CN111554008B - Digital key binding method, digital key verification method, mobile electronic equipment and near field communication device - Google Patents
Digital key binding method, digital key verification method, mobile electronic equipment and near field communication device Download PDFInfo
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00896—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08C—TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR MEASURED VALUES, CONTROL OR SIMILAR SIGNALS
- G08C17/00—Arrangements for transmitting signals characterised by the use of a wireless electrical link
- G08C17/02—Arrangements for transmitting signals characterised by the use of a wireless electrical link using a radio link
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M1/00—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers
- H04M1/72—Mobile telephones; Cordless telephones, i.e. devices for establishing wireless links to base stations without route selection
- H04M1/724—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones
- H04M1/72403—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality
- H04M1/72409—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality by interfacing with external accessories
- H04M1/72412—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality by interfacing with external accessories using two-way short-range wireless interfaces
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M1/00—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers
- H04M1/72—Mobile telephones; Cordless telephones, i.e. devices for establishing wireless links to base stations without route selection
- H04M1/724—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones
- H04M1/72403—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality
- H04M1/72409—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality by interfacing with external accessories
- H04M1/72415—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality by interfacing with external accessories for remote control of appliances
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04W76/10—Connection setup
- H04W76/14—Direct-mode setup
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00412—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal being encrypted
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
The application provides a mobile electronic device, a digital key binding method and a digital key verification method of the mobile electronic device, a near field communication device, a digital key verification method and a digital key binding method of the near field communication device. Firstly, before the mobile electronic equipment performs verification communication with a near field communication device, the two communication parties preset a second key and a digital key of the verification communication in the near field communication device in an encrypted transmission mode; secondly, a first key used for encrypting the second key and the digital key is preset in the equipment of both communication parties before verification communication, and the near field communication device performs primary equipment authentication on the mobile electronic equipment in the process of decrypting by using the first key, so that both communication parties are bound, and the communication safety is further improved; thirdly, the user can use the private remote controller to start binding, so that the communication safety is further enhanced; in addition, a random number is added in the encryption process of verification communication, so that replay attack can be prevented.
Description
Technical Field
The present disclosure relates to digital key technologies, and in particular, to a digital key binding method, a digital key verification method, a mobile electronic device, and a near field communication device.
Background
In recent years, with the rapid development of internet of things, internet of vehicles and intelligent home technologies, the application of digital keys is more and more. The digital key can be used for unlocking an intelligent door, unlocking an electric vehicle, starting the electric vehicle and the like.
The traditional digital key unlocking is mostly carried out by taking a computer as a control platform. In recent years, with the development of mobile electronic devices, the use of wireless transmission modules to construct digital key transmission networks has become more and more popular.
Bluetooth (Bluetooth) is a substitute for a low-power short-range wireless communication technology standard, and is essentially to establish a public standard of a general wireless air interface and control software thereof, so that communication and a computer are further combined, and portable devices produced by different manufacturers can have interoperability and interoperability in a short-range without wire or cable interconnection. Compared with other similar wireless communication technologies, in the design process of Bluetooth, a plurality of factors are considered, and the Bluetooth has the following main characteristics: high working frequency, strong anti-interference, convenient use, voice support, no need of base station, small size, low power consumption, multi-path multi-directional link, strong confidentiality and the like.
The transmission quantity that bluetooth can bear can reach 1M B per second, and the security is high simultaneously, can set for encryption protection, can trade frequency one thousand six hundred times per minute, but effective transmission distance is shorter. Therefore, the digital key non-sensing unlocking realized by adopting the Bluetooth module is widely applied to unlocking under intelligent door lines and unlocking schemes of electric vehicles. However, the bluetooth module used on the electric vehicle or intelligent door and other devices affected by the cost belongs to low-end equipment with limited computing capacity and storage capacity. Therefore, for bluetooth modules on such devices, the digital key encryption scheme set should be simple and reliable.
The existing equipment (electric vehicle, intelligent door, etc.) for realizing noninductive unlocking through a Bluetooth module verifies the unlocking process of a digital key, and the unlocking process is as follows: sending the encrypted digital key to the equipment end through mobile electronic equipment (keys, mobile phones and the like); after the equipment is decrypted, the received digital key is compared with the stored digital key, if the digital key is matched with the stored digital key, verification is passed, and then unlocking or starting of the equipment is realized. The verification scheme of the digital key comprises the following steps: on one hand, only a single-layer key is used for verifying the digital key, and the mobile electronic equipment is not authenticated; on the other hand, replay attacks cannot be prevented.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems that the traditional digital key security scheme does not verify the equipment and cannot prevent replay attack, the application discloses a digital key binding method, which comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that mobile electronic equipment sends a first request to a near field communication device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the near field communication device, and the near field communication device is installed on an electric vehicle; the mobile electronic equipment receives a first response of the near field communication device to the first request; the mobile electronic equipment establishes the communication connection with the near field communication device based on the first response; the mobile electronic device generates a second key and a digital key; the mobile electronic equipment encrypts a plaintext by using a first key to generate a ciphertext, wherein the plaintext comprises the second key and the digital key, and the first key is preset in the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device at the same time; the mobile electronic equipment transmits the ciphertext to the near field communication device; and the mobile electronic equipment sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the near field communication device.
In some embodiments, the digital key binding method further comprises: the mobile electronic equipment obtains the model of the electric vehicle; the mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and the mobile electronic device receiving a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with a model of the electric vehicle.
In some embodiments, the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
In some embodiments, the second key is associated with an ID of the electric vehicle.
The application also discloses a mobile electronic device, comprising: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, the at least one processor reading the at least one instruction set and executing the digital key binding method described herein as instructed by the at least one instruction set when the mobile electronic device is operating.
The application also discloses a digital key binding method, which comprises the following steps: a near field communication device installed on an electric vehicle receives a first request from a target mobile electronic device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the target mobile electronic device, and the near field communication device is installed in the electric vehicle; the near field communication device sends a first response to the first request to the target mobile electronic equipment, wherein the first response comprises the establishment of the communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment; the near field communication device receives a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic equipment, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by using a first key by the target mobile electronic equipment, the plaintext comprises a second key and a digital key, and the first key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic equipment at the same time; the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key to obtain the second key and the digital key; and the near field communication device sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the target mobile electronic device.
In some embodiments, the first key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device at the same time, including: the target mobile electronic equipment obtains the model of the electric vehicle; the target mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and the target mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with a model of the electric vehicle.
In some embodiments, the second key is associated with an ID of the two-wheeled vehicle.
In some embodiments, the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
The application also discloses a near field communication device, including: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, the at least one processor reading the at least one instruction set and executing the digital key binding method described herein according to an indication of the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device is operating.
The application also discloses a digital key verification method, which comprises the following steps: a near field communication device in an electric vehicle sends a broadcast, wherein the broadcast comprises a first random number; the near field communication device receives a near field communication connection request of target mobile electronic equipment within a preset time period and establishes near field communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment; the near field communication device receives a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device, the encryption process comprises a second random number, and the plaintext comprises a digital key; the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number; the near field communication device acquires the digital key; the near field communication device determines that the digital key is the same as the pre-bound digital key; and the near field communication device executes an instruction corresponding to the digital key.
