement or modification made based on the spirit of the present invention should fall within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. A method for dynamic searchable public key encryption with forward security, the method comprising:
step 1, generating a searchable encrypted global public parameter by a key generation center;
step 2, respectively generating a private key and a public key of a data sender and a private key and a public key of a data receiver according to the global public parameters;
step 3, according to the global public parameters, the set keywords, the private key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver, the data sender generates a searchable ciphertext and uploads the searchable ciphertext to a cloud server;
step 4, according to the global public parameters, the keywords, the public key of the data sender and the private key of the data receiver, the data receiver generates a retrieval trapdoor and uploads the retrieval trapdoor to a cloud server;
and 5, according to the global public parameter and the retrieval trapdoor, the cloud server outputs a target ciphertext in the searchable ciphertext by using the public key of the data sender and the public key of the data receiver.
2. The dynamic searchable public key encryption method according to claim 1, wherein step 1 specifically includes:
step 1.1, according to the safety parameter lambda, 2 circulation groups G with prime number p of order are selected1,G2Constructing a bilinear map e: G1×G1→G2；
Step 1.2, two hash functions are selected, respectively H1:{0,1}*→G1And H2:G2→{0,1}*；
Step 1.3, selecting a symmetric encryption algorithm Enc;
step 1.4, outputting the global public parameter GP＝{G1,G2,p,g,e(g,g),H1,H2Enc }, where G ∈ G1Is G1E (G, G) is a group G2One element of (1).
3. The dynamic searchable public key encryption method according to claim 2, wherein step 2 specifically includes:
step 2.1, select 2 integers
Figure FDA0003394812490000011
As the private key of the data sender, the public key of the data sender is
Figure FDA0003394812490000012
Step 2.2, select 2 integers
Figure FDA0003394812490000013
As the private key of the data receiver, the public key of the data receiver is
Figure FDA0003394812490000014
4. The dynamic searchable public key encryption method according to claim 2, wherein step 3 specifically includes:
step 3.1, the searchable cipher text is C0＝gr,C1＝H2(e(H1(T)r,R2) In which random selection is performed
Figure FDA0003394812490000024
T＝Enc(k,w)，
Figure FDA0003394812490000021
Enc is the symmetric encryption algorithm, w is the keyword, s1Is the private key of the data sender, R1Is the public key of the data receiver.
5. The dynamic searchable public key encryption method according to claim 2, wherein step 4 specifically includes:
step 4.1, retrieve trapdoors as
Figure FDA0003394812490000022
Wherein T ═ Enc (k, w),
Figure FDA0003394812490000023
enc is the symmetric encryption algorithm, w is the keyword, r1Is the private key of the data receiver, S1Is the public key of the data sender.
6. The dynamic searchable public key encryption method according to claim 2, wherein step 5 specifically includes:
step 5.1, if H2(e(Tw,C0))＝C1The searchable ciphertext is the target ciphertext that includes the keyword, wherein the searchable ciphertext is C0,C1Said search trapdoor is Tw。
CN202111511832.6A 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security Pending CN114244498A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202111511832.6A CN114244498A (en) 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202111511832.6A CN114244498A (en) 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN114244498A true CN114244498A (en) 2022-03-25

Family

ID=80754904

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN202111511832.6A Pending CN114244498A (en) 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN114244498A (en)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114584286A (en) * 2022-05-06 2022-06-03 武汉大学 Dynamic ciphertext retrieval and verification method and system supporting omnidirectional operation
CN114666050A (en) * 2022-03-30 2022-06-24 浙江科技学院 Data transmission method for resisting online and offline keyword guessing attacks
CN115021934A (en) * 2022-05-31 2022-09-06 福建师范大学 Authentication searchable encryption system and method based on BB signature
CN115021993A (en) * 2022-05-27 2022-09-06 山东大学 Verifiable public key searchable encryption system and method

