CN110554421B - Method for identifying weak point of total dose damage of on-satellite sensitive component - Google Patents
Method for identifying weak point of total dose damage of on-satellite sensitive component Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a component PIT model based on the survival probability of the total dose damage of on-satellite sensitive components, the fault influence transmission probability and the on-orbit radiation damage time T, and the component PIT model is established to identify the weak point of the total dose damage of components of an on-orbit satellite. According to the method for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the satellite sensitive components, the irradiation test data of the sensitive components and the on-orbit radiation damage time are used as model input, the weak point of the satellite components, which resists the total dose damage, is identified through the normalization processing of the damage fault time of the satellite components, the severity of the total dose damage is evaluated, the weak point of the total dose damage of the satellite electronic components can be subjected to anti-additive design and improvement, the requirement of the future satellite on-orbit task is met, and the reliability is improved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of identification of weak parts of satellite total dose radiation damage, and particularly relates to a weak point identification method of satellite sensitive electronic component total dose damage, and more particularly relates to weak point identification and evaluation of satellite sensitive electronic component and single-machine equipment total dose radiation damage.
Background
During the in-orbit operation of the satellite, the satellite can be impacted by various high-energy charged particles, which can cause radiation damage to the surface material of the satellite, an integrated circuit system, an optical window, a temperature control surface and the like, and cause the performance degradation and the functional failure of the satellite, thereby affecting the completion of the task of the satellite. Wherein, the serious influence on the radiation damage of the satellite is the total dose damage of the sensitive components on the satellite
The influence of total dose radiation damage on the damage of sensitive components on the satellite has the following aspects: (1) the occurrence time is the time when the components are subjected to radiation damage, and whether anti-addition measures exist after the radiation damage does not influence system tasks, such as single machine backup, parallel design and the like; (2) drift time, namely, after the on-satellite electronic components are damaged by particle radiation, part of electronic performance parameters can drift or the power output of the electronic components is reduced; (3) survival probability, namely the survival probability of the satellite MOS component for resisting total dose damage; (4) severity, i.e. whether the total dose damage caused satellite system level mission interruption, satellite system lower than normal power operation, no impact.
Radiation damage of different severity degrees needs to consider whether electronic components can work at normal power or not, the survival probability of the total dose of the sensitive components and the influence transmission probability after the radiation damage.
Therefore, it is necessary to establish a 3-element PIT (localization-initialization-Time) model including the above key factors, input the irradiation test data of the sensitive components and the on-orbit radiation damage Time as the model, identify the weak point of the total dose damage of the satellite components by normalizing the fault Time of the on-satellite sensitive components, and evaluate the total dose damage degree to meet the detection requirement of the future on-orbit satellite task.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention aims to provide a weak point identification method for the total dose damage of a satellite sensitive component.
The method for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive component provided by the invention comprises the following steps:
step 6, determining damage fault influence transmission probability Ptransmit；
and 11, evaluating the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task j aiming at the system-level task j, and sequencing the evaluation factor values from high to low through the calculated evaluation factor values to obtain an evaluation factor sequence value of the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task of a typical single machine/device, namely the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task.
Further, the step 3 is to calculate the total dose radiation damage failure probability P of the radiation sensitive componentinvalidThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
the skin color dosage of the sensitive element is influenced by the track, the position and whether the sensitive element is shielded or not, and the radiation damage failure probability P of the sensitive elementinvalidAnd the design margin InR obeys a positive Tailored distribution, i.e.
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,Dsimulationfor simulating the required value, P, of radiation of the sensitive component at the satellite positioninvalid(D) Probability of failure of total dose radiation damage of sensitive components, AaverageIs the average value of the total dose resistance of the sensitive components, sigma is the logarithmic standard deviation of the total dose resistance of the sensitive components, DsimulationHas the unit of Rad, AaverageThe unit of (d) is Rad.
Further, the step 4 is to calculate the radiation survival probability P of the sensitive componentsurviveThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
in the above formula, Q is equal to Aaverage/DsimulationThen, then
Wherein D issimulationThe radiation simulation required value of the sensitive component at the position on the satellite is obtained;
fitting P according to different standard deviation sigma valuessurviveA Q relation curve, calculating radiation survival probability value P of the radiation sensitive component according to the Q value and the sigma valuesurvive。
Further, the step 5 is to determine the number of radiation sensitive components which have an influence on the satellite system-level task after radiation damage, and determine the influence effect on the system-level task, wherein the influence effect on the system-level task is task interruption, working at a power lower than normal power or no influence.
Further, the step 6 is to determine the damage fault influence transmission probability PtransmitThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
considering a single machine/component i aiming at a certain system-level task j, the damage fault influence transmission probability of the single machine/component i comprises the following factors: ptransmit ij＝fij(gij,Pinvalid i,Kij,T1,T2,T3)，
SatelliteIn-orbit life period, damage fault influences transmission probability PtransmitUsing a simplified calculation method, i.e.
