CN111542059A - WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing. The method is divided into four stages: the first stage, all nodes obtain the hop count from the node to the sink node after the network is initialized; in the second stage, an intermediate node, a proxy source node and a proxy sink node are determined by the randomly generated source node and the sink node in the network; in the third stage, the network enters a data packet routing stage, the data packet is routed to a sink node from a source node sequentially through a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node; meanwhile, the transmission of false data packets is mixed in the routing process, so that the purpose of judging interference attackers is achieved. The invention can ensure the randomness of the routing of the data packet from the source node to the sink node, and the false data packet is doped in the non-hot spot area, so that the privacy of the position of the source node is protected, the service life of the network is prolonged, and smaller time delay is ensured.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless sensor network communication support, and particularly relates to a WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing.
Background
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), wireless sensor nodes are widely used in extremely harsh environments due to their characteristics of small size, distributed, self-organizing, robustness, application-oriented, and the like, such as: military monitoring, volcano monitoring, forest fires, and the like[19]. By monitoring in the monitoring area for a long time and providing real-time data feedback for the user, accurate, efficient and real-time data are provided for people, and great convenience is brought to people. However, while WSNs provide great advantages to humans, location privacy issues are gradually being exposed.
In protecting endangered animals, WSNs are used to monitor the activity and status of endangered animals. However, since hunters have extremely powerful devices, they may try to monitor the traffic in the environment of the animal being protected in an attempt to obtain useful information. This condition is very detrimental to the animal and often results in the endangered extinction of the animal being protected. In addition, in a military network, once a network used by my party for monitoring an enemy is discovered by the enemy and attacks are initiated, immeasurable loss and casualties are caused to my party. In order to protect information useful in the network from being compromised, researchers protect the integrity of the data through encryption-decryption algorithms so that the information is not compromised. Although these methods solve the eavesdropping behavior to some extent, the original communication mode in the network is still destroyed, so that the network cannot perform normal communication, and even the whole network is in a paralysis state.
Therefore, it is important to research and protect Source node Location Security (SLP)Of significance[20]. Only with the SLP solution, it is guaranteed that WSNs are widely used in various fields for a longer period of time. The algorithm focuses on the location privacy of key nodes, and particularly focuses on the location privacy problem of source nodes.
Although there are many researches on location privacy, such as encryption-decryption algorithms, the communication mode in the network cannot be hidden, and how to protect the location of the source node is a typical location privacy protection problem in WSNs. Two protection algorithms for the position privacy of the source node are provided to solve the problems in the existing research.
In order to design an efficient source node location privacy protection scheme, researchers at home and abroad propose various routing mechanisms, and relevant documents are as follows:
1. in 2015, Jun Long et al in Anenergy-influencing and sink-location private transmitted scheme for WSNs through set Based routing propose a scheme RBR (Ring Based routing) for protecting the location privacy of sink nodes. The RBR scheme is composed of a plurality of routing rings and routing lines, and data packets of the nodes are not directly sent to the sink node but sent to the nearest routing ring. Data is routed through nodes in the ring and sent to other routing rings via routing lines. The routing loop moves in an irregular mode, and even if the sink position is fixed, an attacker can be tempted. Besides, the routing loop is constructed according to network energy analysis, residual energy in the network is fully used, and the network energy utilization rate and the network service life are improved.
2. In 2018, Guingjiehan et al, in CASLP: A fused Arc-Based Source Location Privacy Protection Scheme in WSNs for IoT, propose a CASLP (fused Arc-Based Source Location Privacy) Scheme that protects the Location Privacy of the Source node. The technology transmits the data packet through a closed confusion arc, increases the randomness of the transmission of the data packet, and makes the position of a source node difficult to distinguish.
