CN111554008A - Digital key binding method, digital key verification method, mobile electronic equipment and near field communication device - Google Patents
Digital key binding method, digital key verification method, mobile electronic equipment and near field communication device Download PDFInfo
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- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
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- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00896—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses
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- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
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Abstract
The application provides a mobile electronic device, a digital key binding method and a digital key verification method of a mobile electronic device end, a near field communication device, a digital key verification method and a digital key binding method of a near field communication device end. Firstly, before the mobile electronic equipment carries out verification communication with a near field communication device, a second secret key and a digital key for verification communication are preset in the near field communication device by two communication parties in an encryption transmission mode; secondly, a first key used for encrypting the second key and the digital key is preset in equipment of both communication parties before communication is verified, the near field communication device carries out equipment authentication on the mobile electronic equipment once by using the decryption process of the first key, both communication parties are bound, and communication safety is further improved; thirdly, the user can use the private remote controller to start binding, so that the communication safety is further enhanced; in addition, random numbers are added in the encryption process of the verification communication, so that replay attack can be prevented.
Description
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of digital key technology, and in particular, to a digital key binding method, a digital key verification method, a mobile electronic device, and a near field communication device.
Background
In recent years, with the rapid development of the technologies of internet of things, internet of vehicles and smart homes, the application scenes of digital keys are more and more. The digital key can be used for unlocking the intelligent door, unlocking the electric vehicle, starting the electric vehicle and the like.
The traditional digital key unlocking method mostly uses a computer as a control platform. In recent years, with the development of mobile electronic devices, a digital key transmission network is becoming more and more popular by using wireless transmission modules.
Bluetooth (Bluetooth) is a substitute for a low-power short-distance wireless communication technology standard, and is essentially a public standard for establishing a universal wireless air interface and control software thereof, so that communication and a computer are further combined, and portable devices produced by different manufacturers can have interoperability and interoperation performance in a short distance range without connecting wires or cables. Compared with other similar wireless communication technologies, the bluetooth considers a plurality of factors in the design process, and has the following main characteristics: high working frequency, strong anti-interference performance, convenient use, voice support, no need of a base station, small size, low power consumption, multi-path and multi-direction linkage, strong confidentiality and the like.
The transmission amount that bluetooth can bear can reach 1MB per second, and the security is high simultaneously, can set for encryption protection, can trade the frequency one thousand six hundred times per minute, but effectual transmission distance is shorter. Therefore, adopt bluetooth module to realize that digital key noninductive unblanking is used widely in the scheme of unblanking and the unblanking of electric motor car under the intelligent door line. However, the bluetooth module used in devices such as electric vehicles or smart doors is a cheap low-end device with limited computing and storage capabilities due to cost. Therefore, the digital key encryption scheme set for bluetooth modules on such devices should be simple and reliable.
The equipment (electric motor car, intelligent door etc.) that current realized noninductive unblanking through bluetooth module verifies the process of unblanking to the digital key is: sending the encrypted digital key to the device end through the mobile electronic device (key, mobile phone, etc.); after the equipment is decrypted, the received digital key is compared with the stored digital key, if the received digital key is matched with the stored digital key, the verification is passed, and then the equipment is unlocked or started. The above authentication scheme for the digital key: on one hand, only a single-layer key is used for verifying the digital key, and the mobile electronic equipment is not authenticated; on the other hand, it cannot prevent replay attacks.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems that the traditional digital key security scheme does not verify equipment and cannot prevent replay attack, the application discloses a digital key binding method, which comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that the mobile electronic equipment sends a first request to a near field communication device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the near field communication device, and the near field communication device is installed on an electric vehicle; the mobile electronic equipment receives a first response of the near field communication device to the first request; the mobile electronic equipment establishes the communication connection with the near field communication device based on the first response; the mobile electronic device generating a second key and a digital key; encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device by using a first secret key to generate a ciphertext, wherein the plaintext comprises the second secret key and the digital key, and the first secret key is preset in the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device at the same time; the mobile electronic equipment transmits the ciphertext to the near field communication device; and the mobile electronic equipment sets the second secret key and the digital key as a default secret key and a digital key for future communication with the near field communication device.
In some embodiments, the digital key binding method further comprises: the mobile electronic equipment acquires the model of the electric vehicle; the mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and the mobile electronic device receiving a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with the model of the electric vehicle.
In some embodiments, the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
In some embodiments, the second key is associated with an ID of the electric vehicle.
The application also discloses a mobile electronic device, including: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and at least one processor, communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, wherein when the mobile electronic device is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the digital key binding method according to an indication of the at least one instruction set.
The application also discloses a digital key binding method, which comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that a near field communication device receives a first request from a target mobile electronic device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the target mobile electronic device, and the near field communication device is installed in an electric vehicle; the near field communication device sends a first response to the first request to the target mobile electronic equipment, wherein the first response comprises the communication connection established with the target mobile electronic equipment; the near field communication device receives a ciphertext transmitted from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the target mobile electronic device by using a first secret key, the plaintext comprises a second secret key and a digital key, and the first secret key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device at the same time; the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first secret key to obtain the second secret key and the digital key; and the near field communication device sets the second secret key and the digital key as a default secret key and a default digital key for future communication with the target mobile electronic equipment.
In some embodiments, presetting the first key at the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device at the same time comprises: the target mobile electronic equipment acquires the model of the target electric vehicle; the target mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and the target mobile electronic device receiving a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with the model of the electric vehicle.
In some embodiments, the second key is associated with an ID of the two-wheeled vehicle.
In some embodiments, the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
The application also discloses a near field communication device, includes: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and at least one processor, communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, wherein when the near field communication device is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the digital key binding method according to an instruction of the at least one instruction set.
The application also discloses a digital key verification method, which comprises the following steps: a near field communication device in an electric vehicle sends a broadcast, wherein the broadcast comprises a first random number; the near field communication device receives a near field communication connection request of target mobile electronic equipment within a preset time period and establishes near field communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment; the near field communication device receives a ciphertext transmitted from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device, the encryption process comprises a second random number, and the plaintext comprises a digital key; the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number; the near field communication device acquires the digital key; the near field communication device determines that the digital key is the same as a pre-bound digital key; and the near field communication device executes the instruction corresponding to the digital key.
In some embodiments, the near field communication device confirming that the second random number is the same as the first random number comprises: the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a second secret key, wherein the second secret key is a secret key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device; the near field communication device acquires the second random number; and the near field communication device determines that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
In some embodiments, the near field communication device confirming that the second random number is the same as the first random number comprises: the near field communication device generates a third secret key based on a second secret key and the first random number, wherein the second secret key is a secret key agreed by the target mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device; the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a third key; and the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
The application also discloses a near field communication device, includes: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and at least one processor in communication with the at least one memory, wherein when the near field communication device is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the digital key binding method according to the instruction of the at least one instruction set.
The application also discloses a digital key verification method, which comprises the following steps: the mobile electronic equipment establishes communication connection with a near field communication device in the electric vehicle; the mobile electronic equipment receives the random number broadcasted by the near field communication device; encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device to generate a ciphertext, wherein the encryption process comprises the random number, the plaintext comprises a digital key, and the digital key is a preset digital key agreed by the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device; and the mobile electronic equipment sends the ciphertext to the near field communication device through the near field communication connection.
