WO2019127467A1

WO2019127467A1 - Data access method and device

Info

Publication number: WO2019127467A1
Application number: PCT/CN2017/120131
Authority: WO
Inventors: 朱江; 桑玉蕾; 方习文; 张冠男; 李基�
Original assignee: 华为技术有限公司
Priority date: 2017-12-29
Filing date: 2017-12-29
Publication date: 2019-07-04
Also published as: CN110651270B; CN110651270A

Abstract

Embodiments of the present application provide a data access method and device, relating to the technical field of communications. The method reduces risk of a user information leak, and improves security of a terminal. The method comprises: a terminal automatically performing identity authentication on a current user operating the terminal; the terminal obtaining a request of a sensitive application to access sensitive data, the sensitive data having been encrypted by means of a key, and the sensitive application being an application needing to access the sensitive data during operation; and in response to the request, the terminal providing an access result to the sensitive application, wherein if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an unauthorized user, the access result does not comprise the sensitive data.

Description

Data access method and device

Technical field

The embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a data access method and apparatus.

Background technique

Data (such as applications, photos, etc.) in terminals such as mobile phones and tablets are usually stored in the form of files in the memory of the terminal. For data sensitive to the user, such as the user's call record, transfer information, application account and password, etc., the terminal may encrypt and store the sensitive data using a certain encryption algorithm. Then, when the terminal needs to access the above sensitive data, it is necessary to first obtain a key for decrypting the sensitive data, and then use the key to access the encrypted sensitive data.

Generally, when the screen of the terminal enters the unlocked state from the locked state, an authentication method such as a fingerprint, a face or a password is required. Authenticate the user identity of the current operation. If the authentication succeeds, the user of the current operation terminal is considered to be a legitimate user, and the terminal can automatically generate a key for decrypting the sensitive data and store it in the cache. When the user triggers the terminal to access the sensitive data, the terminal can obtain the password from the cache. This key thus successfully accesses sensitive data.

However, after the terminal screen is unlocked, the user who operates the terminal is not necessarily a legitimate user authenticated by the terminal. For example, after the terminal screen is unlocked, it is borrowed or stolen by others. However, at this time, the terminal has generated a key that can be used to decrypt the sensitive data, so that the illegal user who has not passed the terminal authentication can also use the key to access the sensitive data, resulting in security risks such as user information leakage.

Summary of the invention

The embodiment of the present application provides a data access method and device, which can reduce the risk of user information leakage and improve the security of the terminal.

To achieve the above objective, the embodiment of the present application adopts the following technical solutions:

In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a data access method, including: the terminal can automatically perform identity authentication on a current user of the operation terminal; and subsequently, when the terminal acquires sensitive application access sensitive data (the sensitive data has been used by the key is In response to the request, the terminal may provide an access result to the sensitive application according to the result of the identity authentication, wherein when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the access result is not included in the access result. This contains sensitive data.

It can be seen that, in the embodiment of the present application, the access authority of the terminal to the sensitive data is not solely dependent on the identity authentication performed by the user when the screen is unlocked, but the current user of the operation terminal may still be displayed after the screen is opened or the screen is unlocked. Continuous identity authentication is performed, so that the user's sensitive data can be protected in real time according to the real-time identity authentication result, thereby preventing the illegal user from accessing the sensitive data of the legitimate user when operating the terminal, thereby improving the security of the terminal.

In a possible design method, after the terminal automatically authenticates the current user of the operation terminal, and before the terminal obtains the request of the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, the method further includes: if the result of the identity authentication is the current user If the user is an illegal user, the terminal deletes the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, after the terminal obtains the request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, and before the terminal provides the first access result to the sensitive application, the method further includes: if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is illegal The user deletes the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.

That is to say, when the terminal detects that the illegal user operates the terminal, the sensitive application can be prevented from accessing the sensitive data by deleting the key, and the terminal can also delete the key when the terminal detects that the illegal user triggers the sensitive application to request access to the sensitive data. Ways to prevent sensitive applications from accessing sensitive data.

In a possible design method, the method further includes: when the terminal is powered on, the terminal may generate the key for unlocking the sensitive data; and store the key in an encrypted area protected by an encryption algorithm. The key in the encryption zone is allowed to be accessed only after obtaining the verification information associated with the user's valid identity authentication information.

Then, when the screen of the terminal is unlocked, the terminal may acquire verification information associated with the identity authentication information input by the user, and then use the verification information to save the key stored in the encrypted area to the cache area. Of course, if the user does not set identity authentication information for the terminal, the verification information may be preset for the terminal.

Alternatively, when the result of the identity authentication indicates that the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal may obtain the verification information, and use the verification information to save the key stored in the encryption area to the cache area.

At this time, when the terminal deletes the key for decrypting the sensitive data, the key that is located in the cache area is specifically deleted.

In a possible design method, the terminal obtains a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, and specifically includes: if the current user opens the operation of the sensitive application, the terminal acquires the request of the sensitive application to access the sensitive data; or If it is detected that the current user opens the target application interface in the sensitive application (the target application interface is an application interface that includes the sensitive data), the terminal acquires a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, the terminal automatically authenticates the current user of the operation terminal, which specifically includes: the terminal automatically acquires the user behavior when the current user operates the terminal; and the terminal compares the behavior of the user with the behavior of the pre-stored legal user. The feature authenticates the identity of the current user, thereby implementing a real-time authentication process for the current user identity.

In a possible design method, after the terminal provides the access result to the sensitive application, the method further includes: the terminal displaying the first interface that does not include the sensitive data.

The first interface may include a prompt for invalidation of the access request, a prompt for inputting the identity authentication information, the sensitive data after the mask processing, or a prompt for opening the access right to the illegal user.

After the first interface includes the prompt for opening the access right to the unauthorized user, after the terminal displays the first interface that does not include the sensitive data, the terminal may further include: the terminal acquiring the authorization of the legal user to open the unauthorized user access right; the terminal acquiring the The length of time an illegal user can access the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, if an illegal user is requested to access the sensitive data within the valid duration, the terminal displays a second interface that includes the sensitive data; if the illegal user is detected after the valid duration is exceeded, When requesting access to the sensitive data, the terminal displays a first interface that does not include the sensitive data.

In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a data access method, including: the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on a current user of the operation terminal; if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal only stores the The non-sensitive data has access rights. At this time, the terminal cannot read the stored sensitive data. Therefore, the first interface displayed by the terminal does not include the sensitive data or a sensitive application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime; if the identity authentication The result is that the current user is a legitimate user, and the terminal has access rights to the stored sensitive data and non-sensitive data. At this time, the second interface displayed by the terminal includes the sensitive data or the sensitivity of the runtime to access the sensitive data. application.

In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a terminal, including: an authentication unit, configured to automatically perform identity authentication on a current user of an operation terminal, and an obtaining unit, configured to acquire a request for sensitive application to access sensitive data, where the sensitive data has been The sensitive application is an application that needs to access the sensitive data at the runtime; the response unit is configured to provide an access result to the sensitive application, wherein when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, This access result does not include the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, the terminal further includes a deleting unit, and when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the deleting unit is configured to delete the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, the obtaining unit is further configured to: when the terminal is powered on, generate the key for unlocking the sensitive data; store the key in an encrypted area protected by an encryption algorithm.

In a possible design method, the obtaining unit is further configured to: when the screen of the terminal is unlocked, acquire verification information, where the verification information is associated with the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the verification The information is preset for the terminal; the key stored in the encrypted area is saved to the cache area using the verification information.

In a possible design method, the obtaining unit is further configured to: if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, obtain verification information, and the verification information and the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked Correspondingly, the verification information is preset by the terminal; using the verification information, the key stored in the encryption area is saved in the cache area.

In a possible design method, the unit is deleted, specifically for deleting the key stored in the cache area.