In some embodiments, the near field communication device confirming that the second random number is the same as the first random number comprises: the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a second key, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device; the near field communication device acquires the second random number; and the near field communication device determines that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
In some embodiments, the near field communication device confirming that the second random number is the same as the first random number comprises: the near field communication device generates a third key based on a second key and the first random number, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the target mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device; the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a third key; and the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
The application also discloses a near field communication device, including: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, wherein when the near field communication device is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key binding method described herein according to an indication of the at least one instruction set.
The application also discloses a digital key verification method, which comprises the following steps: the mobile electronic equipment establishes communication connection with a near field communication device in the electric vehicle; the mobile electronic equipment receives the random number broadcast by the near field communication device; the mobile electronic equipment encrypts a plaintext to generate a ciphertext, wherein the encryption process comprises the random number, the plaintext comprises a digital key, and the digital key is a preset digital key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device; and the mobile electronic equipment sends the ciphertext to the near field communication device through the near field communication connection.
In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext to generate ciphertext includes: the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a third key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the third key is generated based on a second key and the random number, and the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device.
In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext to generate ciphertext includes: the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a second key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device, and the plaintext further comprises the random number.
The application also discloses a mobile electronic device, comprising: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and, upon indication of the at least one instruction set, the digital key authentication method described herein when the mobile electronic device is operating.
The mobile electronic equipment can execute the digital key binding method to bind the mobile electronic equipment (such as a mobile phone of a user) with the near field communication device (such as a Bluetooth controller installed on an electric bicycle), so that the authentication of the near field communication device on the mobile electronic equipment is realized. After the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device are bound, the near field communication device can also execute a digital key verification method to verify unlocking and/or starting requests sent by the mobile electronic device.
According to the digital key binding method and the digital key verification method, first, before an electric vehicle leaves a factory, a first key is preset in a near-field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and a target mobile electronic device (user mobile phone) of the electric vehicle at the same time. Before the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) carry out verification communication, the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) can use a preset first secret key to carry out equipment authentication (namely binding) on the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone), so that the safety of future verification communication of the two interaction parties is improved; secondly, the target mobile electronic can encrypt a second key for future verification communication by using the first key, so that the communication safety is further improved; and thirdly, before the target mobile electronic equipment (a user mobile phone) and the electric vehicle are bound, a user (a vehicle owner) can unlock the Bluetooth controller of the electric vehicle by using a private remote controller matched with the electric vehicle, so that the electric vehicle enters a binding state, and the safety of the binding process is further enhanced. In addition, the random number R is added in the encryption process of the verification communication between the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) and the near field communication device, so that replay attack can be prevented.
Drawings
Fig. 1 illustrates an application scenario of a digital key binding method provided according to some embodiments of the present application;
fig. 2 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a bluetooth controller provided according to some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 3 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a mobile electronic device provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 4 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key binding method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 5 illustrates a flow chart for presetting a first key in a mobile electronic device provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 6 illustrates a schematic diagram of an encryption process for encrypting plaintext with a first key, provided according to some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 7 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key binding method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 8 illustrates a schematic diagram of a Bluetooth controller performing authentication interactions with a mobile electronic device, provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 9 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key verification method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 10 illustrates an encryption process for plaintext provided according to some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 11 illustrates another encryption process for plaintext provided according to some embodiments of the present application; and
fig. 12 illustrates a flow chart of a method of verifying a digital key provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application.
Detailed Description
The following description provides specific applications and requirements of the invention to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention. Various modifications to the disclosed embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments and applications without departing from the spirit and scope of the application. Thus, the present application is not limited to the embodiments shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the claims.
The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular example embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting. For example, as used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" include plural referents unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. The terms "comprises," "comprising," and/or "includes" when used in this specification, are taken to specify the presence of stated integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof.
These and other features of the present application, as well as the operation and function of the related elements of structure, as well as the combination of parts and economies of manufacture, may be significantly improved upon in view of the following description. All of which form a part of the present application, reference is made to the accompanying drawings. It is to be expressly understood, however, that the drawings are for the purpose of illustration and description only and are not intended as a definition of the limits of the application.
The following description may significantly improve the operation and function of these and other features of the present application, as well as related elements of structure, as well as the economic efficiency of the assembly and manufacture. All of which form a part of the present application with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is to be expressly understood, however, that the drawings are for the purpose of illustration and description only and are not intended as a definition of the limits of the application. It should also be understood that the drawings are not drawn to scale.
A flowchart, as used in this application, illustrates system-implemented operations according to some embodiments in this application. It should be clearly understood that the operations of the flowchart may be performed out of order. Rather, operations may be performed in reverse order or concurrently. Further, one or more other operations may be added to the flowchart. One or more operations may be removed from the flowchart.
The digital key binding method and the digital key verification method can be applied to the interaction process of the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device.
Fig. 1 illustrates an application scenario of a digital key binding method provided according to some embodiments of the present application.
The electric vehicle 20 may include, but is not limited to, an electric car, scooter, bicycle, moped, balance car. However, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that other forms of electric vehicles are also suitable for use with the digital key binding method and/or the digital key verification method described herein.
Specifically, the electric vehicle 20 may be provided with an execution device 30 and a near field communication device 40. The actuation means 30 may include, but is not limited to, unlocking, throttle, engine, braking system, and actuation of steering systems (including steering of tires and/or operation of steering lights). The execution device 30 may receive the instruction of the near field communication device 40 to perform various actions such as unlocking/starting.
The near field communication device 40 may establish a communication connection with the mobile electronic device 10 to implement communication with the mobile electronic device 10, receive a control signal of the mobile electronic device 10, and control the execution device 30 to execute an unlocking and/or starting action. The near field communication device 40 may also set the state of the near field communication device 40 according to the control signal of the remote controller 90.
In some embodiments, the communication connection may be a near field communication connection between the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device. For example, the communication connection may be a bluetooth connection. Correspondingly, when the communication connection is a bluetooth connection, the near field communication device 40 may be a bluetooth controller. Fig. 2 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a bluetooth controller 50 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application.
The bluetooth controller 50 may include at least one processor 51. The processor 51 is for executing computer instructions. The computer instructions may include, for example, procedures, programs, objects, components, data structures, processes, modules, and functions that perform the particular functions described herein. In some embodiments, processor 51 may comprise one or more hardware processors. By way of example only, the hardware processor may include a Central Processing Unit (CPU), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a special instruction set processor (ASIP), a graphics processing unit (G PU), a Physical Processing Unit (PPU), a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), a Programmable Logic Device (PLD), a controller, a microcontroller unit, a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC), a microprocessor, or the like, or any combination thereof.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include at least one memory 52. The memory 52 is communicatively coupled to the processor 51. The memory 52 may be a single memory or a group of processors. Memory 52 may store data and/or instructions. In some embodiments, memory 52 may store data obtained from mobile electronic device 10, such as data packets transmitted by mobile electronic device 10. In some embodiments, memory 52 may store data and/or instructions for processor 51 to perform exemplary methods. In some embodiments, memory 52 may include program memory and data memory. The program memory may be used for storing data to be processed. The program memory may be used to store communication protocol software. In some embodiments, memory 52 may include mass storage, removable storage, volatile read-write memory, read-only memory (ROM), and the like, or any combination thereof. Exemplary mass storage devices may include magnetic disks, optical disks, solid state drives, and the like. Exemplary removable storage devices may include flash drives, floppy disks, optical disks, memory cards, zip disks, tape, and the like. Exemplary volatile read-write memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM). The memory 52 in the bluetooth controller 50 shown in fig. 2 includes a static memory 53 (SRAM) and a Flash memory 54 (Flash program memory). Flash memory 54 is used to store all software components in the baseband and link management layers. The static memory 53 serves as a running space for the processor 51, and software in the flash memory 54 is called into the static memory 53 in operation.