3. In 2017, Guangwu et al propose a Constrained Random Routing Mechanism in "Constrained Routing mechanisms for source Privacy Protection in WSNs", which can continuously change the selection of a next-hop route to replace a relatively fixed Routing path, so that an attacker is difficult to analyze and track to a source node. First, a specific selection field is generated in the vicinity of the transmitting node according to the danger distance and the communication radius. The sending node then calculates their magnitudes from the skew angles of the candidate nodes in the domain. And finally, determining the selection of the next hop node according to the magnitude.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems, the invention provides a WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing, in a randomly deployed wireless sensor network, under the premise that nodes do not know the topology of the whole network, three special nodes are jointly determined by a source node and a sink node: the method comprises the steps of proxying a source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node, and then sending a data packet from the source node to the sink node through the proxying source node, the intermediate node and the proxy sink node at one time. In order to induce the direction of an attacker deviating from the real source node, the transmission of a false data packet is merged into the route. The technical purpose is achieved, the technical effect is achieved, and the invention is realized through the following technical scheme:
a WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: network initialization
The network consists of a sink node and a large number of common sensor nodes, wherein the sink node is positioned at the central position of the network; after the network deployment is completed, the sink node starts to broadcast an initialization beacon to the network, wherein the initialization beacon comprises hop value, the position of the sink node and hop threshold information; after receiving the initialization beacon, the common sensor node acquires hop value, sink node position and hop threshold information from the received initialization beacon, processes the beacon and broadcasts the beacon to own neighbor nodes, and finally, all nodes in the network can generate a neighbor list according to the hop values of the neighbor nodes; dividing the neighbor nodes into a neighbor list, an equal neighbor list, a far neighbor list and a forward neighbor list (comprising the equal neighbor list and a near neighbor list) according to hop values of the distance sink nodes;
step two: selection of intermediate node, proxy source node and proxy sink node
When the source node needs to send event information, special nodes such as a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node need to be determined according to the positions of the source node and the sink node. The proxy source node serves as a phantom source node, the proxy sink node serves as a dummy sink node, and the intermediate node is located between the proxy source node and the proxy sink node; the determination of the special node ensures that the lower time delay is ensured and the position information of the source node is also protected on the premise of not consuming too much energy in the network;
step three: routing of data packets
In the process of sending a data packet from a source node to a sink node, the data packet sequentially passes through a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node, and four stages of routing are formed: a source node-proxy source node stage, a proxy source node-intermediate node stage, an intermediate node-proxy sink node stage, and a proxy sink node-sink node stage; nodes including a source node, a proxy source node, an intermediate node, a proxy sink node and a sink node are all called end nodes. In each stage, the end node selects a proper node from the neighbor nodes as the next hop, and performs multi-hop transmission on the data packet until the data packet is transmitted to another end node; the data packet is finally transmitted to the sink node through the four stages of routing; in addition, in order to confuse an attacker, a false path is generated on a path for routing a real data packet, and the transmission of the false data packet is carried out;
step four: dynamic change of route
When the energy of the selected intermediate node, the proxy source node and the proxy sink node reaches a certain threshold value, sending a request for replacing a new node to the whole network, and replacing the new node with the corresponding new node; therefore, a new end node is formed, a new end-to-end routing path is generated, and finally the data packet is sent to the sink node.
In the second step, the specific method for selecting the proxy source node is as follows:
after the source node is generated, h is carried out0Hop flooding, i.e.:the source node sends an initialization beacon to the neighbor node and gets h from the distance of the source node0And randomly selecting one node from the nodes of the hop as a proxy source node.
In the second step, the specific method for selecting the proxy sink node is as follows:
the more the number of the proxy sink nodes is, the more the proxy source nodes are selected, and the higher the security is; however, the larger the number of proxy sink nodes, the more energy is consumed in broadcasting. In order to avoid that the selected proxy sink node is closer to the source node, the invention selects two proxy sink nodes; the two proxy sink nodes are distributed on two sides of the sink node and are symmetrical.