In a possible design method, the obtaining unit is specifically configured to: if detecting that the current user opens the sensitive application, obtain a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data; or; if the current user is detected When the operation of the target application interface in the sensitive application is opened, a request for accessing the sensitive data by the sensitive application is obtained, and the target application interface is an application interface that includes the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, the authentication unit is specifically configured to: automatically obtain the user behavior when the current user operates the terminal; and authenticate the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with the behavior characteristics of the pre-stored legal user.

In a possible design method, the terminal further includes a display unit for displaying the first interface that does not include the sensitive data.

In a possible design method, when the first interface includes a prompt for opening an access right to an illegal user, the obtaining unit is further configured to: obtain a legal user's authorization to open an unauthorized user access right; and obtain the illegal user access to the The effective duration of sensitive data.

In a possible design method, the display unit is further configured to display, during the valid duration, a second interface that includes the sensitive data if an illegal user is requested to access the sensitive data; when the valid duration is exceeded If an illegal user is detected to request access to the sensitive data, a first interface that does not include the sensitive data is displayed.

In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a terminal, including: an authentication unit, configured to automatically perform identity authentication on a current user of the operation terminal, and a display unit, configured to: if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is illegal The user displays a first interface, where the first interface does not include the sensitive data or a sensitive application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime; if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, the second interface is displayed, and the second interface is displayed. The interface contains the sensitive data or sensitive applications that need to access the sensitive data at runtime.

In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a terminal, including: a processor, a memory, an output device, and an input device connected by a bus; the memory is configured to store a computer to execute an instruction, and the processor is connected to the memory through the bus. When the terminal is running, the processor executes the computer execution instruction stored in the memory to enable the terminal to execute any of the above data access methods.

In a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium, where the computer readable storage medium stores an instruction, when the instruction is run on any one of the foregoing terminals, causing the terminal to perform any one of the foregoing data accesses. method.

In a seventh aspect, the embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product, including instructions, when the terminal runs on any of the foregoing terminals, causing the terminal to execute any of the foregoing data access methods.

In the embodiment of the present application, the names of the components in the terminal are not limited to the device itself, and in actual implementation, the components may appear under other names. As long as the functions of the various components are similar to the embodiments of the present application, they are within the scope of the claims and their equivalents.

In addition, the technical effects brought by the design method of any one of the second aspect to the seventh aspect can be referred to the technical effects brought by different design methods in the above first aspect, and details are not described herein again.

DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram 1 of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

2 is a schematic structural diagram of a programming module in a terminal according to an embodiment of the present application;

3 is a schematic diagram of an access process of sensitive data in the prior art;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram 1 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram 2 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram 3 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram 1 of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram 2 of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram 3 of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram 4 of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram 4 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram 5 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 13A is a schematic diagram 6 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 13B is a schematic diagram 7 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram 8 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram 9 of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 17 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 19 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 20 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application; FIG.

FIG. 20B is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 21 is a schematic structural diagram 2 of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 22 is a schematic structural diagram 3 of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Detailed ways

In the following, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only, and are not to be construed as indicating or implying a relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, features defining "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the embodiments of the present application, "multiple" means two or more unless otherwise stated.

A data access method provided by an embodiment of the present application can be applied to a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a wearable device, an in-vehicle device, an augmented reality (AR), a virtual reality (VR) device, a notebook computer, and a super mobile device. The embodiment of the present application does not impose any limitation on any terminal having a friend function, such as an ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), a netbook, or a personal digital assistant (PDA).

As shown in FIG. 1 , the terminal in the embodiment of the present application may be the mobile phone 100. The embodiment will be specifically described below by taking the mobile phone 100 as an example. It should be understood that the illustrated mobile phone 100 is only one example of the above terminal, and the mobile phone 100 may have more or fewer components than those shown in FIG. 1, and two or more components may be combined, or Can have different component configurations.

Referring to FIG. 1, the handset 100 can communicate with other

electronic devices

102 and 104, other than the handset 100, and the server 106. The handset 100 can include a bus 110, a processor 120, a memory 130, a user input module 150, a display module 160, a communication interface 170, and other similar and/or suitable components.

Bus 110 may be circuitry that interconnects the above elements and communicates (e.g., control messages) between the elements.

The processor 120 can receive commands from the other components (such as the memory 130, the user input module 150, the display module 160, the communication interface 170, the communication configuration control module 170, etc.) through the bus 110, can interpret the received commands, and can Interpret commands to perform calculations or data processing.

Memory 130 may store commands or data received from processor 120 or other components (e.g., user input module 150, display module 160, communication interface 170, etc.) or commands or data generated by processor 120 or other components.

Memory 130 may include programming modules such as kernel 131, middleware 132, application programming interface (API) 133, applications 134, and the like. Each of the above programming modules may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware, or a combination of two or more thereof, as described in detail in the related description of FIG.

The kernel 131 may control or manage system resources (e.g., bus 110, processor 120, memory 130, etc.) for performing operations or functions implemented by other programming modules (e.g., middleware 132, API 133, and applications 134). Additionally, the kernel 131 can provide an interface that can access and control or manage the various elements of the handset 100 by using the middleware 132, the API 133, or the application 134.

The middleware 132 can be used to operate between the API 133 or the application 134 and the kernel 131 in communication with the kernel 131 with the API 133 or the application 134 and exchange data therewith. For example, the middleware 132 can be configured as an intermediary for communication between the API 133 or the application 134 and the kernel 131. Additionally, for example, regarding a work request received from one or more applications 134 and/or middleware 132, a priority may be assigned to at least one of the one or more applications 134 (where the priority may be Load balancing of work requests is performed using methods of system resources (e.g., bus 110, processor 120, memory 130, etc.) of handset 100.

The API 133 is an interface by which the application 134 can control functions provided by the kernel 131 or the middleware 132, and can include, for example, at least one interface or function for file control, window control, image processing, character control, and the like.

Applications 134 may include, for example, a home page application, a dialer application, a short message service (SMS)/multimedia message service (MMS) application, an instant messaging (IM) application, a browser application, a camera application, an alarm clock application, a contact application, voice dialing. Applications, email (e-mail) applications, calendar applications, media player applications, photo album applications, clock applications, and any other suitable and/or similar applications.

In the embodiment of the present application, the memory 130 can also be used to store data related to user privacy or user interests, such as a user's call record, transfer information, bank account number, password, etc., and these data are referred to as sensitive data in subsequent embodiments. The processor 120 can distinguish the particular data in the memory 130 as sensitive data by adding a specific identification.

Then, when running a specific application, the application can request access to the above sensitive data and present the sensitive data to the user through the display interface. In the embodiment of the present application, an application that needs to access sensitive data at runtime may be referred to as a sensitive application, for example, a payment application, a banking application, and a chat application.

Or, when running a particular window or service in the application, the application can request access to the sensitive data and present the sensitive data to the user through the display interface. For example, when the "Taobao" application runs the payment window, it can trigger the sensitive data of the "Taobao" application requesting access to the user's bank account.

Correspondingly, the processor 120 can also store the data generated in the above sensitive application or the above specific window (or service) in the memory 130 by adding a specific identifier as sensitive data.

As shown in FIG. 1, the sensitive data is usually stored in the memory 130 in an encrypted form. Then, when the mobile phone 100 needs to access the sensitive data, the key for decrypting the sensitive data needs to be obtained first, and then the key is used. The encrypted sensitive data is accessed in the memory 130.

The user input module 150 can receive commands or data input from a user via input-output means (eg, sensors, keyboards, touch screens, etc.) and can transmit the received commands or data to the processor 120 or memory 130 via the bus 110. Display module 160 can display video, images, data, and the like to the user.

The display module 160 can display various information (eg, multimedia data, text data) received from the above components.

