CN112904379B - GNSS induced deception jamming data generation method based on track - Google Patents
GNSS induced deception jamming data generation method based on track Download PDFInfo
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- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
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- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
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Abstract
A track-based GNSS-induced deception jamming data generation method. The method comprises the steps of presetting a cheating scheme and presetting a motion track of a target receiver according to actual requirements; planning the motion trail of the deceptive receiver according to the motion trail, thereby realizing a code phase change scheme: enabling the target receiver and the deception receiver to move according to the movement track, respectively acquiring satellite signals received by the two receivers after intermediate frequency sampling, taking the signals received by the target receiver as real signals, and taking the signals received by the deception receiver as deception signals; and adjusting the power of the real signal and the power of the deception signal according to the power change scheme, and synthesizing the real signal after the power adjustment and the deception signal to obtain induced deception jamming data. The invention has the following effects: compared with the existing method, the method has the advantages of low complexity, easy realization, and simple required equipment and operation process.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of satellite navigation, and particularly relates to a track-based GNSS induced deception jamming data generation method.
Background
Currently, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are widely used in various military and civil fields, and the related application of GNSS is an indispensable part of people's daily work and life. The importance of GNSS makes it increasingly the target of illegal damage by terrorists and hackers, while the publicity of civil GNSS signal structures, the predictability of navigation information and its weak transmission and reception power make GNSS signals susceptible to various human and malicious interferences. Among the man-made malicious interferences, the deceptive interferences can cause the satellite navigation receiver to generate wrong speed, positioning and time results, and if the satellite navigation receiver cannot be detected and found in time, immeasurable harm and loss can be caused. On the other hand, the deception jamming technology can also be used for a plurality of active aspects such as navigation countermeasure, so that the research on the deception jamming technology is beneficial to promoting the research and development of deception and deception resistance, and has important research significance and value.
The generated spoofing interference can be classified into three categories, i.e., primary, intermediate and advanced according to the complexity of implementation and the detection difficulty. The medium-level generated spoofing interference may also be referred to as induced spoofing interference. The induced deception jamming can deceive under the condition that the tracking loop state of the navigation receiver is not changed, and compared with other deception modes, the induced deception jamming is more concealed, is not easy to be perceived by the receiver and is more threatening. However, the induced spoofing interference has a high requirement on spoofing technology, and the technical difficulty is that the spoofer needs to continuously estimate the code phase of the real signal received by the target receiver, continuously adjust the code phase of the spoofing signal according to the estimated code phase of the real signal, and then generate a complete spoofing signal by combining with other information such as a carrier wave, a navigation message and the like. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain induced spoof interference data by the above method.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above problems, an object of the present invention is to provide a method for generating GNSS-induced spoofing interference data based on trajectory.
In order to achieve the above object, the method for generating trajectory-based GNSS-induced spoof interference data according to the present invention comprises the following steps performed in sequence:
1) presetting a deception scheme, wherein the deception scheme comprises the time when a deception signal is added into a real signal, a code phase change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal, and a power change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal;
2) taking a certain GNSS receiver as a deception target receiver, and presetting a motion track of the target receiver according to actual requirements;
3) planning the motion trail of a deception receiver according to the motion trail of the target receiver in the step 2) by taking another GNSS receiver as the deception receiver, thereby realizing the code phase change scheme in the step 1):
4) enabling the target receiver and the deception receiver to move according to the motion tracks in the step 2), respectively obtaining satellite signals received by the two receivers after intermediate frequency sampling, taking the signals received by the target receiver as real signals, and taking the signals received by the deception receiver as deception signals;
5) adjusting the power of the real signals and the power of the deception signals obtained in the step 3) according to the power change scheme of the deception signals and the real signals in the step 1), and synthesizing the real signals and the deception signals after power adjustment to obtain induced deception interference data.
In step 1), the cheating scheme comprises a non-cheating phase, an approaching phase, a synchronizing phase and a pulling phase; and taking the starting moment of the real signal as the 1 st second, the moment of adding the deception signal into the real signal is the nth second, and the stage before the moment of adding the deception signal into the real signal is a deception-free stage.
