CN110651270B

CN110651270B - Data access method and device

Info

Publication number: CN110651270B
Application number: CN201780090948.2A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 朱江; 桑玉蕾; 方习文; 张冠男; 李基�
Original assignee: Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Current assignee: Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority date: 2017-12-29
Filing date: 2017-12-29
Publication date: 2023-11-10
Anticipated expiration: 2037-12-29
Also published as: CN110651270A; WO2019127467A1

Abstract

The embodiment of the application provides a data access method and device, relates to the technical field of communication, and can reduce the risk of information leakage of a user and improve the safety of a terminal. The method comprises the following steps: the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal; the terminal obtains a request of a sensitive application for accessing sensitive data, wherein the sensitive data is encrypted by using a secret key, and the sensitive application is an application which needs to access the sensitive data in the running process; and responding to the request, and providing an access result to the sensitive application by the terminal, wherein when the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the access result does not contain the sensitive data.

Description

Data access method and device

Technical Field

The embodiment of the application relates to the technical field of communication, in particular to a data access method and device.

Background

Data (e.g., applications, photos, etc.) within a terminal such as a cell phone, tablet, etc. are typically stored in the memory of the terminal in the form of files. For sensitive data of the user, such as call records, transfer information, account numbers and passwords of applications, and the like of the user, the terminal can encrypt the sensitive data by using a certain encryption algorithm and store the encrypted sensitive data. Then, when the terminal needs to access the above-mentioned sensitive data, it is necessary to acquire a key for decrypting the sensitive data first, and then use the key to access the encrypted sensitive data.

In general, when a screen of a terminal is brought from a locked state to an unlocked state, authentication means such as fingerprint, face, password, or the like is required. And authenticating the identity of the user currently operating. If the authentication is passed, the user currently operating the terminal can be considered as a legal user, the terminal can automatically generate a key for decrypting the sensitive data and store the key in the cache, and when the user is waited to trigger the terminal to access the sensitive data, the terminal can acquire the key from the cache so as to successfully access the sensitive data.

However, the user who operates the terminal after the terminal screen is unlocked is not necessarily a legal user who is authenticated by the terminal, for example, the user is borrowed or robbed by other people after the terminal screen is unlocked. However, the terminal generates a key for decrypting the sensitive data, so that an illegal user which is not authenticated by the terminal can access the sensitive data by using the key, and potential safety hazards such as information leakage of the user are caused.

Disclosure of Invention

The embodiment of the application provides a data access method and a data access device, which can reduce the risk of information leakage of a user and improve the safety of a terminal.

In order to achieve the above purpose, the embodiment of the present application adopts the following technical scheme:

In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a data access method, including: the terminal can automatically carry out identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal; subsequently, when the terminal obtains a request of the sensitive application to access the sensitive data (the sensitive data has been encrypted using the key); and responding to the request, the terminal can provide an access result for the sensitive application according to the identity authentication result, wherein when the current user is an illegal user as the identity authentication result, the access result does not contain the sensitive data.

It can be seen that in the embodiment of the application, the access authority of the terminal to the sensitive data is not single and depends on the identity authentication performed on the user when the screen is unlocked, but can still perform continuous identity authentication on the current user operating the terminal after the screen is lightened or unlocked, so that the sensitive data of the user can be protected in real time according to the real-time identity authentication result, thereby avoiding accessing the sensitive data of legal users when the illegal user operates the terminal, and improving the security of the terminal.

In one possible design method, after the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on the current user operating the terminal and before the terminal obtains a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, the method further includes: if the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the terminal deletes the key for decrypting the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, after the terminal obtains the request of the sensitive application to access the sensitive data and before the terminal provides the first access result to the sensitive application, the method further includes: if the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the terminal deletes the key for decrypting the sensitive data.

That is, when the terminal detects that the illegal user operates the terminal, the sensitive application is prevented from accessing the sensitive data by deleting the key, or when the terminal detects that the illegal user triggers the sensitive application to request to access the sensitive data, the sensitive application is prevented from accessing the sensitive data by deleting the key.

In one possible design method, the method further comprises: when the terminal is started, the terminal can generate the key for unlocking the sensitive data; and stores the key in an encryption area protected by an encryption algorithm. The key in the encrypted area is allowed to be accessed only after verification information associated with the user's valid authentication information is obtained.

Then, when the screen of the terminal is unlocked, the terminal may acquire verification information associated with the identity authentication information input by the user, and further save the key stored in the encryption area to the cache area using the verification information. Of course, if the user does not set the identity authentication information for the terminal, the verification information may be preset for the terminal.

Or when the result of the identity authentication indicates that the current user is a legal user, the terminal can acquire the verification information and store the key stored in the encryption area into the cache area by using the verification information.

At this time, when the terminal deletes the key for decrypting the sensitive data, the key located in the buffer area is specifically deleted.

In one possible design method, the terminal obtains a request of the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, which specifically includes: if the operation of opening the sensitive application by the current user is detected, the terminal acquires a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data; or alternatively; if the operation of opening a target application interface (the target application interface is an application interface containing the sensitive data) in the sensitive application by the current user is detected, the terminal acquires a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on a current user operating the terminal, and specifically includes: the terminal automatically acquires the user behavior when the current user operates the terminal; the terminal authenticates the identity of the current user by comparing the user behavior with the prestored behavior characteristics of the legal user, so that the real-time authentication process of the current user identity is realized.

In one possible design method, after the terminal provides the access result to the sensitive application, the method further includes: the terminal displays a first interface that does not contain the sensitive data.

The first interface may include a prompt that the access request is invalid, a prompt that identity authentication information is input, the sensitive data after mask processing, or a prompt that access rights are opened to an illegal user.

When the first interface includes a prompt for opening the access right to the illegal user, after the terminal displays the first interface which does not include the sensitive data, the method may further include: the terminal obtains the authorization of legal users to open the access rights of illegal users; the terminal obtains the effective time length of the illegal user accessing the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, if an illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data within the effective duration, the terminal displays a second interface containing the sensitive data; and after the effective duration is exceeded, if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data, the terminal displays a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data.

In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a data access method, including: the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal; if the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the terminal only has access rights to the stored non-sensitive data, and at the moment, the terminal cannot read the stored sensitive data, so that the first interface displayed by the terminal does not contain the sensitive data or sensitive applications needing to access the sensitive data during running; if the current user is a legal user as a result of the identity authentication, the terminal has access rights to the stored sensitive data and the stored non-sensitive data, and at this time, a second interface displayed by the terminal contains the sensitive data or a sensitive application which needs to access the sensitive data in running.

In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a terminal, including: the authentication unit is used for automatically authenticating the identity of the current user of the operation terminal; an obtaining unit, configured to obtain a request of a sensitive application for accessing sensitive data, where the sensitive data is encrypted using a key, and the sensitive application is an application that needs to access the sensitive data when running; and the response unit is used for providing an access result for the sensitive application, wherein when the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the access result does not contain the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, the terminal further includes a deletion unit for deleting the key for decrypting the sensitive data when the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication.

In one possible design method, the acquisition unit is further configured to: generating the key for unlocking the sensitive data when the terminal is started; the key is stored in an encryption area protected by an encryption algorithm.

In one possible design method, the acquisition unit is further configured to: when a screen of the terminal is unlocked, acquiring check information, wherein the check information is associated with identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the check information is preset by the terminal; and saving the key stored in the encryption area into a cache area by using the verification information.

In one possible design method, the acquisition unit is further configured to: if the current user is a legal user as a result of the identity authentication, acquiring check information, wherein the check information is related to the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the check information is preset by the terminal; and saving the key stored in the encryption area into a cache area by using the verification information.