In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext to generate ciphertext comprises: and the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a third key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the third key is generated based on a second key and the random number, and the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device.
In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext to generate ciphertext comprises: and the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a second key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device, and the plaintext further comprises the random number.
The application also discloses a mobile electronic device, including: at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, wherein when the mobile electronic device is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the digital key verification method described herein based on instructions of the at least one instruction set.
The mobile electronic device can execute a digital key binding method to bind the mobile electronic device (such as a mobile phone of a user) and a near field communication device (such as a bluetooth controller installed on an electric bicycle), so as to realize the authentication of the mobile electronic device by the near field communication device. After the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device are bound, the near field communication device may also perform a digital key verification method to verify an unlocking and/or starting request sent by the mobile electronic device.
According to the digital key binding method and the digital key verification method, firstly, before an electric vehicle leaves a factory, a first secret key is preset in a near-field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and a target mobile electronic device (user mobile phone) of the electric vehicle at the same time. Before the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) carry out verification communication, the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) can use a preset first secret key to carry out one-time equipment authentication (namely binding) on the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone), so that the safety of future verification communication of two interactive parties is improved; secondly, the target mobile electron can use the first secret key to encrypt a second secret key for future verification communication, so that the communication safety is further improved; and thirdly, before the target mobile electronic device (the user mobile phone) and the electric vehicle are bound, the user (a vehicle owner) can unlock the Bluetooth controller of the electric vehicle by using the private remote controller matched with the electric vehicle, so that the electric vehicle enters a binding state, and the safety of the binding process is further enhanced. In addition, the random number R is added in the encryption process of the verification communication between the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) and the near field communication device, so that replay attack can be prevented.
Drawings
Fig. 1 illustrates an application scenario of a digital key binding method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 2 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a Bluetooth controller provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 3 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a mobile electronic device provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 4 illustrates a flow diagram of a digital key binding method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
figure 5 illustrates a flow diagram for provisioning a first key in a mobile electronic device provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 6 illustrates a schematic diagram of an encryption process provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application for encrypting plaintext using a first key;
FIG. 7 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key binding method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 8 illustrates a schematic diagram of a Bluetooth controller performing authentication interaction with a mobile electronic device, provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 9 illustrates a flow chart of a digital key validation method provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 10 illustrates a process for encrypting plaintext provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 11 illustrates another encryption process for plaintext provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application; and
FIG. 12 illustrates a flow chart of a method of authentication of a digital key provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application.
Detailed Description
The following description is presented to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention, and is provided in the context of a particular application and its requirements. Various modifications to the disclosed embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments and applications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Thus, the present application is not limited to the embodiments shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the claims.
The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular example embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting. For example, as used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" may include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The terms "comprises," "comprising," and/or "including," when used in this specification, mean that the associated integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components are present, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof.
These and other features of the present application, as well as the operation and function of the related elements of structure and the combination of parts and economies of manufacture, may be significantly improved upon consideration of the following description. All of which form a part of this application, with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is to be expressly understood, however, that the drawings are for the purpose of illustration and description only and are not intended as a definition of the limits of the application.
These and other features of the present application, as well as the operation and function of the related elements of the structure, and the economic efficiency of assembly and manufacture, are significantly improved by the following description. All of which form a part of this application with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is to be expressly understood, however, that the drawings are for the purpose of illustration and description only and are not intended as a definition of the limits of the application. It should also be understood that the drawings are not drawn to scale.
The flow charts used in this application illustrate the operation of system implementations according to some embodiments of the present application. It should be clearly understood that the operations of the flow diagrams may be performed out of order. Rather, the operations may be performed in reverse order or simultaneously. In addition, one or more other operations may be added to the flowchart. One or more operations may be removed from the flowchart.
The digital key binding method and the digital key verification method can be applied to the interaction process of the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device.
Fig. 1 illustrates an application scenario of a digital key binding method provided according to some embodiments of the present application.
The electric vehicle 20 may include, but is not limited to, an electric car, a scooter, a bicycle, a moped, and a balance car. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that other forms of electric vehicles are also suitable for the digital key binding method and/or the digital key verification method described herein.
Specifically, the electric vehicle 20 may be provided with an actuator 30 and a near field communication device 40. The actuation device 30 may include, but is not limited to, actuation of an unlock, throttle, engine, brake system, and steering system (including steering of tires and/or operation of turn lights). The execution device 30 can receive the command of the nfc device 40 to perform various actions such as unlocking/starting.
The near field communication device 40 may establish a communication connection with the mobile electronic device 10 to implement communication with the mobile electronic device 10, receive a control signal of the mobile electronic device 10, and control the execution device 30 to execute an unlocking and/or starting action. The near field communication device 40 may also set the state of the near field communication device 40 according to a control signal of the remote controller 90.
In some embodiments, the communication connection may be a near field communication connection between the mobile electronic device and the near field communication means. For example, the communication connection may be a bluetooth connection. Correspondingly, when the communication connection is a bluetooth connection, the near field communication device 40 may be a bluetooth controller. Fig. 2 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of a bluetooth controller 50 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application.
The bluetooth controller 50 may include at least one processor 51. The processor 51 is for executing computer instructions. The computer instructions may include, for example, routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, procedures, modules, and functions that perform the particular functions described herein. In some embodiments, the processor 51 may include one or more hardware processors. By way of example only, the hardware processors may include a Central Processing Unit (CPU), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), an application specific instruction set processor (ASIP), a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), a Physical Processing Unit (PPU), a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), a Programmable Logic Device (PLD), a controller, a microcontroller unit, a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC), a microprocessor, or the like, or any combination thereof.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include at least one memory 52. The memory 52 is communicatively coupled to the processor 51. The memory 52 may be a single memory or a group of processors. Memory 52 may store data and/or instructions. In some embodiments, the memory 52 may store data obtained from the mobile electronic device 10, such as data packets transmitted by the mobile electronic device 10. In some embodiments, the memory 52 may store data and/or instructions for the processor 51 to perform the exemplary method. In some embodiments, memory 52 may include program memory and data memory. The program memory may be used to store data to be processed. The program memory may be used to store communication protocol software. In some embodiments, the memory 52 may include mass storage, removable storage, volatile read-write memory, read-only memory (ROM), or the like, or any combination thereof. Exemplary mass storage devices may include magnetic disks, optical disks, solid state drives, and the like. Exemplary removable storage devices may include flash drives, floppy disks, optical disks, memory cards, zip disks, magnetic tape, and the like. Exemplary volatile read and write memories can include Random Access Memory (RAM). In the bluetooth controller 50 shown in fig. 2, the memory 52 includes a static memory 53(SRAM) and a Flash memory 54(Flash program memory). Flash memory 54 is used to store all software components in the baseband and link management layers. The static memory 53 serves as an operating space for the processor 51, and the software in the flash memory 54 is called into the static memory 53 during operation.
The bluetooth controller 50 may include a data bus 55 for data communication.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART) 56. The universal asynchronous transceiver 56 is a universal serial data bus used for asynchronous communications. The UART 56 is a bi-directional communication bus that allows full duplex transmission and reception. The uart 56 may provide a hardware interface (i.e., physical connection) for the processor to communicate with the mcu, and is the channel through which the mcu communicates with the processor.