In the above formula, n is in totaljThe radiation damage fault of each core component is avoided,
aiming at the radiation damage of the radiation sensitive component i of the satellite system-level task j, which causes the interruption times of the system-level task, the reduction times of the output power of a typical single machine and the drift of the electrical performance parameters of the typical single machine for half times,
wherein i is a single machine/sensitive component, j is a system-level task, and gijIs the degree of association, K, between a component i and a satellite system task jijAdding design measure coefficient, T, for ith single machine/sensitive component aiming at jth system-level task1For radiation damage failure time of components, T2For the lower-level time of the output power of the component, T3For drift time of electrical performance parameters of components, Pinvalid iThe probability of failure of the radiation sensitive component i due to total dose radiation damage,
1, 2 and 3 respectively correspond to the radiation damage guarantee time T1, the output power reduction time T2 and the electrical performance parameter drift time T3 of the radiation sensitive component.
Further, step 7 is to determine the accumulated time of system failure caused by radiation damage of the device, specifically: when a sensitive element in the satellite is damaged and fails, the satellite system-level tasks are influenced by different degrees, including system-level task interruption, output power reduction, electrical performance parameter drift and no influence,
determination of T1The unit is'd' for the accumulated time of system task interruption caused by damage and fault of components;
determination of T2The cumulative time of the output power reduction of the electronic component damage fault is in unit of'd';
determination of T3The characteristic parameter drift accumulated time is the damage fault of the component, and the unit is'd'.
Further, step 8 is to determine the contribution degree of the core single machine/sensitive component i state to the system-level task j, specifically:
the contribution degree of the ith core component/single machine in the service life of the jth system task of the satellite is
Csuccesstime ij＝Twholetime·Psuccess ij·Ttime j＝Twholetime·[1-(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij]·Ttime j
In the above formula, Psuccess ijFor the survival probability, T, of the ith core component/stand-alone for the jth system tasktime jFor the normal on-orbit working time of the ith component/single machine in the service life of the jth system task, (1-P)survive ij) Aiming at the damage fault probability of the ith component/single machine of the jth system tasktransmit ijProbability of transmission of system tasks for the influence of faults on sensitive components/units, Csuccesstime ijAnd (3) evaluating the total dose damage influence of the last 50 percent after obtaining the contribution of the typical single machine/sensitive component of the satellite to the system task for the contribution of the i state of the sensitive component to the satellite system task.
Further, step 9 is to determine an evaluation factor of the total dose damage of the single machine/component i to the system task j, specifically:
judging whether the radiation damage of the ith component/single machine on the satellite affects the system task,
if the system task is influenced, the probability model of the system task interruption fault is
Pfault ij＝(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij
The evaluation factor of the PIT model of the system-level task j caused by the total dose damage of the single machine/component i is
PITfaultime ij＝Twholetime·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3)
In the above formula, K1+K2+K3＝1，Twholetime·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3) An accumulated evaluation factor T for the influence of the total dose damage fault of the device/single machine i on the satellite system task in the satellite life1Cumulative time, T, for system task interruption due to component damage and failure2The accumulated time T of the output power reduction of the sensitive component after the damage fault of the sensitive component3D is the drift accumulated time of the characteristic parameters of the sensitive component after the damage fault of the sensitive component;
and if the system task is not influenced, carrying out total dose damage assessment on the next sensitive device i + 1.
Further, step 10 is to set a weakness threshold PIT for total dose damagelimitAnd identifying weak points of the total dose radiation damage of satellite ionization specifically as follows:
step 10.1, Weak threshold PIT for Total dose Damage is setlimit j；
Assuming satellite lifetime T (years), there is a total of n for system task jjRadiation damage fault, output power reduction and performance parameter drift of each core component, and aims to ensure that the total PIT (localization-initialization-Time) evaluation factor of all core components/single units does not exceed TlimitNamely, it is
Step 10.2, identifying weak points of total dose damage;
PIT calculated for sensitive single machine/component i influencing system task jfaultime ijAnd PITlimit jBy comparison, if PITfaultime ij<PITlimit jIf the current single machine/component meets the threshold requirement, the ith single machine/component meets the threshold requirement;
otherwise, the weak point of total dose radiation damage is identified, and the radiation-resistant reinforcement optimization design is needed.
Further, the step 10 further includes a step 10.3, where the step 10.3 is: and (4) repeating the weak identification step aiming at the (i + 1) th sensitive single machine/component.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
(1) the method for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive component can be used for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive component by combining the irradiation test data of the on-satellite sensitive component and the on-orbit damage accumulated time data, and has higher reliability;
(2) the method for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive components scientifically evaluates the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive components, systematically analyzes the weak point, performs the anti-radiation reinforcement design and improves the reliability of the on-orbit satellite.