The bluetooth controller 50 may include a data bus 55 for data communication.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART) 56. The universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter 56 is a universal serial data bus for asynchronous communications. The universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter 56 is a bi-directional communication bus that enables full duplex transmission and reception. The UART 56 may provide a hardware interface (i.e., physical connection) for the processor to communicate with the SCM, and is a channel through which the SCM communicates with the processor.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a codec 57. The codec 57 may encode and decode bluetooth packets. As an example, the codec 57 may include a digital-to-analog converter (DAC), an analog-to-digital conversion port (ADC), a digital interface, an encoding module, and the like.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a wireless transceiver 58. The wireless transceiver 58 is responsible for the reception and transmission of data. The wireless transceiver 58 may perform both data transmission and reception operations. The transmitting operation may include carrier generation, carrier modulation, power control, and automatic gain control AGC; the receiving operation may include frequency tuning to the correct carrier frequency, signal strength control, and so on.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a baseband controller 59. The baseband controller 59 may process the data stream in real time under the control of the processor 51, such as data packets, encryption, decryption, verification, error correction, etc. The baseband controller 59 may also provide an interface (such as a datapath RAM client interface, a microprocessor interface, a pulse code modulation interface (PCM), etc.) from the baseband controller to other chips.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a test module 60. Test module 60 may provide certification and compliance specifications for the wireless layer and the baseband layer while also managing production and after-market testing of the product.
The target server 700 may be a server system of a manufacturer of the electric vehicle 20. The target server 700 may store model information of the electric vehicle 20. The mobile electronic device 10 may send a request to the target server 700 to obtain model information of the electric vehicle 20.
The user 80 may be a user of the electric vehicle 20. The user 80 may control the state of the electric vehicle 20 through the remote controller 90. For example, before binding the mobile electronic device 10 and the electric vehicle 20, the user 80 may control the electric vehicle 20 to enter a bound state through the remote controller 90. The user 80 may implement a binding with the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10. For example, the user 80 may input control instructions to the mobile electronic device 10. After receiving the control instruction, the mobile electronic device 10 may execute the digital key binding method to bind the mobile electronic device 10 and the electric vehicle 20. The user 80 may also send a target instruction to the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10 to control the electric vehicle 20 to perform a target operation. For example, the user 80 may send an unlock instruction to the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10 to control unlocking of the electric vehicle 20. For example, the user 80 may send a start instruction to the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10 to control the electric vehicle 20 to start.
The remote control 90 may be a wireless transmitting device. The user 80 may transmit control information to the near field communication device 40 through the remote controller 90 to control the state of the near field communication device 40. For example, manufacturers of electric vehicles may equip each electric vehicle with a personal remote control when the electric vehicle leaves the factory. The personal remote control is provided to the user 80 at the time of vending the electric vehicle. The user may be a vehicle owner. The user may use a personal remote control 90 associated with the electric vehicle to control the electric vehicle into a binding state. For example, the user may press an unlock key on the remote control 90 for a long time or input an unlock code to control the electric vehicle to enter the binding writable mode.
The mobile electronic device 10 may be an intelligent mobile device. In some embodiments, the smart mobile device may include a smart phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a gaming device, a navigation device, a point-of-sale (POS) device, etc., or any combination thereof. As an example, the mobile electronic device 10 may be a cell phone of the user 80. The mobile electronic device 10 may also include, but is not limited to, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, a smart home device, a wearable device, a virtual reality device, an augmented reality device, and the like, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the smart home devices may include smart lighting devices, control devices for smart electrical devices, smart interphones, and the like, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the wearable device may include a smart bracelet, smart footwear, smart glasses, smart helmet, smart watch, smart garment, smart backpack, smart accessory, or the like, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the virtual reality device and/or the augmented reality device may include a virtual reality helmet, virtual reality glasses, virtual reality patches, augmented reality helmets, augmented reality glasses, augmented reality patches, and the like, or any combination thereof. For example, the virtual reality device and/or augmented reality device may include google glasses, oculus lift, hollens, gear VR, and the like.
Fig. 3 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a mobile electronic device 10 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. The mobile electronic device 10 includes at least one memory 230 and at least one processor 220. In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device 10 may also include a communication port 250 and an internal communication bus 210. Meanwhile, the mobile electronic device 10 may also include an I/O component 260.
Internal communication bus 210 may connect the different system components including memory 230 and processor 220.
The I/O component 260 supports input/output between the mobile electronic device 10 and other components (e.g., the terminal device 130).
Memory 230 may include a data storage device. The data storage device may be a non-transitory storage medium or a transitory storage medium. For example, the data storage device may include one or more of a magnetic disk 232, a Read Only Memory (ROM) 234, or a Random Access Memory (RAM) 236. Memory 230 also includes at least one instruction set stored in the data storage device. The instructions are computer program code that may include programs, routines, objects, components, data structures, procedures, modules, etc. that perform the digital key binding methods and/or digital key verification methods provided herein.
The communication port 250 is used for data communication between the mobile electronic device 10 and the outside world. For example, the mobile electronic device 10 may connect to the network 120 through the communication port 250, and further request the target server to obtain the model of the electric vehicle 20 through the network 120.
The at least one processor 220 communicates with at least one memory 230 over an internal communication bus 210. The at least one processor 220 is configured to execute the at least one instruction set, and when the at least one processor 220 executes the at least one instruction set, the mobile electronic device 10 implements the digital key binding method or the digital key verification method provided herein. Processor 220 may perform all the steps involved in the method of pushing information. Processor 220 may be in the form of one or more processors, in some embodiments processor 220 may include one or more hardware processors, such as microcontrollers, microprocessors, reduced Instruction Set Computers (RISC), application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), application specific instruction set processors (ASIP), central Processing Units (CPU), graphics Processing Units (GPU), physical Processing Units (PPU), microcontroller units, digital Signal Processors (DSP), field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), advanced RISC Machines (ARM), programmable Logic Devices (PLD), any circuit or processor capable of executing one or more functions, or the like, or any combination thereof. For illustrative purposes only, only one processor 220 is depicted in the mobile electronic device 10 in this application. However, it should be noted that the mobile electronic device 10 may also include multiple processors in the present application, and thus, the operations and/or method steps disclosed in the present application may be performed by one processor as described in the present application, or may be performed jointly by multiple processors. For example, if the processor 220 of the mobile electronic device 10 performs steps a and B in this application, it should be understood that steps a and B may also be performed by two different processors 220 in combination or separately (e.g., a first processor performs step a, a second processor performs step B, or the first and second processors together perform steps a and B).
In this application, the role of the mobile electronic device 10 in the method disclosed in this application will be described by way of example of a smartphone, and the role of the near field communication device 40 in the method will be described by way of example of a bluetooth controller.