Communication interface 170 can control a short range communication connection with another electronic device 102. When the mobile phone 100 is paired with another electronic device, the communication interface 170 may stop a scanning operation of waiting for receiving a signal from a neighboring electronic device or stopping a broadcast operation of a broadcast signal. For example, in response to the handset 100 being paired with another electronic device 102, the communication interface 170 stops waiting for a scan operation to receive a signal from a neighboring electronic device or a broadcast operation to stop the broadcast signal. When the handset 100 is paired with another electronic device, the communication interface 170 can control the period of the scanning or broadcast operation.

In accordance with various embodiments disclosed herein, handset 100 can communicate with another electronic device using communication interface 170. For example, communication interface 170 can communicate with another electronic device 104, server 106, and the like. Communication interface 170 can communicate with other electronic devices 104, servers 106, etc., either directly or through network 162. For example, communication interface 170 can operate to connect handset 100 to network 162.

2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a programming module in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Referring to FIG. 2, programming module 310 can be included (or stored) in handset 100 (e.g., memory 130) shown in FIG. At least a portion of programming module 310 can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, or a combination of two or more of them. Programming module 310 can be implemented as hardware (eg, hardware 201) and can include an OS that controls resources associated with an electronic device (eg, cell phone 100) and/or various applications (eg, applications 370) that are executed in the OS. For example, the OS can be Android, iOS, Windows, Symbian, Tizen, Bada, and the like.

Referring to FIG. 2, programming module 310 can include kernel 320, middleware 330, API 360, and/or application 370.

Kernel 320 (e.g., kernel 131) may include system resource manager 321 and/or device driver 323. The system resource manager 321 can include a process manager (not shown), a memory manager (not shown), and a file system manager (not shown). The system resource manager 321 can perform control, allocation, recovery, and the like of system resources. The device driver 323 may include, for example, a display driver (not shown), a camera driver (not shown), a Bluetooth driver (not shown), a shared memory driver (not shown), a USB driver (not shown) And a keypad driver (not shown), a Wi-Fi driver (not shown), and/or an audio driver (not shown). Moreover, in accordance with embodiments disclosed herein, device driver 323 can include an interprocess communication (IPC) driver (not shown).

The middleware 330 may include a plurality of modules that are implemented in advance to provide functions shared by the application 370. In addition, middleware 330 can provide functionality to application 370 via API 360 to enable application 370 to efficiently utilize limited system resources within the electronic device. For example, as shown in FIG. 2, the middleware 330 (eg, the middleware 132) may include at least one of the following: a runtime library 335, an application manager 341, a window manager 342, a multimedia manager 343, a resource manager 344, and a power supply. Manager 345, database manager 346, package manager 347, connection manager 348, notification manager 349, location manager 350, graphics manager 351, security manager 352, and any other suitable and/or similar manager.

The runtime library 335 can include library modules, such as used by a compiler, to add new functionality by using a programming language during execution of the application 370. According to an embodiment disclosed herein, the runtime 335 can perform functions related to input and output, management of memory, arithmetic functions, and the like.

The application manager 341 can manage, for example, the lifecycle of at least one application 370. Window manager 342 can manage graphical user interface (GUI) resources used on the screen. The multimedia manager 343 can detect a format for reproducing various media files, and can encode or decode the media file by using a codec suitable for the relevant format. The resource manager 344 can manage resources of at least one application 370, such as source code, memory, storage space, and the like.

The power manager 345 can operate with a basic input/output system (BIOS), can manage a battery or power source, and can provide power information for operation and the like. Database manager 346 can manage the database in a manner that enables generation, searching, and/or changing of a database to be used by at least one application 370. The package manager 347 can manage the installation and/or update of applications distributed in the form of package files.

Connection manager 348 can manage wireless connections such as Wi-Fi and BT. The notification manager 349 can display or report events such as arrival messages, appointments, proximity alerts, etc. to the user in a manner that does not bother the user. The location manager 350 can manage location information of the electronic device. The graphics manager 351 can manage graphics effects to be provided to the user and/or UIs related to the graphics effects. Security manager 352 can provide various security functions for system security, user authentication, and the like. According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, when an electronic device (eg, mobile phone 100) has a phone function, the middleware 330 may further include a phone manager (not shown) for managing voice phone call functions of the electronic device and/or Video call function.

The middleware 330 can generate and use a new middleware module through various functional combinations of the internal component modules described above. The middleware 330 can provide modules specialized according to the type of OS to provide differentiated functions. The middleware 330 can also dynamically delete some of the existing components, or can add new components. Accordingly, the middleware 330 may omit some of the elements described in the various embodiments disclosed herein, and may include other elements, or some of these elements may be replaced with elements that perform similar functions and have different names.

API 360 (eg API 133) is a collection of API programming functions and can have different configurations depending on the OS. In the case of, for example, Android or iOS, one API set can be provided to each platform. In the case of, for example, Tizen, two or more API sets can be provided to each platform.

Application 370 (eg, application 134 in FIG. 1) may include, for example, a preloaded application and/or a third party application. Application 370 (eg, application 134) may include, for example, home page application 371, dialing application 372, SMS/MMS application 373, IM application 374, browser application 375, camera application 376, alarm application 377, contact application 378, voice dialing application 379. , email application 380, calendar application 381, media player application 382, album application 383, clock application 384, and any other suitable and/or similar applications.

Still as shown in FIG. 2, application 370 can be divided into sensitive applications and non-sensitive applications. Among them, an application that accesses the above sensitive data during operation (for example, the SMS/MMS application 373, the contact application 378, the email application 380, and the album application 383 in FIG. 2) can be used as a sensitive application.

Generally, when the mobile phone 100 is running a sensitive application, the sensitive application can be triggered to access the corresponding sensitive data according to the input operation of the user. Different keys for decrypting sensitive data are generally different. For example, picture A and picture B are marked as sensitive data. When storing picture A, picture 1 can be used to encrypt picture A into ciphertext 1, and when picture B is stored. The picture B is encrypted into the ciphertext 2 using the key 2. Then, when decrypting the ciphertext 1 of the picture A, the key 1 needs to be obtained first, and then the ciphertext 1 of the picture A is decrypted by using the key 1, and the ciphertext 2 of the picture B needs to be obtained first. 2. Further decrypting the ciphertext 2 of picture B using key 2. The key 1 and the key 2 can be maintained by the kernel 320 of the mobile phone 100, and the sensitive application of the application layer cannot directly obtain the key of the sensitive data.

In addition, the above-mentioned key used for encrypting sensitive data or decrypting sensitive data specifically includes a data encryption key (DEK) and/or a key encryption key (KEK), which is used in this embodiment of the present application. Do not make any restrictions.

Then, with the email application 380 as a sensitive application, when the user inputs a specific operation to trigger the email application 380 to access a certain sensitive data, the email application 380 can request the kernel 320 to access the sensitive data by calling the relevant API. In response to the request of the email application 380, the kernel 320 may acquire a key used to encrypt the sensitive data and decrypt the ciphertext of the sensitive data using the key, thereby feeding back the decrypted sensitive data to the email application 380. The email application 380 is enabled to access the sensitive data.

As shown in FIG. 3, when the mobile phone 100 is powered on, the user is generally required to input a password password previously set for the mobile phone 100, such as a digital password consisting of 6 digits. Further, the mobile phone 100 can generate keys of respective sensitive data through a specific algorithm according to the password password input by the user, and store the keys in the encrypted area of the memory 130 and be maintained by the kernel 320. In order to ensure the security of the mobile phone 100, the kernel 320 has the right to access the key in the encrypted area only after obtaining the verification information associated with the user's valid identity authentication information. Thus, while the email application 380 is running, the kernel 320 cannot decrypt sensitive data through the keys in the encrypted area.

If the user does not set identity authentication information such as a digital password, fingerprint, or pattern password for the mobile phone 100, the kernel 320 can access the key in the encrypted area using the preset verification information. In addition, when the user sets the identity authentication information for the mobile phone 100, the identity authentication information may also serve as the verification information.

Then, as shown in FIG. 3, after the mobile phone 100 successfully unlocks the screen, the user of the current operating terminal can be regarded as a legitimate user. At this time, the kernel 320 can obtain the corresponding verification according to the identity authentication information input when the user unlocks. The information, in turn, uses the verification information to copy the key generated at boot time from the encryption area in the cache area of the memory 130. The kernel 320 has direct access to the keys in the cache area. Therefore, when the email application 380 is run after the screen is unlocked, if the email application 380 requests access to the sensitive data by the kernel 320 by calling the relevant API, the kernel 320 The key of the sensitive data can be obtained from the cache area, thereby decrypting the sensitive data using the key, and feeding the decrypted sensitive data to the email application 380. The terminal lock screen will trigger the kernel 320 to delete the key stored in the cache area, preventing malicious programs from accessing sensitive data if the legitimate user is not authorized to unlock.

In addition, it should be noted that, in FIG. 3, only the kernel 320 in the rich execution environment (REE) illustrates the maintenance process of the keys in the cache area. In some embodiments of the present application, a dedicated processor, a memory, and the like may be disposed in the terminal to construct a key protection system such as a trusted execution environment (Tee) or a secure element (SE). In this way, the key in the cache area can be maintained by the key protection system to enhance the security of the terminal.

However, the user who operates the mobile phone 100 after the screen is unlocked is not necessarily a legitimate user. For example, the mobile phone 100 is borrowed or stolen by another person after the screen is unlocked. However, after the screen is unlocked, the mobile phone 100 has stored the key for decrypting the sensitive data to the cache area, so that the unauthenticated illegal user can use the key to access the sensitive data when operating the mobile phone 100, thereby causing leakage of user information, etc. Security risks.

The legal user refers to a user who can pass the identity authentication measures preset by the terminal. For example, the identity authentication measures preset by the terminal are fingerprint identification and face recognition. Then, the fingerprint authenticated by the user is stored in the terminal in advance. The user of the information and face information can be considered as a legitimate user of the terminal. Of course, a legitimate user of a terminal may include one or more, and any user other than the legitimate user may be regarded as an illegal user of the terminal. An illegal user can also be converted into a legitimate user after a certain identity authentication measure. The embodiment of the present application does not impose any limitation on this.

In the data access method provided by the embodiment of the present application, after the terminal unlocks the screen, the user of the operation terminal may continue to perform identity authentication, so that if the sensitive application running on the terminal requests access to the encrypted sensitive data, the terminal A key for decrypting sensitive data can be obtained when it is confirmed that the current user is a legitimate user, thereby using the key to access sensitive data.

Otherwise, the terminal can block the access request of the sensitive application by deleting the key of the sensitive data, or even forcibly shutting down the sensitive application or forcibly shutting down, and preventing the sensitive application from accessing the sensitive data of the user, thereby preventing the illegal user from acquiring the user when operating the terminal. Sensitive data improves the security of the terminal.

It can be seen that, in the embodiment of the present application, the access right of the sensitive data is not solely dependent on the identity authentication performed by the user when the screen is unlocked, but the current user of the operation terminal can still be authenticated after unlocking the screen. In this way, the user's sensitive data can be protected in real time according to the real-time identity authentication result, thereby reducing the risk of user information leakage.

Specifically, when the terminal is in the lock screen state, the user may input identity authentication information, such as a fingerprint, a digital password, a pattern password, and the like. Further, the terminal may determine, according to the identity authentication information input by the terminal, whether the user is a legitimate user. When it is determined that the user is a legitimate user, the terminal can unlock the screen. After the screen is unlocked, the user can use the application and data installed in the terminal; correspondingly, when it is determined that the user is an illegal user, the terminal continues to maintain the lock screen state. Users cannot use the applications and data installed in the terminal while the screen is locked.

Exemplarily, the fingerprint of the user Sam used to unlock the screen is pre-stored in the terminal. Then, as shown in FIG. 4, when the terminal is in the lock screen state, if Sam inputs the fingerprint on the fingerprint identification device 501 of the terminal (ie, identity authentication) Information), the terminal matches the fingerprint input by Sam with the pre-stored fingerprint. When the similarity between the two is greater than the threshold, it indicates that Sam is a legitimate user of the terminal, and therefore, the terminal can unlock the screen and restore the interactivity between the terminal screen and the user. As shown in FIG. 4, after the screen is unlocked, the desktop 502 of the terminal can be accessed, and the desktop 502 includes one or more installed applications.

Among them, the application that needs to access the user's sensitive data at runtime is a privacy application. For example, the user's sensitive data includes the user's email address, and the application 503 named "mail" in FIG. 4 needs to obtain the sensitive data of the user's email address during the running process, so the application of the "mail" can be regarded as 503. For a sensitive application.

After the screen is unlocked, the terminal can continue to authenticate the current user of the operation terminal. For example, when the fingerprint recognition device is integrated on the display screen of the terminal, the terminal can periodically collect the fingerprint received on the display screen after the screen is unlocked. It is further determined whether the fingerprint matches the fingerprint of a legal user stored in advance. When the collected fingerprint matches the fingerprint of the legal user stored in advance, the current user is a legal user; otherwise, the current user is an illegal user.

Then, as shown in FIG. 5, when the terminal detects that the illegal user Tom attempts to open the sensitive application 503 of “mail”, the terminal may block the operation of opening the “mail” application 503 to prevent the sensitive data of the legitimate user from being leaked. And display the prompt 601 that the operation is invalid.

For example, in conjunction with the programming module 310 shown in FIG. 2, when the middleware 330 or the kernel 320 of the terminal detects an illegal user requesting to open the operation of the "mail" application 503, the reporting to the "mail" application 503 in the application 370 may be stopped. The operation. Thus, the "mail" application 503 also does not respond to the open operation, making the operation of opening the "mail" application 503 invalid.

Alternatively, when the middleware 330 or the kernel 320 of the terminal detects an illegal user requesting to open the operation of the "mail" application 503, the operation may continue to be reported to the "mail" application 503 in the application 370, and the "mail" application 503 is When the current user is confirmed to be an illegal user, the operation may not be responded, so that the operation of opening the "mail" application 503 is invalid.

Still alternatively, when the middleware 330 or the kernel 320 of the terminal detects an illegal user requesting to open the operation of the "mail" application 503, the terminal may delete the acquired key for decrypting the sensitive data. Thus, even if the "mail" application 503 acquires an operation by the illegal user requesting to open the "mail" application and responds to the open operation in accordance with the normal response flow, since the "mail" application 503 requests access to the sensitive data from the kernel 320, the kernel 320 The valid key for decrypting the sensitive data cannot be obtained, so the encrypted sensitive data cannot be decrypted, so that the sensitive data of the legitimate user is prevented from being leaked by the illegal user.

In other embodiments of the present application, as shown in FIG. 6, when the terminal detects that the illegal user Tom attempts to open the sensitive application 503 of "mail", the terminal may further perform identity authentication on the current user of the operating terminal. For example, in FIG. 6, the terminal displays a prompt 701 requesting the user to input a fingerprint for identity verification.

Then, if the authentication is passed, the illegal user Tom determined by the terminal is incorrect, or the illegal user Tom requests the legitimate user Sam to input his fingerprint to authorize Tom to continue to access the "mail" application 503. At this time, the terminal can open and operate the "mail" application 503 in response to Tom opening the "mail" application 503.

The manner in which the user is requested to input a fingerprint for identity authentication in FIG. 6 is only an example. It can be understood that when detecting an illegal user requesting access to sensitive data, for example, requesting to open a sensitive application, the terminal may set one or more identities. The authentication mode authenticates the identity of the current user, and the embodiment of the present application does not impose any limitation on this.

For example, the terminal may set an application that includes more sensitive data to the first application with higher sensitivity level, and an application that includes less sensitive data to the second application with lower sensitivity level.

Then, when an illegal user is requested to access the first application, since the first application contains more sensitive data, the terminal can identify whether the current user is a legitimate user by using multiple identity authentication methods, for example, requiring the user to simultaneously perform the user. Face recognition and iris recognition. Correspondingly, when detecting that the illegal user requests access to the second application, since the second application contains less sensitive data, the terminal can identify whether the current user is the current one or only through an identity authentication method, such as authenticating the user's fingerprint. Legal user.

To clarify the data access method provided by the embodiment of the present application, the present application provides various implementation manners to implement the function of rejecting unauthorized users to access sensitive data as shown in FIG. 5-6.

In a possible implementation manner, as shown in FIG. 7, after the terminal unlocks the screen, the terminal may be triggered to perform two operations. First, the triggering terminal saves the key in the encrypted area to a cache area directly accessible by the kernel 320. The second is to trigger the terminal to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user.

Exemplarily, when acquiring the key for decrypting the sensitive data, the terminal may obtain the verification information of the access encryption area according to the identity authentication information input by the user when unlocking, and then use the verification information to copy from the encrypted area of the terminal memory. The key that was generated at boot time and saved to the cache area of the memory so that sensitive applications that need to access sensitive data request the key in the kernel access cache area to decrypt sensitive data.

Exemplarily, when real-time authentication is performed on the identity of the current user, the terminal can authenticate the identity of the current user based on the user behavioral pattern of the user. For example, the terminal can collect user behaviors of legitimate users over a period of time (eg, frequency, amplitude of tapping the screen, frequency of use of each application, time, posture of the holding terminal, speed of movement or acceleration, etc.), through machine learning Algorithms such as artificial intelligence learn and judge the behavior characteristics of legitimate users (for example, touch screen pressure, moving acceleration, etc.). In this way, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal can collect the user behavior of the current user. If the user behavior of the current user matches the behavior of the legitimate user, the current user can be determined to be a legitimate user. Otherwise, the current user can be determined to be an illegal user.

Of course, the real-time authentication of the identity of the current user by the terminal may be periodic or non-periodic, and the embodiment of the present application does not impose any limitation on this.

Then, once the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key stored in the cache area in order to prevent the illegal user from triggering the sensitive application to use the key in the cache area to access the sensitive data. In this way, when the terminal detects the request of the illegal user to access the sensitive data, for example, when the illegal user Tom requests to open the sensitive application "mail" 503, the sensitive application cannot obtain a valid key to decrypt the sensitive data, thereby making the access sensitive. The request for data failed.

In another possible implementation manner, after the terminal unlocks the screen, similar to FIG. 7, the terminal may be triggered to perform two operations. First, the trigger terminal saves the key in the encrypted area to the cache that the kernel 320 can directly access. In the area, the second is to trigger the terminal to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user.

The difference is that, as shown in FIG. 8, when the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, the key stored in the cache area for decrypting sensitive data is not immediately deleted. Because the illegal user does not necessarily access the sensitive data in the terminal when operating the terminal. For example, when the illegal user Tom borrows the terminal of the legitimate user Sam, the sensitive data such as Sam's mail is generally not viewed.

Therefore, determining that the current user is an illegal user does not necessarily cause a threat of leaking sensitive data of the user. Therefore, the terminal can query the identity authentication result of the current user when receiving the request for accessing the sensitive data. If the identity authentication result indicates that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key stored in the cache area.

In this way, a sensitive application requesting access to sensitive data cannot obtain a valid key to decrypt the sensitive data, thereby causing the above request to access sensitive data to fail.

That is, when the terminal detects the request for accessing the sensitive data and determines that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal is triggered to delete the key stored in the cache area, so that the terminal does not frequently delete the key in the cache area. Then, in the scenario where the illegal user uses the terminal but does not access the sensitive data, the key of the sensitive data is still retained in the cache area, so that the subsequent legitimate user does not need to authenticate the identity when requesting access to the sensitive data on the terminal, and After the authentication is passed, the password of the encryption area is copied to the cache area.

In another possible implementation manner, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal does not need to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user, but when the user is requested to access the sensitive data, the terminal is triggered to authenticate the identity of the current user, thereby Reduce the amount of power consumed due to real-time identity authentication.

As shown in FIG. 9, after the screen is unlocked, the terminal obtains the verification information of the access encryption area according to the identity authentication information input by the user when unlocking, and uses the verification information to obtain a key for decrypting the sensitive data from the encryption area, and further Store the key in the cache area. Subsequently, when the terminal detects that the user requests to access the sensitive data, for example, when the user Tom opens the sensitive application "mail" 503, the terminal may be triggered to authenticate the identity of the current user Tom.

Then, if the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can delete the key stored in the cache area. Thus, when a sensitive application requests access to sensitive data, the kernel cannot obtain a valid key to decrypt the sensitive data, thereby causing the above request to access sensitive data to fail.

Correspondingly, if the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal can obtain a key for decrypting sensitive data from the cache area, and then use the key to access the encrypted sensitive data.

In another possible implementation manner, since the user of the operation terminal is not confirmed as a legitimate user after the screen is unlocked, the terminal unlocking screen and the terminal storing the key of the sensitive data to the cache area may be Does not have an association.

As shown in FIG. 10, when the screen is unlocked, the terminal can be triggered to perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user. Then, when the terminal detects that the user requests access to the sensitive data, the terminal can confirm the current user according to the identity authentication result obtained last time. Legal or illegal user.

If the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal may require the user to input the identity authentication information, and then obtain the verification information of the access encryption area according to the identity authentication information, so as to obtain the key used to decrypt the sensitive data from the encryption area by using the verification information. And store the key in the cache area. In this way, the terminal can use the key to access the encrypted sensitive data.

If the current user is an illegal user, as shown in FIG. 6, the terminal may prompt the current user to re-authenticate the identity. If the authentication is passed, the terminal may use the corresponding verification information to obtain a key for decrypting the sensitive data from the encryption area to access the sensitive data. Otherwise, the terminal does not respond to the request for accessing the sensitive data, and avoids the legitimate user. Sensitive data is leaked by illegal users.

Further, in the method for accessing sensitive data shown in FIG. 10, if the terminal supports real-time authentication of the user identity, the terminal may also authenticate the current user behavior according to the manner in which the user holds the terminal in the state of the information screen or the black screen. The identity of the user. Therefore, the above method of accessing sensitive data does not need to depend on the condition that the screen is in an unlocked state.

That is to say, regardless of whether the screen of the terminal is in the unlocked state, the terminal can perform real-time authentication on the identity of the current user. For example, when the screen is lit, the terminal can be triggered to start real-time authentication of the identity of the current user. Then, when the terminal determines that the current user is a legitimate user, or the terminal determines that the current user is a legitimate user, and detects that the legitimate user requests to access the sensitive data, the terminal may be triggered to save the key in the encrypted area to the kernel 320 for direct access. In the cache area.

Correspondingly, when the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, or the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, and detects that the illegal user requests to access the sensitive data, the terminal may be triggered to delete the key in the cache area, and prompt the current user to re-create the key. Certified identity.

Of course, if the operation input by the legal user and/or the illegal user is not received within the preset time, the terminal may also delete the key in the cache area, for example, the preset time is not received after the screen screen or the black screen. When an operation is entered by a legitimate user and/or an illegal user, the terminal is triggered to delete the key in the cache area, so that the malicious program can automatically access the sensitive data of the user through the key in the cache area.

It should be noted that the foregoing various possible implementation manners are only exemplary descriptions, and those skilled in the art may set the manner in which the terminal refuses to access the sensitive data by the illegal user according to the actual experience or the actual application scenario. Do not make any restrictions.

In addition, in the above embodiment, the terminal refuses to access the sensitive application by the illegal user as an example, and describes a specific implementation manner in which the terminal refuses to access the sensitive data by the illegal user. It can be understood that the terminal can also refuse to access the sensitive data by the illegal user by denying the illegal user access to a certain function, a service or a window involving sensitive data in the sensitive application.

Exemplarily, as shown in FIG. 11, the window of the sensitive application "WeChat" containing user sensitive data is: a chat window when chatting with a friend. Then, after the screen is unlocked, the illegal user Tom can still open the "WeChat" application, and then, when the terminal detects that the illegal user Tom requests to open a certain window, for example, the illegal user Tom clicks on the chat window with Sara in FIG. The request contains the identity of the chat window (eg, the activity name of the window), so the terminal can determine that the type of the window is a chat window involving sensitive data.

At this time, the terminal can block the operation of the illegal user Tom to open the chat window with Sara, for example, deleting the key of the sensitive data in the cache area, and the like. At the same time, as shown in FIG. 11, the terminal may display a prompt 801 for further identity authentication of the current user. If the authentication is passed, the terminal can display a chat window with Sara in response to opening the chat window with Sara.

Further, when authenticating the current user, multiple identity authentication methods may be used to authenticate the identity of the current user. As shown in FIG. 12, the terminal may prompt the user to perform face recognition and fingerprint recognition simultaneously to verify the identity. This is because, after the terminal is stolen by an illegal user, the probability that the illegal user obtains multiple authentication information of the legitimate user is small. Therefore, using multiple identity authentication methods can reduce the identity verification information of the legitimate user by stealing the legitimate user. The chance of leaking sensitive data.

Or, in addition to denying an illegal user access to a sensitive application, denying an illegal user access to a function of a sensitive application, a service, or a certain window, the terminal may also reject the illegal user by masking the sensitive data. Access sensitive data itself.

Exemplarily, as shown in FIG. 13A, the sensitive data contained in the sensitive application "WeChat" is the telephone number "130-3292-0112". Then, when detecting that the illegal user Tom requests to open the chat window containing the sensitive data, the terminal may perform mask processing on the sensitive data "130-3292-0112" to display the masked sensitive data 901, that is, "** *-****-****". In this way, as shown in FIG. 13A, although the terminal opens the chat window containing the sensitive data, the sensitive data in the chat window has been anonymized by the mask processing, so that the illegal user cannot obtain the real sensitive data, thereby avoiding the legitimate user. Sensitive data is leaked by illegal users.

Exemplarily, the terminal marks the Word file as sensitive data when storing the Word file named "August Report", and stores the Word file using a certain encryption algorithm. Then, when it is detected that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key in the cache area for decrypting the Word file. At this time, as shown in FIG. 13B, the terminal can hide the related information of the Word file 902 using a certain encryption form when displaying the Word file 902. When it is detected that the illegal user Tom requests to open the Word file 902, since the terminal cannot obtain the key of the Word file 902, the "WeChat" application cannot acquire the decrypted Word file 902. At this time, as shown in FIG. 13B, the terminal can further determine whether the current user has the right to access the Word file 902 by verifying the identity authentication manner such as the power-on password.

In addition, in the embodiment of the present application, the terminal may display a prompt that the terminal is operated by an illegal user by using various methods. As shown in (a) of FIG. 14, the terminal may prompt the user by text: the user currently operating the terminal is an illegal user; or, as shown in (b) of FIG. 14, the terminal may be forced to shut down or forcibly closed. The method of the sensitive application of the sensitive data prompts the user that the user of the current operation terminal is an illegal user; or, as shown in (c) of FIG. 14, when the terminal detects that the user of the current operation terminal is an illegal user, the terminal may further Set permissions to open access to sensitive data to unauthorized users.

It should be noted that the timing at which the terminal prompts the terminal to be operated by the illegal user may be triggered when the terminal determines that the current user is an illegal user, or may be triggered when the terminal determines that the illegal user requests to access the sensitive data of the legal user. There are no restrictions on this.

Further, if the illegal user currently operating the terminal desires to obtain the right to access the sensitive data, for example, when the terminal detects that the illegal user clicks the setting option shown in (c) of FIG. 14, the terminal may enter the access sensitive to the illegal user. Data permission setting interface.

Exemplarily, as shown in (a) of FIG. 15 , when opening the right to access sensitive data to an illegal user, it is first necessary to obtain authorization of a legitimate user of the terminal, for example, by inputting a fingerprint of the legal user, and detecting the legality. The user's face features and other methods obtain the authorization of the legitimate user. Further, as shown in (b) of Fig. 15, a time limit for allowing an unauthorized user to access sensitive data can be further set, for example, setting an illegal user to access the above sensitive data within 20 minutes.

Then, within 20 minutes of the authorized user authorization, the illegal user has the right to access the above sensitive data, and the terminal can stop the identity authentication of the current user to reduce the power consumption of the terminal. Correspondingly, after the time exceeds the authorized user's authorization for 20 minutes, the terminal may delete the key stored in the cache area for decrypting the sensitive data, so that the illegal user cannot continue to use the key to access the sensitive data.

Or, after the time exceeds the authorized user's authorization for 20 minutes, the terminal may further authenticate the identity of the current user. If the current user has changed from the illegal user to the legitimate user, the terminal does not need to delete the key stored in the cache area. Otherwise, if the current user is still an illegal user, the terminal may delete the key stored in the cache area, so that the illegal user cannot continue to use the key to access the sensitive data.

Further, when the terminal detects that the user of the operation terminal changes from the illegal user to the legal user, for example, as shown in FIG. 16, the illegal user Tom operates the terminal for a period of time and then hands the terminal to its legitimate user Sam for use. Sam-based user behavior determines that the current user is a legitimate user. Then, the terminal has deleted the key for accessing the sensitive data from the cache area when the terminal detects that the illegal user Tom operates the terminal, so the terminal can automatically copy the key to the cache area from the encrypted area of the memory at this time, thereby recovering. The legitimate user Sam has access to sensitive data, and does not need the legitimate user Sam to perform identity authentication again. At the same time, as shown in FIG. 16, the terminal may prompt the user to restore the access rights of the legitimate user to the sensitive data, and the legitimate user may use the key to access the sensitive data.

Of course, as shown in FIG. 17, the user can open the control 1001 in the setting interface of the terminal to enable the access protection function for the above sensitive data. Further, after the terminal enables the protection function, the user may further set which applications or which functions of the application are generated when the data is sensitive data, and then the subsequent detection of the user request to open the applications or the functions may be performed by the foregoing embodiment. The data access method protects sensitive data. In addition, the user can also set the specific authentication method when the illegal user accesses the above sensitive data, and which users are used as legitimate users with access to the above sensitive data.

Exemplarily, as shown in (a) of FIG. 18, when setting specific sensitive data, at least one application may be set as a sensitive application with an application granularity. Then, when the subsequent terminal detects that the illegal user accesses the sensitive application set by the user, the unauthorized user can be denied access to the encrypted sensitive data by using the data access method provided in the foregoing embodiment. Of course, the user can also set specific sensitive data according to the window type, service type or data type in the application. When the user sets the window type and service type, the terminal recognizes the required access of the type window or service that is set. Data, set it to sensitive data. The embodiment of the present application does not impose any restrictions on how to set sensitive data.

Exemplarily, as shown in (b) of FIG. 18, when setting a specific verification mode, the user can set one or more verification methods to verify the identity of the user requesting access to the sensitive data. When the user sets multiple authentication modes, if the terminal detects that the illegal user accesses the sensitive data, the user needs to pass each authentication mode that has been set to access the sensitive data.

