CN105188026A - Privacy protection method of source position in WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) based on angle and phantom source - Google Patents
Privacy protection method of source position in WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) based on angle and phantom source Download PDFInfo
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- CN105188026A CN105188026A CN201510481086.9A CN201510481086A CN105188026A CN 105188026 A CN105188026 A CN 105188026A CN 201510481086 A CN201510481086 A CN 201510481086A CN 105188026 A CN105188026 A CN 105188026A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
Abstract
To improve the privacy security of a source position and the energy utilization rate of a node, the invention provides a privacy protection method of a source position in a WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) based on an angle and a phantom source. The area of the phantom source is defined and divided; a phantom source node, the geographic position of which is disperse, is generated; a dynamic and enough-long path is formed with the help of energy in an energy abundant area; therefore, a routing path is random and varied; and the position privacy security of a source node can be effectively protected. After the privacy protection method is adopted, the privacy security of the source position can be obviously increased; and simultaneously, the energy utilization rate can be improved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a seed position method for secret protection, particularly, be a kind of source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source, belong to wireless sensor network application.
Background technology
Wireless sensor network (WirelessSensorNetworks, WSN) (also aggregation node is by general sensor nodes (Node) and base station, SinkNode) form, integrate perception, communication and data processing, extend the information obtaining ability of people.Based in event driven WSN, the nearest node of distance monitoring event is called as source node (SourceNode).Node, once monitor event, just produces event message and sends to base station.But the wireless transmission medium shared makes enemy be easy to the sender of localization message.So, although enemy can not obtain the packet content after encryption, can reverse, hop-by-hop trace sources node location.In target tracking and monitor-type WSN are applied, the exposure of source node location is by the safety of serious threat to monitoring target.Such as, a large amount of sensor node deployments is monitored rare animal in the wild or is interspersed among the real-time messages that battlefield obtains army.The position of animal can not be known by poacher, and the position of army can not be grasped by enemy army.Therefore, the physical location secret protection of source node has become a good problem to study.
For the assailant with local flow monitoring capability; phantom Routing Protocol is proposed to protect the location privacy of source node in prior art; still there is following technical problem in the method: the phantom source of generation can high concentration in being the center of circle with real source, with h be radius circle on.For the assailant having certain memory capability, once find this rule, real source position, location has just become easy.In addition, h jumps the mass data produced in flooding process can bring heavier load to system, can shorten network lifecycle.
Summary of the invention
For solving above technical problem; the present invention proposes the source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN; by producing phantom node based on different angle dynamic randoms; make sensor node utilize the energy formative dynamics in abundant region, sufficiently long path, path, thus while reaching available protecting source node location privacy ensure network life maximize.
For achieving the above object, the present invention adopts following technical scheme: comprise the steps:
(1) netinit, static disposes network node, and realizes each meshed network parameter and be preloaded into;
(2) carry out the phantom route based on angle, first define phantom region, divide phantom region by homogeneous angular method, produce phantom node at random by the zonule selected at random, then packet is forwarded to phantom node from source node;
(3) in the circumference route of circumferentially carrying out certain jumping figure of phantom source node, the communication of phantom source node to intermediary node is completed;
(4) adopt Shortest path routing mode from intermediary node by data packets to base station.
Further, in netinit, first base station is loaded into a pair unsymmetrical key (K
pub, K
pri), each ordinary node is preloaded into the PKI K shared with base station
pub, the minimum range R between phantom source node and real node
minand the ultimate range R between phantom source node and real node
max, base station sets timer also broadcasts initial message bag to the whole network, and the initialization data comprising type of message, base station location, hop count hops and be preloaded into, its Timer duration is netinit stage duration, and hops initial value is 0.Afterwards, for the node receiving message bag first, hops is added 1, upgrade the value of hops and broadcast this message to neighbor node.For the message bag received, self ID and jumping figure hops add in neighbor node table by node, repeat said process until timer expired.
Further, carrying out in the phantom route based on angle, the distance of setting phantom source node and real source node is D ∈ [R
min, R
max], to monitor the real source node of event message for the center of circle, with R
maxfor exradius, R
minfor inner circle radius, form phantom region.Phantom region is evenly divided into μ part, and angle φ=(2 the π)/μ in every part of region, defining these regions is respectively a
1, a
2..., a
μ.Source node, when carrying out the transmission of packet, first selects a region
λ
i∈ [1, μ]; Angle β ∈ [(λ between source node and phantom source
i-1) φ, (λ
i) φ], between source node and phantom source distance d ∈ [R
min, R
max], then the relative position of phantom source node is (Source.xd+dcos (β), Source.yd+dsin (β)), and wherein Sourcexd is the x coordinate of source node, and Sourceyd is the y coordinate of source node.
Further, carrying out in circumference route, the jumping figure of phantom source node route in a circumferential direction
wherein
represent the neighbors number of phantom source node,
represent the shortest path of phantom source node to base station, X is factor of influence.