In step 3), the method for planning the motion trajectory of the spoof receiver according to the motion trajectory of the target receiver in step 2), thereby implementing the code phase change scheme in step 1), is:
if the approach stage in the code phase change scheme is to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is gradually reduced, the position of the deception receiver is made to approach the position of the target receiver; if the synchronization stage is to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is 0, the position of the deception receiver is kept synchronous with the position of the target receiver; if it is desired to implement the pulling phase, even if the code phase time difference is gradually increased, the spoofed receiver location is moved away from the target receiver location.
In step 4), the true signal and the spoof signal both include N satellite signals transmitted by the same N satellites.
In step 5), the formula for synthesizing the real signal after power adjustment and the spoofing signal to obtain the induced spoofing interference data x (n) is as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
the real signal before power adjustment;
a deception signal before power adjustment; a (n) is the power gain of the real signal; b (n) is the spoofed signal power gain.
The track-based GNSS induced deception jamming data generation method provided by the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the distance between the receivers is controlled through the motion track, so that the code phase time difference between the received real signal and the received deceptive signal is indirectly controlled. Besides using two receivers to receive real signals and deception signals, a GNSS signal simulator can be adopted to simulate and generate required real signals and deception signals by setting the motion tracks of a target receiver and the deception receiver.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a method for generating trajectory-based GNSS-induced deception jamming data according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a preset spoofing scheme in the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a diagram of the latitude positioning result of the motion trajectory of the target receiver and the spoof receiver and the synthesized induced spoof interference data.
Fig. 4 is a diagram of the results of the longitude locations of the target receiver, the spoof receiver's motion trajectories, and the synthesized induced spoof interference data.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in detail below with reference to the figures and specific embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1, the method for generating trajectory-based GNSS-induced spoof interference data according to the present invention includes the following steps performed in sequence:
1) presetting a deception scheme, wherein the deception scheme comprises the time when a deception signal is added into a real signal, a code phase change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal, and a power change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal; the spoofing scheme includes a no spoofing phase, a close phase, a synchronization phase, and a pulling phase.
And if the starting time of the real signal is 1 st second, the time of adding the deception signal into the real signal is nth second. The time before adding the deception signal into the real signal is a deception-free stage.
The code phase variation scheme and the power variation scheme of the spoofed signal and the real signal can be set according to the related research.
2) Taking a certain GNSS receiver as a deception target receiver, and presetting a motion track of the target receiver according to actual requirements;
3) planning the motion trail of a deception receiver by taking another GNSS receiver as a deception receiver according to the motion trail of the target receiver in the step 2), thereby realizing the code phase change scheme in the step 1):
the purpose of planning the motion trail of the deception receiver in the step is to control the code phase between the real signal and the deception signal by controlling the distance between the target receiver and the deception receiver, so as to realize a preset code phase change scheme, and the principle is as follows:
pseudorange rho of receiver from transmitting satellite i Can be expressed as:
in the formula, t r Is the receiver local time; t is t sv Receiving time for the receiver; (x) r ,y r ,z r ) Is the receiver position; (x) i ,y i ,z i ) The satellite position of the ith satellite; Δ t i The total time deviation of the ith satellite signal is obtained; and c is the speed of light.
At the same receiving moment, the code phase time difference delta tau of the ith satellite signal received by the deception receiver and the target receiver i Can be expressed as:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
and
respectively the pseudo ranges from the target receiver and the deceptive receiver to the ith satellite; (x) a,r ,y a,r ,z a,r ) Three-dimensional coordinates of a target receiver; (x) s,r ,y s,r ,z s,r ) Three-dimensional coordinates for a spoof receiver;
and
the total time offset of the ith satellite signal received by the target receiver and the spoofed receiver, respectively.
Considering that when the target receiver and the spoof receiver are within a certain area, the different time delays generated by the steam layer and the ionosphere layer to the same satellite signal received by the target receiver and the spoof receiver are almost the same, then
For the code phase time difference Delta tau between real signal and deceptive signal i The effect of (c) is negligible. According to the formula (2), the code phase time difference between the real signal and the deception signal can be adjusted by changing the position relation between the target receiver and the deception receiver, namely when the deception receiver and the target receiver are in the same three-dimensional geographic position, because the two receivers reach the same satellite at the same distance, the code phases of the same satellite signals received by the two receivers are also the same, namely the code phase time difference delta tau i Equal to 0; when the deception receiver and the target receiver are in different three-dimensional geographic positions, the code phase time difference changes, namely, the code phase time difference delta tau i Greater than 0.
