CN114336569A - Cooperative elastic control method and system for direct-current micro-grid - Google Patents
Cooperative elastic control method and system for direct-current micro-grid Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a cooperative elastic control method of a direct current micro-grid, which comprises the steps of constructing a direct current micro-grid model based on distributed two-layer control under DoS attack and communication delay; constructing a time-varying sampling period based on the switching sampling time sequence and the sampling period; replacing the sampling period of the direct-current microgrid model with the time-varying sampling period; improving a communication mechanism of the direct current microgrid model; constructing an elastic secondary controller; and the elastic secondary controller is used for safely recovering the voltage and distributing the current to the direct current micro-grid so as to eliminate the adverse effects of communication delay and DoS attack. In order to avoid the capture of the sampling period by a smart attacker, a new time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism are introduced under the framework of sampling control. Based on the designed sampling period and communication mechanism, an elastic secondary controller based on the sampling and communication mechanism is designed. The method can realize bus voltage recovery and current distribution even under the condition of coexistence of DoS attack and heterogeneous communication time delay.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of intelligent power grid safety, and relates to a cooperative elastic control method for a direct-current micro-grid.
Background
The direct current micro-grid is easy to be threatened by network communication delay and network attack due to the secondary control access, and an effective method for processing asynchronous network communication delay at present is to design a fixed sampling communication scheme. According to the communication scheme, an intelligent attacker can identify the sampling period on line, so that effective attack on network communication is realized, and the risk problems such as voltage out-of-limit and the like occur in the process, so that the overall safe and stable operation of the active power distribution network is influenced.
In addition, although the conventional method for resisting the network attack has a certain capability of resisting the network attack, the problem of security threat caused by simultaneous occurrence of communication delay and the network attack in the network communication process is not comprehensively considered.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects in the prior art, and provides a cooperative elastic control method for a direct-current micro-grid, so that the safety of voltage recovery and current distribution is improved.
In order to solve the problems in the prior art, the invention discloses a cooperative elasticity control method for a direct current micro-grid, which comprises the following steps: constructing a direct current micro-grid model based on distributed two-layer control under DoS attack and communication delay;
calculating a switching sampling time sequence and a sampling period according to the rule between communication delay and DoS attack in the direct-current microgrid, and further constructing a time-varying sampling period;
replacing the sampling period of the direct-current microgrid with the time-varying sampling period;
measuring communication data of adjacent points at fixed points in the direct current microgrid, and improving a communication mechanism of a direct current microgrid model according to the communication data of the adjacent points;
constructing an elastic secondary controller according to a time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism;
and performing voltage safety recovery and current distribution on the direct current micro-grid by using the elastic secondary controller.
Further, the construction process of the direct current microgrid model comprises the following steps: defining communication delay Distributed Generation (DG)jAnd distributed generation DGiAdjacent, then at time t, distributed generator DGiFrom distributedPower supply DGjThe received bus voltage and current are respectively Vb(t-τi(t)) and Ij(t-τij(t)), wherein τi(t) and τij(t) is a nonnegative time-varying bounded function, i.e., τi(t)≤dAnd τij≤d,dIs a known constant.
Further, the construction process of the direct current microgrid model comprises the following steps: DoS attack is defined, and Distributed Generation (DG) is attacked by attackerjAnd distributed generation DGiDoS attack Interval of communication initiation is noted asWhereinDG representing the kth blockadeiAnd DGjThe interval of communication between the first and second communication devices,andrespectively representing the starting time and duration of the kth DoS attackIs shown at (t)1,t2) Period, DGiAnd DGjA set of communications between which are blocked by an attacker; definition of
ΠN(t1,t2)=(t1,t2)\ΠD(t1,t2),
II thereinD(t1,t2) Is shown at (t)1,t2) Set of time intervals during which communication is blocked at least onceN(t1,t2) Represents (t)1,t2) During which the normal set of communications is communicated. The DoS attack under consideration may occur in any channel between DGs.
Suppose there is a positive scalar ζ1>0,ζ2>0,ν1V and v2So that
Wherein | (.) | and n (t)1,t2) Respectively indicates the length of (-) and the value at t1,t2) The number of DoS attacks that occur within.