After adopting the method in a WSN, the phantom source node of generation disperses more, and assailant is difficult to track real source node.According to different network application environments, suitable phantom source region can also be defined, effectively control the distribution of phantom source node.In addition, according to the neighbors number of phantom node and select third party's node as the route intermediary of phantom node to base station to the jumping figure of base station, thus route is spatially occurred in the entire network at random in position, make assailant be difficult to infer from routed path the position source node.Simultaneously owing to not producing flooding process, thus can not produce mass data, therefore system load can not be overweight, and network lifecycle is also extended.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is method flow diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the routing procedure figure of the method.
Embodiment
(1) netinit, static disposes network node, and realizes each meshed network parameter and be preloaded into;
(2) carry out the phantom route based on angle, first define phantom region, divide phantom region by homogeneous angular method, produce phantom node at random by the zonule selected at random, then packet is forwarded to phantom node from source node;
(3) in the circumference route of circumferentially carrying out certain jumping figure of phantom source node, the communication of phantom source node to intermediary node is completed;
(4) adopt Shortest path routing mode from intermediary node by data packets to base station.
Further, in netinit, first base station is loaded into a pair unsymmetrical key (K
pub, K
pri), each ordinary node is preloaded into the PKI K shared with base station
pub, the minimum range R between phantom source node and real node
minand the ultimate range R between phantom source node and real node
max, base station sets timer also broadcasts initial message bag to the whole network, and the initialization data comprising type of message, base station location, hop count hops and be preloaded into, its Timer duration is netinit stage duration, and hops initial value is 0.Afterwards, for the node receiving message bag first, hops is added 1, upgrade the value of hops and broadcast this message to neighbor node.For the message bag received, self ID and jumping figure hops add in neighbor node table by node, repeat said process until timer expired.
Further, carrying out in the phantom route based on angle, the distance of setting phantom source node and real source node is D ∈ [R
min, R
max], to monitor the real source node of event message for the center of circle, with R
maxfor exradius, R
minfor inner circle radius, form phantom region.Phantom region is evenly divided into μ part, and angle φ=(2 the π)/μ in every part of region, defining these regions is respectively a
1, a
2..., a
μ.Source node, when carrying out the transmission of packet, first selects a region
λ
i∈ [1, μ]; Angle β ∈ [(λ between source node and phantom source
i-1) φ, (λ
i) φ], between source node and phantom source distance d ∈ [R
min, R
max], then the relative position of phantom source node is (Source.xd+dcos (β), Source.yd+dsin (β)), and wherein Sourcexd is the x coordinate of source node, and Sourceyd is the y coordinate of source node.
Further, carrying out in circumference route, the jumping figure of phantom source node route in a circumferential direction
wherein
represent the neighbors number of phantom source node,
represent the shortest path of phantom source node to base station, X is factor of influence.
In the random selection process of phantom source node, the minimum range of phantom node in location distribution of generation
in different environmental applications, only need choose suitable parameter value μ, R
minand R
max, just effectively can control the distribution of phantom node.
At circumference routing phase, the hop count circumferentially from phantom source node is
the value of X can have influence on the communication overhead of whole Routing Protocol.To balance the integrated communication expense of agreement, the tracing complexity of assailant and network application environment etc. be passed through, the value of Rational choice X.The value of X is related to the integrated communication expense of APS agreement, is also related to the reversely tracing complexity of assailant.The routed path of agreement is longer, and assailant follows the trail of with regard to needing the cost longer time.So the value of X is relatively flexible, mainly see the demand of network.Very high to the security requirement of network, and when passing over communication overhead, the value of X can be less than normal.Otherwise if the communication condition of network is limited, general to security requirement, at this moment the value of X can be bigger than normal.
The benefit of decision circumference hop count like this is the path long enough of strategy, and is random, and it is also random that routed path stops on which position.Thus cause the fascination to assailant, make the other side be difficult to infer from routed path the position of source node.
Random angles method is adopted to produce phantom node at random in the present invention; and sensor node utilize the energy formative dynamics in abundant region, sufficiently long path, path; add the difficulty of assailant's trace sources node; also extend the life-span of network, more effectively can protect the location privacy of source node than existing method.Further, when during the method is used for during large-scale sensor network, the position distribution of phantom node will be disperseed more, and routed path is randomization more, by better prolong network lifetime, play better protection source position effect.
Claims (4)
1. in WSN based on a source position method for secret protection for angle and phantom source, it is characterized in that: comprise the steps:
(1) netinit, static disposes network node, and realizes each meshed network parameter and be preloaded into;
(2) carry out the phantom route based on angle, first define phantom region, divide phantom region by homogeneous angular method, produce phantom node at random by the zonule selected at random, then packet is forwarded to phantom node from source node;
(3) in the circumference route of circumferentially carrying out certain jumping figure of phantom source node, the communication of phantom source node to intermediary node is completed;
(4) adopt Shortest path routing mode from intermediary node by data packets to base station.
