CN104822144A - Source position privacy protection method for resisting backward tracing of attacker - Google Patents
Source position privacy protection method for resisting backward tracing of attacker Download PDFInfo
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- CN104822144A CN104822144A CN201510221259.3A CN201510221259A CN104822144A CN 104822144 A CN104822144 A CN 104822144A CN 201510221259 A CN201510221259 A CN 201510221259A CN 104822144 A CN104822144 A CN 104822144A
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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Abstract
The invention discloses a source position privacy protection method for resisting backward tracing of an attacker. According to the method, a mode of phantom node selection twice is employed; and one stage is phantom node selection of source-node hop directed routing and the other stage is phantom node selection of constant-gradient routing, so that distribution of phantom nodes does not use location of the source node as the center of circle. Besides, with a random routing strategy, routing to aggregation nodes by data packets is dynamic and diversified. Therefore, a problem that the phantom nodes are centralized at a certain regular area in the prior art can be effectively solved; failure path generation can be avoided; time of backward tracing by an attacker can be prolonged; and thus safety of source position privacy can be improved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to thing network sensing layer node security technical field, particularly relate in wireless sensor network the source position method for secret protection resisting assailant's backward tracing.
Background technology
Along with the fast development of Internet of Things, as the important component part of thing network sensing layer, wireless sensor network has extremely wide application, and use section is deployed in numerous node perceived, image data in monitored area, sends data to aggregation node process by multi-hop wireless transmission.But compared with legacy network, wireless sensor network is due to its radio communication, and its safety problem has become the obstruction of restriction wireless sensor network.Assailant can pass through wireless signal positioning equipment, backward tracing packet, and locator data source, brings threat to monitored target.
In order to effectively protect monitored target, need to carry out safeguard protection to the position of source node.Resist the source position privacy protection policy of assailant's backward tracing usually based on phantom route; but the data of phantom node are sent to aggregation node by shortest route strategy; after assailant can find phantom node, infer the regularity of distribution of phantom node, then have and very high may find source node.
Therefore; in order to make the distribution of phantom node, there is various geographic properties; irregular distribution; propose the source position privacy protection policy based on phantom node; consider to have the assailant of stronger visual capabilities in this strategy, if if namely assailant tracks the node that distance sources node V jumps and namely thinks that source node exposes.This strategy, through the selection of twice phantom node, makes the distance of phantom nodal distance source node farther, and the distribution of phantom node does not concentrate on a certain regular region.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the deficiency that existing source position privacy protection policy exists; the invention provides a kind of source position method for secret protection resisting assailant's backward tracing; the irregular distribution of phantom node can be made to follow; avoid simultaneously failing path region (if so-called failing path region i.e. phantom node to aggregation node path through visible range; then the region at phantom node place is failed areas), good source position security performance is provided.
To achieve these goals, the present invention takes following technical scheme: by the selection course of twice phantom node, and provide a kind of source position method for secret protection resisting assailant's backward tracing, the method comprises the following steps:
(1) the netinit stage: all nodes of static deployment, realize being preloaded into of all meshed network parameters, its neighbor list of node updates;
(2) source node h jumps and limitedly to flood the stage: mark the node that can cause failing path, and calculates the minimum hop count that h jumps scope interior nodes self and its neighbor node distance sources node;
(3) source node h jumps oriented routing phase: packet is jumped according to the direction forwarding h away from source node by source node, determines phantom node 1;
(4) constant gradient c jumps oriented routing phase: packet is forwarded c according to constant gradient route and jumps by phantom node 1, determines phantom node 2;
(5) the stochastic route stage: phantom node 2 by the packet that receives according to specific routing forwarding to aggregation node.
Further, specific implementation is step (1) the netinit stage:
It is 0 that aggregation node arranges initial jumping figure value hop, generates the message that floods, carries out the whole network and flood, and tell all nodes by the visible range radius V of assailant.After node receives the message that floods, jumping figure value hop is added 1, record current jumping figure value, and the message that will flood is broadcasted to its neighbor node.Flood after terminating, each node selects minimum one in its jumping figure value recorded, and arrives the shortest path jumping figure of aggregation node, upgrade its neighbor list as oneself.