In addition, when the user sets various protection functions of the above sensitive data in the setting interface shown in FIG. 17 to FIG. 18, the terminal can also authenticate the identity of the current user. If the current user is an illegal user, the terminal may prohibit the illegal user from setting various protection functions of the sensitive data. In other words, this setting takes effect only when a legitimate user sets the protection functions of the above sensitive data. This prevents unauthorized users from gaining access to sensitive data by modifying the above setting options.

In the present application, after the terminal unlocks the screen, the current user may continue to be authenticated based on the user's behavior on the terminal. Then, in other implementation manners of the present application, the terminal may further determine access rights to different data or applications in the memory according to the identity authentication result of the current user.

Exemplarily, as shown in FIG. 19, when the terminal detects that the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal may set the terminal to have access to all data (for example, sensitive data and non-sensitive data) stored by the terminal. When the terminal detects that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can only set the terminal to have access rights to the non-sensitive data stored therein, that is, the terminal cannot read the stored sensitive data at this time.

Then, as shown in FIG. 20A, the terminal marks the Word file as sensitive data when storing a Word file named "August Report". Subsequently, when the legitimate user Sam opens the chat record containing the sensitive data, since the terminal has access rights to all sensitive data at this time, the terminal can display the decrypted Word file by acquiring the key of the Word file. Correspondingly, when the illegal user Tom opens the chat record containing the above sensitive data, since the terminal has only access rights to the non-sensitive data at this time, that is, the terminal cannot perceive the Word file, the terminal displays the chat record with Sara. Does not include the Word file.

Alternatively, the terminal can also be applied as a granularity to set the access rights of the terminal. For example, when the terminal detects that the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal can be set to have access rights to both the sensitive application and the non-sensitive application. When the terminal detects that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal can be set to have access only to non-sensitive applications that do not need to access sensitive data.

Then, as shown in FIG. 20B, the three applications "contact", "short message", and "mail" need to access the user's sensitive data at runtime, so these three applications can be set as sensitive applications. Subsequently, when the legitimate user Sam operates the terminal, since the terminal has access rights to all applications at this time, the terminal can display icons of all installed applications on the desktop. Correspondingly, when the illegitimate user operates the terminal, the terminal has access to the non-sensitive application at this time. Therefore, the terminal cannot obtain related information of the sensitive application when displaying the desktop, and cannot display the icon of the sensitive application.

It can be understood that, in order to implement the above functions, the above terminal and the like include hardware structures and/or software modules corresponding to each function. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that the embodiments of the present application can be implemented in a combination of hardware or hardware and computer software in combination with the elements and algorithm steps of the various examples described in the embodiments disclosed herein. Whether a function is implemented in hardware or computer software to drive hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the solution. A person skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each particular application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the embodiments of the present application.

The embodiment of the present application may perform the division of the function modules on the terminal or the like according to the foregoing method example. For example, each function module may be divided according to each function, or two or more functions may be integrated into one processing module. The above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of the module in the embodiment of the present application is schematic, and is only a logical function division, and the actual implementation may have another division manner.

FIG. 21 is a schematic diagram showing a possible structure of a terminal involved in the foregoing embodiment, where the terminal includes: an authentication unit 2101, an obtaining unit 2102, a response unit 2103, and The unit 2104 and the display unit 2105 are deleted.

In a possible implementation, the authentication unit 2101 is configured to automatically perform identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal, and the obtaining unit 2102 is configured to obtain a request for sensitive application to access sensitive data, where the sensitive data is encrypted by using a key. The sensitive application is an application that needs to access the sensitive data at the runtime; the response unit 2103 is configured to provide an access result to the sensitive application, where, when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the access result is Does not include this sensitive data.

Further, when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the deleting unit 2104 is configured to delete the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.

Further, the obtaining unit 2102 is further configured to: when the terminal is powered on, generate the key for unlocking the sensitive data; store the key in an encrypted area protected by an encryption algorithm.

Further, the obtaining unit 2102 is further configured to: when the screen of the terminal is unlocked, acquire verification information, where the verification information is associated with the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the verification information is preset by the terminal. The key stored in the encrypted area is saved to the cache area using the check information.

Further, the obtaining unit 2102 is further configured to: if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, obtain verification information, where the verification information is associated with the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or The verification information is preset by the terminal; the verification key is used to save the key stored in the encryption area to the cache area.

At this time, the deleting unit 2104 is specifically configured to delete the key stored in the cache area.

Further, the obtaining unit 2102 is specifically configured to: if detecting that the current user opens the sensitive application, acquiring a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data; or; if detecting that the current user opens the target in the sensitive application The operation of the application interface obtains a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, and the target application interface is an application interface that includes the sensitive data.

Further, the authentication unit 2101 is specifically configured to: automatically acquire the user behavior when the current user operates the terminal; and authenticate the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with the behavior characteristics of the pre-stored legal user.

Further, the display unit 2105 is configured to display a first interface that does not include the sensitive data.

Further, when the first interface includes a prompt for opening the access right to the unauthorized user, the obtaining unit 2102 is further configured to: obtain the authorization of the legal user to open the unauthorized user access authority; and obtain the effective duration of the illegal user accessing the sensitive data. .

Further, the display unit 2105 is further configured to display, during the valid duration, a second interface that includes the sensitive data, if an illegal user is requested to access the sensitive data, and if an illegal user is detected after the valid duration is exceeded Requesting access to the sensitive data displays a first interface that does not contain the sensitive data.

In another possible implementation, the authentication unit 2101 is configured to automatically perform identity authentication on the current user of the operation terminal, and the display unit 2105 is configured to: if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, display The first interface, the first interface does not include the sensitive data or a sensitive application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime; if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, the second interface is displayed, and the second interface includes the sensitive Sensitive applications that require access to sensitive data at the data or runtime.

All the related content of the steps involved in the foregoing method embodiments may be referred to the functional descriptions of the corresponding functional modules, and details are not described herein again.

In the case of the integrated unit, as shown in FIG. 22, a possible structural diagram of the terminal involved in the foregoing embodiment is shown, including a processing module 2201, a storage module 2202, an output module 2203, and an input module 2204. .

The processing module 2201 is configured to control and manage the action of the terminal. The input module 2204 is configured to support information interaction between the terminal and the user. The storage module 2202 is configured to save program codes and data of the terminal. The output module 2204 is for outputting information input by the user or information provided to the user and various menus of the terminal.

Exemplarily, the processing module 2201 can correspond to the functions of the foregoing authentication unit 2101, the response unit 2103, and the deletion unit 2104, the output module 2203 can correspond to the function of the display unit 2105, and the input module 2204 can correspond to the function of the obtaining unit 2102. .

Specifically, the processing module 2201 may be a processor or a controller, such as a central processing unit (CPU), a GPU, a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), and an application specific integrated circuit ( Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, transistor logic device, hardware component, or any combination thereof. It is possible to implement or carry out the various illustrative logical blocks, modules and circuits described in connection with the present disclosure. The processor may also be a combination of computing functions, for example, including one or more microprocessor combinations, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, and the like.

The storage module 2202 may be a memory, which may include a high speed random access memory (RAM), and may also include a nonvolatile memory such as a magnetic disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other volatile solid state storage device.

The output module 2203 can be a display, a speaker or a headphone, etc., and is exemplified by a display. Specifically, the display can be configured in the form of a liquid crystal display, an organic light emitting diode or the like. In addition, a touch panel can be integrated on the display for collecting touch events on or near the display, and transmitting the collected touch information to other devices (such as a processor, etc.).

The input module 2204 can be a touch screen, a transceiver circuit, a Bluetooth device, a Wi-Fi device, a peripheral interface, or the like for inputting user input.