In the second step, the specific method for selecting the intermediate node is as follows:
the intermediate node is jointly determined by the position information of the proxy source node and the proxy sink node. After the agent source node and the agent sink node are determined, the position information of the nodes is broadcasted to the whole network, and therefore all the nodes know the hop counts from the nodes to the agent source node and the agent sink node respectively. Of course, the hop count from the proxy source node to two proxy sink nodes can also be obtained, called hss1Or hss2. The hop values from the proxy source node and the proxy sink node are all the same
Or
Randomly selects one of the nodes as an intermediate node.
In the third step, the specific method of packet routing is as follows:
the routing of the data packets is divided into four end-to-end routes: from source node to proxy source node, from proxy source node to intermediate node, from intermediate node to proxy sink node, from proxy sink node to sink node. When receiving a data packet sent from a source node, the node sends a real data packet to a next hop node on one hand and sends a false data packet request message to a neighbor node according to a probability on the other hand. In the four-segment route, the node sends a false data packet request message to the neighbor nodes according to the probabilities of 0.8, 0.5, 0.4 and 0.2 until the other end node of each segment route. And the node receiving the request packet sends a false data packet to the node sending the request packet, and simultaneously continues to send the request packet to the neighbor node. The node receiving the real data packet caches and sends the data packet to the next hop node, and the node receiving the false data packet discards the false data packet. Therefore, the data packets routed on the real path only have real data packets, and the dummy data packets are only used for luring an attacker.
In the fourth step, the specific method for dynamically changing the route is as follows:
and when the energy of the selected intermediate node, the proxy source node or the proxy sink node reaches a certain threshold value, sending a request for replacing a new node to the whole network, and not serving as a relay node for forwarding the data packet. And selecting a new intermediate node, a proxy source node or a proxy sink node according to the rule in the step two. Therefore, a new end node is formed, a new end-to-end routing path is generated, and finally the data packet is sent to the sink node.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the invention randomly selects the intermediate node in the constructed variable region, thereby ensuring that the intermediate node is in a range far away from the source node and has randomness; secondly, by dynamic movement of the confusion ring, the residual energy of the nodes in the network is fully utilized, and the service life of the network is prolonged while the position privacy of the source node is enhanced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the network initialization of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a selection of a proxy source node according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating the selection of a proxy sink node according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the packet routing phase of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating the transmission of true and false packets according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the following embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
The following detailed description of the principles of the invention is provided in connection with the accompanying drawings.
In order to solve the problem that the position of a source node in a randomly deployed wireless sensor network is easy to expose, on the premise that the node does not know the topology of the whole network, a data packet is sent to a randomly determined special node: the method comprises the steps of proxying a source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node, and ensuring that a special node is far enough away from the source node; meanwhile, the dynamic movement of the tree is used for reducing the energy consumption of the network as much as possible and balancing the energy consumption of the network, so that the service life of the network is prolonged, the invention provides a wireless sensor network source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing, which comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: the network initializes as shown in fig. 1.
The network consists of a sink node and a large number of common sensor nodes, wherein the sink node is located at the central position of the network. After the network deployment is completed, the sink node starts to broadcast an initialization beacon to the network, wherein the initialization beacon comprises hop value, the position of the sink node and hop threshold information; after receiving the initialization beacon, the common sensor node acquires hop value, sink node position and hop threshold information from the received initialization beacon, processes the beacon and broadcasts the beacon to own neighbor nodes, and finally, all nodes in the network can generate a neighbor list according to the hop values of the neighbor nodes. Dividing the neighbor nodes into a neighbor list, an equal neighbor list, a far neighbor list and a forward neighbor list according to hop values of the distance sink nodes; in the invention, all nodes can know the positions of the nodes according to the GPS positioning technology;
step two: and as shown in fig. 2 and 3, selecting a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node.