In one possible design method, the deletion unit is specifically configured to delete the key stored in the cache area.

In one possible design method, the obtaining unit is specifically configured to: if the operation of opening the sensitive application by the current user is detected, acquiring a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data; or alternatively; if the operation of opening a target application interface in the sensitive application by the current user is detected, acquiring a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data, wherein the target application interface is an application interface containing the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, the authentication unit is specifically configured to: automatically acquiring user behaviors when a current user operates a terminal; and authenticating the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with prestored behavior characteristics of legal users.

In one possible design method, the terminal further comprises a display unit for displaying a first interface that does not contain the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, when the first interface includes a prompt for opening the access right to the illegal user, the obtaining unit is further configured to: acquiring the authorization of a legal user to the access authority of an open illegal user; and acquiring the effective time length of the illegal user for accessing the sensitive data.

In one possible design method, the display unit is further configured to: if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data within the effective duration, displaying a second interface containing the sensitive data; and after the effective duration is exceeded, if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data, displaying a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data.

In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a terminal, including: the authentication unit is used for automatically authenticating the identity of the current user of the operation terminal; a display unit for: if the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, displaying a first interface, wherein the first interface does not contain the sensitive data or sensitive application which needs to access the sensitive data in running; and if the current user is a legal user as a result of the identity authentication, displaying a second interface, wherein the second interface comprises the sensitive data or sensitive application which needs to access the sensitive data in running.

In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a terminal, including: the processor, the memory, the output device and the input device are connected through buses; the memory is used for storing computer executing instructions, the processor is connected with the memory through the bus, and when the terminal runs, the processor executes the computer executing instructions stored in the memory so as to enable the terminal to execute any one of the data access methods.

In a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium having stored therein instructions that, when executed on any one of the above terminals, cause the terminal to perform any one of the above data access methods.

In a seventh aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a computer program product comprising instructions that, when run on any of the above terminals, cause the terminals to perform any of the above data access methods.

In the embodiment of the present application, the names of the components in the terminal are not limited to the device itself, and in actual implementation, the components may appear under other names. Insofar as the function of the individual components is similar to that of the embodiments of the present application, it is within the scope of the claims of the present application and the equivalents thereof.

In addition, the technical effects of any one of the design manners of the second aspect to the seventh aspect may be referred to as the technical effects of the different design manners of the first aspect, which are not described herein.

Drawings

Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a programming module in a terminal according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a prior art access flow of sensitive data;

fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 5 is a second application scenario diagram of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 6 is a third application scenario diagram of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 8 is a schematic diagram II of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 9 is a schematic diagram III of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 10 is a schematic diagram of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 11 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

Fig. 12 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 13A is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 13B is a schematic diagram seventh of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 14 is an application scenario diagram eighth of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 15 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 16 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 17 is an eleventh application scenario diagram of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 18 is a schematic diagram twelve application scenarios of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 19 is a thirteenth application scenario diagram of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 20A is a schematic diagram fourteen application scenarios of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 20B is a schematic diagram fifteen application scenarios of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 21 is a schematic diagram of a second structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present application;

Fig. 22 is a schematic structural diagram III of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present application.

Detailed Description

The terms "first" and "second" are used below for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defining "a first" or "a second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more such feature. In the description of the embodiments of the present application, unless otherwise indicated, the meaning of "a plurality" is two or more.

The data access method provided by the embodiment of the application can be applied to any terminal with friend making function such as a mobile phone, a tablet computer, wearable equipment, vehicle-mounted equipment, augmented reality (augmented reality, AR) \virtual reality (VR) equipment, a notebook computer, an ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), a netbook, a personal digital assistant (personal digital assistant, PDA) and the like, and the embodiment of the application is not limited in any way.

As shown in fig. 1, the terminal in the embodiment of the present application may be a mobile phone 100. The following describes embodiments of the mobile phone 100. It should be understood that the illustrated handset 100 is only one example of the above-described terminal, and that the handset 100 may have more or fewer components than shown in fig. 1, may combine two or more components, or may have a different configuration of components.

Referring to fig. 1, a mobile phone 100 may communicate with other electronic devices 102 and 104, in addition to the mobile phone 100, and a server 106. The handset 100 may include a bus 110, a processor 120, a memory 130, a user input module 150, a display module 160, a communication interface 170, and other similar and/or suitable components.

Bus 110 may be a circuit that interconnects the elements and communicates, such as control messages, between the elements.

The processor 120 may receive commands from the other elements described above (e.g., the memory 130, the user input module 150, the display module 160, the communication interface 170, the communication configuration control module 170, etc.) via the bus 110, may interpret the received commands, and may perform calculations or data processing based on the interpreted commands.

The memory 130 may store commands or data received from the processor 120 or other elements (e.g., the user input module 150, the display module 160, the communication interface 170, etc.) or commands or data generated by the processor 120 or other elements.

Memory 130 may include programming modules such as a kernel 131, middleware 132, application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 133, applications 134, and the like. Each of the above-described programming modules may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware, or a combination of two or more thereof, the detailed description of which may be found in relation to fig. 2.

The kernel 131 may control or manage system resources (e.g., bus 110, processor 120, memory 130, etc.) for performing operations or functions implemented by other programming modules (e.g., middleware 132, APIs 133, and applications 134). In addition, the kernel 131 may provide an interface capable of accessing and controlling or managing various elements of the handset 100 through the use of middleware 132, APIs 133, or applications 134.

Middleware 132 may be used to run between API 133 or application 134 and kernel 131 in a manner that API 133 or application 134 communicates with kernel 131 and exchanges data therewith. For example, middleware 132 may be configured as an intermediary for communication between APIs 133 or applications 134 and kernel 131. In addition, for example, with respect to work requests received from one or more applications 134 and/or middleware 132, load balancing of work requests may be performed by using a method that assigns a priority to at least one of the one or more applications 134, wherein system resources (e.g., bus 110, processor 120, memory 130, etc.) of the mobile phone 100 may be used at the priority.

The API 133 is an interface through which the application 134 can control functions provided by the kernel 131 or the middleware 132, and may include at least one interface or function for file control, window control, image processing, character control, and the like, for example.

Applications 134 may include, for example, a home page application, a dialer application, a Short Message Service (SMS)/Multimedia Message Service (MMS) application, an Instant Messaging (IM) application, a browser application, a camera application, an alarm clock application, a contacts application, a voice dialing application, an electronic mail (e-mail) application, a calendar application, a media player application, an album application, a clock application, and any other suitable and/or similar applications.

In the embodiment of the present application, the memory 130 may be further used to store data related to user privacy or user benefits, such as call records, transfer information, bank accounts, passwords, etc., of the user, and these data are referred to as sensitive data in the following embodiments. Processor 120 may distinguish particular data in memory 130 as sensitive data by adding a particular identification.

Then, while running a particular application, the application may request access to the sensitive data and present the sensitive data to the user via the display interface. Applications that need to access sensitive data during running may be referred to as sensitive applications in embodiments of the present application, for example, payment applications, banking applications, chat applications, and the like.

Alternatively, the application may request access to the sensitive data and present the sensitive data to the user via a display interface while running a particular window or service in the application. For example, when the "panning" application runs a payment window, the "panning" application may be triggered to request access to sensitive data of the user's bank account.

Accordingly, the data generated when the sensitive application or the specific window (or service) is executed may be stored in the memory 130 as sensitive data by the processor 120 by adding a specific identifier.

