CN105188026B - Source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN - Google Patents
Source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN Download PDFInfo
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- CN105188026B CN105188026B CN201510481086.9A CN201510481086A CN105188026B CN 105188026 B CN105188026 B CN 105188026B CN 201510481086 A CN201510481086 A CN 201510481086A CN 105188026 B CN105188026 B CN 105188026B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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Abstract
For improve source position privacy safety and node energy utilization rate, the present invention proposes the source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN.By defining and divide phantom source region, the phantom source node of geographical location dispersion is generated, dynamic, the sufficiently long path in path is formed by the energy in the abundant region of energy, routed path is changeable at random to reaching, the location privacy safety of effective protection source node.After adopting this method, it is remarkably improved the safety of source position privacy, while capacity usage ratio can be improved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a seed position method for secret protection, specifically a kind of based on the source of angle and phantom source position
Method for secret protection is set, application of higher wireless sensor network field is belonged to.
Background technology
Wireless sensor network (Wireless Sensor Networks, WSN) by general sensor nodes (Node) and
Base station (being also aggregation node, Sink Node) forms, and integrates perception, communication and data processing, extends the information of people
Acquisition capability.In based on event driven WSN, the node nearest apart from monitoring event is referred to as source node (Source
Node).Node once monitors event, just generates event message and is sent to base station.However, shared wireless transmission medium makes
Obtain the sender that enemy is easy to localization message.So although enemy cannot obtain encrypted packet content, it can be inverse
Source node location is tracked to, hop-by-hop.In target tracking and monitor-type WSN applications, the exposure of source node location will seriously threaten
To the safety of monitoring object.For example, a large amount of sensor node deployment external monitor rare animal out of office or interspersing among battlefield and obtaining
Obtain the real-time messages of army.The position of animal cannot be known that the position of army cannot be grasped by enemy army by poacher.Therefore, source
The physical location secret protection of node is at a good problem to study.
For the attacker with local flow monitoring capability, phantom Routing Protocol is had proposed in the prior art to protect source
The location privacy of node, this method still have following technical problem：The phantom source of generation can high concentration in being with real source
The center of circle, using h as on the circle of radius.For there is the attacker of certain memory capability, once being found that this rule, real source is positioned
Position just becomes easy.It can bring compared with heavy duty, can be contracted to system in addition, h jumps the mass data generated in flooding process
Short network lifecycle.
Invention content
In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention proposes the source position privacy based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN
Guard method makes sensor node utilize the energy in abundant region by generating phantom node based on different angle dynamic randoms
Amount forms dynamic, the sufficiently long path in path, ensures the network longevity while to reach effective protection source node location privacy
Life maximizes.
To achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme that：Include the following steps：
(1) netinit, static state deployment network node, and realize that each meshed network parameter is preloaded into,；
(2) the phantom routing based on angle is carried out, defines phantom region first, phantom region is divided with homogeneous angular method,
Phantom node is randomly generated by the zonule selected at random, data packet is then forwarded to phantom node from source node；
(3) the circumference routing that certain hop count is carried out on the circumferencial direction of phantom source node, completes phantom source node in
The communication of Jie's node；
(4) data packet is sent to by base station from intermediary node using Shortest path routing mode.
Further, in netinit, base station is loaded into a pair of of unsymmetrical key (K firstpub,Kpri), it is each common
Node is preloaded into the public key K shared with base stationpub, the minimum range R between phantom source node and real nodeminWith phantom source section
Maximum distance R between point and real nodemax, base station sets timer is simultaneously to the whole network broadcast initial message packet, including message
Type, base station location, hop count hops and the initialization data being preloaded into, Timer duration are the netinit stage
Duration, hops initial values are 0.Later, for receiving the node of message package for the first time, by hops plus 1, update the value of hops and to
Neighbor node broadcasts the message.For the message package received, self ID and hop count hops are added in neighbor node table node,
It repeats the above process until timer expired.
Further, in carrying out the phantom routing based on angle, setting phantom source node is at a distance from true source node
For D ∈ [Rmin,Rmax], to monitor the true source node of event message as the center of circle, with RmaxFor exradius, RminFor inner circle half
Diameter forms phantom region.Phantom region is uniformly divided into μ parts, angle φ=(2 the π)/μ in every part of region defines these areas respectively
Domain is a1,a2,…,aμ.Source node selects a region first when carrying out the transmission of data packetλi∈[1,μ]；Source node
Angle β ∈ [(λ between phantom sourcei-1)φ,(λi) φ], the distance d ∈ [R between source node and phantom sourcemin,Rmax],
Then the relative position of phantom source node is (Source.xd+dcos (β), Source.yd+dsin (β)), and wherein Sourcexd is
The x coordinate of source node, Sourceyd are the y-coordinate of source node.
Further, in carrying out circumference routing, hop count that phantom source node is route in a circumferential directionWhereinIndicate the neighbors number of phantom source node,Indicate unreal
For eikonogen node to the shortest path of base station, X is impact factor.
In a WSN after adopting this method, the phantom source node of generation more disperses, and attacker is difficult to track real source section
Point.Suitable phantom source region can also be defined according to different network application environments, effectively control point of phantom source node
Cloth.In addition, the hop count according to the neighbors number of phantom node and its to base station selectes third party's node as phantom section
Point to base station routing intermediary, to make routing is random in the entire network on locational space to occur, make attacker be difficult to from
The position of source node is deduced on routed path.Simultaneously because not generating flooding process, to which mass data will not be generated, therefore
System load will not be overweight, and network lifecycle is also extended.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the method for the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the routing procedure figure of this method.
Specific implementation mode
(1) netinit, static state deployment network node, and realize that each meshed network parameter is preloaded into,；
(2) the phantom routing based on angle is carried out, defines phantom region first, phantom region is divided with homogeneous angular method,
Phantom node is randomly generated by the zonule selected at random, data packet is then forwarded to phantom node from source node；
(3) the circumference routing that certain hop count is carried out on the circumferencial direction of phantom source node, completes phantom source node in
The communication of Jie's node；
(4) data packet is sent to by base station from intermediary node using Shortest path routing mode.
Further, in netinit, base station is loaded into a pair of of unsymmetrical key (K firstpub,Kpri), it is each common
Node is preloaded into the public key K shared with base stationpub, the minimum range R between phantom source node and real nodeminWith phantom source section
Maximum distance R between point and real nodemax, base station sets timer is simultaneously to the whole network broadcast initial message packet, including message
Type, base station location, hop count hops and the initialization data being preloaded into, Timer duration are the netinit stage
Duration, hops initial values are 0.Later, for receiving the node of message package for the first time, by hops plus 1, update the value of hops and to
Neighbor node broadcasts the message.For the message package received, self ID and hop count hops are added in neighbor node table node,
It repeats the above process until timer expired.
Further, in carrying out the phantom routing based on angle, setting phantom source node is at a distance from true source node
For D ∈ [Rmin,Rmax], to monitor the true source node of event message as the center of circle, with RmaxFor exradius, RminFor inner circle half
Diameter forms phantom region.Phantom region is uniformly divided into μ parts, angle φ=(2 the π)/μ in every part of region defines these areas respectively
Domain is a1,a2,…,aμ.Source node selects a region first when carrying out the transmission of data packetλi∈[1,μ]；It saves in source
Angle β ∈ [(λ between point and phantom sourcei-1)φ,(λi) φ], the distance d ∈ [R between source node and phantom sourcemin,
Rmax], then the relative position of phantom source node is (Source.xd+dcos (β), Source.yd+dsin (β)), wherein
Sourcexd is the x coordinate of source node, and Sourceyd is the y-coordinate of source node.
Further, in carrying out circumference routing, hop count that phantom source node is route in a circumferential directionWhereinIndicate the neighbors number of phantom source node,Indicate unreal
For eikonogen node to the shortest path of base station, X is impact factor.
In the random selection process of phantom source node, the minimum range of the phantom node of generation in location distributionIn different environmental applications, only suitable parameter value μ, R need to be chosenminAnd Rmax, just
The distribution of phantom node can be efficiently controlled.
In circumference routing phase, the hop count on circumferencial direction since phantom source node isThe value of X influences whether the communication overhead of entire Routing Protocol.It will be by weighing the whole of agreement
Body communication expense, the tracing complexity of attacker and network application environment etc., the value of Rational choice X.The value of X is related to
The integrated communication expense of APS agreements is also related to the reversely tracing complexity of attacker.The routed path of agreement is longer, attack
Person just needs that the longer time is spent to be tracked.So the value of X is relatively flexible, the demand of network is mainly seen.Right
The security requirement of network is very high, and in the case of passing over communication overhead, the value of X can be less than normal.Conversely, if network is logical
Creed part is limited, general to security requirement, and at this moment the value of X can be bigger than normal.
It so determines that the benefit of circumference hop count is the path long enough of strategy, and is random, routed path exists
It is also random for being terminated on which position.To cause the fascination to attacker so that other side is difficult to speculate from routed path
The position of source node.