Further, the limited stage specific implementation that floods of step (2) source node h jumping is:
Source node generates broadcast BM={Bro_Source, id, h_s, θ, flag, s_x, s_y}, wherein Bro_Source represents type of message, id represents the node number sending this message, and h_s represents the count value of message, is initialized as 0, θ is angle maximum in interior nodes drift angle, visible range, is determined by source node location coordinate, aggregation node coordinate and visible range radius V.Flag represents that node number is the flag bit whether node of id can cause failing path, is initially 0.S_x, s_y represent the position coordinates of source node.Then message BM broadcasts in source node h jumps.When message BM arrives each forward node, h_s adds 1, simultaneously according to the position (s_x of source node, s_y), the position of aggregation node and self-position calculate the drift angle of oneself according to the cosine law and compare with θ, if drift angle is less than θ, then make flag be 1, broadcast this message to its neighbor node.When h_s count down to h, node no longer broadcasts this message.Jump limited flooding through h, according to flag value in message, the minimum hop count value of the node acquisition within the scope of h jumping self and neighbor node distance sources node thereof, judges that in its neighbor node, which can cause failing path simultaneously.
Further, step (3) source node h jumps the specific implementation of oriented routing phase and is:
(3.1) source node s sends a packet PK={E every Δ T time
k(m), h_r, nx_id}, E
km () represents the result utilizing key k encrypting messages content m, h_r represents that packet forwards the counting variable of jumping figure, and nx_id represents No. id of next-hop node;
(3.2), after node receives the packet PK of source node transmission, from next-hop node set, Stochastic choice node carries out packet forwarding;
Described next-hop node set, satisfies condition: the neighbor node being node, and the minimum hop count of distance sources node is greater than the minimum hop count that self arrives source node, can not cause failing path simultaneously;
(3.3) h_r is initially 0, and packet is often forwarded a h_r and adds 1, until be counted as h, then stops forwarding.If no count is jumped to h, repeat (3.2) step, jump until packet is forwarded h.The node that now packet arrives is phantom node 1.
Further, step (4) constant gradient c jumps the specific implementation of oriented routing phase and is:
Phantom node 1 is by hop count value h_r clear 0 in the packet that receives, in its constant gradient neighbor node, select the node deviating from this packet source direction as down hop forward node, the node receiving packet carries out according to identical mode, forward, often forward once, h_r adds 1, until h_r is c, stop forwarding, finally arrive phantom node 2; Described constant gradient neighbor node refers to that the minimum hop count of the neighbor node middle distance aggregation node of node equals the node of node self to aggregation node minimum hop count.
Further, the specific implementation in step (5) stochastic route stage is:
From the set of down hop forward node, Stochastic choice node is as forward node using the packet that receives for phantom node 2, and the node receiving packet repeats this process, until packet arrives aggregation node.
Described down hop forward node, satisfies condition: the neighbor node being node, and the minimum hop count value of distance aggregation node is less than the jumping figure of node self to aggregation node.
The present invention adopts technique scheme; there is following beneficial effect: in the present invention; (1) due to be avoid failing path source node h jump Oriented Path from Its Maximal Subtrees by; make packet avoid visible range completely from source node to the process of phantom node 1, thus build reliable source position privacy protection policy system efficiently.(2) the present invention guarantees that the last distribution of phantom node does not concentrate on source node is a certain annular region in the center of circle, ensures that assailant by several position distribution of having caught phantom node, cannot infer the position of source node.(3) in the present invention phantom node as much as possible away from source node; the path of data packet transmission adopts dynamic random route; the reverse hop-by-hop of better obstruction assailant is followed the trail of; extend the safety time of source node; theory analysis and experiment prove; the present invention can protect source node location privacy effectively, and the research for thing network sensing layer node location privacy is one and effectively supplements.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is present system model.
Fig. 2 is netinit flow chart of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is that source node h of the present invention jumps the limited flow chart that floods.
Fig. 4 is that source node h of the present invention jumps Oriented Path from Its Maximal Subtrees by flow chart.
Fig. 5 is that constant gradient c of the present invention jumps constant gradient flow chart.
Embodiment
In order to make object of the present invention, technical scheme and beneficial effect are clearly clear and definite, and below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments, the present invention is described in further detail.
Asking for an interview Fig. 1, is system model figure of the present invention, by the selection course of twice phantom node, realizes for a kind of source position method for secret protection resisting assailant's backward tracing.