Fig. 4 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key binding method S100 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 4 illustrates a process for describing the binding of a digital key from the processing of the mobile electronic device 10. The process S100 may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium (such as memory 230) in the handset 10 for the digital key binding. At least one processor 220 is communicatively coupled to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein when the handset 10 is operating, the at least one processor 220 reads the at least one instruction set and performs the steps in flow S100 as directed by the at least one instruction set.
The operation of the illustrated flow S100 presented below is intended to be illustrative and not limiting. In some embodiments, flow S100 may add one or more additional operations not described and/or prune one or more operations described herein when implemented. Further, the order of operations shown in fig. 4 and described below is not limited thereto.
S110, the mobile electronic equipment sends a first request to the near field communication device.
The user 80 controls the near field communication device 40 to enter a binding state through the remote controller 90. The mobile electronic device 10 may then send a first request to the near field communication device 40. The first request includes establishing a communication connection with the near field communication device, wherein the near field communication device is mounted on an electric vehicle. In some embodiments, the near field communication device comprises a bluetooth controller. In some embodiments, the communication connection is a near field communication connection, such as a bluetooth connection, between the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device.
S120, the mobile electronic equipment receives a first response of the near field communication device to the first request.
And S130, the mobile electronic equipment establishes the communication connection with the near field communication device based on the first response.
For example, a bluetooth controller in an electric vehicle may generate a command packet for establishing a communication connection, and send the command packet to a mobile phone. After receiving the command packet, the mobile phone can execute the command packet and establish communication connection with a Bluetooth controller in the electric vehicle.
And S140, the mobile electronic device generates a second key and a digital key. The second key may be a default key for future communications of the mobile electronic device with the near field communication device. In some embodiments, the second key may be associated with an ID of the electric vehicle. The mobile phone may generate the second key based on the ID of the electric vehicle.
The ID of the electric vehicle may be unique identification information of the electric vehicle. For example, the ID of the electric vehicle may be a Serial Number (Serial Number) of the electric vehicle. As an example, the ID of the electric vehicle may be a circuit board number of the electric vehicle or a circuit board number of the bluetooth controller; the ID of the electric vehicle may also be generated by a circuit board number of the electric vehicle or a circuit board number of the bluetooth controller. The ID of the electric vehicle may be stored in the mobile phone in advance. For example, before the electric vehicle leaves the factory, a mobile phone manufacturer cooperating with the electric vehicle manufacturer can store the ID of the electric vehicle in the mobile phone by a white box encryption technology; the owner can obtain the ID of the electric vehicle only by completing the authentication and configuration of the mobile phone. For example, the ID of the electric vehicle is stored in the bluetooth controller in advance, and the mobile phone may send a request to the bluetooth controller to request to obtain the ID of the electric vehicle. For example, the ID of the electric vehicle is stored in the server 700 of the electric vehicle manufacturer in advance, and the mobile phone sends a request to the server 700 to request to obtain the ID of the electric vehicle.
The handset may generate the second key using a fixed algorithm preset in its memory. The processing procedure of program instructions in the mobile phone is described as follows: input (electric vehicle ID); output (second key). One mobile phone corresponds to one second secret key to realize one secret. In some embodiments, user information set by the user may also be added to the input information, namely: input (electric vehicle ID and user information); output (second key). Thus, the user can change the user information when the user changes the mobile phone or the mobile phone is lost. The handset may generate a new second key based on the new user information and the electric vehicle ID. Thus, the old second key is disabled and cannot be used.
The digital key may also be associated with the ID of the electric vehicle or generated by the mobile phone 10 based on the ID of the electric vehicle 20. The process of generating the digital key by the mobile phone 10 based on the ID of the electric vehicle 20 is similar to or identical to the process of generating the second key, and for brevity, will not be described herein.
And S150, the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using the first key to generate ciphertext.
And S160, the mobile electronic equipment transmits the ciphertext to the near field communication device.
The plaintext may comprise the second key and the digital key. In some embodiments, the plaintext may further comprise a check code. The check code may check whether decryption was successful at the time of decryption. In some embodiments, the plaintext may further comprise a flag bit. The processor of the mobile phone can read the marking bit and run the program instruction corresponding to the marking bit according to the content of the marking bit. In some embodiments, the flag bit may identify a status of the electric vehicle. The state of the electric vehicle may be a binding state or a verification state. As an example, when the flag bit is "6A", the electric vehicle is indicated to be in a bound state; the processor executes the storage instruction to store the decrypted second key and the digital key into the memory. And when the marking bit is 6B, indicating that the electric vehicle is in a verification state.
In some embodiments, the first key may be preset in the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device at the same time.
As an example, the manufacturer of the electric vehicle may encrypt the first key to be stored in the bluetooth controller before the electric vehicle leaves the factory. Thus, the first key is preset in the Bluetooth controller.
As an example, fig. 5 illustrates a process provided according to an embodiment of the present application for presetting a first key a in a mobile electronic device 10.
S510, the mobile electronic equipment obtains the model of the electric vehicle.
In some embodiments, the user may scan a bar code or two-dimensional code containing electric vehicle model information using a mobile phone. Thus, the mobile phone obtains the model information of the electric vehicle. In some embodiments, the user may directly manually input model information of the electric vehicle.
And S520, the mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to the target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle.
Before the electric vehicle leaves the factory, the manufacturer of the electric vehicle may establish a mapping relationship between the electric vehicle model information and the first key (i.e. "model information—the first key") in the server 700. After obtaining the model information of the electric vehicle, the mobile electronic device may encapsulate the model information into a request packet, and send the request packet to the target server through a network. Of course, other information, such as the state of the electric vehicle, may also be included in the request packet.
S530 the mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response comprising the first key, wherein the first key is associated with the model of the target device.
After receiving a request packet from the mobile electronic equipment, the target server analyzes the request packet to obtain model information in the request packet. And the target server searches the first secret key corresponding to the model information through a pre-established mapping relation. The target server encapsulates the first key into a response packet and sends the response packet to the mobile electronic device.
After receiving the response packet, the mobile electronic device 10 parses the response packet to obtain a first key in the response packet.
Thus, the first key is preset in the mobile electronic device 10.
Of course, other methods of presetting the first key in the mobile electronic device 10 may be employed. For example, before the electric vehicle leaves the factory, a mobile phone manufacturer cooperating with the electric vehicle manufacturer can store the first secret key in the mobile phone by a white box encryption technology; the user (such as the owner of the vehicle) can obtain the first key only by completing the authentication and configuration of the mobile phone.
In some embodiments, the first key may be associated with a model of the electric vehicle. For example, the first key may be generated based on a model number of the electric vehicle.
When the near field communication device 40 is a bluetooth controller, the plaintext may be encrypted using an AES encryption algorithm. Here, the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) encryption algorithm is a globally disclosed symmetric encryption algorithm. By symmetric encryption algorithm, it is meant that both encryption and decryption use the same key. During encryption, the AES algorithm has two inputs and one output. The input is the key and plaintext and the output is ciphertext. During decryption, the AES algorithm also has two inputs, which are ciphertext and key, and one output, which is plaintext. In AES encryption, a file is split into individual file blocks, each file block being 128 bits, i.e. 16 bytes, for encryption. If the file size is not an integer multiple of 16 bytes, then some data is added at the end of the file to make an integer multiple of 16 bytes. Each file block is individually de-encrypted.