The bluetooth controller 50 may further include a codec 57. The codec 57 can encode and decode bluetooth packets. By way of example, the codec 57 may include a digital-to-analog converter (DAC), an analog-to-digital conversion port (ADC), a digital interface, a coding module, and the like.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a wireless transceiver 58. The wireless transceiver 58 is responsible for the reception and transmission of data. The wireless transceiver 58 may perform both data transmission and reception operations. The transmitting operation may include generation of a carrier, carrier modulation, power control, and automatic gain control AGC; the receiving operation may include frequency tuning to the correct carrier frequency, signal strength control, etc.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a baseband controller 59. The baseband controller 59 may process the data stream in real time, such as packetizing, encrypting, decrypting, checking, error correcting, etc., data under the control of the processor 51. The baseband controller 59 may also provide an interface from the baseband controller to other chips, such as a data path RAM client interface, a microprocessor interface, a pulse code modulation interface (PCM), etc.
The bluetooth controller 50 may also include a test module 60. The test module 60 may provide certification and compliance specifications for the wireless and baseband layers while also managing production and after-market testing of the product.
The target server 700 may be a server system of a manufacturer of the electric vehicle 20. The target server 700 may store therein model information of the electric vehicle 20. The mobile electronic device 10 may send a request to the target server 700 to acquire model information of the electric vehicle 20.
The user 80 may be a user of the electric vehicle 20. The user 80 may control the state of the electric vehicle 20 through the remote controller 90. For example, the user 80 may control the electric vehicle 20 to enter the binding state through the remote controller 90 before binding the mobile electronic device 10 and the electric vehicle 20. The user 80 may implement the binding with the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10. For example, the user 80 may input control commands to the mobile electronic device 10. After receiving the control command, the mobile electronic device 10 may execute the digital key binding method to bind the mobile electronic device 10 and the electric vehicle 20. The user 80 may also send a target instruction to the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10 to control the electric vehicle 20 to perform a target operation. For example, the user 80 may send an unlocking instruction to the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10 to control the electric vehicle 20 to unlock. For example, the user 80 may send a start instruction to the electric vehicle 20 through the mobile electronic device 10 to control the electric vehicle 20 to start.
The remote control 90 may be a wireless transmitting device. The user 80 may transmit control information to the near field communication device 40 via the remote control 90 to control the state of the near field communication device 40. For example, a manufacturer of an electric vehicle may equip each electric vehicle with a private remote control when the electric vehicle leaves the factory. The private remote control is provided to the user 80 at the time of sale of the electric vehicle. The user may be a vehicle owner. The user can control the electric vehicle to enter the binding state using the private remote controller 90 mated with the electric vehicle. For example, the user may press an unlock button on the remote controller 90 for a long time or input an unlock password to control the electric vehicle to enter the binding writable mode.
The mobile electronic device 10 may be a smart mobile device. In some embodiments, the smart mobile device may include a smart phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a gaming device, a navigation device, a point of sale (POS) device, and the like, or any combination thereof. As an example, the mobile electronic device 10 may be a cell phone of the user 80. The mobile electronic device 10 may also include, but is not limited to, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a smart home device, a wearable device, a virtual reality device, an augmented reality device, and the like, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the smart home devices may include smart lighting devices, control devices for smart electrical devices, smart walkie-talkies, and the like, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the wearable device may include a smart bracelet, smart footwear, smart glasses, smart helmet, smart watch, smart garment, smart backpack, smart accessory, or the like, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the virtual reality device and/or the augmented reality device may include a virtual reality helmet, virtual reality glasses, a virtual reality patch, an augmented reality helmet, augmented reality glasses, an augmented reality patch, and the like, or any combination thereof. For example, the virtual reality device and/or augmented reality device may include google glasses, Oculus Rift, Hololens, Gear VR, and the like.
Fig. 3 illustrates a hardware architecture diagram of the mobile electronic device 10 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. The mobile electronic device 10 includes at least one memory 230 and at least one processor 220. In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device 10 may also include a communications port 250 and an internal communications bus 210. Meanwhile, the mobile electronic device 10 may also include I/O components 260.
The I/O components 260 support input/output between the mobile electronic device 10 and other components (e.g., the terminal device 130).
The communication port 250 is used for data communication between the mobile electronic device 10 and the outside. For example, the mobile electronic device 10 may connect to the network 120 through the communication port 250, and request the target server to obtain the model of the electric vehicle 20 through the network 120.
The at least one processor 220 communicates with the at least one memory 230 via an internal communication bus 210. The at least one processor 220 is configured to execute the at least one instruction set, and when the at least one processor 220 executes the at least one instruction set, the mobile electronic device 10 implements the digital key binding method or the digital key verification method provided herein. The processor 220 may perform all the steps involved in the method of pushing information. Processor 220 may be in the form of one or more processors, and in some embodiments, processor 220 may include one or more hardware processors, such as microcontrollers, microprocessors, Reduced Instruction Set Computers (RISC), Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), application specific instruction set processors (ASIPs), Central Processing Units (CPUs), Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), Physical Processing Units (PPUs), microcontroller units, Digital Signal Processors (DSPs), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), Advanced RISC Machines (ARM), Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs), any circuit or processor capable of executing one or more functions, or the like, or any combination thereof. For illustrative purposes only, only one processor 220 is depicted in the mobile electronic device 10 in the present application. It should be noted, however, that the mobile electronic device 10 may also include multiple processors and that, thus, the operations and/or method steps disclosed herein may be performed by one processor, as described herein, or by a combination of multiple processors. For example, if in the present application the processor 220 of the mobile electronic device 10 performs steps a and B, it should be understood that steps a and B may also be performed jointly or separately by two different processors 220 (e.g. a first processor performing step a, a second processor performing step B, or a first and a second processor performing steps a and B together).
In the present application, the role played by the mobile electronic device 10 in the method disclosed in the present application will be described by taking a smartphone as an example, and the role played by the near field communication apparatus 40 in the method will be described by taking a bluetooth controller as an example.
Fig. 4 illustrates a flow diagram of a digital key binding method S100 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 4 illustrates the binding process of the digital key from the processing of the mobile electronic device 10. The process S100 may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium (such as the memory 230) in the mobile phone 10 for the digital key binding. At least one processor 220 is communicatively coupled to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein when the handset 10 is operating, the at least one processor 220 reads the at least one instruction set and executes the steps of process S100 according to the instructions of the at least one instruction set.
The illustrated operations of the flow S100 presented below are intended to be illustrative and not limiting. In some embodiments, the process S100 may be implemented with one or more additional operations not described, and/or with one or more operations described herein. Further, the order of the operations shown in FIG. 4 and described below is not intended to be limiting.
S110, the mobile electronic equipment sends a first request to the near field communication device.
The user 80 controls the near field communication device 40 to enter the binding state through the remote controller 90. Thereafter, the mobile electronic device 10 may send a first request to the near field communication means 40. The first request includes establishing a communication connection with the near field communication device, wherein the near field communication device is installed on an electric vehicle. In some embodiments, the near field communication device comprises a bluetooth controller. In some embodiments, the communication connection is a near field communication connection between the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device, such as a bluetooth connection.
S120, the mobile electronic device receives a first response of the near field communication device to the first request.
S130, the mobile electronic equipment establishes the communication connection with the near field communication device based on the first response.