When the source node needs to send event information, the position of the source node and the sink node needs to be determinedSpecial nodes such as a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node; the proxy source node serves as a phantom source node, the proxy sink node serves as a dummy sink node, and the intermediate node is located between the proxy source node and the proxy sink node. The determination of the special node ensures that the lower time delay is ensured and the position information of the source node is also protected on the premise of not consuming too much energy in the network; after the source node is generated, h is carried out0Hop flooding, i.e.: the source node sends an initialization beacon to the neighbor node and gets h from the distance of the source node0Randomly selecting one node from the jumping nodes as a proxy source node; to avoid that the proxy source node is too close to the source node, h0Not too small, this embodiment takes h0＝5；
The more the number of the proxy sink nodes is, the more the proxy source nodes are selected, and the higher the security is; however, the more the number of proxy sink nodes is, the more energy is consumed in broadcasting; in order to avoid the situation that the security of the source position is too low due to the fact that the selected proxy sink node is close to the source node, the two proxy sink nodes are selected. The two proxy sink nodes are distributed in two opposite directions of the sink node;
after the agent source node and the agent sink node are determined, the position information of the nodes is broadcasted to the whole network, and therefore all the nodes know the hop counts from the nodes to the agent source node and the agent sink node respectively. Of course, the hop count from the proxy source node to two proxy sink nodes can also be obtained, called hss1Or hss2(ii) a The hop values from the proxy source node to the proxy sink node are all c or
Randomly selecting one of the nodes as an intermediate node;
step three: as shown in fig. 4 and 5, routing of data packets
In the process of sending a data packet from a source node to a sink node, the data packet sequentially passes through a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node, and four stages of routing are formed: a source node-proxy source node stage, a proxy source node-intermediate node stage, an intermediate node-proxy sink node stage, and a proxy sink node-sink node stage; in each stage, the end node selects a proper node from the neighbor nodes as the next hop according to a corresponding algorithm, and performs multi-hop transmission on the data packet until the data packet is transmitted to another end node. The data packet is finally transmitted to the sink node through the four stages of routing; in addition, in order to confuse an attacker, a false path is generated on a path for routing a real data packet, and the transmission of the false data packet is carried out; in the four-segment routing, the node sends a false data packet request message to the neighbor node according to the probabilities of 0.8, 0.5, 0.4 and 0.2 until the other end node of each segment of routing; and the node receiving the request packet sends a false data packet to the node sending the request packet, and simultaneously continues to send the request packet to the neighbor node. The node receiving the real data packet caches and sends the data packet to the next hop node, and the node receiving the false data packet discards the false data packet. Therefore, the data packets routed on the real path only have real data packets, and the false data packets are only used for luring an attacker;
step four: dynamic change of route
When the energy of the selected intermediate node, the proxy source node or the proxy sink node reaches a certain threshold value, sending a request for replacing a new node to the whole network, and not serving as a relay node for forwarding a data packet; selecting a new intermediate node, a proxy source node or a proxy sink node according to the rule in the step two; therefore, a new end node is formed, a new end-to-end routing path is generated, and finally the data packet is sent to the sink node.
In summary, the following steps:
the invention discloses a source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing. Firstly, a sink node initializes a network in a flooding beacon mode, so that the node can generate respective neighbor lists; secondly, the source node and the sink node jointly determine three special nodes: the system comprises an agent source node, an intermediate node and an agent sink node; and then the source node sends the data packet to the sink node after sequentially passing through the proxy source node, the intermediate node and the proxy sink node, so as to form a four-segment route. And on the four-segment route, in order to entice an attacker to be far away from a real path, the transmission of a false data packet is mixed in the real path. The invention can ensure that the special node is far away from the real source node enough, and the path from the source node to the sink node of each data packet has randomness and the paths of the adjacent data packets are not repeated. In addition, the dynamic change of the special nodes realizes the dynamic movement of the tree, and the utilization rate of energy in the network is improved while the position privacy of the source node is protected, so that the service life of the network is prolonged.
The foregoing shows and describes the general principles and broad features of the present invention and advantages thereof. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, which are described in the specification and illustrated only to illustrate the principle of the present invention, but that various changes and modifications may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, which fall within the scope of the invention as claimed. The scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and equivalents thereof.