Further, the construction process of the time-varying sampling period is as follows:
h(t)=hm,t∈[tm,tm+1) (1),
hmis [ t ]m,tm+1) Sampling period of (d), tmIndicating the time at which the sampling period is changed;
to ensure that all distributed power sources are at tmAll can obtain h from its neighborsmSwitching the sampling time sequenceThe following were used:
tm=mι,m=1,2,... (2),
wherein iota ═ kappa N ζ*,ζ*=ζ1+(1+ν1)d,Under the influence of DoS attack, all the distributed power supplies are at time tmPreviously, h is received from at least one neighboring pointm;
At time [ tm,tm+1) Constructing a time-varying sampling period hm:
Wherein p is a positive integer and h > 0.
Further, the improved communication mechanism algorithm is specifically as follows:
step 1: parameter initialization t0=0,m=0,κι=0,
And step 3: if iota is less than vm,κ<sm
At time tm+ιhm+κdDistributed Generation (DG)iTransmission Ii(tm+ιhm) For distributed generation DGjStep 3 is restarted by changing k to k + 1;
else let κιT, t +1, k 0, and restarting step 3;
otherwise, making iota ═ iota +1, and restarting the step 3;
otherwise, making m equal to m +1, and jumping to the step 2.
Further, the elastic secondary controller is:
whereinpiFor voltage-bound gain, when the distributed power supply DGiWhen the direct current bus voltage is accessed, the gain is 1, otherwise, the gain is 0;
correspondingly, the cooperative elasticity control method for the direct current microgrid comprises the following steps:
a time-varying sampling period module: calculating a switching sampling time sequence and a sampling period according to the rule between network communication delay and network communication attack in the direct-current microgrid, constructing a time-varying sampling period based on the switching sampling time sequence and the sampling period, and replacing the sampling period of the direct-current microgrid with the time-varying sampling period;
an improved communication mechanism module: improving the communication mechanism of the direct-current micro-grid according to the communication data of the adjacent points measured at the fixed points in the direct-current micro-grid;
the elastic secondary controller: the elastic secondary controller is constructed according to a time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism and is used for voltage safety recovery and current distribution of the direct-current micro-grid.
Correspondingly, the computer-readable storage medium is used for storing the direct-current micro-grid cooperative elasticity control method.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
the invention provides a cooperative and elastic control method for a direct-current micro-grid, which is used for eliminating adverse effects of communication delay and DoS attack. In order to avoid the capture of the sampling period by a smart attacker, a new time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism are introduced under the framework of sampling control. Based on the designed sampling period and communication mechanism, an elastic secondary controller based on the sampling and communication mechanism is designed. The method can realize bus voltage recovery and current distribution even under the condition of coexistence of DoS attack and heterogeneous communication time delay.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby.
The communication delay and DoS attack are defined as follows.
(1) Communication delay if DGjAnd DGiAdjacently, a Distributed Generation (DG) is generated at time t, DGiFrom DGjThe received bus voltage and current are respectively Vb(t-τi(t)) and Ij(t-τij(t)), wherein τi(t) and τij(t) is a non-negative time-varying bounded function, i.e., τi(t)≤dAnd τij≤d,dIs a known constant.
(2) DoS attack-attacker to DGiAnd DGjDoS attack Interval of communication initiation is noted asWhereinDG representing the kth blockadeiAnd DGjThe interval of communication between the first and second communication devices,andrespectively representing the starting time and the duration of the kth DoS attack. Order toIs shown at (t)1,t2) Period, DGiAnd DGjThe set of communications between which are blocked by an attacker. Definition of
ΠN(t1,t2)=(t1,t2)\ΠD(t1,t2),
II thereinD(t1,t2) Is shown at (t)1,t2) Set of time intervals during which communication is blocked at least onceN(t1,t2) Represents (t)1,t2) During which the normal set of communications is communicated. The DoS attack under consideration may occur in any channel between DGs.