For example, a bluetooth controller in an electric vehicle may generate a command packet for establishing a communication connection and send the command packet to a mobile phone. After the mobile phone receives the command packet, the mobile phone can execute the command packet and establish communication connection with a Bluetooth controller in the electric vehicle.
S140, the mobile electronic device generates a second key and a digital key. The second key may be a default key for future communications of the mobile electronic device with the near field communication device. In some embodiments, the second key may be associated with an ID of the electric vehicle. The mobile phone may generate the second key based on the ID of the electric vehicle.
The ID of the electric vehicle may be unique identification information of the electric vehicle. For example, the ID of the electric vehicle may be a Serial Number (Serial Number) of the electric vehicle. As an example, the ID of the electric vehicle may be a circuit board number of the electric vehicle or a circuit board number of the bluetooth controller; the ID of the electric vehicle may also be generated from a circuit board number of the electric vehicle or a circuit board number of the bluetooth controller. The ID of the electric vehicle may be stored in the mobile phone in advance. For example, before the electric vehicle leaves the factory, a mobile phone manufacturer cooperating with the electric vehicle manufacturer may store the ID of the electric vehicle in the mobile phone by a white box encryption technology; the owner can obtain the ID of the electric vehicle only by finishing the authentication and configuration of the mobile phone. For example, the ID of the electric vehicle is pre-stored in the bluetooth controller, and the mobile phone may send a request to the bluetooth controller to request to obtain the ID of the electric vehicle. For example, the ID of the electric vehicle is stored in the server 700 of the electric vehicle manufacturer in advance, and the mobile phone sends a request to the server 700 to request the ID of the electric vehicle.
The handset may generate the second key using a fixed algorithm preset in its memory. The description is from the processing procedure of the program instruction in the mobile phone, namely: input (electric vehicle ID); output (second key). One mobile phone corresponds to one second secret key to realize one secret key for one car. In some embodiments, user information set by the user can be added to the input information, that is: input (electric vehicle ID and user information); output (second key). Thus, when the user changes the mobile phone or loses the mobile phone, the user can change the user information. The handset may generate a new second key based on the new user information and the electric vehicle ID. Thus, the old second key is invalidated and unusable.
The digital key may also be associated with the ID of the electric vehicle or generated by the cell phone 10 based on the ID of the electric vehicle 20. The process of generating the digital key by the mobile phone 10 based on the ID of the electric vehicle 20 is similar to or consistent with the process of generating the second key, and is not repeated here for brevity.
S150, the mobile electronic device encrypts the plaintext by using the first secret key to generate a ciphertext.
And S160, the mobile electronic equipment transmits the ciphertext to the near field communication device.
The plaintext may include the second key and the digital key. In some embodiments, the plaintext may also include a check code. The check code can check whether the decryption is successful or not when decrypting. In some embodiments, the plaintext may also include a flag bit. The processor of the handset can read the flag bit and execute the program instruction corresponding to the flag bit according to the content of the flag bit. In some embodiments, the flag bit may identify a state of the electric vehicle. The state of the electric vehicle may be a binding state or a verification state. As an example, when the flag bit is "6A", indicating that the electric vehicle is in a binding state; the processor executes the storage instruction to store the successfully decrypted second key and the digital key in the memory. When the flag bit is '6B', indicating that the electric vehicle is in an authentication state.
In some embodiments, the first key may be preset in both the mobile electronic device and the near field communication apparatus.
As an example, the manufacturer of the electric vehicle may store the first key in the bluetooth controller in an encrypted manner before the electric vehicle leaves the factory. Thus, the first key is preset in the bluetooth controller.
As an example, fig. 5 shows a process of presetting a first key a in the mobile electronic device 10 according to an embodiment of the present application.
And S510, the mobile electronic equipment acquires the model of the electric vehicle.
In some embodiments, a user may scan a barcode or two-dimensional code containing information on the model of the electric vehicle using a mobile phone. Therefore, the mobile phone obtains the model information of the electric vehicle. In some embodiments, the user may directly and manually input the model information of the electric vehicle.
S520, the mobile electronic device sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle.
Before the electric vehicle leaves the factory, the manufacturer of the electric vehicle may establish a mapping relationship between the electric vehicle model information and the first key (i.e., "model information — first key") in the server 700. After obtaining the model information of the electric vehicle, the mobile electronic device may encapsulate the model information into a request packet, and send the request packet to the target server via a network. Of course, the request packet may also include other information, such as the status of the electric vehicle.
S530, the mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, where the second response includes the first key, and the first key is associated with the model of the target device.
After receiving a request packet from the mobile electronic device, the target server analyzes the request packet to obtain model information in the request packet. And the target server searches the first key corresponding to the model information through the pre-established mapping relation. And the target server encapsulates the first secret key into a response packet and sends the response packet to the mobile electronic equipment.
After receiving the response packet, the mobile electronic device 10 analyzes the response packet to obtain the first key in the response packet.
In this way, the first key is preset in the mobile electronic device 10.
Of course, other methods of pre-setting the first key in the mobile electronic device 10 may also be employed. For example, before the electric vehicle leaves the factory, a mobile phone manufacturer cooperating with the electric vehicle manufacturer may store the first secret key in the mobile phone by a white-box encryption technology; the user (such as the owner of the vehicle) only needs to complete the authentication and configuration of the mobile phone to obtain the first key.
In some embodiments, the first key may be associated with a model of the electric vehicle. For example, the first key may be generated based on a model of the electric vehicle.
When the nfc device 40 is a bluetooth controller, the plaintext may be encrypted by using AES encryption algorithm. Here, the aes (advanced Encryption standard) Encryption algorithm is a symmetric Encryption algorithm that is disclosed globally. By symmetric encryption algorithm, it is meant that both encryption and decryption use the same key. In the encryption, the AES algorithm has two inputs and one output. The input is the key and plaintext and the output is the ciphertext. When decrypting, the AES algorithm also has two inputs and one output, the inputs are ciphertext and a secret key, and the output is plaintext. In AES encryption, the file is divided into file blocks, each of which is 128 bits, i.e., 16 bytes, for encryption. If the file size is not an integer multiple of 16 bytes, some data may be added at the end of the file that is an integer multiple of 16 bytes. Each file block is individually encrypted.
Fig. 6 illustrates a schematic diagram of an encryption process for encrypting plaintext 46 with a first key 45 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. In the embodiment shown in fig. 6, the plaintext 46 is composed of the second key 43, the digital key 44, the check bit 42, and the flag bit 41. The second key 43 comprises 8 bytes. The digital key 44 comprises 4 bytes. The check bit 42 includes 3 bytes, and the check bit 42 is set in byte 1, byte 14, and byte 15, respectively. Of course, the check bit 42 may be disposed in other locations. Flag bit 41 is a string "6A" and occupies 1 byte. The plaintext 46 constitutes a file block. The file block length is 16 bytes. The first key 45 is 16 bytes. Plaintext 46 is encrypted using first key 45 to generate ciphertext 47. The cipher text 47 is 16 bytes.
And when the communication connection is Bluetooth connection, the mobile phone sends the encrypted ciphertext 47 to the Bluetooth controller on the electric vehicle through Bluetooth connection. And after receiving the ciphertext 47 sent from the mobile phone terminal, the bluetooth controller decrypts the ciphertext 47 by using a preset first key 45. After decryption, the bluetooth controller first verifies the check bits 42. If the check bits 42 are all verified, the decryption is successful. The bluetooth controller stores the decrypted second key 43 and the decrypted digital key 44 into the bluetooth controller according to the binding state indicated by the flag bit 41.
S170, the mobile electronic device sets the second key and the digital key as a default key and a digital key for future communication with the nfc device 40.
The mobile phone can directly set the second secret key and the digital key as a default secret key and a digital key for future communication with the Bluetooth controller; that is, the mobile phone can directly store the second key and the digital key in the mobile phone memory after generating the second key and the digital key. The mobile phone may also set the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the bluetooth controller after receiving the confirmation information (confirmation of successful decryption) of the bluetooth controller.
And the mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller finish the communication of the binding process and respectively store the second secret key and the digital key into respective memories. In the future, the mobile phone can directly use the second secret key and the digital key when communicating with the Bluetooth controller. As an example, the purpose of future communication between the mobile phone and the bluetooth controller may be to unlock and/or activate using the digital key. As an example, in the future, the purpose of the communication between the mobile phone and the bluetooth controller may be to share the key.
The digital key binding method S100 has the following beneficial effects:
firstly, before the mobile phone communicates with the bluetooth controller in the future, the mobile phone encrypts the second secret key and the digital key for future communication and sends the encrypted second secret key and the encrypted digital key to the bluetooth controller. And the Bluetooth controller decrypts the received encrypted data, and stores the second secret key and the digital key after decryption is successful. The mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller obtain the second secret key and the digital key used for future communication in an encryption transmission mode, and the safety of the future communication is improved.
Secondly, the first secret key is preset in the mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller at the same time. And the mobile phone encrypts the second key and the digital key by using the first key and sends the encrypted second key and the encrypted digital key to the Bluetooth controller. And the Bluetooth controller decrypts the received ciphertext by using the same first secret key. The Bluetooth controller decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key and simultaneously performs one-time equipment authentication on the mobile phone (if decryption is successful, the first keys used by the two interactive parties can be considered to be the same, the equipment authentication is successful, and if decryption is unsuccessful, the first keys used by the two interactive parties can be considered to be different, the equipment authentication is failed), so that the safety of communication between the mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller in the future is further improved.
Thirdly, before the mobile phone and the electric vehicle are bound, a user 80 (vehicle owner) can unlock the Bluetooth controller of the electric vehicle by using the private remote controller 90 matched with the electric vehicle, so that the electric vehicle enters a binding state, and the safety of the binding process is further enhanced.
Correspondingly, in the digital key binding process, the processing procedure of the near field communication device 40 (the bluetooth controller) side may be as follows:
s210, a near field communication device receives a first request from a target mobile electronic device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the target mobile electronic device, and the near field communication device is installed in an electric vehicle;
s220, the near field communication device sends a first response to the first request to the target mobile electronic equipment, and the first response comprises the communication connection established with the target mobile electronic equipment;
s230, the near field communication device receives a ciphertext sent from the target mobile electronic device, where the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the target mobile electronic device with a first key, the plaintext includes a second key and a digital key, and the first key is preset in both the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device;
s240, the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first key to obtain the second key and the digital key;
and S250, the near field communication device sets the second secret key and the digital key as a default secret key and a digital key for future communication with the target mobile electronic device.
Fig. 7 illustrates a flow diagram of a digital key binding method S200 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 7 illustrates a process of binding the digital key from the process of the nfc device 40.
It should be noted that, since there may be a plurality of mobile electronic devices (mobile phones) around the near field communication apparatus 40 (bluetooth controller), and only the mobile electronic device 10 (user's mobile phone) is used to implement the digital key binding, the mobile electronic device 10 may be the target mobile electronic device of the near field communication apparatus 40.
The method S200 for binding a digital key may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the nfc device 40, and is used for binding the digital key. At least one processor in the near field communication device 40 is in communication connection with the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein when the near field communication device is in operation, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the above-mentioned digital key binding method S200 according to the instruction of the at least one instruction set. The specific binding method has been described above, and is not described herein again.
In summary, through the binding operation, the mobile phone end and the bluetooth controller end both store the second key and the digital key in their respective memories. Then, the user can operate the mobile phone to make the mobile phone perform verification interaction with the Bluetooth controller. The Bluetooth controller can receive the control information of the mobile phone and verify the control signal, and if the control signal passes the verification, the Bluetooth controller executes an unlocking and/or starting command corresponding to the digital key. Fig. 8 illustrates a schematic diagram of a bluetooth controller 50 providing authentication interaction with a mobile electronic device 10 according to some embodiments of the present application.
Fig. 9 illustrates a flow diagram of a digital key validation method S300 provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 9 shows a process of processing the near field communication device 40 to describe the authentication process of the digital key. The digital key verification method 300 may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the near field communication device 40. At least one processor in the near field communication device 40 is communicatively coupled to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein when the near field communication device is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and performs the steps of flow 300 as indicated by the at least one instruction set.
The illustrated operations of flow S300 presented below are intended to be illustrative and not limiting. In some embodiments, the flow S300 may be implemented with one or more additional operations not described, and/or with one or more operations described herein. Further, the order of the operations shown in FIG. 9 and described below is not intended to be limiting.
It should be noted that, since there may be a plurality of mobile electronic devices (such as mobile phones) around the near field communication apparatus 40 (such as bluetooth controller), and only the mobile electronic device 10 (such as the mobile phone of the user) is used to implement the digital key binding, the mobile electronic device 10 may be a target mobile electronic device of the near field communication apparatus 40.
S310, the near field communication device in the electric vehicle sends a broadcast, and the broadcast comprises a first random number.
And S320, the near field communication device receives the near field communication connection request of the target mobile electronic equipment within a preset time period and establishes near field communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment.
As previously described, the bluetooth controller has stored the second key and the digital key to memory through a digital key binding process. During the period of waiting for the mobile phone to verify and unlock, the Bluetooth controller continuously sends out a broadcast (Beacon), wherein the broadcast contains a random number R which changes periodically. The periodic variation may refer to a periodic variation in the random number R over time. In some embodiments, the random number R changes when time exceeds a predetermined period of time. For example, the predetermined period of time may be set to 5 minutes, and the random number R may be changed when the time exceeds 5 minutes. In some embodiments, the random number R is also changed when the bluetooth connection between the handset and the bluetooth controller is disconnected and then reconnected. In some embodiments, the random number R is changed when the time does not exceed the predetermined time period, but if the bluetooth controller receives two or more communication connection requests within the same predetermined time period (e.g., two or more devices simultaneously initiate connection requests to the bluetooth controller), this indicates that the authentication interaction is in an unsafe state. The bluetooth controller simultaneously records and stores the random number R transmitted in the broadcast.
The target mobile electronic device may receive the random number R broadcast by the near field communication device. For example, when the electric vehicle needs to be unlocked, the mobile phone establishes bluetooth connection with a bluetooth controller on the electric vehicle. And the mobile phone receives the broadcast of the Bluetooth controller, and can analyze the data in the broadcast to obtain a random number R. For ease of understanding, in the description of the present application, the "first random number" is used to denote the random number R recorded and stored by the bluetooth controller.