Fig. 6 illustrates a schematic diagram of an encryption process provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application to encrypt plaintext 46 with a first key 45. In the embodiment shown in fig. 6, the plaintext 46 is composed of the second key 43, the digital key 44, the check bit 42, and the flag bit 41. The second key 43 contains 8 bytes. The digital key 44 contains 4 bytes. Check bits 42 include 3 bytes, and check bits 42 are set in bytes 1, 14, and 15, respectively. Of course, the check bit 42 may be located elsewhere. The flag bit 41 is a character string "6A" and occupies 1 byte. The plaintext 46 constitutes a file block. The file block length is 16 bytes. The first key 45 is 16 bytes. The plaintext 46 is encrypted using the first key 45 to generate ciphertext 47. The ciphertext 47 is 16 bytes.
When the communication connection is a bluetooth connection, the mobile phone sends the encrypted ciphertext 47 to the bluetooth controller on the electric vehicle via the bluetooth connection. After receiving the ciphertext 47 sent from the mobile phone end, the Bluetooth controller decrypts the ciphertext 47 by adopting a preset first key 45. After decryption, the bluetooth controller first verifies the check bit 42. If the check bits 42 are all verified, then this indicates that decryption was successful. The bluetooth controller stores the successfully decrypted second key 43 and the digital key 44 into the bluetooth controller according to the binding state indicated by the flag bit 41.
S170, the mobile electronic equipment sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the near field communication device 40.
The mobile phone can directly set the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the Bluetooth controller; that is, the mobile phone may directly store the second key and the digital key in the mobile phone memory after generating the second key and the digital key. The mobile phone may also set the second key and the digital key to default keys and digital keys for future communication with the bluetooth controller after receiving the confirmation information (confirming that decryption is successful) of the bluetooth controller.
So far, the mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller both complete communication of the binding process, and each stores the second key and the digital key into a respective memory. The second key and the digital key can be directly used when the mobile phone communicates with the Bluetooth controller in future. As an example, future communication of the handset with the bluetooth controller may be for unlocking and/or starting using the digital key. As an example, the purpose of the future communication between the mobile phone and the bluetooth controller may be to share a key.
The digital key binding method S100 has the following beneficial effects:
first, before the mobile phone communicates with the bluetooth controller in the future, the mobile phone encrypts the second key and the digital key in the future and sends the encrypted second key and the encrypted digital key to the bluetooth controller. And the Bluetooth controller decrypts the received encrypted data, and stores the second key and the digital key after the decryption is successful. The mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller acquire the second key and the digital key used for future communication in an encrypted transmission mode, so that the security of future communication is improved.
Second, the first secret key is preset in the mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller at the same time. And the mobile phone encrypts the second key and the digital key by using the first key and sends the encrypted second key and the digital key to the Bluetooth controller. The bluetooth controller decrypts the received ciphertext using the same first key. The Bluetooth controller decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key and performs primary equipment authentication on the mobile phone (if decryption is successful, the first keys used by the interaction parties can be considered to be the same, equipment authentication is successful, and if decryption is unsuccessful, the first keys used by the interaction parties can be considered to be different, equipment authentication is failed), so that the safety of communication between the mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller in the future is further improved.
Third, before the mobile phone and the electric vehicle are bound, the user 80 (vehicle owner) can unlock the bluetooth controller of the electric vehicle by using the private remote controller 90 matched with the electric vehicle, so that the electric vehicle enters a binding state, and the safety of the binding process is further enhanced.
Correspondingly, in the digital key binding process, the processing procedure of the near field communication device 40 (the bluetooth controller) may be as follows:
s210, a near field communication device receives a first request from a target mobile electronic device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the target mobile electronic device, and the near field communication device is installed in an electric vehicle;
s220, the near field communication device sends a first response to the first request to the target mobile electronic equipment, wherein the first response comprises the establishment of the communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment;
s230, receiving a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic equipment by a near field communication device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting plaintext by using a first key by the target mobile electronic equipment, the plaintext comprises a second key and a digital key, and the first key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic equipment at the same time;
S240, the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key to obtain the second key and the digital key;
and S250, the near field communication device sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the target mobile electronic equipment.
Fig. 7 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key binding method S200 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 7 shows a process procedure for describing the binding procedure of the digital key from the near field communication device 40.
It should be noted that, since there may be a plurality of mobile electronic devices (handsets) around the near field communication device 40 (bluetooth controller), only the mobile electronic device 10 (handset of the user) may implement the digital key binding, and thus the mobile electronic device 10 may be the target mobile electronic device of the near field communication device 40.
The above-mentioned binding method S200 of the digital key may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the near field communication device 40 for the digital key binding. At least one processor in the near field communication device 40 is communicatively coupled to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the above-described binding method S200 of the digital key as instructed by the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device is operating. Specific binding methods have been described above and are not described here again.
In summary, through the binding operation, the mobile phone end and the bluetooth controller end store the second secret key and the digital key into respective memories. Then, the user can operate the mobile phone to enable the mobile phone to conduct verification interaction with the Bluetooth controller. The Bluetooth controller can receive the control information of the mobile phone and verify the control signal, and if the control signal passes the verification, the unlocking and/or starting command corresponding to the digital key is executed. Fig. 8 illustrates a schematic diagram of a bluetooth controller 50 that performs authentication interactions with a mobile electronic device 10, provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application.
Fig. 9 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key verification method S300 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 9 shows a process procedure for describing the authentication procedure of the digital key from the near field communication device 40. The digital key verification method 300 may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the near field communication device 40. At least one processor in the near field communication device 40 is communicatively coupled to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the steps in flow 300 as directed by the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device is operating.
The operation of the illustrated flow S300 presented below is intended to be illustrative and not limiting. In some embodiments, flow S300 may be implemented by adding one or more additional operations not described, and/or by subtracting one or more operations described herein. Further, the order of operations shown in fig. 9 and described below is not limited thereto.
It should be noted that, since there may be a plurality of mobile electronic devices (such as mobile phones) around the near field communication device 40 (such as bluetooth controller), only the mobile electronic device 10 (such as mobile phone of the user) may implement the digital key binding, the mobile electronic device 10 may be the target mobile electronic device of the near field communication device 40.
S310, a near field communication device in the electric vehicle sends a broadcast, wherein the broadcast comprises a first random number.
S320, the near field communication device receives the near field communication connection request of the target mobile electronic equipment within a preset time period and establishes near field communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment.
As previously described, the bluetooth controller has stored the second key and the digital key to the memory through the digital key binding process. During waiting for verification unlocking of the mobile phone, the Bluetooth controller continuously transmits a broadcast (Beacon) to the outside, wherein the broadcast contains a random number R which changes regularly. The periodic variation may refer to periodic variation of the random number R over time. In some embodiments, the random number R changes when the time exceeds a predetermined period of time. For example, the predetermined period of time may be set to 5 minutes, and the random number R is changed when the time exceeds 5 minutes. In some embodiments, the random number R also changes when the handset reconnects after disconnecting from the bluetooth connection of the bluetooth controller. In some embodiments, the time does not exceed the predetermined period of time, but if the bluetooth controller receives two or more communication connection requests (e.g., two or more devices initiate connection requests to the bluetooth controller at the same time) within the same predetermined period of time, then the random number R is also changed, indicating that the authentication interaction is in an unsafe state. The bluetooth controller simultaneously records and stores the random number R transmitted in the broadcast.