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105871543A (en) * 2016-03-29 2016-08-17 西安电子科技大学 Attribute-based multi-keyword ciphertext retrieval method under background of multiple data owners
CN109086615A (en) * 2018-08-03 2018-12-25 上海海事大学 A kind of support multiple key search public key encryption method of anti-keyword guessing attack
US20190207763A1 (en) * 2017-12-29 2019-07-04 Huazhong University Of Science And Technology Method of searchable public-key encryption and system and server using the same
WO2020133032A1 (en) * 2018-12-27 2020-07-02 深圳技术大学（筹） Multi-user ciphertext search method capable of preventing forgery

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105871543A (en) * 2016-03-29 2016-08-17 西安电子科技大学 Attribute-based multi-keyword ciphertext retrieval method under background of multiple data owners
US20190207763A1 (en) * 2017-12-29 2019-07-04 Huazhong University Of Science And Technology Method of searchable public-key encryption and system and server using the same
CN109086615A (en) * 2018-08-03 2018-12-25 上海海事大学 A kind of support multiple key search public key encryption method of anti-keyword guessing attack
WO2020133032A1 (en) * 2018-12-27 2020-07-02 深圳技术大学（筹） Multi-user ciphertext search method capable of preventing forgery

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
郭丽峰;李智豪;: "基于身份的抗内部猜测攻击的关键字搜索方案", 山西大学学报(自然科学版), no. 01, 29 April 2020 (2020-04-29) *

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114666050A (en) * 2022-03-30 2022-06-24 浙江科技学院 Data transmission method for resisting online and offline keyword guessing attacks
CN114666050B (en) * 2022-03-30 2024-03-12 浙江科技学院 Data transmission method for resisting on-line and off-line keyword guessing attack
CN114584286A (en) * 2022-05-06 2022-06-03 武汉大学 Dynamic ciphertext retrieval and verification method and system supporting omnidirectional operation
CN115021993A (en) * 2022-05-27 2022-09-06 山东大学 Verifiable public key searchable encryption system and method
CN115021993B (en) * 2022-05-27 2023-02-28 山东大学 Verifiable public key searchable encryption system and method
CN115021934A (en) * 2022-05-31 2022-09-06 福建师范大学 Authentication searchable encryption system and method based on BB signature

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US11973889B2 (en) Searchable encrypted data sharing method and system based on blockchain and homomorphic encryption
CN106803784B (en) Lattice-based multi-user fuzzy searchable encryption method in secure multimedia cloud storage
CN108494768B (en) Ciphertext searching method and system supporting access control
CN114244498A (en) Dynamic searchable public key encryption method with forward security
Wu et al. Security analysis and enhancement of a certificateless searchable public key encryption scheme for IIoT environments
CN111930881B (en) Connection keyword authentication searchable encryption method based on state cryptographic algorithm
CN112270006A (en) Searchable encryption method for hiding search mode and access mode in e-commerce platform
CN109361644B (en) Fuzzy attribute based encryption method supporting rapid search and decryption
CN114338038B (en) Storage system for secret inquiry of block chain data and careless transmission method
CN112152803B (en) Identity-based encryption method with searchable multi-receiver ciphertext
CN112332979B (en) Ciphertext search method, system and equipment in cloud computing environment
CN105282167A (en) Searchable certificateless public key encryption method
Tuo et al. An effective fuzzy keyword search scheme in cloud computing
JP2004336794A (en) Method and apparatus for generation of public key based on user-defined id in cryptosystem
CN114338025A (en) Ciphertext equivalence testing method in cloud environment
CN107181596B (en) Searchable encryption method based on bilinear pairings
Wang et al. A Verifiable Fuzzy Keyword Search Scheme Over Encrypted Data.
CN114142996B (en) Searchable encryption method based on SM9 cryptographic algorithm
CN112560075B (en) Lightweight searchable encryption method and device based on elliptic curve
CN108920968B (en) File searchable encryption method based on connection keywords
CN109672525B (en) Searchable public key encryption method and system with forward index
KR100951034B1 (en) Method of producing searchable keyword encryption based on public key for minimizing data size of searchable keyword encryption and method of searching data based on public key through that
Yang et al. Proxy re-encryption conjunctive keyword search against keyword guessing attack
WO2022213577A1 (en) Method and apparatus for querying spatial text
Rizomiliotis et al. Simple forward and backward private searchable symmetric encryption schemes with constant number of roundtrips

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination