CN107148013B - Source position privacy protection method of multi-phantom node strategy - Google Patents
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Abstract
A source position privacy protection method based on a multi-phantom node strategy comprises network initialization, node three-tuple construction, alternate selection of phantom nodes, source node-phantom node forwarding based on sector area division and phantom node-base station forwarding avoiding of a visible area. The method utilizes the idea of multiple phantom nodes to simultaneously generate two phantom nodes for a source node, and forms a node triple, so that any two nodes in the triple can be used as alternative phantom nodes of a third node; in addition, the source data packet is forwarded in the routing working stage by combining the sector area division method and the visual area avoidance strategy, so that the security of the source node can be effectively improved by avoiding the visual area of the source node, and meanwhile, the transmission delay and the routing energy consumption are better controlled.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a network technology, in particular to a network and communication technology, and specifically relates to a source position privacy protection method of a multi-phantom node strategy.
Background
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have the characteristic that Sensor nodes deployed in large areas can accurately acquire data related to a target monitoring environment in real time, and are widely used in the fields of smart homes, military and national defense, traffic management, environment monitoring, medical care and health, emergency rescue, industrial manufacturing and the like. Since the wireless sensor network nodes are often deployed in a remote unattended environment, and the wireless multi-hop communication mode is easily attacked by an attacker, the network security is always a non-negligible problem. Accordingly, there has been much research into security research focusing on wireless sensor networks.
At present, the security research directions of wireless sensor networks are numerous, and the wireless sensor networks can be mainly divided into a plurality of research directions such as data encryption methods, identity authentication, key management, attack detection and defense, secure routing protocols, privacy problems and the like. The privacy of the wireless sensor network comprises position privacy, time privacy and data privacy. The node position privacy comprises two categories of source node position privacy and base station node position privacy, and is one of important attention objects of the current wireless sensor network privacy. For example, in a sensor network deployed in a wild animal monitoring environment, the location information of a monitored object (i.e., a wild animal that may be present in the environment) is extremely important, and once the location information is revealed to a threatening object (such as a hunter), the security of the monitored object will present a great threat. Therefore, the research on the source position privacy protection technology of the wireless sensor network has great significance for large-scale deployment and application of the sensor network.
Ozturk et al first proposed a "panda-hunter" model, which became the basic model for studying the source node location privacy protection problem. In the model, wireless sensor network nodes are deployed in the environment where pandas live for monitoring the life habits of the pandas. And the monitoring data is sent to a base station in the network by monitoring the nodes of the target in a mode of forwarding data packets hop by hop among the nodes. Aiming at the model, the source position privacy protection protocol is designed with the aim of changing the original shortest path route data packet forwarding mode and increasing the time of an attacker (i.e. hunter) in the network tracking the position of a source node, namely the safety time of the source node. In addition, considering the factors of network performance, the related privacy protection protocol should also consider to optimize the data packet transmission delay and network energy consumption while ensuring the privacy protection strength, and improve the performance of the protocol.
There is currently research work to classify the attackers present in WSNs into two broad categories: local traffic attackers with more limited attack capability and global traffic attackers with stronger attack capability. For a relatively common local traffic attacker, ozturn et al first proposes a Phantom routing strategy idea, and respectively proposes a Phantom routing protocol pr (Phantom routing) and a Phantom Single-path routing protocol PSPR (Phantom Single-path routing). Both routing strategies generate a false source node called a phantom source node by randomly walking a source packet of the source node by a specified hop count (e.g., a self-defined h-hop). And then the phantom node sends the source data packet to the base station to complete the transmission of the event data monitored by the source node. Wang et al first propose the concept of a source node visual area, which is defined as: the source node is located within a certain listening range of the attacker, i.e., the source node location is exposed, and the range of the circle centered on the source node and having a designated radius R is referred to as a "visible area". Based on the definition, a routing path of a single phantom path stage passing through a visible area range is called as a failure path, and for the local attacker with the visible capability, a common source location privacy protection scheme based on a phantom routing strategy has a poor effect, so that the research on the source location privacy protection scheme with the visible area avoidance capability is particularly important.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a source position privacy protection method for solving a multi-phantom node strategy based on a panda-hunter model, aiming at the problem that the existing source position privacy protection scheme based on a phantom routing strategy has a poor effect.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a source position privacy protection method based on a multi-phantom node strategy is characterized in that: it comprises the following steps:
step 1: initializing a network; the base station initializes the flooding data packet to the general nodes of the whole network, and after the initialization, each node reports the relevant information to the base station Sink through the message data packet; after the initialization stage is completed, all nodes in the network obtain the minimum hop value of the base station, and the base station Sink holds the geographical position information of each node and the minimum hop value of each node and the base station;
step 2: constructing a node triad; according to hop values of the network nodes and the base station obtained by the base station after the initialization stage is finished, the base station creates a hop distance value table, sorts the nodes according to the hop values in the table, and sequentially creates node triples; in the routing working stage, any two nodes in each triple can be used as phantom source nodes of another node;
and step 3: the routing working stage is started after any node monitors a target event, firstly, monitoring event information, a source node ID, a source node coordinate, a target node ID and a target node coordinate are stored in a data packet, and the routing working stage is started; firstly, a phantom node alternate selection process is carried out, and one of two alternative phantom nodes is alternately selected in each round to forward a source data packet;
and 4, step 4: after the step 3 is completed, dividing and forwarding the source node-phantom node based on the sector area; limiting the forwarding path range of the source data packet, and simultaneously ensuring the randomness of the path so as to cope with the backtracking attack of an attacker;
and 5: after the step 4 is finished, the source data packet is forwarded by the phantom node-base station to avoid the visible area; and selecting a next hop node to avoid the range of the visible area by calculating the distance between the relay node and the source node.
In the process of constructing the base station node three-tuple in the step 2, all the alternative phantom node pairs are ensured to be positioned outside the range of the source node visible area through calculation; assume that the geographical location coordinate of the source node S is (x)s,ys) The candidate phantom node coordinates are (x)p,yp) In order to prevent the phantom nodes from falling within the range of the visible area, the following conditions should be satisfied:
in order to ensure that the distance between two phantom nodes is large enough and respectively avoid the visual area range of the other side, the candidate phantom nodes should satisfy the condition:
in the formulae (1) and (2), dp_minMinimum limit value of distance between any two nodes in node triad set for network initialization, ds_pComprises the following steps: distance d between phantom node and source nodep_pComprises the following steps: distance between two phantom nodes; rVThe radius of the visible area range of the source node; through the calculation, any node triple is ensuredWhen the two nodes are phantom nodes, the phantom nodes are far enough away from the source node and completely avoid the range of the visible area.
The alternate phantom node selection strategy method in the step 3 comprises the following steps:
a selecting flag bit SelectFlag is stored in the network node, the selecting flag bit is set as FLASE during initialization, the selecting flag bit is judged before the source node starts to send a source data packet, if the flag bit is FALSE, the phantom node 1 of the selecting source node is selected as the phantom node of the data sending of the current round, and the ID (identity) of the phantom node 1, namely the IDP1And the position coordinate is (x)P1,yP1) Adding a data packet, setting the ID and the coordinate of the target phantom node to be transmitted in the current round, and setting the value of the selected flag bit to be TRUE; if the flag bit is TRUE, selecting the phantom node 2 of the source node as the phantom node for sending data in the current round, and selecting the ID of the phantom node 2, namely the IDP2And the position coordinate is (x)P2,yP2) Adding a data packet, setting the ID and the coordinate of the target phantom node to be sent in the current round, and setting the value of the flag bit to be FALSE; through the flag bit alternate selection mechanism, the condition that the data packet sending target phantom nodes of adjacent time sequences are different can be ensured, and the probability that paths are easy to repeat due to the repetition of phantom nodes is effectively prevented.
The source node-phantom node adopted by each relay node in the step 4 is divided and forwarded based on the sector area, and the forwarding steps are as follows:
step 4.1, setting parameters of a sector division angle β, dividing the number L of sub-sectors and a communication radius Rt；
Step 4.2: obtaining the coordinates (x) of the phantom node selected in the current round from the source data packetP,yP)；
Step 4.3: obtaining the coordinates (x) of the current node from the internal storage of the current nodeC,yC)；
Step 4.4: calculating the distance d between the current node C and the phantom node PC_P；
Step 4.5: judgment of dC_PWhether or not it is equal to or smaller than the communication radius RtIf the number of the nodes is less than or equal to the preset value, the nodes are directly forwarded to the phantom node P, the stage is ended, and a forwarding stage for avoiding the visible area is enteredA segment; otherwise, turning to the step 4.6;
step 4.6: generating an integer random number V by using the parameter L; l is the number of the divided sub-sector areas, and V is a natural number;
step 4.7: generating a sector angle in a (-beta, beta) range by using the current node C and the target phantom node P, and generating a random sub-sector area angle range theta by using a random number and sector angle division parameters, wherein the random sub-sector area angle range theta is used as a currently selected random sub-sector area vector;
step 4.8: sequentially calculating neighbor node centralized node NiThe included angle is formed between the straight line with the current node C and the straight line with the C, P node;
step 4.9: if node N existsiAnd if the source data packet is located in the vector of the sub-sector area, delivering the source data packet to the NiA node; if not, turning to step 4.6, regenerating the random number V to select a random sub-sector area;
step 4.10: and repeating the steps until the source data packet is delivered to the phantom node P.
Step 5, during the forwarding process of the phantom node-base station avoiding the visible area, the next hop coordinate is assumed to be (x)n,yn) According to the definition of the visible area range, the next hop node should satisfy the formula:
in the formula: x is the number ofs，ysAs geographical location coordinates of the source node S, ds_nThe distance between the source node S and the next-hop coordinate point n is obtained;
each relay node divides the neighbor nodes into a far node set and a near node set, wherein the hop value of the nodes in the near node set from the base station is smaller than that of the current node, namely, the nodes are closer to the base station, and the hop value of the nodes in the far node set from the base station is larger than that of the current node; in order to control the transmission delay, the data packet is sent to the base station as soon as possible, and the nodes in the near node set of the current relay node are selected to be forwarded.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the source position privacy protection method provided by the invention can ensure that the forwarding path avoids the visible area of the source node through operations such as the construction of the three-element group of the node and the like aiming at an attacker with the visual capability, thereby effectively increasing the security of the source node, and simultaneously, the transmission delay and the routing energy consumption are better optimized through the method based on the sector area division, thereby enhancing the practicability of the privacy protection method.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the multiple phantom node method EMPRP principle.
Fig. 2 is an overall framework diagram of a source location privacy protection protocol EMPRP based on a multi-phantom node policy.
Fig. 3 is a flowchart of a forwarding method based on sector area division for a source node and a phantom node.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described with reference to the following figures and specific embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1-3.
A source location privacy protection method of a multi-phantom node strategy comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: the network is initialized. The base station initializes the flooding data packet to the common node, and after the initialization, each node reports the relevant information to the base station through the data packet. After the initialization stage is completed, all nodes in the network obtain the minimum hop value with the base station, and the base station holds the geographical position information of each node and the minimum hop value of each node and the base station. This step provides sufficient data for the node triplet construction process.
Step two: and constructing a node triplet. And according to the hop values of the network nodes and the base station obtained by the base station after the initialization stage is finished, the base station creates a hop distance value table, sorts the nodes according to the hop values in the table and sequentially creates node triples. In the routing working phase, any two nodes in each triple can be used as a phantom source node of another node.
Step three: and (4) alternately selecting phantom nodes. The routing working phase is started after any node monitors a target event, firstly, monitoring event information, a source node ID, source node coordinates, a target node ID and target node coordinates are stored in a data packet, and the routing working phase is started. Firstly, a phantom node alternate selection process is carried out, and one of two alternative phantom nodes is alternately selected in each round to forward a source data packet. The alternate selection process ensures that data packets of adjacent time sequences are sent to different phantom nodes, thereby increasing the difficulty of backtracking of attackers and ensuring the source position privacy.
Step four: and the source node-phantom node forwards based on sector area division. This step ensures that the source packet is forwarded along a sector area between the source node and the phantom node, thereby avoiding unlimited random walk of the source packet, and effectively controlling transmission delay and energy consumption. The division and random selection and forwarding of the plurality of sub-sector areas ensure the randomness and diversity of routing paths, thereby increasing the difficulty of backtracking of attackers.
And 5: and the phantom node-base station avoids the forwarding of the visible area. In the step, the distance between the relay node and the source node is calculated to ensure that the relay node is positioned outside the range of the visible area, so that a failure path is effectively avoided, and the source position privacy protection strength is increased.
The details are as follows:
as shown in FIG. 1, the source node S sets two phantom nodes P simultaneously1、P2，P1、P2The method comprises the steps that the distance between each two nodes of a source node is larger than the radius of a visible area, so that phantom nodes can effectively avoid the range of the visible area, the process of forwarding a source packet to a base station is divided into two stages, namely a phantom routing stage and a visible area avoiding forwarding stage, one of the two phantom nodes is randomly selected in the phantom routing stage, the data packet is forwarded by utilizing the source node-phantom node based on a sector area forwarding method, a candidate next hop node is limited in the sector area with the size of 2 β, a sub-sector area is randomly selected to select the next hop node, the visible area avoiding forwarding stage is calculated through the distance of the candidate node, the visible area is guaranteed to be avoided, the generation of a failure path is avoided, and the safety time of the source node is prolonged.
As shown in fig. 2, the present invention is divided into two phases of network configuration and routing work as a whole. The network configuration comprises two steps of network initialization and node three-tuple construction. The routing working stage comprises three steps of alternate selection of phantom nodes, division and forwarding of source nodes and phantom nodes based on sector areas, and forwarding of phantom nodes and base stations avoiding visual areas.
1. The network initialization is implemented by flooding data packets to common nodes by the base station, and after the initialization is completed, each node reports its own related information to the base station through the data packets. After the initialization stage is completed, all nodes in the network obtain the minimum hop value with the base station, and the base station holds the geographical position information of each node and the minimum hop value of each node and the base station.
2. And the base station constructs phantom node pairs which are all positioned outside the range of the visible area for the source node in the process of constructing the network node three-tuple. The step is that each node in the network selects two phantom nodes to form a node Triple (N)1,N2,N3) In which N isiAnd (i is 1,2 and 3) all represent sensor nodes, any two nodes in the triple can be phantom nodes for each other, and one of the phantom nodes is randomly selected to forward the data packet through random number generation in the routing working stage. The specific implementation manner of the base station node triplet is as follows:
step 2.1: initialization parameter dp_minAnd RV。dp_minMinimum limit value of distance between any two nodes in node triple set for network initialization, RVThe radius of the visible area is used to ensure that when any two nodes in the node triple are phantom nodes, the phantom nodes are far enough away from the source node and completely avoid the range of the visible area.
Step 2.2: assume that the geographical location coordinate of the source node S is (x)s,ys) The candidate phantom node coordinates are (x)p,yp) In order to prevent the phantom nodes from falling in the range of the visible area, the calculation is carried out according to the physical distance between the nodes in the two-dimensional plane, and the following conditions are met:
in order to ensure that the distance between two phantom nodes is large enough and respectively avoid the visual area range of the other side, the candidate phantom nodes should satisfy the condition:
and (3) selecting proper phantom node pairs through formulas (1) and (2) to form node triples.
Step 2.3: and the base station sends a data packet to inform the node of the IDs and the coordinates of other two nodes in the node triple, and after the node receives the data packet, the ID and the coordinates of the phantom node pair are respectively stored in the node and are used as an alternative phantom node pair of the node. Let two phantom node IDs be ID respectivelyP1、IDP2The respective coordinates are (x)P1,yP1)、(xP2,yP2). In the routing working stage, one of the two nodes is selected as a phantom node and corresponding ID and coordinate information are added into the data packet in each round of data packet transmission.
3. The source node sends a source data packet to the phantom node to carry out the alternate selection process of the phantom node, and the data packets of adjacent time sequences are ensured to be sent to different phantom nodes, so that the attack difficulty of an attacker is increased. The specific implementation mode is as follows:
step 3.1: the network node stores a boolean variable SelectFlag as a selection flag bit and sets the flag to flag during initialization.
Step 3.2: before the source node starts to send the source data packet, the selection flag bit is judged, if the flag bit is FALSE, the phantom node 1 of the source node is selected as the phantom node of the data sending of the current round, and the ID of the phantom node 1, namely the IDP1And the position coordinate is (x)P1,yP1) Adding a data packet, setting the ID and the coordinate of the target phantom node to be transmitted in the current round, and setting the value of the selected flag bit to be TRUE; if the flag bit is TRUE, selecting the phantom node 2 of the source node as the phantom node for sending data in the current round, and selecting the ID of the phantom node 2, namely the IDP2And the position coordinate is (x)P2,yP2) Adding data packets, setting the data packets as the transmission target phantom in the current roundNode ID and coordinates, and sets the value of the flag bit to FALSE.
4. As shown in fig. 3, the source node-phantom node adopted by the source node and the relay node is divided based on the sector area according to the specific implementation manner:
step 4.1, setting parameters of a sector division angle β, dividing the number L of sub-sectors and a communication radius Rt。
Step 4.2: obtaining the coordinates (x) of the phantom node selected in the current round from the source data packetP,yP)。
Step 4.3: obtaining the coordinates (x) of the current node from the internal storage of the current nodeC,yC)。
Step 4.4: calculating the distance d between the current node C and the phantom node PC_P. The calculation method comprises the following steps:
step 4.5: judgment of dC_PWhether or not it is equal to or smaller than the communication radius RtIf the number of the nodes is less than or equal to the number of the nodes, directly forwarding the nodes to the phantom node P, ending the stage and entering a forwarding stage avoiding a visible area; otherwise go to step 4.6.
Step 4.6: the parameter L is used for generating an integer random number V, and the generation method comprises the following steps:
step 4.7: generating a sector angle in a (-beta, beta) range by using the current node C and the target phantom node P, generating a random sub-sector area angle range theta by using a random number V and a sector angle division parameter, and taking the random sub-sector area angle range theta as a currently selected random sub-sector area vector, wherein the range is as follows:
step 4.8: sequentially calculating neighbor node centralized node NiThe angle between the line with the current node C and the line with the C, P node. Calculation methodComprises the following steps:
step 4.9: if node N existsiAnd if the source data packet is located in the vector of the sub-sector area, delivering the source data packet to the NiA node; if not, go to step 4.6 to regenerate the random number V to select the random sub-sector area.
Step 4.10: and repeating the steps until the source data packet is delivered to the phantom node P.
5. And (3) assuming that the next hop coordinate is (x) in the process of avoiding the visible area for forwarding by the phantom node-base stationn,yn) The specific implementation manner of the next hop node selection is as follows:
step 5.1: each relay node divides the neighbor nodes into a far node set and a near node set, wherein the hop value of the nodes in the near node set from the base station is smaller than that of the current node, namely, the nodes in the near node set are closer to the base station, and the hop value of the nodes in the far node set from the base station is larger than that of the current node. In order to control the transmission delay, the data packet is sent to the base station as soon as possible, and the nodes in the near node set of the current relay node are selected to be forwarded. Firstly, judging whether a candidate node belongs to a near node set; if so, go to step 5.2.
Step 5.2: according to the definition of the range of the visible area, the next hop node should satisfy the formula:
and if the node meets the formula (3), the node is the next hop forwarding node.
The present invention is not related to the same or can be solved by the prior art.
Claims (1)
1. A source location privacy protection method of a multi-phantom node strategy comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: initializing a network; the base station initializes the flooding data packet of the common node, and after the initialization, each node reports the relevant information of the node to the base station through the data packet; after the initialization stage is completed, all nodes in the network obtain the minimum hop value with the base station, and the base station holds the geographical position information of each node and the minimum hop value of each node and the base station; this step provides sufficient data for the node triplet construction process;
step two: constructing a node triad; according to the hop values of the network nodes and the base station obtained by the base station after the initialization stage is finished, the base station creates a hop distance value table, sorts the nodes according to the hop values in the table, and sequentially creates node triples; in the routing working stage, any two nodes in each triple can be used as phantom source nodes of another node;
step three: alternately selecting phantom nodes; starting a routing working stage after any node monitors a target event, firstly storing monitoring event information, a source node ID, source node coordinates, a target node ID and target node coordinates in a data packet, and entering the routing working stage; firstly, a phantom node alternate selection process is carried out, and one of two alternative phantom nodes is alternately selected in each round to forward a source data packet; the alternative selection process ensures that the data packets of adjacent time sequences are sent to different phantom nodes, thereby increasing the difficulty of backtracking of attackers and ensuring the source position privacy;
step four: the source node-phantom node is divided and forwarded based on the sector area; this step ensures that the source data packet will be forwarded along a sector area between the source node and the phantom node, thereby avoiding unlimited random walk of the source data packet, and effectively controlling transmission delay and energy consumption; the division and random selection and forwarding of the plurality of sub-sector areas ensure the randomness and diversity of routing paths, thereby increasing the backtracking difficulty of attackers;
and 5: the phantom node-base station avoids forwarding in a visible area; in the step, the distance between the relay node and the source node is calculated to ensure that the relay node is positioned outside the range of the visible area, so that a failure path is effectively avoided, and the source position privacy protection strength is increased;
the source node S sets two phantom nodes, P respectively1、P2，P1、P2The source data packet forwarding process is divided into two stages, namely a phantom routing stage and a visible area forwarding avoiding stage, wherein the phantom routing stage randomly selects one of two phantom nodes and forwards a data packet by using a sector area forwarding method between the source node and the phantom node, a candidate next hop node is limited in a sector area range with the size of 2 β, and a sub-sector area is randomly selected to select the next hop node;
the whole system is divided into two stages of network configuration and routing work; the network configuration comprises two steps of network initialization and node three-tuple construction; the routing working stage comprises three steps of alternate selection of phantom nodes, division and forwarding of source nodes-phantom nodes based on sector areas, and forwarding of phantom nodes-base stations avoiding visual areas;
1) the network initialization adopts the base station to carry out initialization on the flooding data packet of the common node, and after the initialization is finished, each node reports the relevant information of the node to the base station through the data packet; after the initialization stage is completed, all nodes in the network obtain the minimum hop value with the base station, and the base station holds the geographical position information of each node and the minimum hop value of each node and the base station;
2) the base station carries out a network node three-tuple construction process to construct phantom node pairs which are all positioned outside the range of a visible area for a source node; the step is that each node in the network selects two phantom nodes to form a node Triple (N)1,N2,N3) In which N isi(i ═ 1,2 and 3) all represent sensor nodes, any two nodes in the triple can be phantom nodes for each other, and one of the phantom nodes is randomly selected to forward a data packet through random number generation in the routing working stage; the specific implementation manner of the base station node triplet is as follows:
step 2.1: initialization parameter dp_minAnd RV；dp_minAny two of node triples set for network initializationMinimum limit of distance between nodes, RVThe radius of the visible area is used to ensure that when any two nodes in the node triple are phantom nodes, the phantom nodes are far enough away from the source node and completely avoid the range of the visible area;
step 2.2: assume that the geographical location coordinate of the source node S is (x)s,ys) The candidate phantom node coordinates are (x)p,yp) In order to prevent the phantom nodes from falling in the range of the visible area, the calculation is carried out according to the physical distance between the nodes in the two-dimensional plane, and the following conditions are met:
in order to ensure that the distance between two phantom nodes is large enough and respectively avoid the visual area range of the other side, the candidate phantom nodes should satisfy the condition:
selecting proper phantom node pairs through formulas (1) and (2) to form node triples;
step 2.3: the base station sends a data packet to inform the node triples of the IDs and the coordinates of other two nodes of the node, and after the node receives the data packet, the IDs and the coordinates of the phantom node pairs are respectively stored in the node and are used as alternative phantom node pairs of the node; let two phantom node IDs be ID respectivelyP1、IDP2The respective coordinates are (x)P1,yP1)、(xP2,yP2) (ii) a In the routing working stage, one of the two nodes is respectively selected as a phantom node and corresponding ID and coordinate information are added into the data packet in each round of data packet transmission;
3) the source node sends a source data packet to the phantom node to carry out a phantom node alternate selection process, so that data packets of adjacent time sequences are sent to different phantom nodes, and the attack difficulty of an attacker is increased; the specific implementation mode is as follows:
step 3.1: a Boolean type variable SelectFlag is stored in the network node and is used as a selection flag bit, and the selection flag bit is set as FLASE during initialization;
step 3.2: before the source node starts to send the source data packet, the selection flag bit is judged, if the flag bit is FALSE, the phantom node 1 of the source node is selected as the phantom node of the data sending of the current round, and the ID of the phantom node 1, namely the IDP1And the position coordinate is (x)P1,yP1) Adding a data packet, setting the ID and the coordinate of the target phantom node to be transmitted in the current round, and setting the value of the selected flag bit to be TRUE; if the flag bit is TRUE, selecting the phantom node 2 of the source node as the phantom node for sending data in the current round, and selecting the ID of the phantom node 2, namely the IDP2And the position coordinate is (x)P2,yP2) Adding a data packet, setting the ID and the coordinate of the target phantom node to be sent in the current round, and setting the value of the flag bit to be FALSE;
4) the specific implementation mode of the source node-phantom node based on sector area division adopted by the source node and the relay node is as follows:
step 4.1, setting parameters of a sector division angle β, dividing the number L of sub-sectors and a communication radius Rt；
Step 4.2: obtaining the coordinates (x) of the phantom node selected in the current round from the source data packetP,yP)；
Step 4.3: obtaining the coordinates (x) of the current node from the internal storage of the current nodeC,yC)；
Step 4.4: calculating the distance d between the current node C and the phantom node PC_P(ii) a The calculation method comprises the following steps:
step 4.5: judgment of dC_PWhether or not it is equal to or smaller than the communication radius RtIf the number of the nodes is less than or equal to the number of the nodes, directly forwarding the nodes to the phantom node P, ending the stage and entering a forwarding stage avoiding a visible area; otherwise, turning to the step 4.6;
step 4.6: the parameter L is used for generating an integer random number V, and the generation method comprises the following steps:
step 4.7: generating a sector angle in a (-beta, beta) range by using the current node C and the target phantom node P, generating a random sub-sector area angle range theta by using a random number V and a sector angle division parameter, and taking the random sub-sector area angle range theta as a currently selected random sub-sector area vector, wherein the range is as follows:
step 4.8: sequentially calculating neighbor node centralized node NiThe included angle is formed between the straight line with the current node C and the straight line with the C, P node; the calculation method comprises the following steps:
step 4.9: if node N existsiAnd if the source data packet is located in the vector of the sub-sector area, delivering the source data packet to the NiA node; if not, turning to step 4.6, regenerating the random number V to select a random sub-sector area;
step 4.10: repeating the steps until the source data packet is delivered to the phantom node P;
5) and (3) assuming that the next hop coordinate is (x) in the process of avoiding the visible area for forwarding by the phantom node-base stationn,yn) The specific implementation manner of the next hop node selection is as follows:
step 5.1: each relay node divides the neighbor nodes into a far node set and a near node set, wherein the hop value of the nodes in the near node set from the base station is smaller than that of the current node, namely, the nodes are closer to the base station, and the hop value of the nodes in the far node set from the base station is larger than that of the current node; in order to control the transmission delay, the data packet is sent to the base station as soon as possible, and the nodes selected from the near node set of the current relay node are forwarded; firstly, judging whether a candidate node belongs to a near node set; if yes, go to step 5.2;
step 5.2: according to the definition of the range of the visible area, the next hop node should satisfy the formula:
and if the node meets the formula (3), the node is the next hop forwarding node.
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