The target mobile electronic device may receive the random number R broadcast by the near field communication device. For example, when the electric vehicle needs to be unlocked, the mobile phone establishes Bluetooth connection with a Bluetooth controller on the electric vehicle. The mobile phone receives the broadcast of the Bluetooth controller and can analyze data in the broadcast to obtain a random number R. For ease of understanding, in the description of this application, the "first random number" is used to denote the random number R recorded and stored by the bluetooth controller.
And S330, receiving a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic equipment by the near field communication device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the target mobile electronic equipment, the encryption process comprises a second random number, and the plaintext comprises a digital key.
The digital key is a preset digital key agreed by the target mobile electronic device and the near field communication device (namely, a digital key stored in a binding process). In some embodiments, the plaintext may further comprise a check code. The check code may be used to check whether future decryption by the bluetooth controller is successful. In some embodiments, the plaintext may further comprise a flag bit. In some embodiments, the flag bit may identify an interaction state of the user mobile phone with the bluetooth controller. In some embodiments, the flag bit may also identify encryption information. The encryption information includes, but is not limited to, encryption mode, encryption algorithm, plaintext content, etc. The user mobile phone can send the ciphertext with the flag bit to the Bluetooth controller. After the Bluetooth controller receives and successfully decrypts the ciphertext, the program instruction corresponding to the flag bit can be executed according to the state of the flag bit identifier.
The encryption process may include a random number R. For ease of understanding, in the description of this application, the "second random number" is used to denote the random number R used by the target mobile electronic device in the encryption process. In some embodiments, the encryption key may include a second random number; for example, the plaintext is encrypted using a key comprising a second random number. In some embodiments, the plaintext may comprise a second random number; for example, the plaintext containing the second random number is encrypted using a key. The decryption process of the ciphertext by the Bluetooth controller corresponds to the encryption process of the plaintext by the user mobile phone.
In some embodiments, the target mobile electronic device may encrypt the plaintext using a second key agreed upon by the user's handset and the bluetooth controller to generate ciphertext; wherein the plaintext comprises a digital key and a second random number. Fig. 10 illustrates an encryption process for plaintext provided according to some embodiments of the present application. In the embodiment shown in fig. 10, the instruction set in the user's mobile phone encrypts the plaintext 82 by using the second key 43 preset in the binding process to generate the ciphertext 83. The plaintext 82 includes a second random number 84 (random number R), a digital key 44 preset during the binding process, and a flag bit 86.
In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device 10 may encrypt the plaintext using a third key to generate ciphertext; wherein the third key is generated based on the second key and the second random number; and the second secret key is a secret key agreed by the user mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller. Fig. 11 illustrates another encryption process for plaintext provided according to some embodiments of the present application. In the embodiment shown in fig. 11, the instruction set in the user's handset 10 encrypts plaintext 92 using third key 91 to generate ciphertext 93. The plaintext 92 includes the flag bit 94 and the digital key 44 preset during the binding process. The third key 91 may be generated by the second random number 84 (random number R) and the second key 43 preset in the binding process. In some embodiments, the program instructions in the handset 10 may execute at least one set of conversion commands to generate the third key based on the second key and the random number R. In particular, the at least one set of conversion commands may comprise an encryption algorithm. The flag bit "6B" is used to identify that the interaction of the handset 10 and the near field communication device 40 is in an authenticated state. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 11, the flag bit 94 occupies 1 byte; the digital key 44 occupies 4 bytes. The plaintext 92 consisting of the flag bit 94 and the digital key 44 is 5 bytes in total. When the plaintext 92 is encrypted using AES, some data may be supplemented in the plaintext 92 to bring the length of the plaintext to 16 bytes. For example, a second identification bit for identifying the encryption scheme and/or encryption algorithm may be appended to the plaintext. The plaintext may be supplemented with a check code for verification.
In the above encryption process, whether the plaintext including the digital key and the random number R is encrypted with the second key (for example, as shown in fig. 10) or the plaintext including the digital key is encrypted with the third key generated by the random number R and the second key (for example, as shown in fig. 11), the ciphertext (authentication data) transmitted to the bluetooth controller (near field communication device 40) by the user's mobile phone (target mobile electronic device 10) each time is changed together with the random number R. Therefore, even if an attacker sniffs certain verification data and sends the data to the Bluetooth controller as it is in the process of interaction between the user mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller, the verification is impossible, and replay attack is avoided.
S340, the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
In some embodiments, when the target mobile electronic device 10 encrypts the plaintext including the digital key and the random number R using the first key, the bluetooth controller decrypts the ciphertext using the same first key to obtain the plaintext including the digital key and the random number R, and then verifies whether the random number R (second random number) obtained by decryption is the same as the random number R (first random number) recorded and stored when the bluetooth controller transmits the broadcast. If the verification passes, the second random number is confirmed to be identical to the first random number, and verification communication is safe.
For example, in the encryption process shown in fig. 10, the instruction set in the user's handset encrypts the plaintext 82 using the second key 43. The second key 43 is a key preset in the binding process. The plaintext 82 includes a random number R, a preset digital key during the binding process, and a flag bit. Correspondingly, the bluetooth controller may decrypt the ciphertext 83 with the second key 43 to obtain the random number R, the digital key, and the flag bit. After decryption, the instruction set determines whether decryption was successful by verifying the random number R. If the random number R obtained by decryption is the same as the random number R stored in advance in the instruction set, the decryption is successful, and the bluetooth controller continues to execute the instruction (such as verifying the key, unlocking and/or starting) corresponding to the flag bit "6B". If the random number R obtained by decryption is different from the random number R prestored in the instruction set, the Bluetooth controller can update the random number R in broadcasting. The user's handset may start a new round of authentication process. In some embodiments, the maximum authentication number may also be preset in the near field communication device 40. When the verification times of the user mobile phone in the preset time period exceeds the preset maximum verification times, the Bluetooth controller can enter a locking state. Of course, when the bluetooth controller enters a locking state, a prompt message can be sent to the mobile phone of the user to prompt the user that the electric vehicle provided with the near field communication device is in an unsafe environment. The user can unlock the lock state using the equipped private remote control. The user may also rebind the user's handset. Of course, an unlock condition may be set, and the bluetooth controller automatically releases the lock state when the unlock condition is satisfied. As an example, the unlocking condition may be: the bluetooth controller receives a connection request of zero for a predetermined period of time, such as 10 minutes.
In some embodiments, when the target mobile electronic device 10 encrypts the digital key using the second key generated based on the first key and the random number R, the near field communication device 40 may also decrypt the ciphertext using the second key generated based on the first key and the random number R to obtain the digital key. And verifying whether the random number R (second random number) in the encryption key of the mobile electronic device is identical to the random number R (first random number) in the decryption key of the near field communication device by judging whether decryption is successful. If the decryption is successful, the random number R (second random number) in the encryption key of the mobile electronic equipment is confirmed to be the same as the random number R (first random number) in the decryption key of the near field communication device. If the decryption fails, it cannot be confirmed whether the random number R (second random number) in the encryption key of the mobile electronic device is the same as the random number R (first random number) in the decryption key of the near field communication device. That is, the decryption process is a process of confirming that the second random number is identical to the first random number.
