CN109660945A - Dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN is by source node location method for secret protection - Google Patents
Dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN is by source node location method for secret protection Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
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- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H04W28/02—Traffic management, e.g. flow control or congestion control
- H04W28/06—Optimizing the usage of the radio link, e.g. header compression, information sizing, discarding information
- H04W28/065—Optimizing the usage of the radio link, e.g. header compression, information sizing, discarding information using assembly or disassembly of packets
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Abstract
The invention discloses the dynamic multipaths based on more sink in a kind of WSN by source node location method for secret protection, first random selection phantom source nodeP h ；Then phantom source nodeP h Truthful data packet is divided intoMPart, it is randomly choosed in candidate regionMA forward node；Using shortest route strategy transmissionMA truthful data segment is to forward node；Then forward node willMA truthful data segment is respectively transmitted to corresponding sink node along grid opportunistic transmission, and there are mulitpaths for synchronization in network, protects source node location privacy；Sink node generates new false data packet, continues to transmit along clockwise about ring, the judgement of interference attack person.According to network size, source node location, the factors such as attacker's quantity, the number of control data bag segmentation, manufacture multipath.Invention enhances the difficulty for cracking source data packet and source node location, source node location could be obtained by needing to intercept and capture mass data packet simultaneously, and Dynamic Multi-Pathing improves the utilization rate of more sink.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to wireless sensor networks to protect source position privacy field, and in particular to based on more sink's in WSN
Dynamic multipath is by source node location method for secret protection.
Background technique
Node in wireless sensor network is responsible for perceiving, detecting, receive transmission data etc. as basis awareness apparatus
Work, but due to the preciousness of sensor node detection information, often there is attacker, it is intended to use analysis of central issue, hop-by-hop
Backtracking compromises and monitors the various ways such as node data flow, data packet association analysis, signal strength positioning, directly threatens whole
The operation and safety of a network.
Exactly because in practical application, the easily exposed problem of source node location is the critical issue that network operates normally, because
This solves the research emphasis that Privacy Protection is current wireless sensor network.
The method of the location privacy of protection source node is roughly divided at present: selection phantom node simulation real source rows of nodes
For, into network inject false data packet, introduce loop by obscure attacker judgement, manufaturing data hot spot region temptation attack
Person the methods of tracks round about.The essence of protective position privacy is the position for preventing attacker from successfully positioning source node, with
The safety of this protection target and the correct operation of network.
In the process of research enhancing wireless sensor network location privacy protection, domestic and international many researchers are proposed
Many secret protection schemes, pertinent literature are as follows:
1.Anfeng Liu et al. is in " Secure and Energy-Efficient Disjoint Multipath
Routing for WSNs " propose the non-intersecting multi-alternate routing (SEDR) of safe high-energy effect, it is contemplated that exist in network and passes
The case where defeated black hole, reduces a possibility that data packet is decrypted from routing angle.To avoid transmitting black hole area caused by attacker
Domain, by each packet segmentation at multiple shared packets；Then it is cut to reduce shared packet by the same link transmission by opponent
The possibility obtained, using the Multi-path route shared based on key；SEDR scheme is shared in the first two stage dispersion opportunistic transmission
Packet, is then sent to sink node along shortest path.Even if the guarantee of SEDR scheme has multiple black holes in a network, share
It is coated with the probability very little that attacker intercepts and captures.
2.Na Wang etc. is in " All-Direction Random Routing for Source-Location
Privacy Protecting against Parasitic Sensor Networks " in propose a kind of omnidirectional's stochastic route machine
It makes (ARR), this scheme chooses the sink node as a purpose of a sink node in multiple sink nodes at random first, from first
Beginning position starts, and the distribution in distributed transmission path increases the randomness of routed path, then calculates and generates virtual coordinates, uses
Data packet is transferred to the node near virtual coordinates from source node by periphery forward mode and invasion forward mode, in second-order
Data are forwarded a packet to sink using shortest path by section, this node.ARR is determined and is waited by control two parameters of vertical and horizontal
Favored area, every wheel calculates different virtual coordinates, even if whithin a period of time, source node is identical with purpose sink node, every time
The transmission path of data packet is entirely different.The presence of virtual coordinates is appropriately extended, and increases the traversal time of attacker, prolongs
The safety time of data packet is grown.
3.Alejandro etc. is in " Traffic Decorrelation Techniques for Countering
Global Eavesdropper in WSNs " in, it proposes new attack mode, has formulated an attacker and inferred transmission time
Effective flow is proposed on the basis of this challenge model with the universal flow analysis method of the relevant information in eavesdropping place
Normalization scheme.WSN is divided into minimum connected dominating set first；Then the loose coordination data packet of packet delay is reduced
Relaying carries out packet tags cleaning, event filtering, the processes such as topology approximation and information inference, so that network flow is normal
Change, reduce hot spot there are a possibility that, and the directionality of non-disclosre flow.In the real data packet of different sub-slots
Replace virtual transmission, all the sensors real information all arrives at sink node at the indefinite moment.Therefore, when the appearance of data packet
Between be hidden, isolate the temporal correlation in transmission of data packets.
4.Leron Lightfoot etc. is in " STaR:design and quantitative measurement of
Source-location privacy for wireless sensor networks " one kind is proposed based on creation sink ring
The route technology (STaR) in shape area.Firstly, source node is randomly chosen the middle node in the region STaR around sink
Point, therefore, to assure that intermediate node is appropriate at a distance from sink.The message of source node is routed to sink node week by the first stage
Predetermined region is enclosed, intermediate node serves as false source node.Second stage is routed message by single path from intermediate node
It is transmitted to sink node.STaR mechanism uses a set of quantitative measure based on source node location privacy, evaluation result explanation
STaR mechanism can protect source position privacy while guaranteeing low energy consumption.Attacker not can determine that direction and length, for
The determination range of intermediate node can be increasing, the position of hiding source node location and sink node that can be better.
5.Altis Raja etc. is in " An Approach to Defend Global Eavesdropper in Sensor
Networks " in be proposed for the limited network of resource, with false data packet hide source node position；First using based on void
The method in quasi- source, effectively handles listener-in；Then according on the basis of the angle of sink node and source node, determine two it is new
Angle Selection range, random selection neighbors become virtual source node.If the transmission path hair that multiple dummy nodes generate
It is raw to be overlapped, then path merging is carried out, agent node is updated caching, transmitted using shortest path.This scheme can calculate most preferably
The virtual source of quantity realizes source position privacy, can also calculate communications cost, two factors of balanced safety time and energy consumption.
Summary of the invention
In view of the above-mentioned problems, the present invention proposes that the dynamic multipath based on more sink is by source node location privacy in a kind of WSN
Guard method in the second stage of routing, to packet fragmentation, is selected in candidate region at random using phantom source node
Forward node, then in the phase III of data slot transmission, according to the relative position of forward node and multiple sink nodes,
Each data slot independent choice purpose sink node, creates that length is different in network simultaneously, the different routing road in distributed areas
Diameter.Finally fill false data packet, guarantee the complete transmission path of each data slot be it is random, it is irregular, to increase
The number of nodes for adding attacker to seek source node all over there may be position, maximization network safety time.
It realizes above-mentioned technical purpose, reaches above-mentioned technical effect, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
The dynamic multipath based on more sink is by source node location method for secret protection in a kind of WSN, comprising the following steps:
(1) wireless sensor network initializes, and includes 4 sink nodes in the wireless sensor network, is expressed as
sinki(i=1,2,3,4) is located at 4 apexes in entire square net region, carries out ring division to network；
(2) phantom source node is determined；According to network size size, jumping figure value is set, randomly chooses phantom source node Ph,
Receive truthful data packet；
(3) divide truthful data packet；Phantom source node PhTruthful data packet is divided into M parts, wherein at least need to attack
The person of hitting, which captures T parts of segments, could completely crack data packet, know the position of source node；
(4) forward node, the phantom source node P selected in step (2) are randomly choosedh, randomly choosed in candidate region
M node is as forward node, then phantom source node PhDistribute data slot to corresponding forward node；
(5) forward node is by truthful data fragments for transport to corresponding sink node；
(6) sink node generates false data packet and sends around ring, by false data packet is transmitted along ring clockwise, by random
The forwarding of hop count, comes back to forward node, confuses the judgement of attacker, can not determine the starting point of data packet, can not also crack
Truthful data packet realizes the target of source node location secret protection.