Suppose there is a positive scalar ζ1>0,ζ2>0,ν1V and v2So that
ii)Wherein | (.) | and n (t)1,t2) Respectively indicates the length of (-) and the value at t1,t2) The number of DoS attacks that occur within.
As shown in fig. 1, (one) to avoid the sampling period being captured by a smart attacker, a time-varying sampling period is constructed.
a. The piecewise constant sampling period is as follows:
h(t)=hm,t∈[tm,tm+1) (1),
hmis [ t ]m,tm+1) The sampling period of (a). t is tmIndicating the time at which the sampling period is changed;
b. to ensure that all Distributed Generation (DG) are at tmAll can obtain h from its neighborsmSwitching the sampling time sequenceThe following were used:
tm=mι,m=1,2,... (2),
wherein iota ═ kappa N ζ*,ζ*=ζ1+(1+ν1)d,Then all DGs will be at time t even under the influence of DoS attacksmPreviously, h was received from at least one neighborm;
c. At time [ tm,tm+1) Constructing a sampling period hm:
Wherein p is a positive integer designed by a user, and h is more than 0.
And (II) improving the communication mechanism of the direct current microgrid in order to recover the network communication mechanism of the direct current microgrid more quickly.
An improved algorithm of a communication mechanism of the direct-current microgrid is as follows:
step 1: initial value t0=0,m=0,κι=0,
And step 3:
if iota is less than vmThen, then
If κ < smThen, then
At time tm+ιhm+κd,DGiTransmission Ii(tm+ιhm) To DGjStep 3 is restarted by changing k to k + 1;
else let κι=κI +1, k 0, restarting step 3;
end up
Otherwise, making iota ═ iota +1, and restarting the step 3;
end up
Otherwise, making m equal to m +1, and jumping to the step 2.
End up
According to the proposed communication mechanism algorithm whenWhen it is, DGiFrom DGjThe received signals are:
And (III) designing the elastic secondary controller based on the time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism and a distributed control technology.
The method realizes effective defense against DoS attack and heterogeneous communication delay, and ensures voltage recovery and current distribution. Based on the proposed communication mechanism algorithm, the time-varying sampling sequence { h } in the formula (1) is appliedmAnd time series t in equation (2)mDesigning an elastic secondary controller as follows:
whereinpiFor voltage-constrained gain, when DGiWhen the direct current bus voltage is accessed, the gain is 1, otherwise, the gain is 0.Is composed of
Firstly, in order to avoid the capture of a sampling period by an intelligent attacker, a required switching sampling time sequence and a sampling period are calculated according to the rule between network communication delay and network communication attack in the direct current microgrid, and then a time-varying sampling period is constructed; secondly, in order to recover the network communication mechanism more quickly, the technology designs an improved communication mechanism, and measures the data of adjacent points at fixed points; by analyzing the data of neighboring points, it is determined when to increase communication. Finally, an elastic secondary controller is designed based on a time-varying sampling period, an improved communication mechanism and a distributed control technology, so that effective defense against DoS attack and heterogeneous communication delay is realized, and voltage recovery and current distribution are ensured.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several modifications and variations can be made without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and these modifications and variations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. A cooperative elasticity control method for a direct current micro-grid is characterized by comprising the following steps:
constructing a direct current micro-grid model based on distributed two-layer control under DoS attack and communication delay;
calculating a switching sampling time sequence and a sampling period according to the rule between communication delay and DoS attack in the direct-current microgrid, and constructing a time-varying sampling period based on the switching sampling time sequence and the sampling period;
replacing the sampling period of the direct-current microgrid with the time-varying sampling period;
measuring communication data of adjacent points at fixed points in the direct current microgrid, and improving a communication mechanism of a direct current microgrid model according to the communication data of the adjacent points;
constructing an elastic secondary controller according to a time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism;
and performing voltage safety recovery and current distribution on the direct current micro-grid by using the elastic secondary controller.