(1) the netinit stage
Ask for an interview Fig. 2, it is 0 that aggregation node arranges initial jumping figure value hop, generates the message that floods, carries out the whole network and flood, and tell all nodes by the visible range radius V of assailant.After node receives the message that floods, jumping figure value hop is added 1, record current jumping figure value, and the message that will flood is broadcasted to its neighbor node.Flood after terminating, each node selects minimum one in its jumping figure value recorded, and arrives the shortest path jumping figure of aggregation node, upgrade its neighbor list as oneself.
Being preloaded into of all meshed network parameters of this process implementation, its neighbor list of node updates.
(2) source node h jumps limited flooding the stage
Ask for an interview Fig. 3, source node generates broadcast BM={Bro_Source, id, h_s, θ, flag, s_x, s_y}, wherein Bro_Source represents type of message, and id represents the node number sending this message, h_s represents the count value of message, being initialized as 0, θ is angle maximum in interior nodes drift angle, visible range, is determined by source node location coordinate, aggregation node coordinate and visible range radius V.Flag represents that node number is the flag bit whether node of id can cause failing path, is initially 0.S_x, s_y represent the position coordinates of source node.Then message BM broadcasts in source node h jumps.When message BM arrives each forward node, h_s adds 1, simultaneously according to the position (s_x of source node, s_y), the position of aggregation node and self-position calculate the drift angle of oneself according to the cosine law and compare with θ, if drift angle is less than θ, then make flag be 1, broadcast this message to its neighbor node.When h_s count down to h, node no longer broadcasts this message.Jump limited flooding through h, according to flag value in message, the minimum hop count value of the node acquisition within the scope of h jumping self and neighbor node distance sources node thereof, judges that in its neighbor node, which can cause failing path simultaneously.
This phased markers goes out the node that can cause failing path, and calculates the minimum hop count that h jumps scope interior nodes self and its neighbor node distance sources node.
(3) source node h jumps oriented routing phase
Ask for an interview Fig. 4, (3.1) source node s sends a packet PK={E every Δ T time
k(m), h_r, nx_id}, E
km () represents the result utilizing key k encrypting messages content m, h_r represents that packet forwards the counting variable of jumping figure, and nx_id represents No. id of next-hop node;
(3.2), after node receives the packet PK of source node transmission, from next-hop node set, Stochastic choice node carries out packet forwarding;
Described next-hop node set, satisfies condition: the neighbor node being node, and the minimum hop count of distance sources node is greater than the minimum hop count that self arrives source node, can not cause failing path simultaneously;
(3.3) h_r is initially 0, and packet is often forwarded a h_r and adds 1, until be counted as h, then stops forwarding.If no count is jumped to h, repeat (3.2) step, jump until packet is forwarded h.The node that now packet arrives is phantom node 1.
Packet is jumped according to the direction forwarding h away from source node by this stage source node, determines phantom node 1;
(4) constant gradient c jumps oriented routing phase
Ask for an interview Fig. 5, phantom node 1 is by hop count value h_r clear 0 in the packet that receives, in its constant gradient neighbor node, select the node deviating from this packet source direction as down hop forward node, the node receiving packet carries out according to identical mode, forwards, often forwards once, h_r adds 1, until h_r is c, stop forwarding, finally arrive phantom node 2; Described constant gradient neighbor node refers to that the minimum hop count of the neighbor node middle distance aggregation node of node equals the node of node self to aggregation node minimum hop count.
This stage realizes phantom node 1, according to constant gradient route, packet is forwarded c jumping, determines phantom node 2;
(5) the stochastic route stage
From the set of down hop forward node, Stochastic choice node is as forward node using the packet that receives for phantom node 2, and the node receiving packet repeats this process, until packet arrives aggregation node.
Described down hop forward node, satisfies condition: the neighbor node being node, and the minimum hop count value of distance aggregation node is less than the jumping figure of node self to aggregation node.
This stage realize phantom node 2 by the packet that receives according to specific routing forwarding to aggregation node.
On the whole, the invention provides the sensing layer nodes location privacy protection method based on wireless sensor network: a kind of source position guard method based on phantom node resisting backward tracing.This method ensure that phantom node is as much as possible away from source node, the distribution of phantom node is made again to have geographical position diversity, do not concentrate in a certain regular region, effectively resist the assailant with stronger visual capacity, extend the safety time of assailant's backward tracing, improve the fail safe of source position privacy.