Therefore, the method for realizing the code phase variation scheme through the motion track comprises the following steps: if the approach stage in the code phase change scheme is to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is gradually reduced, the position of the deception receiver is made to approach the position of the target receiver; if the synchronization stage is to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is 0, the position of the deception receiver is kept synchronous with the position of the target receiver; if it is desired to implement the pulling phase, even if the code phase time difference is gradually increased, the spoofed receiver location is moved away from the target receiver location.
4) Enabling the target receiver and the deception receiver to move according to the motion tracks in the step 2), respectively obtaining satellite signals received by the two receivers after intermediate frequency sampling, taking the signals received by the target receiver as real signals, and taking the signals received by the deception receiver as deception signals;
the true signal and the deception signal both contain N satellite signals emitted by the same N satellites.
5) Adjusting the power of the real signals and the power of the deception signals obtained in the step (3) according to the power change scheme of the deception signals and the real signals in the step 1), and synthesizing the real signals after power adjustment and the deception signals to obtain induced deception interference data x (n), wherein the formula is as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
the real signal before power adjustment;
the deception signal before power adjustment; a (n) is the power gain of the real signal; b (n) is the spoofed signal power gain.
Simulation experiment
The effect of the track-based GNSS-induced deception jamming data generation method provided by the present invention can be further illustrated by the following simulation data experiment.
In the simulation experiment, a GPS signal simulator is adopted to generate two GPS signals, satellite signals received by a target receiver and a deception receiver are simulated respectively, the satellite signals comprise eight satellite signals, namely PRN1, PRN10, PRN12, PRN14, PRN18, PRN24, PRN25 and PRN31, and the signal sampling rate is 15 MHz.
The preset spoofing scheme is shown in fig. 2. In the figure, a dotted triangle represents a code correlation peak of a real signal, a solid line represents a code correlation peak of a deceptive signal, a horizontal axis corresponding to a peak value of the correlation peak is a code phase of the signal, and the height of the peak value reflects the power intensity of the signal. The spoofing scheme shown in fig. 2 is: no deception signal exists within 0-40s, and only a real signal exists; 40s is the deception starting moment, 40-80s is the approaching stage, the code phase difference between the deception signal and the real signal in the stage is continuously reduced, and the deception signal power is lower than the real signal power; 80-100s is a synchronization stage, the code phase difference between the deception signal and the real signal in the synchronization stage is always 0, and the deception signal power is gradually increased until the deception signal power is higher than the real signal power; 100-300s is a pulling phase, in which the code phase difference between the spoofed signal and the real signal is continuously increased, and the power of the spoofed signal is kept higher than that of the real signal.
According to the spoofing scheme, the preset motion trajectories of the target receiver and the spoofing receiver are as follows: and within 0-300s, the target receiver always makes uniform linear motion at a speed of (10,0,0) m/s. After the start time of the spoofed receiver trajectory is 40s after the target receiver starts to move, the distance between the spoofed receiver and the target receiver is (800,0,0) m at the moment, and the initial speed is (10,0,0) m/s. Approach phase, first 40-60s, spoof receiver acceleration as (2,0,0) m/s 2 Then 60-80s, spoof the receiver acceleration as (-2,0,0) m/s 2 (ii) a Synchronization phase, 80-100s, spoofing receiver acceleration as (0,0,0) m/s 2 The speed is (10,0,0) m/s; the pulling phase, first 100- 2 And then 120-300s, spoofing the receiver acceleration as (0,0,0) m/s 2 The speed was (16,16,0) m/s.
The power variation scheme used is shown in table 1. Within 0-300s, the true signal power is always-20 dB. In the approach stage, the deception signal power is-22 dB; in the synchronization stage, the deception signal is gradually increased from-22 dB to-18 dB; during the pulling phase, the spoofed signal power remains-18 dB.
TABLE 1
The real signal, the deceptive signal and the mixed signal are respectively read by a GPS software receiver, and longitude and latitude positioning results are respectively shown in figures 3 and 4. And the positioning result shows that the motion tracks of the target receiver and the deception receiver conform to the preset track scheme. The positioning result of the induced deception jamming data obtained after the real signal and the deception signal are mixed is consistent with the real signal in the 0-40s deception-free stage; in the approach stage of 40-80s, the positioning result is influenced by the deception signal, but the position of the deception signal is not greatly different from that of the target receiver; in the 80-100s synchronization stage, the positioning result is consistent with the positions of the target receiver and the deception receiver; in the 100-300s pulling stage, the positioning result is influenced by the spoofing signal again, gradually deviates from the motion track of the target receiver and finally changes according to the motion track of the spoofing signal.