And S330, the near field communication device receives a ciphertext transmitted from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the target mobile electronic device, the encryption process comprises a second random number, and the plaintext comprises a digital key.
The digital key is a preset digital key (i.e. a digital key stored in a binding process) agreed by the target mobile electronic device and the near field communication device. In some embodiments, the plaintext may also include a check code. The check code may be used to check whether future decryption by the bluetooth controller is successful. In some embodiments, the plaintext may also include a flag bit. In some embodiments, the flag may identify an interaction state of the user's handset with the bluetooth controller. In some embodiments, the flag bit may also identify the encryption information. The encryption information includes, but is not limited to, encryption scheme, encryption algorithm, plaintext content, etc. The user mobile phone can send the ciphertext with the flag bit to the Bluetooth controller. And after the Bluetooth controller receives and successfully decrypts the ciphertext, executing a program instruction corresponding to the flag bit according to the state of the flag bit identifier.
The encryption process may include a random number R. For ease of understanding, in the description of the present application, the "second random number" is used to denote the random number R used by the target mobile electronic device in the encryption process. In some embodiments, the encryption key may include a second random number; for example, the plaintext is encrypted using a key containing a second random number. In some embodiments, the plaintext may include a second random number; for example, a plaintext containing the second random number is encrypted using the key. The decryption process of the ciphertext by the Bluetooth controller corresponds to the encryption process of the plaintext by the user mobile phone.
In some embodiments, the target mobile electronic device may encrypt the plaintext using a second key agreed by the user mobile phone and the bluetooth controller to generate a ciphertext; wherein the plaintext includes a digital key and a second random number. Fig. 10 illustrates a process for encrypting plaintext according to some embodiments of the present application. In the embodiment shown in fig. 10, the instruction set in the user's handset encrypts the plaintext 82 using the second key 43 preset in the binding process to generate the ciphertext 83. The plain text 82 includes a second random number 84 (random number R), the digital key 44 preset during the binding process, and a flag 86.
In some embodiments, the mobile electronic device 10 may encrypt the plaintext using a third key to generate ciphertext; wherein the third key is generated based on the second key and the second random number; the second key is a key agreed by the user mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller. FIG. 11 illustrates another encryption process for plaintext provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. In the embodiment shown in fig. 11, the instruction set in the user's handset 10 encrypts plaintext 92 using the third key 91 to generate ciphertext 93. The plain text 92 includes the flag 94 and the digital key 44 preset in the binding process. The third key 91 may be generated from the second random number 84 (random number R) and the second key 43 preset in the binding process. In some embodiments, program instructions in the handset 10 may execute at least one set of conversion commands to generate the third key based on the second key and the random number R. In particular, the at least one set of conversion commands may comprise an encryption algorithm. The flag "6B" is used to identify that the interaction between the handset 10 and the near field communication device 40 is in a verified state. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 11, flag bit 94 occupies 1 byte; the digital key 44 occupies 4 bytes. The plaintext 92 consisting of the flag bit 94 and the digital key 44 is 5 bytes in total. When encrypting the plaintext 92 using AES, some data may be supplemented in the plaintext 92 so that the length of the plaintext reaches 16 bytes. For example, the plaintext may be supplemented with a second identification bit for identifying an encryption scheme and/or an encryption algorithm. The plaintext may also be supplemented with a check code for verification.
In the encryption process, whether the plaintext containing the digital key and the random number R is encrypted by the second key (as shown in fig. 10) or the plaintext containing the digital key is encrypted by the third key generated by the random number R and the second key (as shown in fig. 11), the ciphertext (authentication data) sent by the user mobile phone (target mobile electronic device 10) to the bluetooth controller (near field communication apparatus 40) each time is changed together with the random number R. Therefore, in the process of interaction between the user mobile phone and the Bluetooth controller, even if an attacker sniffs certain verification data and sends the data to the Bluetooth controller without changing the data, the verification cannot be passed, and therefore replay attack is avoided.
S340, the nfc device determines that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
In some embodiments, when the target mobile electronic device 10 encrypts the plaintext containing the digital key and the random number R using the first key, the bluetooth controller decrypts the ciphertext using the same first key to obtain the plaintext containing the digital key and the random number R, and then verifies whether the random number R (the second random number) obtained by decryption is the same as the random number R (the first random number) recorded and stored when the bluetooth controller transmits the broadcast. And if the verification is passed, confirming that the second random number is the same as the first random number, and indicating that the communication is safe.
For example, in the encryption process shown in fig. 10, the instruction set in the user's handset encrypts the plaintext 82 using the second key 43. The second key 43 is a key preset in the binding process. The plain text 82 includes a random number R, a preset digital key in the binding process, and a flag bit. Correspondingly, the bluetooth controller may decrypt the ciphertext 83 with the second key 43 to obtain the random number R, the number key, and the flag bit. After decryption, the instruction set determines whether the decryption was successful by checking the random number R. If the random number R obtained by decryption is the same as the random number R prestored in the instruction set, the decryption is successful, and the Bluetooth controller continues to execute the instruction (such as verifying the key, unlocking and/or starting) corresponding to the flag bit "6B". If the random number R obtained by decryption is different from the random number R prestored in the instruction set, it indicates that decryption has failed, and the bluetooth controller may update the random number R in the broadcast. The user's handset may start a new round of authentication process. In some embodiments, the maximum number of authentications may be preset in the nfc apparatus 40. When the verification times of the mobile phone of the user in the preset time period exceed the preset maximum verification times, the Bluetooth controller can enter a locking state. Certainly, when the bluetooth controller enters the locked state, the bluetooth controller may also send a prompt message to the user mobile phone to prompt the user that the electric vehicle equipped with the near field communication device is in an unsafe environment. The user can use the equipped private remote control to release the locked state. The user may also re-bind the user's handset. Of course, an unlocking condition may be set, and the bluetooth controller automatically releases the locking state when the unlocking condition is satisfied. As an example, the unlocking condition may be: the connection request received by the bluetooth controller is zero for a predetermined period of time, such as 10 minutes.
In some embodiments, when the target mobile electronic device 10 encrypts the digital key by using the second key generated based on the first key and the random number R, the near field communication device 40 may also decrypt the ciphertext by using the second key generated based on the first key and the random number R to obtain the digital key. And verifying whether the random number R (second random number) in the encryption key of the mobile electronic equipment is the same as the random number R (first random number) in the decryption key of the near field communication device by judging whether the decryption is successful. If the decryption is successful, the random number R (second random number) in the encryption key of the mobile electronic equipment is confirmed to be the same as the random number R (first random number) in the decryption key of the near field communication device. If the decryption fails, it cannot be determined whether the random number R (second random number) in the encryption key of the mobile electronic device is the same as the random number R (first random number) in the decryption key of the nfc apparatus. That is, the decryption process is a process of confirming that the second random number is identical to the first random number.