Further, the step (1) specifically:
Ordinary node in wireless sensor network is uniformly disposed, and each node communication radius is r, each on vertex
Sink node starts the broadcast initialization beacon into network, and initializing includes sink node identifier and each sink in beacon
The position of node；Ordinary node calculates the distance between oneself and each sink node from the information in beacon；
Establish the ring that shape is square using network center as the center of ring, between ring between be divided intoGuarantee node
With the connectivity of adjacent ring, belong to same ring apart from the identical node of network center's hop count, then according to apart from network center
The number of hop count, the ID number of each ring are respectively 1,2,3...n rings；
Then, coordinate system is established by origin of network center, each node has determining unique coordinate values (x, y) and institute
Belong to ring number.
Further, source node calculates selection phantom source node P according to network size in the step (2)hHop count
Value, determines phantom source node P using shortest routeh, detailed process are as follows:
When source node detects the generation of event, to avoid hot spot seat offence, according to network size, jumping figure value is set
hmax, apart from source node hmaxA node is randomly choosed in the both candidate nodes of jump becomes phantom source node Ph, using shortest path
By truthful data packet is transferred to P by source nodehThe calculation formula of point, the random jumping figure value is as follows:
Wherein, RmIt is the maximum loop numerical value in network.
Further, phantom source node P in the step (3)hDivide truthful data packet, tool according to Shamir's algorithm
Body process are as follows:
For the flow around dispersion source node, reduce the energy consumption of source node segmentation data packet, phantom source node PhIt receives true
After real data packet, by packet segmentation at M parts, attacker, which at least needs to intercept and capture T parts of data slots, could be completely restored to really
Data packet, and then obtain the location privacy information of source node.
Further, the step (4) specifically:
Phantom source node PhAfter segmenting data slot, candidate region is determined, withCentered on, 2hmax- 2 be side
Long width constructs square candidate region, and in this area, randomly choosing M node becomes forward node, phantom source node
PhData slot is transferred to chosen multiple forward node with shortest route.
Further, the step (5) specifically:
According to relative position of the forward node in candidate region, forward data slot to corresponding sink node along grid,
Every wheel generates new phantom source node Ph, therefore every randomly selected forward node of wheel is also different, the routed path of every wheel is all
Different.Each data slot is sent to corresponding sink node by forward node, and the rule of correspondence is as follows:
Belong to truthful data fragments for transport that the forward node of the i-th quadrant of candidate region just receives oneself to sinkiSection
Point；Since whole network annularly connects, forward node utilizes neighbour in conjunction with orientation stochastic route according to the position of sink node
Node along grid to selected sink node direction transmit data slot, wherein every time randomly choose neighbors in coordinate value with
The neighbors that corresponding sink node coordinate value difference value becomes smaller is as next-hop, after neighbors receives data slot, repeats previous step
Suddenly, until data slot reaches sink node position；
Meanwhile when transmitting data slot, possibility of the node of true source node and surrounding as forward node is excluded,
It will really be deleted from the neighbor node table of other nodes source node, avoid being selected.
Further, sink node generates false data packet and sends by clockwise about ring, the step (6) specifically:
After all sink nodes receive a segment, new false data packet is all generated, includes network maximum in false data packet
Number of rings between number of rings and current forward node is poor, by false data packet be filled into transmission path relaying resume it is defeated；
Provide false data packet on each ring can only right-hand circular, the false data packet of each node on the ring passes to inner ring
Defeated probability is Pt, with most outer ring, i.e., on the basis of the ring where sink node, as soon as subtract 1, Zhi Daohuan per inwardly transmitting ring
Number difference is reduced to 0, forms closed loop until returning to starting forward node along ring circulation where forward node.
Assuming that the perception radius of an attacker is equal to the communication radius of node, if data slot is by attacker's
Node in sensing region detects the transmission path of genuine segments, be considered as one segment of acquisition success；If detected
The false data packet of sink filling is then considered as and invalid once arrests；Q is the probability that a genuine segments are trapped, using attack
Person sensing region indicates that calculation formula is as follows in the transmission region area accounting that truthful data segment may pass through:
Wherein, nAIt is attacker's quantity, SAIt is the sensing region size of attacker, Si(i=1,2, L M) represents every
The region area size that a forward node is constituted with corresponding sink node and network edge, that is, orient i-th of the stochastic route stage
The region area size that data slot may pass through；
The number of M has to be larger than the minimum number for requiring transmission, while to guarantee the quantity being trapped, and avoids successfully breaking
Solution, therefore, the quantity of M must satisfy condition:
Thus it releases:
q≤0.5
Further, according to the boundary of candidate region, the minimum critical region area of data slot process is obtained, to intercepting and capturing
Probability q is calculated, and specific calculating process is as follows:
Wherein, SDi(i=1,2,3,4) is candidate region vertex between corresponding sink node, it is possible to create transmission path
Region area, the S of each forward nodeiCertainly it is greater than the S equal to respective quadrants vertexDi, go out M's according to the derivation of equation
The upper limit, specific formula is as follows:
There are enough nodes for phantom source node P in candidate regionhRandomly choose forward node, therefore, the numerical value of M
There is the upper limit, need to meet condition:
M≤(2hmax-1)2-1
Then, the numerical value of selected M brings M value into formula, so that it may obtain according to simplification of a formula at random within this range
The numberical range of T, specific formula is as follows:
M·(1-q)≤T≤M·q
Then the numerical value that T is selected in OK range, arrests probabilityBi-distribution is obeyed, therefore by the specific of M and T
Numerical value brings formula into, calculates the probability for successfully cracking complete truthful data packet, i.e., at least captures the probability of T genuine segments,
Specific calculating process is as follows:
Beneficial effects of the present invention:
(1) present invention introduces multiple sink distributed transmission path profile ranges in a network, as far as possible using more
Node increases attacker and seeks the time all over, reduces truthful data and is coated with the probability cracked, is selected according to the relative position of forward node
Purpose sink node is selected, path randomness is increased, extends the network security time；
(2) present invention randomly chooses forward node in region appropriate, makes according to factors such as network size and probability
Obtaining path becomes diversification, maximizes the randomness for increasing path；
(3) present invention can be realized in a network there are multiple attackers in the case where, by divide data packet, avoid
One data coating intercepts and captures the problem of just exposing source node location privacy easily, further decreases the probability that source position is positioned；
The false data packet that right-hand circular is introduced in network, confuses the judgement of attacker, while also improving whole the utilizing of network and imitating
Rate；
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the network model schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is that forward node schematic diagram is selected in the selection phantom source node and candidate region of an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is the orientation stochastic route transmission schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the area schematic that the data slot transmission route of an embodiment of the present invention may be distributed.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to embodiments, to this hair
It is bright to be further elaborated.It should be appreciated that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention, not
For limiting the present invention.
Application principle of the invention is explained in detail with reference to the accompanying drawing.
It is as shown in Figure 1 wireless sensor network model structure schematic diagram of the invention, the wireless sensor network is
One square 2 dimensional region, 4 sink nodes in wireless sensor network, is located at the vertex of entire sensing region
(each sink node is expressed as sink at placei, i=1,2,3,4), ordinary node is uniformly disposed in network, in the embodiment of the present invention
Dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN by source node location method for secret protection, specific steps are as follows:
Step (1): intiating radio sensor network implements process are as follows:
Ordinary node in wireless sensor network is uniformly disposed, and each node communication radius is r, each on vertex
Sink node starts the broadcast initialization beacon into network, and initializing includes sink node identifier and each sink in beacon
The position of node；Ordinary node calculates the distance between oneself and each sink node from the information in beacon；
Establish the ring that shape is square using network center as the center of ring, between ring between be divided intoGuarantee node
With the connectivity of adjacent ring, belong to same ring apart from the identical node of network center's hop count, then according to apart from network center
The number of hop count, the ID number of each ring are respectively 1,2,3...n rings；
Then, coordinate system is established by origin of network center, each node has determining unique coordinate values (x, y) and institute
Belong to ring number.
Step (2): phantom source node P is determinedh, calculate selection phantom source node PhJumping figure value, it is true using shortest route
Determine phantom source node Ph,；
When source node detects the generation of event, to avoid hot spot seat offence, according to network size, jumping figure value is set
hmax, apart from source node hmaxA node is randomly choosed in the both candidate nodes of jump becomes phantom source node Ph, using shortest path
By truthful data packet is transferred to phantom source node P by source nodeh, the calculation formula of the random jumping figure value is as follows:
Wherein, RmIt is the maximum loop numerical value in network.Due to data packet experience h jump stochastic route after data packet
Distance apart from source node existsProbability in jump isWhen h is jumped it is larger when, P=1, truthful data packet is still
Near source node, because node random walk is centered around near source node always, is directly determined and jumped according to network size
Numerical value, truthful data packet are sent to phantom source node P with shortest routeh.As shown in Fig. 2, phantom source node PhIt is that source node S is straight
It connects in hmaxIt is randomly selected in jumping.
Step (3): phantom source node PhDivide truthful data packet according to Shamir's algorithm；
In order to reduce the flow around source node, reduce the energy consumption of source node segmentation data packet, phantom source node PhIt receives
After truthful data packet, as shown in Fig. 2, according to Shamir's algorithm, phantom source node PhBy packet segmentation at M parts, distribution
To the forward node chosen in step (4), attacker, which at least needs to intercept and capture T parts of data slots, could be completely restored to truthful data
Packet, and then obtain the location privacy information of source node.The numerical value of M and T needs to remove constraint solving by condition.Specific value with
The position of source node, the length of true path, attacker's number have relationship.
Step (4): determining candidate region, randomly chooses M node as forward node；
Phantom source node PhAfter segmenting data slot, candidate region is determined, withCentered on, 2hmax- 2 be side
Long width constructs square candidate region, as shown in Fig. 2, in this area, randomly choosing M node becomes forward node,
Phantom source node PhData slot is transferred to chosen multiple forward node with shortest route.
Step (5): according to relative position of the forward node in candidate region, forward data slot to correspondence along grid
Sink node；
Each data slot is sent to corresponding sink node by forward node, and the rule of correspondence is as follows:
Belong to truthful data fragments for transport that the forward node of the i-th quadrant of candidate region just receives oneself to sinkiSection
Point.As shown in Figure of abstract, such as some forward node is located at the first quartile of candidate region, just sends data slot to
sink1；
Since whole network annularly connects, forward node is according to the position of sink node, in conjunction with orientation stochastic route,
As shown in figure 3, forward node transmits data slot to selected sink node direction along grid using neighbors, wherein every time
The neighbors that coordinate value and corresponding sink node coordinate value difference value become smaller in random selection neighbors is as next-hop, neighbors
After receiving data slot, previous step is repeated, until data slot reaches sink node position；
Meanwhile when transmitting data slot, possibility of the node of true source node and surrounding as forward node is excluded,
It will really be deleted from the neighbor node table of other nodes source node, avoid being selected.On the one hand multiple sink nodes can
It is used simultaneously, synchronization, many of network routed path.On the other hand the flow in dispersion multiple directions, network
In more nodes participate in transmission, energy balance intercepts and captures multiple data packets on the direction for avoiding attacker from concentrating at one, such as
Shown in Fig. 3, a forward node has a plurality of Random candidate path.Since every wheel forward node is random selection, and can when transmission
It is take turns data slot transmission to generate a plurality of path candidate more.
Step (6): sink node generates false data packet and sends by clockwise about ring, comes back to forward node；
After all sink nodes receive a segment, new false data packet is all generated, includes network maximum in false data packet
Number of rings between number of rings and current forward node is poor, and false data packet is filled into transmission path relaying and resumes defeated, formation closed loop time
Road can allow attacker that can not distinguish the starting point of data packet；
As shown in Figure of abstract, it is specified that false data packet on each ring can only right-hand circular, the vacation of each node on the ring
Data packet to the probability of inner loop transmission be Pt, with most outer ring, i.e. on the basis of ring where sink, as soon as per inwardly transmitting ring,
Subtract 1, until number of rings difference is reduced to 0, along ring circulation where forward node, until returning to starting forward node, formation closed loop.Therefore,
No matter how much random hop counts are passed through, and false data always returns to forward node, forms winding.
Assuming that the perception radius of an attacker is equal to the communication radius of node, if data slot is by attacker's
Node in sensing region detects the transmission path of genuine segments, be considered as one segment of acquisition success；If detected
The false data packet of sink filling is then considered as and invalid once arrests；Q is the probability that a genuine segments are trapped, using attack
Person sensing region indicates that calculation formula is as follows in the transmission region area accounting that truthful data segment may pass through:
Wherein, nAIt is attacker's quantity, SAIt is the sensing region size of attacker, Si(i=1,2, L M) represents every
The region area size that a forward node is constituted with corresponding sink node and network edge, that is, orient i-th of the stochastic route stage
The region area size that data slot may pass through；
The number of M has to be larger than the minimum number for requiring transmission, while to guarantee the quantity being trapped, and avoids successfully breaking
Solution, therefore, the quantity of M must satisfy condition:
Thus it releases:
q≤0.5
Further, according to the boundary of candidate region, the minimum critical region area of data slot process is obtained, to intercepting and capturing
Probability q is calculated, and specific calculating process is as follows:
Wherein, SDi(i=1,2,3,4) is candidate region vertex between corresponding sink node, it is possible to create transmission path
Region area, the S of each forward nodeiCertainly it is greater than the S equal to respective quadrants vertexDi, SDiThe shade as shown in Fig. 4
Area goes out the upper limit of M according to the derivation of equation, specific formula is as follows:
There are enough nodes for phantom source node P in candidate regionhRandomly choose forward node, therefore, the numerical value of M
There is the upper limit, need to meet condition:
M≤(2hmax-1)2-1
Then, the numerical value of selected M brings M value into formula, so that it may obtain according to simplification of a formula at random within this range
The numberical range of T, specific formula is as follows:
M·(1-q)≤T≤M·q
Then the numerical value that T is selected in OK range, arrests probabilityBi-distribution is obeyed, therefore by the specific of M and T
Numerical value brings formula into, calculates the probability for successfully cracking complete truthful data packet, i.e., at least captures the probability of T genuine segments,
Specific calculating process is as follows:
In summary:
The invention discloses the dynamic multipaths based on more sink in a kind of WSN by source node location method for secret protection, first
First according to hop count range appropriate, phantom source node is selected, in next transmission process, using Shamir's algorithm point
Truthful data packet is cut, the data slot after transmission cutting protects source node location privacy to corresponding sink node respectively；Injection
False data packet, and inwardly transmitted clockwise around ring, guarantee that transmission path forms closed loop, interference attack person judges that data package
Initial point.Each round reselects forward node, and in conjunction with orientation stochastic route, the path of every wheel is all dynamic change.The present invention
The listening period that attacker seeks all over can be increased, reduce hop-by-hop and recall attack cost, setting up for phantom source node can
Source node ambient fluid is shifted, source node location is hidden with this, resists the hot spot attack of attacker.
The above shows and describes the basic principles and main features of the present invention and the advantages of the present invention.The skill of the industry
Art personnel it should be appreciated that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, the above embodiments and description only describe
The principle of the present invention, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, various changes and improvements may be made to the invention, this
A little changes and improvements all fall within the protetion scope of the claimed invention.The claimed scope of the invention is by the attached claims
Book and its equivalent thereof.
Claims (7)
1. the dynamic multipath based on more sink in a kind of WSN is by source node location method for secret protection, which is characterized in that including with
Lower step:
(1) wireless sensor network initializes, and includes 4 sink nodes in the wireless sensor network, is expressed as sinki(i
=1,2,3,4) 4 apexes in entire square net region, are located at, ring division is carried out to network；
(2) phantom source node P is determinedh；According to network size size, jumping figure value is set, randomly chooses phantom source node Ph, receive
Truthful data packet；
(3) divide truthful data packet；Phantom source node PhTruthful data packet is divided into M parts, wherein at least attacker is needed to catch
Data packet could completely be cracked by obtaining T parts of segments, know the position of source node；
(4) forward node, the phantom source node P selected in step (2) are randomly choosedh, M section is randomly choosed in candidate region
Point is used as forward node, then phantom source node PhDistribute data slot to corresponding forward node；
(5) forward node is by truthful data fragments for transport to corresponding sink node；
(6) sink node generates false data packet and sends around ring, by false data packet is transmitted along ring clockwise, by random hop count
Forwarding, comes back to forward node, confuses the judgement of attacker, can not determine the starting point of data packet, can not also crack true number
According to packet, source node location secret protection is realized.
2. dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN according to claim 1 is by source node location method for secret protection,
It is characterized in that: the step (1) specifically:
Ordinary node in wireless sensor network is uniformly disposed, and each node communication radius is r, each sink node on vertex
Start the broadcast initialization beacon into network, initializes the position in beacon comprising sink node identifier and each sink node
It sets；Ordinary node calculates the distance between oneself and each sink node from the information in beacon；
Establish the ring that shape is square using network center as the center of ring, between ring between be divided intoGuarantee node and phase
The connectivity of adjacent ring belongs to same ring apart from the identical node of network center's hop count, then according to the hop count apart from network center
Number, the ID number of each ring is respectively 1,2,3...n rings；
Then, coordinate system is established by origin of network center, each node has determining unique coordinate values (x, y) and affiliated ring
Number.
3. dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN according to claim 1 is by source node location method for secret protection,
Be characterized in that: source node calculates the jumping figure value of selection phantom source node according to network size in the step (2), and use is most short
It routes and determines phantom source node Ph, detailed process are as follows:
When source node detects the generation of event, to avoid hot spot seat offence, according to network size, jumping figure value h is setmax,
Apart from source node hmaxA node is randomly choosed in the both candidate nodes of jump becomes phantom source node Ph, using shortest route, source section
Truthful data packet is transferred to P by pointhThe calculation formula of point, the random jumping figure value is as follows:
Wherein, RmIt is the maximum loop numerical value in network.
4. dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN according to claim 1 is by source node location method for secret protection,
It is characterized in that: phantom source node P in the step (3)hDivide truthful data packet, detailed process according to Shamir's algorithm are as follows:
For the flow around dispersion source node, reduce the energy consumption of source node segmentation data packet, phantom source node Ph receives true number
After packet, by packet segmentation at M parts, attacker, which at least needs to intercept and capture T parts of data slots, could be completely restored to truthful data
Packet, and then obtain the location privacy information of source node.
5. dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN according to claim 1 is by source node location method for secret protection,
It is characterized in that: the step (4) specifically:
After phantom source node Ph segments data slot, candidate region is determined, withCentered on, 2hmax- 2 is wide for side length
Degree constructs square candidate region, and in this area, randomly choosing M node becomes forward node, and Ph shortest route will count
According to fragments for transport to chosen multiple forward node.
6. dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN according to claim 1 is by source node location method for secret protection,
It is characterized in that the step (5) specifically:
According to relative position of the forward node in candidate region, forward data slot to corresponding sink node, every wheel along grid
New phantom source node Ph is generated, therefore every randomly selected forward node of wheel is also different, the routed path of every wheel is all different
, each data slot is sent to corresponding sink node by forward node, and the rule of correspondence is as follows:
Belong to the truthful data fragments for transport that the forward node of the i-th quadrant of candidate region just receives oneself and gives sinki node；
Since whole network annularly connects, forward node utilizes neighbour in conjunction with orientation stochastic route according to the position of sink node
Node along grid to selected sink node direction transmit data slot, wherein every time randomly choose neighbors in coordinate value with
The neighbors that corresponding sink node coordinate value difference value becomes smaller is as next-hop, after neighbors receives data slot, repeats previous step
Suddenly, until data slot reaches sink node position；
Meanwhile when transmitting data slot, exclude possibility of the node of true source node and surrounding as forward node, i.e., it will be true
Actual source node is deleted from the neighbor node table of other nodes, avoids being selected.
7. dynamic multipath based on more sink in WSN according to claim 1 is by source node location method for secret protection,
It is characterized in that the step (6) specifically:
After all sink nodes receive a segment, new false data packet is all generated, includes network maximum number of rings in false data packet
Number of rings between current forward node is poor, by false data packet be filled into transmission path relaying resume it is defeated；
Provide false data packet on each ring can only right-hand circular, the false data packet of each node on the ring is to the general of inner loop transmission
Rate is Pt, with most outer ring, i.e., on the basis of the ring where sink node, as soon as subtract 1 per inwardly transmitting ring, until number of rings difference drops
It is 0, forms closed loop until returning to starting forward node along ring circulation where forward node；
Assuming that the perception radius of an attacker is equal to the communication radius of node, if data slot passes through the Perception Area of attacker
Node in domain detects the transmission path of genuine segments, be considered as one segment of acquisition success；If detecting sink node
The false data packet of filling is then considered as and invalid once arrests；Q is the probability that a genuine segments are trapped, and is felt using attacker
Know that region indicates that calculation formula is as follows in the transmission region area accounting that truthful data segment may pass through:
Wherein, nAIt is attacker's quantity, SAIt is the sensing region size of attacker, Si(i=1,2, L M) represents each turn
Send out the region area size that node is constituted with corresponding sink node and network edge, i.e. orientation i-th of data of stochastic route stage
The region area size that segment may pass through；
The number of M has to be larger than the minimum number for requiring transmission, while to guarantee the quantity being trapped, and avoids successfully cracking, because
This, the quantity of M must satisfy condition:
Thus it releases:
q≤0.5
Further, according to the boundary of candidate region, the minimum critical region area of data slot process is obtained, to intercept probability q
It is calculated, specific calculating process is as follows:
Wherein, SDi(i=1,2,3,4) is candidate region vertex between corresponding sink node, it is possible to create the area of transmission path
Domain area, the S of each forward nodeiCertainly it is greater than the S equal to respective quadrants vertexDi, the upper limit of M is gone out according to the derivation of equation,
Specific formula is as follows:
There are enough nodes to randomly choose forward node for phantom source node Ph in candidate region, therefore, on the numerical value of M has
Limit, needs to meet condition:
M≤(2hmax-1)2-1
Then, the numerical value of selected M brings M value into formula, so that it may obtain the number of T according to simplification of a formula at random within this range
It is worth range, specific formula is as follows:
M·(1-q)≤T≤M·q
Then the numerical value that T is selected in OK range, arrests probabilityBi-distribution is obeyed, therefore by the specific value band of M and T
Enter formula, calculate the probability for successfully cracking complete truthful data packet, i.e., at least captures the probability of T genuine segments, it is specific to count
Calculation process is as follows:
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