For example, in the encryption process shown in fig. 11, the instruction set in the user's handset encrypts the plaintext 92 using the third key 91. The plaintext 92 includes the digital key 44 and the flag bit 94. The third key 91 is generated based on the second key 43 and the random number R. Correspondingly, the bluetooth controller can decrypt the ciphertext by using the third key 91, and if the decryption is successful, the communication security is confirmed, and the digital key and the flag bit are further obtained. Of course, a check code may also be included in the plaintext. After decryption, the instruction set determines whether decryption was successful by verifying the check code. If the check code obtained by decryption is the same as the check code stored in advance in the instruction set, the success of decryption is indicated, the near field communication device confirms that the random number R used by the user mobile phone for encryption is the same as the random number R sent in the previous broadcast, and the near field communication device continues to execute the instruction (such as verification key, unlocking and/or starting) corresponding to the flag bit '6B'. If the check code obtained by decryption is different from the check code stored in advance in the instruction, the fact that the decryption fails is indicated, the near-field communication device cannot confirm whether the random number R used by the user mobile phone for encryption is the same as the random number R sent in the previous broadcast, and the near-field communication device can update the random number R in the broadcast. The user mobile phone generates a new third secret key based on the new random number R and starts a new round of verification process.
S350, the near field communication device acquires the digital key.
When the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number, namely, the communication safety is confirmed, the near field communication device acquires the digital key.
S360, the near field communication device determines that the digital key is identical to the pre-bound digital key.
If the digital key is different from the pre-bound digital key, the digital key is indicated to fail to verify, and the Bluetooth controller updates the random number or enters a locking state. If the digital key is the same as the pre-bound digital key, the digital key is verified successfully, and the Bluetooth controller executes the instruction corresponding to the digital key.
And S370, the near field communication device executes an instruction corresponding to the digital key. As an example, the instruction may include at least one of an unlock instruction and starting the electric vehicle. In some embodiments, the instruction may also be a sharing key.
In the above digital key verification process, on the one hand, the second key and/or the digital key is a preset key and a digital key agreed in the binding process of the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device. The interaction parties (the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device) use the secret key and the digital key agreed by the two parties to carry out service interaction, so that the safety in the service interaction process is improved. On the other hand, the near field communication device sends the random number R to the mobile electronic equipment in a broadcast mode; the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the digital key, and the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext and/or verifies the decryption, and the random number R is added; the random number R may vary; thus, the encryption and decryption process also varies with the random number R, avoiding replay attacks.
Correspondingly, in the digital key verification process, the processing procedure of the mobile electronic device 10 may be:
s410, the mobile electronic equipment establishes communication connection with a near field communication device in the electric vehicle;
s420, the mobile electronic equipment receives the random number broadcasted by the near field communication device;
s430, encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic equipment to generate a ciphertext, wherein the encryption process comprises the random number, the plaintext comprises a digital key, and the digital key is a preset digital key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device; and
s440, the mobile electronic equipment sends the ciphertext to the near field communication device through the near field communication connection.
Fig. 12 illustrates a flow chart of a method S400 of verifying a digital key provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 12 illustrates a process for describing the authentication process of a digital key from the processing of the mobile electronic device 10.
The digital key authentication method described above may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the mobile electronic device 10 for the digital key authentication. At least one processor in the mobile electronic device 10 is communicatively coupled to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key authentication method S400 described above as directed by the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device is operating. Specific binding methods have been described above and are not described here again.
In summary, the present application provides a digital key binding method S100 (mobile electronic device side), a digital key verification method S400 (mobile electronic device side), a digital key binding method S200 (near field communication device side), and a digital key verification method S300 (near field communication device side).
The present application also provides a mobile electronic device 10. The mobile electronic device 10 may include at least one memory including at least one set of instructions; at least one processor in communication with the at least one memory, the at least one processor, when the near field communication device 40 is operating, reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key binding method S100 and/or the digital key verification method S400 according to an indication of the at least one instruction set.
The digital key binding method S100 and/or the digital key verification method S400 may be stored as an instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the mobile electronic device 10. The mobile electronic device 10 may execute the set of instructions and may accordingly perform the steps in the digital key binding method S100 and/or the digital key verification method S400.
The present application also provides a near field communication device 40. The near field communication device 40 may include at least one memory including at least one set of communication instructions; at least one processor in communication with the at least one memory, wherein when the near field communication device 40 is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key binding method S200 and/or the digital key verification method S300 according to an indication of the at least one instruction set.
The digital key binding method S200 and/or the digital key verification method S300 may be stored as an instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the near field communication device 40. The near field communication device 40 may execute the set of instructions and may accordingly perform the steps in the digital key binding method S200 and/or the digital key verification method S300.
The mobile electronic device 10 may execute the digital key binding method S100 to bind the mobile electronic device 10 and the electric vehicle 20, so as to implement authentication of the electric vehicle 20 to the mobile electronic device 10. After the mobile electronic device 10 is bound to the near field communication device 40, the near field communication device 40 may also perform the digital key verification method S300 to verify the unlocking and/or starting request sent by the mobile phone 10.
According to the digital key binding method and the digital key verification method, first, before an electric vehicle leaves a factory, a first key is preset in a near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and a target mobile electronic device (user mobile phone) of the electric vehicle at the same time. Before the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) are verified, the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) can use a preset first secret key to conduct equipment authentication on the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) once, and safety of future verification communication of the two interaction parties is improved. And secondly, the target mobile electronic can encrypt a second key for future verification communication by using the first key, so that the communication safety is further improved. And thirdly, before the target mobile electronic equipment (a user mobile phone) and the electric vehicle are bound, a user (a vehicle owner) can unlock the Bluetooth controller of the electric vehicle by using a private remote controller matched with the electric vehicle, so that the electric vehicle enters a binding state, and the safety of the binding process is further enhanced. In addition, the random number R is added in the encryption process of the verification communication between the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) and the near field communication device, so that the re-attack prevention can be realized.
It should be noted that the communication connection in the digital key binding process and the communication connection in the digital key verification process may be the same or different. For example, the communication connection in the binding process may be a wifi connection, and the connection in the verification process may be a bluetooth connection. Of course, the communication connection in the binding process and the communication connection in the verification process may be bluetooth connections.
In view of the foregoing, it will be evident to a person skilled in the art that the foregoing detailed disclosure may be presented by way of example only and may not be limiting. Although not explicitly described herein, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present application is intended to embrace a variety of reasonable alterations, improvements and modifications to the embodiments. Such alterations, improvements, and modifications are intended to be proposed by this application, and are intended to be within the spirit and scope of the exemplary embodiments of this application.
Furthermore, certain terms in the present application have been used to describe embodiments of the present application. For example, "one embodiment," "an embodiment," and/or "some embodiments" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment may be included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Thus, it is emphasized and should be appreciated that two or more references to "an embodiment" or "one embodiment" or "an alternative embodiment" in various portions of this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined as suitable in one or more embodiments of the application.
It should be appreciated that in the foregoing description of embodiments of the present application, various features are sometimes grouped together in a single embodiment, figure, or description thereof for the purpose of streamlining the application. Alternatively, the present application is directed to various features that are dispersed throughout a plurality of embodiments of the present application. However, this is not to say that a combination of these features is necessary, and it is entirely possible for a person skilled in the art to extract some of them as separate embodiments to understand them at the time of reading this application. That is, embodiments in this application may also be understood as an integration of multiple secondary embodiments. While each secondary embodiment is satisfied by less than all of the features of a single foregoing disclosed embodiment.