For example, in the encryption process shown in fig. 11, the instruction set in the user's handset encrypts plaintext 92 using a third key 91. The plain text 92 includes the digital key 44 and the flag 94. The third key 91 is generated based on the second key 43 and the random number R. Correspondingly, the bluetooth controller may decrypt the ciphertext with the third key 91, and if decryption succeeds, the communication security is confirmed, and the digital key and the flag bit are further obtained. Of course, the plaintext may further include a check code. After decryption, the instruction set verifies the check code to determine whether the decryption was successful. If the check code obtained by decryption is the same as the check code pre-stored in the instruction set, the decryption is successful, the near field communication device confirms that the random number R used by the user mobile phone for encryption is the same as the random number R sent in the previous broadcast, and the near field communication device continues to execute the instruction (such as verifying the key, unlocking and/or starting) corresponding to the zone bit "6B". If the check code obtained by decryption is different from the check code pre-stored in the instruction, the decryption is failed, the near field communication device cannot confirm whether the random number R used by the user mobile phone for encryption is the same as the random number R sent in the previous broadcast, and the near field communication device can update the random number R in the broadcast. And the user mobile phone generates a new third secret key based on the new random number R and starts a new round of verification process.
And S350, the near field communication device acquires the digital key.
When the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number, namely, the communication safety is confirmed, the near field communication device obtains the digital key.
And S360, the near field communication device determines that the digital key is the same as the digital key bound in advance.
And if the digital key is different from the digital key bound in advance, the verification of the digital key is failed, and the Bluetooth controller updates the random number or enters a locking state. If the digital key is the same as the digital key bound in advance, the verification of the digital key is successful, and the Bluetooth controller executes an instruction corresponding to the digital key.
And S370, the near field communication device executes the instruction corresponding to the digital key. As an example, the instruction may include at least one of an unlock instruction and starting the electric vehicle. In some embodiments, the instruction may also be to share a key.
In the above digital key verification process, on the one hand, the second key and/or the digital key are a preset key and a digital key agreed in the binding process between the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device. The two interactive parties (the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device) use the key and the digital key agreed by the two parties to carry out service interaction, so that the safety in the service interaction process is improved. On the other hand, the near field communication device sends the random number R to the mobile electronic equipment in a broadcast mode; the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the digital key, the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext and/or the random number R is added during verification of decryption; the random number R may vary; therefore, the encryption and decryption processes also vary with the random number R, avoiding replay attacks.
Correspondingly, in the process of verifying the digital key, the processing procedure at the mobile electronic device 10 side may be:
s410, establishing communication connection between the mobile electronic equipment and a near field communication device in the electric vehicle;
s420, the mobile electronic equipment receives the random number broadcasted by the near field communication device;
s430, encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device to generate a ciphertext, wherein the encryption process comprises the random number, the plaintext comprises a digital key, and the digital key is a preset digital key agreed by the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device; and
and S440, the mobile electronic equipment sends the ciphertext to the near field communication device through the near field communication connection.
Fig. 12 illustrates a flow chart of a method S400 of authenticating a digital key provided in accordance with some embodiments of the present application. Fig. 12 shows a process of the mobile electronic device 10 to describe the authentication process of the digital key.
The above-described method of digital key verification may be stored as at least one instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the mobile electronic device 10 for the digital key verification. At least one processor in the mobile electronic device 10 is communicatively connected to the at least one non-transitory storage medium, wherein when the near field communication apparatus is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the above digital key authentication method S400 according to the instruction of the at least one instruction set. The specific binding method has been described above, and is not described herein again.
In summary, the present application provides a digital key binding method S100 (mobile electronic device), a digital key verification method S400 (mobile electronic device), a digital key binding method S200 (near field communication device), and a digital key verification method S300 (near field communication device).
The present application also provides a mobile electronic device 10. The mobile electronic device 10 may include at least one memory including at least one set of instructions; at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, the at least one processor reading the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device 40 is operating and executing the digital key binding method S100 and/or the digital key verification method S400 according to an indication of the at least one instruction set.
The digital key binding method S100 and/or the digital key verification method S400 may be stored as a set of instructions in a non-transitory storage medium in the mobile electronic device 10. The mobile electronic device 10 may execute the set of instructions and may accordingly perform the steps in the digital key binding method S100 and/or the digital key verification method S400.
The present application also provides a near field communication device 40. Near field communication device 40 may include at least one memory including at least one set of communication instructions; at least one processor in communication with the at least one memory, wherein when the near field communication device 40 is operating, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the digital key binding method S200 and/or the digital key verification method S300 according to the instructions of the at least one instruction set.
The digital key binding method S200 and/or the digital key verification method S300 may be stored as an instruction set in a non-transitory storage medium in the near field communication device 40. The near field communication device 40 may execute the instruction set and may accordingly perform the steps of the digital key binding method S200 and/or the digital key verification method S300.
The mobile electronic device 10 may perform the digital key binding method S100 to bind the mobile electronic device 10 and the electric vehicle 20, thereby enabling the electric vehicle 20 to authenticate the mobile electronic device 10. After the mobile electronic device 10 is bound to the near field communication device 40, the near field communication device 40 may also perform the digital key verification method S300 to verify the unlocking and/or starting request sent by the mobile phone 10.
According to the digital key binding method and the digital key verification method, firstly, before an electric vehicle leaves a factory, a first secret key is preset in a near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and a target mobile electronic device (user mobile phone) of the electric vehicle at the same time. Before the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) and the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) are verified, the near field communication device (Bluetooth controller) can use a preset first secret key to perform one-time equipment authentication on the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone), so that the safety of future verification communication between two interactive parties is improved. Secondly, the target mobile electronic can use the first secret key to encrypt a second secret key for future verification communication, and communication safety is further improved. And thirdly, before the target mobile electronic device (the user mobile phone) and the electric vehicle are bound, the user (a vehicle owner) can unlock the Bluetooth controller of the electric vehicle by using the private remote controller matched with the electric vehicle, so that the electric vehicle enters a binding state, and the safety of the binding process is further enhanced. In addition, the random number R is added in the encryption process of the verification communication between the target mobile electronic equipment (user mobile phone) and the near field communication device, so that replay attack can be prevented.
It should be noted that the communication link in the digital key binding process and the communication link in the digital key verification process may be the same or different. For example, the communication connection during the binding process may be a wifi connection, and the connection during the verification process may be a bluetooth connection. Of course, the communication connection in the binding process and the communication connection in the verification process may both be bluetooth connections.
In conclusion, upon reading the present detailed disclosure, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the foregoing detailed disclosure can be presented by way of example only, and not limitation. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present application is intended to cover various reasonable variations, adaptations, and modifications of the embodiments described herein, although not explicitly described herein. Such alterations, improvements, and modifications are intended to be suggested by this application and are within the spirit and scope of the exemplary embodiments of the application.
Furthermore, certain terminology has been used in this application to describe embodiments of the application. For example, "one embodiment," "an embodiment," and/or "some embodiments" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment can be included in at least one embodiment of the application. Therefore, it is emphasized and should be appreciated that two or more references to "an embodiment" or "one embodiment" or "an alternative embodiment" in various portions of this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined as suitable in one or more embodiments of the application.
It should be appreciated that in the foregoing description of embodiments of the present application, various features are sometimes grouped together in a single embodiment, figure, or description thereof for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure aiding in the understanding of such feature. Alternatively, various features may be dispersed throughout several embodiments of the application. This is not to be taken as an admission that any of the features of the claims are essential, and it is fully possible for a person skilled in the art to extract some of them as separate embodiments when reading the present application. That is, embodiments in the present application may also be understood as an integration of multiple sub-embodiments. And each sub-embodiment described herein is equally applicable to less than all features of a single foregoing disclosed embodiment.