The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention; be noted that for those skilled in the art; under the prerequisite not departing from inventive principle, can also carry out improving and revising, these improve and amendment also should be considered as protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. resist a source position method for secret protection for assailant's backward tracing, it is characterized in that, comprise the steps:
(1) source node h jumps and limitedly to flood: source node carries out h and jumps limited flooding, and marks the node that can cause failing path, and the node within the scope of h jumping obtains self and the neighbor node Minimal routing jumping figure to source node;
(2) source node h jumps oriented routing phase: source node carries out random h jumping figure according to Packet forwarding, and selected down hop forward node satisfies condition: away from source node be not positioned at failed areas, packet is delivered to phantom node 1;
(3) c jumps constant gradient routing phase: packet is forwarded c according to constant gradient route and jumps by phantom node 1, arrives phantom node 2, changes the regularity of distribution of phantom node 1.
2. a kind of source position method for secret protection resisting assailant's backward tracing according to claim 1, is characterized in that: it is as follows that described step (1) the source node h jumping limited stage of flooding comprises step:
(1) source node generates broadcast BM={Bro_Source, id, h_s, θ, flag, s_x, s_y}, wherein Bro_Source represents type of message, and id represents the node number sending this message, h_s represents the count value of message, is initialized as 0, flag and represents that node number is the flag bit whether node of id can cause failing path, be initially 0, if can cause failing path, then flag is 1, s_x, s_y represent the position coordinates of source node, and θ node number is the drift angle of the node of id;
(2) according to the cosine law, node receives according to it message content, self-position and aggregation node position judge whether oneself is in visible range, if not in visible range, judgement can or can not cause failing path; Its neighbor list of node updates, obtains the minimum hop count that oneself arrives source node;
(3) packet is often forwarded once, and BM hop count value h_s adds 1, repeats step (2), jumps until forward h.
3. a kind of source position method for secret protection based on phantom node resisting assailant's backward tracing according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described step (1) source node h jumps oriented routing phase, and to comprise step as follows:
(1) source node complete h jump limited flood after, produce a packet PK={E every a Δ T chronomere
k(m), h_r, nx_id}, Ek (m) represent the result utilizing key k encrypting messages content m, and h_r represents that packet forwards the counting variable of jumping figure, and nx_id represents No. id of next-hop node;
(2), after node receives the packet of source node transmission, from next-hop node set, Stochastic choice node carries out packet forwarding;
Described next-hop node set interior joint, satisfy condition: node is the element in the set of the neighbor node formation of this ordinary node, the minimum hop count of distance sources node is greater than the minimum hop count of this ordinary node to source node, and can not failing path be caused, i.e. the flag value 0 when flooding BM message of this node;
(3) the hop count value initial value h_r in packet content is 0, and packet is often forwarded once, and count value adds 1, heavy step (2), jumps until forward h, and the node that now packet arrives is phantom node 1.
4. a kind of source position method for secret protection resisting assailant's backward tracing according to claim 1, is characterized in that: it is as follows that described step (3) c jumping constant gradient routing phase comprises step:
(1) hop count value h_r in the packet content received resets by phantom node 1, and from its next forward node set, random selecting node carries out packet forwarding;
The jumping figure of the nodal distance aggregation node in described down hop forward node set equals the minimum hop count of node self to aggregation node, i.e. constant gradient node set;
(2) packet often forwards once, and hop count value h_r adds 1, repeats step (1), until count value h_r is c, the node that now packet arrives is phantom node 2.
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Cited By (10)
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| CN111542059A (en) * | 2020-05-06 | 2020-08-14 | 河海大学常州校区 | WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing |
| CN111542059B (en) * | 2020-05-06 | 2023-05-16 | 河海大学常州校区 | WSNs source node position privacy protection method based on dynamic tree routing |
| CN113453143A (en) * | 2021-05-14 | 2021-09-28 | 浙江工业大学 | Source position privacy protection method of dynamic phantom node strategy |
| CN113453143B (en) * | 2021-05-14 | 2022-07-26 | 浙江工业大学 | Source position privacy protection method based on dynamic phantom node strategy |
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