When the processing module 2201 is the processor 120, the storage module 2202 is the memory 130, the output module 2203 is the display module 160, and the input module 2204 is the user input module 150, the terminal provided by the embodiment of the present application may be the mobile phone shown in FIG. 100.

In the above embodiments, it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented using a software program, it may occur in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in accordance with embodiments of the present application are generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transferred from one computer readable storage medium to another computer readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions can be from a website site, computer, server or data center Transfer to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wire (eg, coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless (eg, infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer readable storage medium can be any available media that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, or the like that includes one or more available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (such as a solid state disk (SSD)).

The foregoing is only a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions within the technical scope of the present application should be covered by the scope of the present application. . Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

A data access method, comprising:

The terminal automatically performs identity authentication on a current user who operates the terminal;

Receiving, by the terminal, a request for accessing sensitive data by a sensitive application, where the sensitive data is encrypted by using a key, where the sensitive application is an application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime;

In response to the request, the terminal provides an access result to the sensitive application, wherein when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the sensitive data is not included in the access result.
The method according to claim 1, wherein after the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on the current user of the terminal, and before the terminal obtains the request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, the method further includes:

If the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal deletes the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.
The method according to claim 1, wherein after the terminal obtains the request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, and before the terminal provides the first access result to the sensitive application, the method further includes:

If the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal deletes the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.
The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the method further comprises:

When the terminal is powered on, the terminal generates the key for unlocking the sensitive data;

The terminal stores the key in an encrypted area protected by an encryption algorithm.
The method of claim 4, wherein the method further comprises:

When the screen of the terminal is unlocked, the terminal acquires verification information, where the verification information is associated with the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the verification information is preset by the terminal. of;

The terminal saves the key stored in the encrypted area to a cache area using the verification information.
The method according to claim 4, further comprising: after the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on the current user operating the terminal,

If the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal acquires verification information, where the verification information is associated with the identity authentication information acquired by the terminal when the screen is unlocked, or the school The verification information is preset for the terminal;

The terminal saves the key stored in the encrypted area to a cache area using the verification information.
The method according to claim 5 or 6, wherein the deleting the key for decrypting the sensitive data by the terminal comprises:

The terminal deletes the key stored in the cache area.
The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the terminal acquires a request for a sensitive application to access sensitive data, including:

If the operation of the sensitive application is detected by the current user, the terminal acquires a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data; or

If the operation of the target application interface in the sensitive application is detected, the terminal acquires a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data, where the target application interface is an application that includes the sensitive data. interface.
The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the terminal automatically performs identity authentication on a current user who operates the terminal, including:

The terminal automatically acquires a user behavior when the current user operates the terminal;

The terminal authenticates the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with the behavior characteristics of a pre-stored legitimate user.
The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein after the terminal provides the access result to the sensitive application, the method further includes:

The terminal displays a first interface that does not include the sensitive data.
The method according to claim 10, wherein the first interface includes a prompt for invalid access request, a prompt for inputting identity authentication information, the masked processed sensitive data, or opening access rights to an illegal user. Tips.
The method according to claim 11, wherein when the first interface includes a prompt for opening an access right to an illegal user,

After the terminal displays the first interface that does not include the sensitive data, the method further includes:

The terminal acquires an authorization of a legitimate user to open an unauthorized user access right;

The terminal acquires an effective duration of the illegal user accessing the sensitive data.
The method according to claim 12, further comprising: after the terminal obtains the effective duration of determining that the unauthorized user accesses the sensitive data, the method further includes:

Within the valid duration, if an illegal user is detected to request access to the sensitive data, the terminal displays a second interface including the sensitive data;

After the valid duration is exceeded, if an illegal user is detected to request access to the sensitive data, the terminal displays a first interface that does not include the sensitive data.
A data access method, comprising:

The terminal automatically performs identity authentication on the current user who operates the terminal;

If the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the terminal displays a first interface, where the first interface does not include sensitive data or a sensitive application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime;

If the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, the terminal displays a second interface, where the second interface includes the sensitive data or a sensitive application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime.
A terminal, comprising: a processor, and a memory connected to the processor, wherein

The memory is configured to: store sensitive data, where the sensitive data has been encrypted using a key;

The processor is configured to: automatically perform identity authentication on a current user that operates the terminal; and obtain a request for a sensitive application to access the sensitive data, where the sensitive application is an application that needs to access the sensitive data at a runtime; The request provides an access result to the sensitive application, wherein when the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, the sensitive data is not included in the access result.
The terminal of claim 15 wherein:

The processor is further configured to: if the current user is an illegal user, delete the key used to decrypt the sensitive data.
A terminal according to claim 15 or 16, wherein

The processor is further configured to: when the terminal is powered on, generate the key for unlocking the sensitive data; store the key in an encrypted area in the memory that is protected by an encryption algorithm.
The terminal according to claim 17, wherein said terminal further comprises an input device connected to said processor,

The input device is configured to: when the screen of the terminal is unlocked, or when the processor determines that the current user is a legitimate user, obtain verification information, where the verification information is when the screen is unlocked The identity authentication information acquired by the terminal is associated, or the verification information is preset by the terminal;

The processor is further configured to: save the key stored in the encryption area to a cache area of the memory by using the verification information.
The terminal according to claim 18, characterized in that

The processor is specifically configured to: delete the key stored in the cache area.
A terminal according to claim 18 or 19, characterized in that

The input device is further configured to: receive an operation of the current user to open the sensitive application, or receive an operation of the current user to open a target application interface in the sensitive application, where the target application interface includes the Application interface for sensitive data;

The processor is specifically configured to: in response to the operation, obtain a request for the sensitive application to access the sensitive data.
A terminal according to any one of claims 18 to 20, characterized in that

The input device is further configured to: automatically acquire a user behavior when the current user operates the terminal;

The processor is specifically configured to: authenticate the identity of the current user by comparing the behavior of the user with a behavior characteristic of a pre-stored legal user.
The terminal according to any one of claims 18 to 21, wherein the terminal further comprises an output device connected to the processor,

The output device is configured to display a first interface that does not include the sensitive data, where the first interface includes a prompt for invalid access request, a prompt for inputting identity authentication information, and the masked processed sensitive data. Or a prompt to open access to an illegal user.
The terminal according to claim 22, wherein when the first interface includes a prompt for opening an access right to an illegal user,

The input device is further configured to: obtain an authorization of a legal user to open an unauthorized user access right; and obtain an effective duration of the illegal user accessing the sensitive data.
The terminal according to claim 23, characterized in that

The input device is further configured to: during the valid duration, detecting that an illegal user requests access to the sensitive data; or, after the valid duration is exceeded, detecting that an illegal user requests access to the sensitive data;

The output device is further configured to: if an illegal user requests to access the sensitive data within the valid duration, display a second interface that includes the sensitive data; if the valid duration is exceeded, the detected When an illegal user requests access to the sensitive data, a first interface that does not include the sensitive data is displayed.
A terminal, comprising: a processor, and a memory and an output device connected to the processor, wherein

The memory is configured to: store sensitive data, where the sensitive data has been encrypted using a key;

The processor is configured to: automatically perform identity authentication on a current user that operates the terminal;

The output device is configured to: if the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is an illegal user, display a first interface, where the first interface does not include the sensitive data or needs to access the sensitive data when running If the result of the identity authentication is that the current user is a legitimate user, the second interface is displayed, and the second interface includes the sensitive data or a sensitive application that needs to access the sensitive data at runtime.
A computer readable storage medium having stored therein instructions, wherein when the instructions are run on a terminal, causing the terminal to perform any of claims 1-13 or 14 The data access method described in the item.
A computer program product comprising instructions, wherein the computer program product, when run on a terminal, causes the terminal to perform the data access method of any one of claims 1-13 or 14.