2. The cooperative elasticity control method for the direct current microgrid according to claim 1, characterized in that the construction process of the direct current microgrid model comprises: defining communication delay Distributed Generation (DG)jAnd distributed generation DGiAdjacent, then at time t, distributed generator DGiFrom distributed power DGjThe received bus voltage and current are respectively Vb(t-τi(t)) and Ij(t-τij(t)), wherein τi(t) and τij(t) is a non-negative time varying function, assuming τi(t) and τij(t) is bounded, i.e. τi(t)≤dAnd τij≤d,dIs a known constant.
3. The cooperative elasticity control method for the direct current microgrid according to claim 2, characterized in that the construction process of the direct current microgrid model comprises: DoS attack is defined, and Distributed Generation (DG) is attacked by attackerjAnd distributed generation DGiDoS attack Interval of communication initiation is noted asWhereinRepresents a set of positive integers representing the number of positive integers,DG representing the kth blockadeiAnd DGjThe interval of communication between them,andrespectively representing the starting time and duration of the kth DoS attackIs shown at (t)1,t2) Period, DGiAnd DGjA set of communications between which are blocked by an attacker; definition of
ΠN(t1,t2)=(t1,t2)\ΠD(t1,t2),
II thereinD(t1,t2) Is shown at (t)1,t2) Set of time intervals during which communication is blocked at least onceN(t1,t2) Represents (t)1,t2) During which the normal set of communications is communicated. The DoS attack under consideration may occur in any channel between DGs.
Suppose there is a positive scalar ζ1>0,ζ2>1,ν1V and v2So that
Wherein | (.) | and n (t)1,t2) Respectively indicates the length of (-) and the value at t1,t2) The number of DoS attacks that occur within.
4. The cooperative elastic control method for the direct current microgrid according to claim 3, characterized in that the construction process of the time-varying sampling period is as follows:
h(t)=hm,t∈[tm,tm+1),
hmis [ t ]m,tm+1) Sampling period of (d), tmIndicating the time at which the sampling period is changed;
to ensure that all distributed power sources are at tmAll can obtain h from its neighborsmSwitching the sampling time sequenceThe following were used:
tm=mι,m=1,2,...,
whereinζ*=ζ1+(1+ν1)d,Under the influence of DoS attack, all the distributed power supplies are at time tmPreviously, h is received from at least one neighboring pointm;
At time [ tm,tm+1) Constructing a time-varying sampling period hm:
Wherein p is a positive integer and h > 0.
5. The cooperative elastic control method for the direct current microgrid according to claim 4, characterized in that the improved communication mechanism algorithm steps are as follows:
step 1: parameter initialization t0=0,m=0,κι=0,
And step 3: if iota is less than vm,κ<sm
At time tm+ιhm+κdDistributed Generation (DG)iTransmission Ii(tm+ιhm) For distributed generation DGjStep 3 is restarted by changing k to k + 1;
else let κιT, t +1, k 0, and restarting step 3;
otherwise, making iota ═ iota +1, and restarting the step 3;
otherwise, making m equal to m +1, and jumping to the step 2.
6. The cooperative elastic control method for the direct current microgrid according to claim 5, characterized in that the elastic secondary controller is:
whereinpiFor voltage-bound gain, when the distributed power supply DGiWhen the direct current bus voltage is accessed, the gain is 1, otherwise, the gain is 0;
7. a DC micro-grid cooperative elasticity control system is characterized by comprising:
a direct current microgrid model based on distributed two-layer control under DoS attack and communication delay;
a time-varying sampling period module: calculating a switching sampling time sequence and a sampling period according to the rule between network communication delay and network communication attack in the direct-current microgrid, constructing a time-varying sampling period based on the switching sampling time sequence and the sampling period, and replacing the sampling period of the direct-current microgrid with the time-varying sampling period;
an improved communication mechanism module: improving the communication mechanism of the direct-current micro-grid according to the communication data of the adjacent points measured at the fixed points in the direct-current micro-grid;
the elastic secondary controller: the elastic secondary controller is constructed according to a time-varying sampling period and an improved communication mechanism and is used for voltage safety recovery and current distribution of the direct-current micro-grid.
8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: the cooperative elasticity control method for the direct current microgrid for storing any one of claims 1-6.
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