Claims (5)
1. A WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: network initialization
The network consists of a sink node and a large number of common sensor nodes, wherein the sink node is positioned at the central position of the network; after the network deployment is completed, the sink node starts to broadcast an initialization beacon to the network, wherein the initialization beacon comprises hop value, the position of the sink node and hop threshold information; after receiving the initialization beacon, the common sensor node acquires hop value, sink node position and hop threshold information from the received initialization beacon, processes the beacon and broadcasts the beacon to own neighbor nodes, and finally, all nodes in the network can generate a neighbor list according to the hop values of the neighbor nodes;
step two: selection of intermediate node, proxy source node and proxy sink node
When a source node needs to send event information, an intermediate node, a proxy source node and a proxy sink node need to be determined according to the positions of the source node and the sink node, so that the position information of the source node is protected;
step three: routing of data packets
In the process of sending a data packet from a source node to a sink node, the data packet sequentially passes through a proxy source node, an intermediate node and a proxy sink node to form four stages of routing; respectively as follows: a stage from a source node to a proxy source node, a stage from the proxy source node to an intermediate node, a stage from the intermediate node to a proxy sink node, and a stage from the proxy sink node to the sink node; the nodes including the source node, the proxy source node, the intermediate node, the proxy sink node and the sink node are all called end nodes; in each stage, the end node selects a proper node from the neighbor nodes as the next hop, and performs multi-hop transmission on the data packet until the data packet is transmitted to another end node; in addition, in order to confuse an attacker, the transmission of false data packets is also blended in the process of routing real data packets;
step four: dynamic change of route
When the energy of the selected intermediate node, the proxy source node and the proxy sink node reaches a certain threshold value, sending a request for replacing the intermediate node, the proxy source node and the proxy sink node to the whole network, and replacing the intermediate node, the proxy source node and the proxy sink node with corresponding new nodes; therefore, a new end node is formed, a new end-to-end routing path is generated, and finally the data packet is sent to the sink node.
2. The WSNs source node location privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the second step, the specific method for selecting the proxy source node is as follows:
source node proceeds with h0Hop flooding and from distance h0And selecting one node from the nodes of the hop as a proxy source node.
3. The WSNs source node location privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing as claimed in claim 2, wherein: in the second step, the specific method for selecting the proxy sink node is as follows:
two proxy sink nodes are selected and distributed on two sides of the sink node and are symmetrical.
4. The WSNs source node location privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing as claimed in claim 3, wherein: in the second step, the specific method for selecting the intermediate node is as follows:
the intermediate node is determined by the position information of the proxy source node and the proxy sink node; after the agent source node and the agent sink node are determined, broadcasting own position information to the whole network, so that all nodes know the hop counts from the nodes to the agent source node and the agent sink node respectively; the number of hops from a proxy source node to two proxy sink nodes is also available, called hss1Or hss2The hop count to the proxy source node and to the proxy sink node are both
Or
Randomly selects one of the nodes as an intermediate node.
5. The WSNs source node location privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the third step, the specific method of packet routing is as follows:
in the process of routing from the four end nodes to the end node, the node receiving the real data packet sends a false data packet request message to the neighbor node respectively according to different probabilities until the other end node of each route section; the node receiving the dummy packet discards the dummy packet.
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| CN112492588A (en) * | 2020-12-03 | 2021-03-12 | 桂林电子科技大学 | Multipath source node position privacy protection routing method based on dynamic token |
| CN112492588B (en) * | 2020-12-03 | 2022-07-12 | 桂林电子科技大学 | Multi-path source node position privacy protection routing method based on dynamic token |
| CN116506844A (en) * | 2023-03-20 | 2023-07-28 | 青海师范大学 | Underwater acoustic sensor network routing protocol based on layering and source location privacy |
| CN116506844B (en) * | 2023-03-20 | 2024-01-26 | 青海师范大学 | Underwater acoustic sensor network routing protocol method based on layering and source position privacy |
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