2. in a kind of WSN as claimed in claim 1 based on the source position method for secret protection of angle and phantom source, it is characterized in that: in netinit, first base station is loaded into a pair unsymmetrical key (K
pub, K
pri), each ordinary node is preloaded into the PKI K shared with base station
pub, the minimum range R between phantom source node and real node
minand the ultimate range R between phantom source node and real node
max, base station sets timer also broadcasts initial message bag to the whole network, and the initialization data comprising type of message, base station location, hop count hops and be preloaded into, its Timer duration is netinit stage duration, and hops initial value is 0.Afterwards, for the node receiving message bag first, hops is added 1, upgrade the value of hops and broadcast this message to neighbor node.For the message bag received, self ID and jumping figure hops add in neighbor node table by node, repeat said process until timer expired.
3. in a kind of WSN as claimed in claim 1 based on the source position method for secret protection of angle and phantom source, it is characterized in that: carrying out in the phantom route based on angle, the distance of setting phantom source node and real source node is D ∈ [R
min, R
max], to monitor the real source node of event message for the center of circle, with R
maxfor exradius, R
minfor inner circle radius, form phantom region.Phantom region is evenly divided into μ part, and angle φ=(2 the π)/μ in every part of region, defining these regions is respectively a
1, a
2..., a
μ.Source node, when carrying out the transmission of packet, first selects a region
λ
i∈ [1, μ]; Angle β ∈ [(λ between source node and phantom source
i-1) φ, (λ
i) φ], between source node and phantom source distance d ∈ [R
min, R
max], then the relative position of phantom source node is (Source.xd+dcos (β), Source.yd+dsin (β)), and wherein Sourcexd is the x coordinate of source node, and Sourceyd is the y coordinate of source node.
4. in a kind of WSN as claimed in claim 1 based on the source position method for secret protection of angle and phantom source, it is characterized in that: carrying out in circumference route, the jumping figure of phantom source node route in a circumferential direction
wherein Count
pi.neighborrepresent the neighbors number of phantom source node, SP
pi, brepresent the shortest path of phantom source node to base station, X is factor of influence.
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Cited By (5)
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| CN105916118A (en) * | 2016-07-08 | 2016-08-31 | 河海大学常州校区 | Source node privacy protection method based on position tracking in wireless sensor network |
| CN105979508A (en) * | 2016-07-27 | 2016-09-28 | 河海大学常州校区 | Node privacy protection method based on directional random routing in wireless sensor network |
| CN106102048A (en) * | 2016-06-03 | 2016-11-09 | 上海理工大学 | The security data packet that in a kind of Internet of Things, sensor sends is transferred to the transmission method of base station |
| CN107835510A (en) * | 2017-10-31 | 2018-03-23 | 河海大学常州校区 | A kind of wireless sensor network source node location method for secret protection based on phantom route |
| CN113259932A (en) * | 2021-05-19 | 2021-08-13 | 贵州大学 | Source node position privacy protection strategy in WSNs |
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| CN103747440A (en) * | 2014-01-09 | 2014-04-23 | 东南大学 | Enhanced source position privacy protection method based on phantom single-path routing |
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Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106102048A (en) * | 2016-06-03 | 2016-11-09 | 上海理工大学 | The security data packet that in a kind of Internet of Things, sensor sends is transferred to the transmission method of base station |
| CN106102048B (en) * | 2016-06-03 | 2019-06-04 | 上海理工大学 | Sensor issues the method that security data packet is transferred to base station in a kind of Internet of Things |
| CN105916118A (en) * | 2016-07-08 | 2016-08-31 | 河海大学常州校区 | Source node privacy protection method based on position tracking in wireless sensor network |
| CN105916118B (en) * | 2016-07-08 | 2019-05-03 | 河海大学常州校区 | Source node method for secret protection in wireless sensor network based on location tracking |
| CN105979508A (en) * | 2016-07-27 | 2016-09-28 | 河海大学常州校区 | Node privacy protection method based on directional random routing in wireless sensor network |
| CN105979508B (en) * | 2016-07-27 | 2019-05-03 | 河海大学常州校区 | Node method for secret protection based on orientation stochastic route in wireless sensor network |
| CN107835510A (en) * | 2017-10-31 | 2018-03-23 | 河海大学常州校区 | A kind of wireless sensor network source node location method for secret protection based on phantom route |
| CN107835510B (en) * | 2017-10-31 | 2020-07-14 | 河海大学常州校区 | Phantom routing-based wireless sensor network source node position privacy protection method |
| CN113259932A (en) * | 2021-05-19 | 2021-08-13 | 贵州大学 | Source node position privacy protection strategy in WSNs |
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