Claims (2)
1. A trajectory-based GNSS-induced spoof interference data generating method, said method comprising the steps of, in order:
1) presetting a deception scheme, which comprises the time when a deception signal is added into a real signal, a code phase change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal, and a power change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal;
2) taking a certain GNSS receiver as a deception target receiver, and presetting a motion track of the target receiver according to actual requirements;
3) planning the motion trail of a deception receiver according to the motion trail of the target receiver in the step 2) by taking another GNSS receiver as the deception receiver, thereby realizing the code phase change scheme in the step 1):
4) enabling the target receiver and the deception receiver to move according to the movement track in the step 2), respectively obtaining each satellite signal which is received by the two receivers and subjected to intermediate frequency sampling, taking the signal received by the target receiver as a real signal, and taking the signal received by the deception receiver as a deception signal;
5) adjusting the power of the real signal and the power of the deception signal obtained in the step 3) according to the power change scheme of the deception signal and the real signal in the step 1), and synthesizing the real signal after power adjustment and the deception signal to obtain induced deception jamming data;
in step 1), the cheating scheme comprises a non-cheating phase, an approaching phase, a synchronizing phase and a pulling phase; taking the starting time of the real signal as the 1 st second, the time of adding the deception signal into the real signal is the nth second, and the time before adding the deception signal into the real signal is a deception-free stage;
the method is characterized in that: in step 3), the method for planning the motion trajectory of the spoof receiver according to the motion trajectory of the target receiver in step 2), thereby implementing the code phase change scheme in step 1), is:
if the approach stage in the code phase change scheme is to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is gradually reduced, the position of the deception receiver is made to approach the position of the target receiver; if the synchronization stage is to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is 0, the position of the deception receiver is kept synchronous with the position of the target receiver; if the pulling phase is required to be realized, even if the code phase time difference is gradually increased, the position of the deception receiver is far away from the position of the target receiver;
in step 5), the formula for synthesizing the real signal after power adjustment and the spoofing signal to obtain the induced spoofing interference data x (n) is as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
the real signal before power adjustment is obtained;
the deception signal before power adjustment; a (n) is the power gain of the real signal; b (n) is the spoofed signal power gain.
2. The trajectory-based GNSS-induced spoof interference data generating method of claim 1, wherein: in step 4), the true signal and the spoof signal both contain N satellite signals transmitted by the same N satellites.
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| CN109471133A (en) * | 2019-01-11 | 2019-03-15 | 西安雷擎电子科技有限公司 | A kind of Cheating Technology of seamless intrusion UAV Navigation System |
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| CN104330808B (en) * | 2014-11-01 | 2017-01-25 | 中国民航大学 | Multiclass satellite navigation interference suppression method based on solution expanding technology |
| CN104777493B (en) * | 2015-05-05 | 2018-04-27 | 中国人民解放军国防科学技术大学 | A kind of signal creating method for realizing desired guiding trajectory deception and wired test system |
| CN106950578A (en) * | 2017-03-23 | 2017-07-14 | 华东师范大学 | A kind of aircraft capture method based on satellite navigation system |
| CN107607965B (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2019-11-08 | 桂林电子科技大学 | The black winged Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system of one kind and method |
| KR102194734B1 (en) * | 2020-03-24 | 2020-12-23 | 국방과학연구소 | Anti-drone system and method using gps spoofing attacks |
| CN111381604B (en) * | 2020-04-30 | 2023-04-28 | 北京无线电计量测试研究所 | Method and system for generating deception tracks for intercepting autonomous flight low-speed small targets |
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| CN108333600A (en) * | 2018-02-09 | 2018-07-27 | 桂林电子科技大学 | Formula Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system and method coexists in one kind |
| CN109471133A (en) * | 2019-01-11 | 2019-03-15 | 西安雷擎电子科技有限公司 | A kind of Cheating Technology of seamless intrusion UAV Navigation System |
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