As shown in fig. 1, the sensitive data is typically stored in the memory 130 in an encrypted form, and when the mobile phone 100 needs to access the sensitive data, a key for decrypting the sensitive data needs to be acquired first, and then the encrypted sensitive data is accessed in the memory 130 using the key.

The user input module 150 may receive commands or data input from a user via input-output means (e.g., sensors, keyboards, touch screens, etc.), and may transmit the received commands or data to the processor 120 or the memory 130 through the bus 110. The display module 160 may display video, images, data, etc. to a user.

The display module 160 may display various information (e.g., multimedia data, text data) received from the above-described elements.

The communication interface 170 may control a short-range communication connection with another electronic device 102. When the handset 100 is paired with another electronic device, the communication interface 170 may stop the scanning operation of waiting to receive signals from the neighboring electronic device or stop the broadcasting operation of broadcasting signals. For example, in response to the pairing of the mobile phone 100 with another electronic device 102, the communication interface 170 stops a scanning operation of waiting to receive signals from a nearby electronic device or a broadcasting operation of broadcasting signals. The communication interface 170 may control the period of the scanning or broadcasting operation when the handset 100 is paired with another electronic device.

According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the handset 100 may communicate with another electronic device using the communication interface 170. For example, the communication interface 170 may communicate with another electronic device 104, the server 106, and the like. The communication interface 170 may communicate with other electronic devices 104, servers 106, etc. directly or through the network 162. For example, the communication interface 170 may be operative to connect the handset 100 to the network 162.

Fig. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a programming module according to a disclosed embodiment of the present application.

Referring to fig. 2, the programming module 310 may be included (or stored) in the handset 100 (e.g., memory 130) shown in fig. 1. At least a portion of programming module 310 may be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, or a combination of two or more thereof. The programming module 310 may be implemented as hardware (e.g., hardware 201) and may include an OS that controls resources associated with an electronic device (e.g., the handset 100) and/or various applications (e.g., application 370) executing in the OS. For example, the OS may be Android, iOS, windows, symbian, tizen, bada or the like.

Referring to fig. 2, programming module 310 may include kernel 320, middleware 330, API 360, and/or application 370.

Kernel 320 (e.g., kernel 131) may include a system resource manager 321 and/or a device driver 323. The system resource manager 321 may include a process manager (not shown), a memory manager (not shown), and a file system manager (not shown). The system resource manager 321 may perform control, allocation, restoration, etc. of system resources. The device drivers 323 may include, for example, a display driver (not shown), a camera driver (not shown), a bluetooth driver (not shown), a shared memory driver (not shown), a USB driver (not shown), a keypad driver (not shown), a Wi-Fi driver (not shown), and/or an audio driver (not shown). Further, according to the disclosed embodiments of the application, the device driver 323 may include an inter-process communication (IPC) driver (not shown).

Middleware 330 may include a plurality of modules that are implemented in advance to provide functionality that is shared by applications 370. In addition, middleware 330 may provide functionality to applications 370 through APIs 360 to enable applications 370 to efficiently use limited system resources within the electronic device. For example, as shown in fig. 2, middleware 330 (e.g., middleware 132) may include at least one of: the runtime 335, application manager 341, window manager 342, multimedia manager 343, resource manager 344, power manager 345, database manager 346, package manager 347, connection manager 348, notification manager 349, location manager 350, graphics manager 351, security manager 352, and any other suitable and/or similar manager.

The runtime library 335 may include a library module, for example, used by a compiler, to add new functionality during execution of the application 370 through the use of a programming language. According to the disclosed embodiment of the application, the runtime library 335 may perform functions related to input and output, management of memory, arithmetic functions, and the like.

The application manager 341 may manage, for example, a lifecycle of the at least one application 370. The window manager 342 can manage Graphical User Interface (GUI) resources used on-screen. The multimedia manager 343 may detect formats for reproducing various media files and may encode or decode the media files by using a codec suitable for the relevant formats. The resource manager 344 may manage resources, such as source code, memory, storage space, etc., of the at least one application 370.

The power manager 345 may operate with a basic input/output system (BIOS), may manage a battery or power, may provide power information for operation, and the like. Database manager 346 may manage databases in the following manner: enabling the generation, searching and/or changing of a database to be used by the at least one application 370. The package manager 347 may manage the installation and/or updating of applications distributed in the form of package files.

The connection manager 348 may manage wireless connections such as Wi-Fi and BT. The notification manager 349 may display or report events such as arrival messages, appointments, proximity alarms, etc. to the user in a manner that does not disturb the user. The location manager 350 may manage location information of the electronic device. The graphic manager 351 may manage graphic effects and/or UIs related to graphic effects to be provided to a user. The security manager 352 may provide various security functions for system security, user authentication, and the like. When an electronic device (e.g., handset 100) has telephony capabilities, the middleware 330 may also include a telephony manager (not shown) for managing voice telephony call functions and/or video telephony call functions of the electronic device, in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.

The middleware 330 may generate and use a new middleware module through various functional combinations of the above-described internal element modules. Middleware 330 may provide a module specialized according to the type of OS to provide differentiated functions. Middleware 330 may also dynamically delete some of the existing elements or may add new elements. Accordingly, middleware 330 may omit some of the elements described in the various embodiments of the present disclosure, may include other elements, or may replace some of these elements with elements that perform similar functions and have different names.

API 360 (e.g., API 133) is a collection of API programming functions and may have different configurations depending on the OS. In the case of Android or iOS, for example, one set of APIs may be provided to each platform. In the case of Tizen, for example, two or more API sets may be provided to each platform.

The applications 370 (e.g., applications 134 in fig. 1) may include, for example, preloaded applications and/or third party applications. Applications 370 (e.g., applications 134) may include, for example, a home application 371, a dial-up application 372, an SMS/MMS application 373, an IM application 374, a browser application 375, a camera application 376, an alarm application 377, a contact application 378, a voice dial-up application 379, an email application 380, a calendar application 381, a media player application 382, an album application 383, a clock application 384, and any other suitable and/or similar applications.

As also shown in FIG. 2, applications 370 may be divided into sensitive applications and non-sensitive applications. Applications that access the sensitive data during operation (e.g., SMS/MMS application 373, contact application 378, email application 380, and album application 383 in fig. 2) may be used as sensitive applications.

Generally, when the mobile phone 100 runs the sensitive sensing, the sensitive application can be triggered to access corresponding sensitive data according to the input operation of the user. The keys required to decrypt the sensitive data are typically different, e.g., picture a and picture B are marked as sensitive data, picture a may be encrypted as ciphertext 1 using key 1 when storing picture a, and picture B may be encrypted as ciphertext 2 using key 2 when storing picture B. Then, the key 1 needs to be acquired first when decrypting the ciphertext 1 of the picture a, and then the ciphertext 1 of the picture a needs to be decrypted by using the key 1, and the key 2 needs to be acquired first when decrypting the ciphertext 2 of the picture B, and then the ciphertext 2 of the picture B needs to be decrypted by using the key 2. The key 1 and the key 2 may be maintained by the kernel 320 of the mobile phone 100, and the sensitive application of the application layer cannot directly obtain the key of the sensitive data.

In addition, the key used in encrypting or decrypting the sensitive data specifically includes a data encryption key (data encryption key, DEK) and/or a key encryption key (key encryption key, KEK), which is not limited in any way by the embodiments of the present application.

Then, taking email application 380 as an example of a sensitive application, when a user enters a particular action that triggers email application 380 to access some sensitive data, email application 380 may request kernel 320 to access the sensitive data by calling the relevant API. In response to a request by email application 380, kernel 320 may obtain a key used in encrypting the sensitive data and decrypt ciphertext of the sensitive data using the key, thereby feeding the decrypted sensitive data back to email application 380 so that email application 380 can access the sensitive data.

As shown in fig. 3, when the mobile phone 100 is powered on, a user is generally required to input a password code, such as a digital code consisting of 6 digits, preset for the mobile phone 100. Further, the handset 100 may generate keys for the respective sensitive data by a specific algorithm based on the password entered by the user, and store these keys in the encrypted area of the memory 130 for maintenance by the kernel 320. To ensure security of the handset 100, the kernel 320 has access to the key in the encrypted area only after acquiring the verification information associated with the user's valid authentication information. Thus, while email application 380 is running, kernel 320 cannot decrypt sensitive data by the key in the encrypted region.

If the user does not set the authentication information such as a digital password, a fingerprint, or a pattern password for the mobile phone 100, the kernel 320 may access the key in the encrypted area using the preset verification information. In addition, when the user sets the authentication information for the mobile phone 100, the authentication information may also be used as the verification information.

Then, as shown in fig. 3, after the mobile phone 100 successfully unlocks the screen each time, the user currently operating the terminal may be considered as a legal user, at this time, the kernel 320 may obtain corresponding verification information according to the identity authentication information input during unlocking of the user, and further copy the key generated during starting up from the encryption area using the verification information into the cache area of the memory 130. The kernel 320 has direct access to the key in the cache region, so when the email application 380 is running after the screen is unlocked, if the email application 380 requests access to a certain sensitive data from the kernel 320 by calling the related API, the kernel 320 may obtain the key of the sensitive data from the cache region, thereby decrypting the sensitive data using the key, and feeding the decrypted sensitive data back to the email application 380. The terminal lock screen will trigger the kernel 320 to delete the key stored in the cache area, preventing malicious programs from accessing sensitive data in the case that a legitimate user does not unlock the key in an unauthorized manner.

In addition, in fig. 3, only the kernel 320 in the normal execution environment (rich execution environment, re) is used to illustrate the maintenance procedure for the key in the cache area. In some embodiments of the present application, a special processor, a memory, and other components may be further disposed in the terminal to construct a key protection system such as a trusted execution environment (trusted execution environment, tee) or a Secure Element (SE). In this way, the key protection system can maintain the key in the buffer area to strengthen the security of the terminal.

However, the user who operates the mobile phone 100 after the screen is unlocked is not necessarily a legitimate user, for example, the mobile phone 100 is borrowed or robbed by other people after the screen is unlocked. However, after the screen is unlocked, the mobile phone 100 stores a key for decrypting the sensitive data in the buffer area, so that an unauthorized illegal user can access the sensitive data by using the key when operating the mobile phone 100, and potential safety hazards such as user information leakage are caused.

The legal user refers to a user who can pass through the identity authentication measures preset by the terminal, for example, the identity authentication measures preset by the terminal are fingerprint identification and face recognition, and then the user which stores the fingerprint information and the face information after the identity authentication of the user in the terminal in advance can be considered as the legal user of the terminal. Of course, a legitimate user of a terminal may include one or more, and any user other than the legitimate user may be considered an illegitimate user of the terminal. The illegal user can be converted into the legal user after a certain identity authentication measure, and the embodiment of the application does not limit the method.

In the data access method provided by the embodiment of the application, after the terminal unlocks the screen, the identity of the user operating the terminal can be still continuously authenticated, so that if the sensitive application running on the terminal requests to access the encrypted sensitive data, the terminal can acquire the key for decrypting the sensitive data when confirming that the current user is a legal user, and the key is used for accessing the sensitive data.

Otherwise, the terminal can prevent the sensitive application from accessing the sensitive data of the user by deleting the secret key of the secret sensitive data, shielding the access request of the sensitive application, even forcibly closing the sensitive application or forcibly closing the switch, and the like, thereby avoiding the acquisition of the sensitive data of the user when the illegal user operates the terminal and improving the safety of the terminal.

It can be seen that in the embodiment of the application, the access authority of the sensitive data is not solely dependent on the identity authentication performed on the user when the screen is unlocked, but can still perform continuous identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal after the screen is unlocked, so that the sensitive data of the user can be protected in real time according to the real-time identity authentication result, and the risk of information leakage of the user is reduced.

Specifically, when the terminal is in the screen locking state, the terminal can receive identity authentication information input by a user, such as a fingerprint, a digital code, a pattern code and the like. Furthermore, the terminal can judge whether the user is a legal user according to the identity authentication information input by the user. When the user is determined to be a legal user, the terminal can unlock the screen, and the user can use the application and the data installed in the terminal after the screen is unlocked; correspondingly, when the user is determined to be an illegal user, the terminal continues to keep a screen locking state, and the user cannot use the application and the data installed in the terminal in the screen locking state.

For example, if a fingerprint of the user Sam for unlocking a screen is stored in the terminal in advance, as shown in FIG. 4, if Sam inputs a fingerprint (i.e., identity authentication information) on the fingerprint recognition device 501 of the terminal when the terminal is in a screen locking state, the terminal matches the fingerprint input by Sam with the fingerprint stored in advance. When the similarity of the two is greater than the threshold value, sam is a legal user of the terminal, so that the terminal can unlock the screen and the interactivity between the terminal screen and the user is restored. As shown in fig. 4, the screen may be unlocked and the desktop 502 of the terminal may be accessed, where the desktop 502 includes one or more installed applications.

Wherein the application requiring access to sensitive data of the user at runtime is a privacy application. For example, the sensitive data of the user includes the mailbox address of the user, and the application 503 named "mail" in fig. 4 needs to obtain the sensitive data of the mailbox address of the user during the running process, so the application 503 of "mail" can be regarded as a sensitive application.

When the screen is unlocked, the terminal can still continuously carry out identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal, for example, when a fingerprint identification device is integrated on a display screen of the terminal, the terminal can periodically collect fingerprints received on the display screen after the screen is unlocked, so as to identify whether the fingerprints are matched with the fingerprints of prestored legal users. When the collected fingerprint is matched with the prestored fingerprint of the legal user, the current user is indicated to be the legal user; otherwise, the current user is an illegal user.

Then, as shown in fig. 5, when the terminal detects that the illegal user Tom tries to open the sensitive application 503 of "mail", in order to avoid that the sensitive data of the legal user is leaked, the terminal may mask the operation of opening the application 503 of "mail" and display a prompt 601 that the operation is invalid.

For example, in connection with the programming module 310 shown in fig. 2, when the middleware 330 or the kernel 320 of the terminal detects that an illegal user requests an operation of opening the above-described "mail" application 503, reporting of the operation to the "mail" application 503 in the application 370 may be stopped. In this way, the "mail" application 503 does not respond to the opening operation either, making the operation of opening the "mail" application 503 ineffective.

Alternatively, when the middleware 330 or the kernel 320 of the terminal detects that the illegal user requests the operation of opening the "mail" application 503, the operation may be continuously reported to the "mail" application 503 in the application 370, and the "mail" application 503 may not respond to the operation when confirming that the current user is the illegal user, so that the operation of opening the "mail" application 503 is invalid.

Alternatively, when the middleware 330 or the kernel 320 of the terminal detects that an illegal user requests the operation of opening the above-mentioned "mail" application 503, the terminal may delete the acquired key for decrypting the sensitive data. Thus, even if the "mail" application 503 obtains the operation that the illegal user requests to open the "mail" application, and responds to the opening operation according to the normal response flow, since the kernel 320 cannot obtain the effective key for decrypting the sensitive data when the "mail" application 503 requests to access the sensitive data to the kernel 320, the encrypted sensitive data cannot be decrypted, thereby avoiding the sensitive data of the legal user from being revealed by the illegal user.

In other embodiments of the present application, as shown in fig. 6, when the terminal detects that an illegal user Tom tries to open a sensitive application 503, the terminal may further authenticate the current user operating the terminal. For example, in fig. 6 the terminal displays a prompt 701 requesting the user to enter a fingerprint for authentication.

Then, if the authentication passes, it is indicated that the illegal user Tom judged by the terminal is wrong, or the illegal user Tom requests the legal user Sam to input his fingerprint to authorize Tom to continue to access the "mail" application 503. At this time, the terminal may open and normally run the "mail" application 503 in response to the operation of Tom to open the "mail" application 503.

The manner in which the user is requested to input the fingerprint for identity authentication in fig. 6 is merely exemplary, and it can be understood that, when an illegal user is detected to request to access sensitive data, for example, when the sensitive is requested to be opened, the terminal may set one or more identity authentication manners to authenticate the identity of the current user, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.

For example, the terminal may set an application containing more sensitive data as a first application with a higher sensitivity level, and set an application containing less sensitive data as a second application with a lower sensitivity level.

When an illegal user is detected to request to access the first application, the terminal can identify whether the current user is a legal user or not through a plurality of identity authentication modes, for example, the user is required to perform face recognition and iris recognition simultaneously because the first application contains more sensitive data. Accordingly, when an illegal user is detected to request to access the second application, the terminal can identify whether the current user is a legal user only through one identity authentication mode, such as a mode of authenticating the fingerprint of the user, because the second application contains less sensitive data.

In order to illustrate the data access method provided by the embodiment of the present application in detail, the present application provides various implementation manners to implement the function of rejecting the illegal user to access the sensitive data shown in fig. 5 to 6.

In one possible implementation, as shown in fig. 7, after the terminal unlocks the screen, the terminal may be triggered to perform two operations, namely, the terminal is triggered to save the key in the encryption area to the cache area directly accessible to the kernel 320, and the terminal is triggered to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user.

When the key for decrypting the sensitive data is obtained, the terminal may obtain the verification information for accessing the encrypted area according to the identity authentication information input by the user during unlocking, further copy the key generated during starting from the encrypted area of the terminal memory by using the verification information, and store the key in the cache area of the memory, so that the sensitive application requiring the kernel to access the sensitive data requests the key in the cache area to decrypt the sensitive data.

Illustratively, in real-time authentication of the identity of the current user, the terminal may authenticate the identity of the current user based on the user's behavior pattern (user behavioral pattern) on the terminal. For example, the terminal may collect user behaviors (e.g., frequency, amplitude of clicking on a screen, frequency, time of using each application, gesture of holding the terminal, speed or acceleration of movement, etc.) of the legitimate user over a period of time, learn and judge behavior features (e.g., touch screen pressure, acceleration of movement, etc.) of the legitimate user through algorithms such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, etc. Thus, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal can collect the user behavior of the current user, if the user behavior of the current user is matched with the behavior characteristics of the legal user, the current user can be determined to be the legal user, and otherwise, the current user can be determined to be the illegal user.

Of course, the terminal may perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user periodically or aperiodically, which is not limited in any way by the embodiment of the present application.

Then, once the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key stored in the cache area in order to avoid that the illegal user triggers the sensitive application to access the sensitive data using the key in the cache area. In this way, when the terminal detects a request of an illegal user to access the sensitive data, for example, when the illegal user Tom requests to open the sensitive application "mail" 503, the sensitive application cannot acquire a valid key to decrypt the sensitive data, so that the request of accessing the sensitive data fails.

In another possible implementation, after the terminal unlocks the screen, similar to fig. 7, the terminal may be triggered to perform two operations, one is that the terminal is triggered to save the key in the encryption area to the cache area directly accessible to the kernel 320, and the other is triggered to authenticate the identity of the current user in real time.

In contrast, as shown in fig. 8, when the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, the key for decrypting the sensitive data stored in the buffer area is not immediately deleted. Because the illegal user does not have to access to the sensitive data in the terminal when operating the terminal, for example, when the illegal user Tom borrows the terminal of the legal user Sam to make a call, the sensitive data such as Sam mail will not be checked.

Therefore, the threat of revealing the sensitive data of the user is not necessarily caused after the current user is determined to be an illegal user, and therefore, the terminal can inquire the latest identity authentication result of the current user when receiving the request for accessing the sensitive data. If the identity authentication result shows that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can delete the secret key stored in the cache area.

In this way, a sensitive application requesting access to sensitive data cannot obtain a valid key to decrypt the sensitive data, thereby failing the above request to access sensitive data.

That is, when the terminal detects a request for accessing sensitive data and judges that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal is triggered to delete the key stored in the cache area, so that the terminal does not delete the key in the cache area frequently. Then, under the condition that the illegal user uses the terminal but does not access the sensitive data, the key of the sensitive data is still reserved in the buffer area, so that when the subsequent legal user requests to access the sensitive data on the terminal, the identity of the subsequent legal user does not need to be authenticated, and the password of the encryption area is copied to the buffer area again after the authentication is passed.

In another possible implementation manner, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal does not need to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user, but triggers the terminal to perform authentication on the identity of the current user when detecting that the user requests to access the sensitive data, so that a large amount of electricity consumption caused by real-time identity authentication is reduced.

As shown in fig. 9, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal may obtain verification information for accessing the encrypted area according to the identity authentication information input by the user during unlocking, and use the verification information to obtain a key for decrypting the sensitive data from the encrypted area, and further store the key in the buffer area. Subsequently, when the terminal detects that the user requests access to sensitive data, for example, when the user Tom opens the sensitive application "mail" 503, the terminal may be triggered to verify the identity of the current user Tom.

Then, if the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key stored in the cache area. Thus, when the sensitive application requests to access the sensitive data, the kernel cannot acquire a valid key to decrypt the sensitive data, so that the request for accessing the sensitive data fails.

Correspondingly, if the current user is a legal user, the terminal can acquire a key for decrypting the sensitive data from the cache area, and then access the encrypted sensitive data by using the key.

In another possible implementation manner, since the user operating the terminal cannot be confirmed as a legal user after the screen is unlocked, there may be no association between the two things that the terminal unlocks the screen and the terminal stores the key of the sensitive data in the buffer area.

As shown in fig. 10, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal may be triggered to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user, and when the terminal detects that the user requests to access the sensitive data, the terminal may confirm that the current user is a legal user or an illegal user according to the last obtained identity authentication result.

If the current user is a legal user, the terminal can require the user to input identity authentication information, and further obtain verification information for accessing the encryption area according to the identity authentication information, so that a key for decrypting the sensitive data is obtained from the encryption area by using the verification information, and the key is stored in the cache area. In this way, the terminal can use the key to access the encrypted sensitive data.

If the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may prompt the current user to re-authenticate the identity as shown in fig. 6. If the authentication is passed, the terminal can acquire a key for decrypting the sensitive data from the encryption area by using the corresponding verification information so as to access the sensitive data, otherwise, the terminal cannot respond to the request for accessing the sensitive data, and the sensitive data of the legal user is prevented from being revealed by the illegal user.

Further, in the method for accessing sensitive data shown in fig. 10, if the terminal supports real-time authentication of the user identity, the terminal can also authenticate the identity of the current user according to the user behavior such as the mode that the user holds the terminal in the state of screen-off or screen-black. Therefore, the above-described access method of sensitive data does not need to rely on the condition that the screen is in an unlocked state.

That is, the terminal may perform real-time authentication of the identity of the current user regardless of whether the screen of the terminal is in an unlocked state, for example, when the screen is lit, the terminal may be triggered to start real-time authentication of the identity of the current user. Then, when the terminal determines that the current user is a legal user, or the terminal determines that the current user is a legal user and detects that the legal user requests to access the sensitive data, the terminal may be triggered to store the key in the encryption area into the cache area directly accessible by the kernel 320.

Correspondingly, when the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, or the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user and detects that the illegal user requests to access the sensitive data, the terminal can be triggered to delete the key in the cache area and prompt the current user to re-authenticate the identity.

Of course, if the operation of legal user and/or illegal user input is not received within the preset time, the terminal may delete the key in the buffer area, for example, when the operation of legal user and/or illegal user input is not received within the preset time after the screen is closed or the screen is blocked, the terminal is triggered to delete the key in the buffer area, so as to avoid the malicious program from automatically accessing the sensitive data of the user through the key in the buffer area.

It should be noted that the above multiple possible implementations are merely illustrative, and those skilled in the art may set the manner in which the terminal refuses to access the sensitive data by the illegal user according to practical experience or practical application scenario, which is not limited in any way by the embodiment of the present application.

In addition, in the above embodiments, the specific implementation manner of the terminal for refusing the illegal user to access the sensitive data is described by taking the terminal for refusing the illegal user to access the sensitive application as an example. It can be understood that the terminal can also realize the purpose of refusing the illegal user to access the sensitive data by refusing the illegal user to access a certain function, a certain service or a certain window related to the sensitive data in the sensitive application.

Illustratively, as shown in fig. 11, the window containing the user sensitive data in the sensitive application "WeChat" is: chat window when chatting with friends. Then, after the screen is unlocked, the illegal user Tom may still open a "WeChat" application, and further, when the terminal detects that the illegal user Tom requests to open a certain window, for example, when the illegal user Tom clicks on the chat window with Sara in FIG. 11, the terminal may determine that the type of the window is a chat window related to sensitive data because the request includes an identifier (for example, activity name of the window) of the chat window.

At this time, the terminal may mask the operation that the illegal user Tom requests to open the chat window with Sara, for example, delete the key of the sensitive data in the buffer area, etc. At the same time, as also shown in fig. 11, the terminal may display a prompt 801 for further authentication of the current user. If the authentication is passed, the terminal may display a chat window with Sara in response to the operation of opening the chat window with Sara.

Further, when authenticating the identity of the current user, multiple identity authentication modes can be used to authenticate the identity of the current user. As shown in fig. 12, the terminal may prompt the user for both face recognition and fingerprint recognition to verify identity. The method is characterized in that after the terminal is stolen and robbed by an illegal user, the probability that the illegal user acquires a plurality of authentication information of a legal user is smaller, so that the probability of sensitive data leakage caused by the illegal user stealing the authentication information of the legal user can be reduced by using a plurality of authentication modes.

Or, in addition to rejecting the illegal user to access the sensitive application and rejecting the illegal user to access a certain function, a certain service or a certain window related to the sensitive data in the sensitive application, the terminal can reject the illegal user to access the sensitive data by masking the sensitive data.

Illustratively, as shown in fig. 13A, the sensitive data contained in the sensitive application "WeChat" is the telephone number "111-1111-1111". Then, when detecting that the illegal user Tom requests to open the chat window containing the sensitive data, the terminal may mask the sensitive data "111-1111-1111" and display the masked sensitive data 901, i.e. "x-". Thus, as shown in fig. 13A, although the terminal opens the chat window containing the sensitive data, the sensitive data in the chat window is anonymized through mask processing, so that the illegal user cannot acquire the real sensitive data, and the sensitive data of the legal user is prevented from being revealed by the illegal user.

Illustratively, the terminal marks a Word file named "8-month report" as sensitive data when storing the Word file, and stores the Word file using a certain encryption algorithm. Then, when detecting that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key for decrypting the Word file in the cache area. At this time, as shown in fig. 13B, the terminal may conceal the related information of the Word file 902 using a certain encryption form when displaying the Word file 902. When detecting that the illegal user Tom requests to open the Word file 902, the terminal cannot acquire the key of the Word file 902, so that the "WeChat" application cannot acquire the decrypted Word file 902. At this time, as shown in fig. 13B, the terminal may further determine whether the current user has the right to access the Word file 902 by verifying an identity authentication manner such as a startup password.

In addition, the terminal in the embodiment of the application can display the prompt that the terminal is operated by an illegal user through various methods. As shown in (a) of fig. 14, the terminal may prompt the user through text: the user of the current operation terminal is an illegal user; alternatively, as shown in (b) of fig. 14, the terminal may prompt the user by forced shutdown or forced shutdown of the sensitive application containing the sensitive data, etc.: the user of the current operation terminal is an illegal user; or, as shown in (c) of fig. 14, when the terminal detects that the user currently operating the terminal is an illegal user, the terminal may further set a right to open access to the sensitive data to the illegal user.

It should be noted that, the time when the terminal prompts the terminal to be operated by the illegal user may be triggered when the terminal determines that the current user is the illegal user, or may be triggered when the terminal determines that the illegal user requests to access the sensitive data of the legal user, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

Further, if an illegal user currently operating the terminal wishes to acquire rights to access the sensitive data, for example, when the terminal detects that the illegal user clicks the setting option shown in (c) of fig. 14, the terminal may enter a setting interface that opens rights to access the sensitive data to the illegal user.

For example, as shown in fig. 15 (a), when the authority to access the sensitive data is opened to the illegal user, the authority of the legal user of the terminal needs to be acquired first, for example, the authority of the legal user may be acquired by inputting the fingerprint of the legal user, detecting the face feature of the legal user, or the like. Further, as shown in (b) of fig. 15, a time limit for allowing an illegal user to access the sensitive data may be further set, for example, the illegal user may be allowed to access the sensitive data within 20 minutes.

Then, within the 20 minutes authorized by the legal user, the illegal user has the right to access the sensitive data, and the terminal can stop the identity authentication of the current user so as to reduce the power consumption of the terminal. Correspondingly, after the time exceeds 20 minutes authorized by the legal user, the terminal can delete the key for decrypting the sensitive data stored in the buffer area, so that the illegal user cannot continue to use the key to access the sensitive data.

Or after the time exceeds 20 minutes authorized by the legal user, the terminal can further carry out identity authentication on the identity of the current user, if the current user is converted from the illegal user to the legal user, the terminal does not need to delete the secret key stored in the cache area, otherwise, if the current user is still the illegal user, the terminal can delete the secret key stored in the cache area, so that the illegal user cannot continue to use the secret key to access the sensitive data.

Further, when the terminal detects that the user operating the terminal is changed from an illegal user to a legal user, for example, as shown in fig. 16, the illegal user Tom operates the terminal for a period of time and then gives the terminal to the legal user Sam for use, at this time, the terminal can determine that the current user is the legal user based on the user behavior of Sam. Then, since the terminal has deleted the key for accessing the sensitive data from the buffer area when detecting that the illegal user Tom operates the terminal, the terminal can copy the key from the encryption area of the memory to the buffer area again automatically at this time, thereby recovering the authority of the legal user Sam for accessing the sensitive data, and the legal user Sam is not required to perform identity authentication again. Meanwhile, as shown in fig. 16, the terminal may prompt the user that the access right of the legitimate user to the sensitive data has been restored, and the legitimate user may use the key to access the sensitive data.

Of course, as shown in fig. 17, the user may open a control 1001 in the setting interface of the terminal to open the access protection function for the above-mentioned sensitive data. Further, after the terminal opens the protection function, the user can further set which applications or which functions in the applications are running, and the generated data are sensitive data, so that when the user requests to open the applications or the functions are detected subsequently, the sensitive data can be protected by the data access method in the embodiment; in addition, the user can also set a specific verification mode when the illegal user accesses the sensitive data, and which users are used as legal users with the authority to access the sensitive data, and the like.

For example, as shown in (a) of fig. 18, at least one application may be set as a sensitive application with application granularity when setting specific sensitive data. When the subsequent terminal detects that the illegal user accesses the sensitive application set by the user, the data access method provided in the above embodiment can reject the illegal user from accessing the encrypted sensitive data. Of course, the user can set specific sensitive data according to the window type, service type or data type in the application, and when the user sets the window type and service type, the terminal identifies the data to be accessed by the set window type or service type and sets the data as sensitive data. The embodiment of the application does not limit how to set the sensitive data.

Illustratively, as shown in (b) of fig. 18, when a specific authentication mode is set, the user may set one or more authentication modes to authenticate the identity of the user requesting access to the sensitive data. When the user sets a plurality of verification modes, if the terminal detects that an illegal user accesses the sensitive data, the user can access the sensitive data after passing through each set verification mode.

In addition, when the user sets the various protection functions of the above sensitive data in the setting interface shown in fig. 17 to 18, the terminal can also authenticate the identity of the current user. If the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can prohibit the illegal user from setting various protection functions of the sensitive data. That is, only when the legal user sets the protection functions of the sensitive data, the setting will be effective, so that the illegal user can be prevented from obtaining the right of accessing the sensitive data by modifying the setting options.

In the application, after the terminal unlocks the screen, the identity authentication of the current user can be continued based on the user behavior of the user on the terminal and other modes. In other embodiments of the present application, the terminal may then determine access rights to different data or applications in its memory based on the identity authentication result of the current user.

For example, as shown in fig. 19, when the terminal detects that the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal may be set to have access rights to all data (e.g., sensitive data and non-sensitive data) stored therein. When the terminal detects that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can be set to have access rights only to the stored non-sensitive data, namely, the terminal cannot read the stored sensitive data at the moment.

Then, as shown in fig. 20A, the terminal marks the Word file named "8-month report" as sensitive data when storing the Word file. Subsequently, when the legal user Sam opens the chat record containing the sensitive data, the terminal has access rights to all the sensitive data at the moment, so the terminal can display the decrypted Word file by acquiring the key of the Word file. Accordingly, when the illegal user Tom opens the chat log containing the sensitive data, the terminal only has access rights to the non-sensitive data, that is, the terminal cannot perceive the Word file, so the terminal does not include the Word file when displaying the chat log with Sara.

Or, the terminal may also apply to set the access rights of the terminal for granularity. For example, when the terminal detects that the current user is a legal user, the terminal may be set to have access rights to both sensitive applications and non-sensitive applications. When the terminal detects that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can be set to have access rights only to non-sensitive applications which do not need to access sensitive data.

Then, as shown in fig. 20B, three applications of "contact", "short message", and "mail" need to access sensitive data of the user at the time of operation, and thus the three applications can be set as sensitive applications. Subsequently, when the legitimate user Sam operates the terminal, the terminal can display icons of all applications installed on the desktop because the terminal has access rights to all applications at this time. Correspondingly, when the illegal user Tom operates the terminal, the terminal only has access rights to the non-sensitive application, so that the terminal cannot acquire the related information of the sensitive application when displaying the desktop, and cannot display the icon of the sensitive application.

It will be appreciated that the above-described terminal, etc. may comprise hardware structures and/or software modules that perform the respective functions in order to achieve the above-described functions. Those of skill in the art will readily appreciate that the various illustrative elements and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as hardware or combinations of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is implemented as hardware or computer software driven hardware depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the embodiments of the present application.

The embodiment of the application can divide the functional modules of the terminal and the like according to the method example, for example, each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, and two or more functions can be integrated in one processing module. The integrated modules may be implemented in hardware or in software functional modules. It should be noted that, in the embodiment of the present application, the division of the modules is schematic, which is merely a logic function division, and other division manners may be implemented in actual implementation.

Fig. 21 shows a possible structural diagram of the terminal involved in the above-described embodiment in the case of dividing respective functional modules with corresponding respective functions, the terminal including: an authentication unit 2101, an acquisition unit 2102, a response unit 2103, a deletion unit 2104, and a display unit 2105.

In one possible implementation, the authentication unit 2101 is configured to automatically perform identity authentication on a current user of the operation terminal; an acquiring unit 2102 configured to acquire a request for accessing sensitive data by a sensitive application, the sensitive data having been encrypted using a key, the sensitive application being an application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime; and a response unit 2103, configured to provide an access result to the sensitive application, where when the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the access result does not include the sensitive data.

Further, when the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, the deleting unit 2104 is configured to delete the key for decrypting the sensitive data.

Further, the acquisition unit 2102 is further configured to: generating the key for unlocking the sensitive data when the terminal is started; the key is stored in an encryption area protected by an encryption algorithm.

Further, the acquisition unit 2102 is further configured to: when a screen of the terminal is unlocked, acquiring check information, wherein the check information is associated with identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the check information is preset by the terminal; and saving the key stored in the encryption area into a cache area by using the verification information.

Further, the acquisition unit 2102 is further configured to: if the current user is a legal user as a result of the identity authentication, acquiring check information, wherein the check information is related to the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the check information is preset by the terminal; and saving the key stored in the encryption area into a cache area by using the verification information.

At this time, the deleting unit 2104 is specifically configured to delete the key stored in the cache area.

Further, the acquisition unit 2102 specifically functions to: if the operation of opening the sensitive application by the current user is detected, acquiring a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data; or alternatively; if the operation of opening a target application interface in the sensitive application by the current user is detected, acquiring a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data, wherein the target application interface is an application interface containing the sensitive data.

Further, the authentication unit 2101 specifically functions to: automatically acquiring user behaviors when a current user operates a terminal; and authenticating the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with prestored behavior characteristics of legal users.

Further, the display unit 2105 is used for displaying a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data.

Further, when a hint for opening access rights to an illegal user is included in the first interface, the obtaining unit 2102 is further configured to: acquiring the authorization of a legal user to the access authority of an open illegal user; and acquiring the effective time length of the illegal user for accessing the sensitive data.

Further, the display unit 2105 is also configured to: if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data within the effective duration, displaying a second interface containing the sensitive data; and after the effective duration is exceeded, if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data, displaying a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data.

In another possible implementation, the authentication unit 2101 is configured to automatically perform identity authentication on a current user of the operation terminal; a display unit 2105 for: if the current user is an illegal user as a result of the identity authentication, displaying a first interface, wherein the first interface does not contain the sensitive data or sensitive application which needs to access the sensitive data in running; and if the current user is a legal user as a result of the identity authentication, displaying a second interface, wherein the second interface comprises the sensitive data or sensitive application which needs to access the sensitive data in running.

All relevant contents of each step related to the above method embodiment may be cited to the functional description of the corresponding functional module, which is not described herein.

In the case of using integrated units, as shown in fig. 22, a schematic diagram of a possible structure of the terminal involved in the above embodiment is shown, including a processing module 2201, a storage module 2202, an output module 2203, and an input module 2204.

The processing module 2201 is configured to control and manage an action of the terminal. The input module 2204 is used for supporting information interaction between the terminal and the user. The memory module 2202 is used to store program codes and data for the terminal. The output module 2204 is used to output information input by a user or information provided to the user and various menus of the terminal.