Phantom node is randomly generated using random angles method in the present invention, and sensor node utilizes the energy in abundant region
Dynamic, the sufficiently long path in path is formed, the difficulty that attacker tracks source node is increased, also extends the service life of network,
Than the location privacy that existing method can more effectively protect source node.Also, the large-scale sensor in this method is used for
When network, the position distribution of phantom node will more disperse, and routed path is more randomized, and will preferably extend network life,
Play the role of preferably protecting source position.
Claims (1)
1. the source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN, it is characterised in that：Include the following steps：
(1) netinit, static state deployment network node, and realize that each meshed network parameter is preloaded into,；
(2) carry out the phantom routing based on angle, define phantom region first, phantom region is divided with homogeneous angular method, by with
The selected zonule of machine randomly generates phantom node, and data packet is then forwarded to phantom node from source node；
(3) the circumference routing that certain hop count is carried out on the circumferencial direction of phantom source node, completes phantom source node and is saved to intermediary
The communication of point；
(4) data packet is sent to by base station from intermediary node using Shortest path routing mode；
In netinit, base station is loaded into a pair of of unsymmetrical key (K firstpub,Kpri), each ordinary node is preloaded into and base
Stand shared public key Kpub, the minimum range R between phantom source node and real nodeminWith phantom source node and real node it
Between maximum distance Rmax, base station sets timer and to the whole network broadcast initial message packet, including type of message, base station location,
Hop count hops and the initialization data being preloaded into, Timer duration are netinit stage duration, and hops is initial
Value is 0；Later, hops plus 1 is updated the value of hops and is broadcasted to neighbor node for receiving the node of message package for the first time
The message；For the message package received, self ID and hop count hops are added in neighbor node table, repeat the above process by node
Until timer expired；
In carrying out the phantom routing based on angle, phantom source node is set at a distance from true source node as D ∈ [Rmin,
Rmax], to monitor the true source node of event message as the center of circle, with RmaxFor exradius, RminFor inner circle radius, formed unreal
Shadow zone domain；Phantom region is uniformly divided into μ parts, angle φ=(2 the π)/μ in every part of region, it is a to define these regions respectively1,
a2,…,aμ；Source node selects a region a first when carrying out the transmission of data packetλi, λi∈[1,μ]；Source node and phantom
Angle β ∈ [(λ between sourcei-1)φ,(λi) φ], the distance d ∈ [R between source node and phantom sourcemin,Rmax], then phantom
The relative position of source node is (Source.xd+dcos (β), Source.yd+dsin (β)), and wherein Sourcexd is source node
X coordinate, Sourceyd be source node y-coordinate；
In carrying out circumference routing, hop count that phantom source node is route in a circumferential directionWhereinIndicate the neighbors number of phantom source node,Indicate unreal
For eikonogen node to the shortest path of base station, X is impact factor.
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| CN201510481086.9A CN105188026B (en) | 2015-08-07 | 2015-08-07 | Source position method for secret protection based on angle and phantom source in a kind of WSN |
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Families Citing this family (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN106102048B (en) * | 2016-06-03 | 2019-06-04 | 上海理工大学 | Sensor issues the method that security data packet is transferred to base station in a kind of Internet of Things |
| CN105916118B (en) * | 2016-07-08 | 2019-05-03 | 河海大学常州校区 | Source node method for secret protection in wireless sensor network based on location tracking |
| CN105979508B (en) * | 2016-07-27 | 2019-05-03 | 河海大学常州校区 | Node method for secret protection based on orientation stochastic route in wireless sensor network |
| CN107835510B (en) * | 2017-10-31 | 2020-07-14 | 河海大学常州校区 | Phantom routing-based wireless sensor network source node position privacy protection method |
| CN113259932B (en) * | 2021-05-19 | 2023-05-05 | 贵州大学 | Source node position privacy protection strategy in WSNs |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103747440A (en) * | 2014-01-09 | 2014-04-23 | 东南大学 | Enhanced source position privacy protection method based on phantom single-path routing |
| CN104735650A (en) * | 2015-03-30 | 2015-06-24 | 重庆邮电大学 | Source position privacy protection method of fan-shaped domain phantom routing |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103747440A (en) * | 2014-01-09 | 2014-04-23 | 东南大学 | Enhanced source position privacy protection method based on phantom single-path routing |
| CN104735650A (en) * | 2015-03-30 | 2015-06-24 | 重庆邮电大学 | Source position privacy protection method of fan-shaped domain phantom routing |
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| Title |
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| WSN中源位置隐私保护研究;卢妙杰;《硕士学位论文》;20130131;参见文章第4章40页第7行-48页第2行 * |
| 基于角度和概率的WSN源位置隐私保护路由研究;赵泽茂，刘洋，张帆，周建钦，张品;《山东大学学报》;20130930;第48卷(第9期);全文 * |
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