In some embodiments, numbers expressing quantities or properties useful for describing and claiming certain embodiments of the present application are to be understood as being modified in certain instances by the terms "about", "approximately" or "substantially". For example, "about", "approximately" or "substantially" may mean a ± 20% variation of the value it describes, unless otherwise specified. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the numerical parameters set forth in the written description and attached claims are approximations that may vary depending upon the desired properties sought to be obtained by a particular embodiment. In some embodiments, numerical parameters should be construed in light of the number of reported significant digits and by applying ordinary rounding techniques. Notwithstanding that the numerical ranges and parameters setting forth the broad scope of the embodiments of the application are approximations, the numerical values set forth in the specific examples are reported as precisely as possible.
Each patent, patent application, publication of a patent application, and other material, such as articles, books, descriptions, publications, documents, articles, and the like, cited herein is hereby incorporated by reference. All matters hithertofore set forth herein except as related to any prosecution history, may be inconsistent or conflicting with this document or any prosecution history which may have a limiting effect on the broadest scope of the claims. Now or later associated with this document. For example, if there is any inconsistency or conflict in the description, definition, and/or use of terms associated with any of the included materials with respect to the terms, descriptions, definitions, and/or uses associated with this document, the terms in this document are used.
Finally, it should be understood that the embodiments of the application disclosed herein are illustrative of the principles of the embodiments of the present application. Other modified embodiments are also within the scope of the present application. Accordingly, the disclosed embodiments are presented by way of example only, and not limitation. Those skilled in the art may implement the present application in alternative configurations according to the embodiments of the present application. Thus, embodiments of the present application are not limited to those embodiments described with precision in the application.
Claims (18)
1. A digital key binding method, comprising:
the method comprises the steps that the mobile electronic equipment sends a first request to a near field communication device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the near field communication device, and the near field communication device is installed on an electric vehicle;
the mobile electronic equipment receives a first response of the near field communication device to the first request;
the mobile electronic equipment establishes the communication connection with the near field communication device based on the first response;
the mobile electronic device generating a second key and a digital key;
encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device by using a first secret key to generate a ciphertext, wherein the plaintext comprises the second secret key and the digital key, and the first secret key is preset in the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device at the same time;
the mobile electronic equipment transmits the ciphertext to the near field communication device; and
the mobile electronic device sets the second key and the digital key as default keys and digital keys for future communication with the near field communication device.
2. The digital key binding method of claim 1, further comprising:
the mobile electronic equipment acquires the model of the electric vehicle;
the mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and
the mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with the model of the electric vehicle.
3. The digital key binding method of claim 1, wherein the communication link is a near field communication link.
4. The digital key binding method of claim 1, wherein the second key is associated with an ID of the electric vehicle.
5. A mobile electronic device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory,
the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set when the mobile electronic device is running and performs the digital key binding method of any of claims 1 to 4 in accordance with instructions of the at least one instruction set.
6. A digital key binding method, comprising:
the method comprises the steps that a near field communication device receives a first request from a target mobile electronic device, wherein the first request comprises the establishment of communication connection with the target mobile electronic device, and the near field communication device is installed in an electric vehicle;
the near field communication device sends a first response to the first request to the target mobile electronic equipment, wherein the first response comprises the communication connection established with the target mobile electronic equipment;
the near field communication device receives a ciphertext transmitted from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the target mobile electronic device by using a first secret key, the plaintext comprises a second secret key and a digital key, and the first secret key is preset in the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device at the same time;
the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using the first secret key to obtain the second secret key and the digital key; and
and the near field communication device sets the second secret key and the digital key as a default secret key and a default digital key for future communication with the target mobile electronic equipment.
7. The digital key binding method of claim 6, wherein the presetting of the first key at the near field communication device and the target mobile electronic device comprises:
the target mobile electronic equipment acquires the model of the target electric vehicle;
the target mobile electronic equipment sends a second request to a target server, wherein the second request comprises the model of the electric vehicle; and
the target mobile electronic device receives a second response to the second request from the target server, the second response including the first key, wherein the first key is associated with the model of the electric vehicle.
8. The digital key binding method of claim 6, wherein the second key is associated with an ID of the two-wheeled vehicle.
9. The digital key binding method of claim 6, wherein the communication connection is a near field communication connection.
10. A near field communication device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key binding; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory,
when the near field communication device is running, the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set and executes the digital key binding method according to the instruction of the at least one instruction set.
11. A digital key verification method, comprising:
a near field communication device in an electric vehicle sends a broadcast, wherein the broadcast comprises a first random number;
the near field communication device receives a near field communication connection request of target mobile electronic equipment within a preset time period and establishes near field communication connection with the target mobile electronic equipment;
the near field communication device receives a ciphertext transmitted from the target mobile electronic device, wherein the ciphertext is generated by encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device, the encryption process comprises a second random number, and the plaintext comprises a digital key;
the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number;
the near field communication device acquires the digital key;
the near field communication device determines that the digital key is the same as a pre-bound digital key; and
and the near field communication device executes the instruction corresponding to the digital key.
12. The method for authenticating a digital key as set forth in claim 11, wherein the step of the near field communication device confirming that the second random number is identical to the first random number comprises:
the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a second secret key, wherein the second secret key is a secret key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device;
the near field communication device acquires the second random number; and
and the near field communication device determines that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
13. The method for authenticating a digital key as set forth in claim 11, wherein the step of the near field communication device confirming that the second random number is identical to the first random number comprises:
the near field communication device generates a third secret key based on a second secret key and the first random number, wherein the second secret key is a secret key agreed by the target mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device;
the near field communication device decrypts the ciphertext by using a third key; and
and the near field communication device confirms that the second random number is the same as the first random number.
14. A near field communication device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory, wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set when the near field communication device is operating and performs the digital key binding method of any of claims 11 to 13 in accordance with instructions of the at least one instruction set.
15. A digital key verification method, comprising:
the mobile electronic equipment establishes communication connection with a near field communication device in the electric vehicle;
the mobile electronic equipment receives the random number broadcasted by the near field communication device;
encrypting a plaintext by the mobile electronic device to generate a ciphertext, wherein the encryption process comprises the random number, the plaintext comprises a digital key, and the digital key is a preset digital key agreed by the mobile electronic device and the near field communication device; and
and the mobile electronic equipment sends the ciphertext to the near field communication device through the near field communication connection.
16. The digital key verification method of claim 15, wherein the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext into ciphertext comprises:
and the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a third key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the third key is generated based on a second key and the random number, and the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device.
17. The digital key verification method of claim 15, wherein the mobile electronic device encrypting plaintext into ciphertext comprises:
and the mobile electronic equipment encrypts the plaintext by using a second key to generate the ciphertext, wherein the second key is a key agreed by the mobile electronic equipment and the near field communication device, and the plaintext further comprises the random number.
18. A mobile electronic device, comprising:
at least one memory including at least one instruction set for digital key verification; and
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one memory,
wherein the at least one processor reads the at least one instruction set when the mobile electronic device is running and performs the digital key validation method of any of claims 15 to 17 in accordance with instructions of the at least one instruction set.
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CN115915131B (en) * | 2022-10-20 | 2023-11-10 | 远峰科技股份有限公司 | Vehicle key bidirectional encryption authentication method and system, vehicle binding device and NFC card |
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