In some embodiments, numbers expressing quantities or properties used to describe and claim certain embodiments of the present application are to be understood as being modified in some instances by the term "about", "approximately" or "substantially". For example, unless otherwise indicated, "about", "approximately" or "substantially" may mean a 20% change in the value it describes. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the numerical parameters set forth in the written description and attached claims are approximations that may vary depending upon the desired properties sought to be obtained by the particular embodiment. In some embodiments, numerical parameters should be construed in light of the number of reported significant digits and by applying ordinary rounding techniques. Notwithstanding that the numerical ranges and parameters setting forth the broad scope of the embodiments of the disclosure are approximations, the numerical values set forth in the specific examples are reported as precisely as possible.
Each patent, patent application, publication of patent application, and other materials, such as articles, books, specifications, publications, documents, articles, etc., cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference. The entire contents for all purposes, except for any prosecution file history associated therewith, may be any identical prosecution file history inconsistent or conflicting with this file, or any identical prosecution file history which may have a limiting influence on the broadest scope of the claims. Now or later in association with this document. For example, if there is any inconsistency or conflict between the description, definition, and/or use of terms associated with any of the incorporated materials, the terms in the present document shall prevail.
Finally, it is to be understood that the embodiments of the application disclosed herein are illustrative of the principles of the embodiments of the present application. Other modified embodiments are also within the scope of the present application. Accordingly, the embodiments disclosed herein are by way of example only and not limitation. Those skilled in the art can adopt alternative configurations to implement the applications herein according to embodiments herein. Accordingly, embodiments of the present application are not limited to those precisely described in the application.
Claims (18)
1. A digital key binding method comprising:
the mobile electronic equipment establishes communication connection with a near field communication device arranged on the electric vehicle and generates a second secret key and a digital key;
the mobile electronic equipment encrypts plaintext by using a first key to generate ciphertext, wherein the plaintext comprises the second key and the digital key, and the first key is preset in the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device simultaneously before the second key is generated;
the mobile electronic equipment transmits the ciphertext to the near field communication device so that the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key to obtain the second key and the digital key; and
the mobile electronic equipment sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the near field communication device so as to encrypt plaintext of the future communication by using the second key to generate ciphertext and send the ciphertext to the near field communication device.
2. The digital key binding method of claim 1, further comprising:
the mobile electronic equipment obtains the model of the electric vehicle;
The mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and
the mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with a model of the electric vehicle.
3. The digital key binding method of claim 1, wherein the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
4. The digital key binding method of claim 1, further comprising the mobile electronic device generating the second key based on an ID of the electric vehicle, wherein the ID of the electric vehicle is pre-stored in the mobile electronic device, and the second key uniquely corresponds to the mobile electronic device.
5. A mobile electronic device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory,
when the mobile electronic device is running, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key binding method of any one of claims 1 to 4 as directed by the at least one instruction set.
6. A digital key binding method comprising:
the near field communication device installed on the electric vehicle establishes communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment;
the near field communication device receives a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the target mobile electronic device through a first key, the plaintext comprises a second key and a digital key, and the first key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device simultaneously before the second key is generated;
the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key to obtain the second key and the digital key; and
the near field communication device sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the target mobile electronic equipment, so that ciphertext sent by the future mobile electronic equipment is decrypted by using the second key to obtain the digital key.
7. The digital key binding method of claim 6, wherein the first key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device at the same time, comprising:
The target mobile electronic equipment obtains the model of the electric vehicle;
the target mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and
the target mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with a model of the electric vehicle.
8. The digital key binding method of claim 6, wherein the second key is associated with an ID of the electric vehicle and the second key uniquely corresponds to the mobile electronic device.
9. The digital key binding method of claim 6, wherein the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
10. A near field communication device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory,
when the near field communication device is running, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key binding method according to the instruction of the at least one instruction set.
11. A digital key verification method comprising:
a near field communication device arranged on an electric vehicle sends a broadcast, wherein the broadcast comprises a first random number and the first random number is replaced in a preset period;
the near field communication device receives a near field communication connection request of the target mobile electronic equipment in a preset period after the broadcast is sent and establishes near field communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment;
the near field communication device receives a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic device and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain a second random number and a digital key, wherein the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a second key, the second key is a key which is independently agreed in advance by the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device, is associated with an ID of the electric vehicle and is uniquely corresponding to the mobile electronic device, the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device, the encryption process comprises the second random number, and the plaintext comprises the digital key corresponding to a target instruction;
the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number and the digital key is the same as the pre-bound digital key; and
And the near field communication device executes a target instruction corresponding to the digital key.
12. The digital key verification method of claim 11, wherein the near field communication device verifying that the second random number is the same as the first random number comprises:
the near field communication device acquires the second random number; and
the near field communication device determines that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
13. The digital key verification method of claim 11, wherein the near field communication device verifying that the second random number is the same as the first random number comprises:
the near field communication device generates a third key based on a second key and the first random number, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the target mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device;
the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a third key; and
the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
14. A near field communication device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and
at least one processor in communicative connection with the at least one memory, wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key binding method according to the instructions of the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device is operating.
15. A digital key verification method comprising:
the mobile electronic equipment receives a broadcast sent by a near field communication device in the electric vehicle, wherein the broadcast comprises a random number and the random number is replaced in a preset period;
encrypting a plaintext by using a second key by the mobile electronic device in a preset period after broadcasting to generate a ciphertext, wherein the second key is a key which is independently agreed with the near field communication device in advance, is associated with the ID of the electric vehicle and is uniquely corresponding to the mobile electronic device, the encryption process comprises the random number, the plaintext comprises the digital key corresponding to a target instruction, and the digital key is a preset digital key agreed with the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device; and
and the mobile electronic equipment sends the ciphertext to the near field communication device through the near field communication connection.
16. The digital key verification method of claim 15, the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext to generate ciphertext comprising:
the mobile electronic device encrypts the plaintext using a third key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the third key is generated based on a second key and the random number.
17. The digital key verification method of claim 15, the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext to generate ciphertext comprising:
the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a second key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device, and the plaintext further comprises the random number.
18. A mobile electronic device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory,
wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key verification method of any one of claims 15 to 17 as directed by the at least one instruction set when the mobile electronic device is operating.
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CN111935302B (en) * | 2020-08-20 | 2023-01-31 | 捷德(中国)科技有限公司 | Key management device, method and equipment |
CN112464203A (en) * | 2020-11-16 | 2021-03-09 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | Data format detection method based on intelligent password key application interface and electronic equipment |
CN113596827B (en) * | 2021-07-29 | 2024-02-13 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | Key generation method, device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
CN115102726B (en) * | 2022-06-07 | 2024-04-05 | 东风柳州汽车有限公司 | Dual authentication matching method, device, system and equipment for remote key |
CN115348300A (en) * | 2022-07-12 | 2022-11-15 | 厦门盈趣科技股份有限公司 | Internet of things control method, device and equipment and readable storage medium |
CN115915131B (en) * | 2022-10-20 | 2023-11-10 | 远峰科技股份有限公司 | Vehicle key bidirectional encryption authentication method and system, vehicle binding device and NFC card |
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