Illustratively, the processing module 2201 may correspond to the functions of the authentication unit 2101, the response unit 2103, and the deletion unit 2104, the output module 2203 may correspond to the functions of the display unit 2105, and the input module 2204 may correspond to the functions of the acquisition unit 2102.

In particular, the processing module 2201 may be a processor or controller, such as a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), GPU, general purpose processor, digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, DSP), application-specific integrated circuit (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), field programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or other programmable logic device, transistor logic device, hardware components, or any combination thereof. Which may implement or perform the various exemplary logic blocks, modules and circuits described in connection with this disclosure. The processor may also be a combination that performs the function of a computation, e.g., a combination comprising one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, and the like.

The memory module 2202 may be memory, which may include high speed Random Access Memory (RAM), and may also include non-volatile memory, such as magnetic disk storage devices, flash memory devices, or other volatile solid-state memory devices, and the like.

The output module 2203 may be a display, a speaker, or an earphone, for example, and may be specifically configured in the form of a liquid crystal display, an organic light emitting diode, or the like. In addition, a touch pad may be integrated on the display for capturing touch events thereon or thereabout and transmitting the captured touch information to other devices (e.g., a processor, etc.).

The input module 2204 may be a touch screen, transceiver circuitry, bluetooth device, wi-Fi device, peripheral interface, or the like, for receiving user input.

When the processing module 2201 is the processor 120, the storage module 2202 is the memory 130, the output module 2203 is the display module 160, and the input module 2204 is the user input module 150, the terminal provided by the embodiment of the application may be the mobile phone 100 shown in fig. 1.

In the above embodiments, it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using a software program, may be present in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When loaded and executed on a computer, produces a flow or function in accordance with embodiments of the present application, in whole or in part. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable apparatus. The computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another, for example, by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital Subscriber Line (DSL)), or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, etc. that contains an integration of one or more available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy Disk, hard Disk, tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., solid State Disk (SSD)), etc.

The foregoing is merely illustrative of specific embodiments of the present application, and the scope of the present application is not limited thereto, but any changes or substitutions within the technical scope of the present application should be covered by the scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method of data access, comprising:

when a terminal is started, the terminal generates a key for unlocking sensitive data, wherein the sensitive data is encrypted by using the key;

the terminal stores the secret key in an encryption area protected by an encryption algorithm;

when a screen of the terminal is unlocked, the terminal acquires verification information which is related to identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the verification information is preset by the terminal;

the terminal uses the verification information to store the secret key stored in the encryption area into a cache area;

the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on a current user operating the terminal;

the terminal acquires a request of a sensitive application for accessing sensitive data, wherein the sensitive application is an application which needs to access the sensitive data in the running process;

Responding to the request, the terminal provides an access result for the sensitive application, wherein when the identity authentication result is that the current user is an illegal user, the access result does not contain the sensitive data;

when the terminal receives a request for accessing the sensitive data, inquiring the identity authentication result of the current user last time; and if the latest identity authentication result of the current user shows that the current user is the illegal user, deleting the secret key stored in the cache area by the terminal.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising, after the terminal automatically authenticates the identity of a current user operating the terminal:

if the identity authentication result is that the current user is a legal user, the terminal acquires check information, wherein the check information is associated with the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the check information is preset by the terminal;

and the terminal uses the verification information to store the secret key stored in the encryption area into a cache area.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the terminal obtaining a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data comprises:

if the operation of opening the sensitive application by the current user is detected, the terminal acquires a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data; or alternatively;

if the operation of opening a target application interface in the sensitive application by the current user is detected, the terminal acquires a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data, wherein the target application interface is an application interface containing the sensitive data.

4. A method according to any of claims 1-3, characterized in that the terminal automatically authenticates the current user operating the terminal, comprising:

the terminal automatically acquires user behaviors when a current user operates the terminal;

and the terminal authenticates the identity of the current user by comparing the user behavior with the prestored behavior characteristics of the legal user.

5. A method according to any of claims 1-3, characterized in that after the terminal provides the access result to the sensitive application, it further comprises:

the terminal displays a first interface that does not contain the sensitive data.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the first interface includes a prompt for invalidating the access request, inputting authentication information, masking the sensitive data, or opening access rights to an unauthorized user.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein when the first interface includes a prompt to open access rights to an illegitimate user,

after the terminal displays the first interface which does not contain the sensitive data, the method further comprises the following steps:

the terminal obtains the authorization of legal users to open the access rights of illegal users;

and the terminal acquires the effective time length of the illegal user accessing the sensitive data.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising, after the terminal obtains the effective duration for determining that the illegal user accessed the sensitive data:

if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data within the effective duration, the terminal displays a second interface containing the sensitive data;

and after the effective duration is exceeded, if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data, the terminal displays a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data.

9. A terminal comprising a processor, a memory coupled to the processor, and an input device coupled to the processor, wherein,

the processor is configured to: when the terminal is started, a secret key for unlocking sensitive data is generated; storing the key in an encryption area of the memory protected by an encryption algorithm;

the input device is used for: when the screen of the terminal is unlocked, or when the processor judges that the current user is a legal user, acquiring check information, wherein the check information is associated with identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the check information is preset by the terminal;

the processor is further configured to: storing the key stored in the encryption area into a cache area of the memory by using the verification information;

the memory is used for: storing sensitive data, the sensitive data having been encrypted using a key;

the processor is further configured to: automatically authenticating the identity of the current user operating the terminal; acquiring a request of a sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data, wherein the sensitive application is an application which needs to access the sensitive data in running; responding to the request, and providing an access result for the sensitive application, wherein when the identity authentication result is that the current user is an illegal user, the access result does not contain the sensitive data;

Wherein when the terminal receives a request to access the sensitive data, the processor is further configured to: inquiring the latest identity authentication result of the current user; and if the latest identity authentication result of the current user shows that the current user is the illegal user, deleting the secret key stored in the cache area by the terminal.

10. The terminal of claim 9, wherein the terminal comprises a base station,

the input device is further configured to: receiving the operation of opening the sensitive application by the current user, or receiving the operation of opening a target application interface in the sensitive application by the current user, wherein the target application interface is an application interface containing the sensitive data;

the processor is specifically configured to: and responding to the operation, and acquiring a request of the sensitive application for accessing the sensitive data.

11. The terminal of claim 9, wherein the terminal comprises a base station,

the input device is further configured to: automatically acquiring user behaviors when a current user operates the terminal;

the processor is specifically configured to: and authenticating the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with the prestored behavior characteristics of the legal user.

12. The terminal according to any of the claims 9-11, characterized in that the terminal further comprises an output device connected to the processor,

the output device is used for: displaying a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data, wherein the first interface comprises a prompt for invalidating an access request, a prompt for inputting identity authentication information, the sensitive data after mask processing or a prompt for opening access rights to illegal users.

13. The terminal of claim 12, wherein when the first interface includes a prompt to open access rights to an illegitimate user,

the input device is further configured to: acquiring the authorization of a legal user to the access authority of an open illegal user; and acquiring the effective time length of the illegal user for accessing the sensitive data.

14. The terminal of claim 13, wherein the terminal comprises a base station,

the input device is further configured to: detecting that an illegal user requests to access the sensitive data within the effective duration; or after the effective duration is exceeded, detecting that an illegal user requests to access the sensitive data;

the output device is further configured to: if the illegal user is detected to request to access the sensitive data within the effective duration, displaying a second interface containing the sensitive data; and if the valid time period is exceeded, detecting that the illegal user requests to access the sensitive data, displaying a first interface which does not contain the sensitive data.

15. A computer readable storage medium having instructions stored therein, which when run on a terminal, cause the terminal to perform the data access method of any of claims 1-8.