Drawings
Other features, objects and advantages of the invention will become more apparent upon reading of the detailed description of non-limiting embodiments with reference to the following drawings:
FIG. 1 is a step diagram of the weak point identification method for the total dose damage of the satellite sensitive components;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a three-dimensional refinement simulation method of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a method for obtaining total dose resistance test parameters of a sensitive device according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 shows P of the present inventionsurvive-Q-relation graph.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in detail with reference to specific examples. The following examples will assist those skilled in the art in further understanding the invention, but are not intended to limit the invention in any way. It should be noted that it would be obvious to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the invention. All falling within the scope of the present invention.
The embodiment of the invention provides a weak point identification method for total dose damage of on-satellite sensitive components, which comprises the following steps:
step 6, determining damage fault influence transmission probability Ptransmit；
and 11, evaluating the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task j aiming at the system-level task j, and sequencing the evaluation factor values from high to low through the calculated evaluation factor values to obtain an evaluation factor sequence value of the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task of a typical single machine/device, namely the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task.
the skin color dosage of the sensitive element is influenced by the track, the position and whether the sensitive element is shielded or not, and the radiation damage failure probability P of the sensitive elementinvalidAnd the design margin InR obeys a positive Tailored distribution, i.e.
Wherein D issimulationFor simulating the desired value of the radiation of the sensitive component at the satellite position, DsimulationHas the unit of Rad, AaverageThe unit of (d) is Rad.
in the above formula, Q is equal to Aaverage/DsimulationThen, then
Wherein D issimulationSimulating required value for radiation of sensitive element at on-satellite position
Fitting P according to different standard deviation sigma valuessurviveA Q relation curve, calculating the survival probability value P of the component according to the Q value and the sigma valuesurvive。
And 5, determining the number of radiation sensitive components which have influence on the satellite system-level task after radiation damage, and determining the influence effect on the system-level task, wherein the influence effect on the system-level task is task interruption, lower than normal power operation or no influence.
The step 6 is to determine the damage fault influence transmission probability PtransmitThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
considering a single machine/component i aiming at a certain system-level task j, the damage fault influence transmission probability of the single machine/component i comprises the following factors: ptransmit ij＝fij(gij,Pinvalid i,Kij,T1,T2,T3)，
In the in-orbit service life of the satellite, the damage fault influences the transmission probability PtransmitUsing a simplified calculation method, i.e.
In the above formula, n is in totaljThe radiation damage fault of each core component is avoided,
aiming at the problems that the total dose radiation damage of a single machine/component i of a satellite system-level task j causes the system-level task interruption times, the typical single machine output power reduction times and the typical single machine electrical performance parameter drift over half times,
wherein i is a single machine/sensitive component, j is a system-level task, and gijIs the degree of association, K, between a component i and a satellite system task jijAdding design measure coefficient, T, for ith single machine/sensitive component aiming at jth system-level task1For radiation damage failure time of components, T2For the lower-level time of the output power of the component, T3For drift time of electrical performance parameters of components, Pinvalid iIs the probability of total dose radiation failure of the component i,
1, 2 and 3 respectively correspond to the radiation damage of the radiation sensitive componentGuarantee time T1, output power drop time T2 and electrical property parameter drift time T3;
fijprobability function representing the effect of total dose damage failure, passed to the next stage, its value and gij、Pinvalid i、 Kij、T1、T2、T3(ii) related; n isjIs represented by njRadiation damage is generated on each radiation sensitive component, so that the faults are caused; n is a radical ofij 123Three conditions of the radiation damage guarantee time T1, the output power drop time T2 and the electrical performance parameter drift time T3 of the radiation sensitive component are shown.
determination of T1The unit is'd' for the accumulated time of system task interruption caused by damage and fault of components;
determination of T2The cumulative time of the output power reduction of the electronic component damage fault is in unit of'd';
determination of T3The characteristic parameter drift accumulated time is the damage fault of the component, and the unit is'd'.
the contribution degree of the ith core component/single machine in the service life of the jth system task of the satellite is
Csuccesstime ij＝Twholetime·Psuccess ij·Ttime j＝Twholetime·[1-(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij]·Ttime j
In the above formula, Psuccess ijFor the survival probability, T, of the ith core component/stand-alone for the jth system tasktime jFor the normal on-orbit working time of the ith component/single machine in the service life of the jth system task, (1-P)survive ij) Aiming at the damage fault probability of the ith component/single machine of the jth system tasktransmit ijProbability of transmission of system tasks for the influence of faults on sensitive components/units, Csuccesstime ijAnd (3) evaluating the total dose damage influence of the last 50 percent after obtaining the contribution of the typical single machine/sensitive component of the satellite to the system task for the contribution of the i state of the sensitive component to the satellite system task.
judging whether the radiation damage of the ith component/single machine on the satellite affects the system task,
if the system task is influenced, the probability model of the system task interruption fault is
Pfault ij＝(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij
The evaluation factor of the PIT model of the system-level task j caused by the total dose damage of the single machine/component i is
PITfaultime ij＝Twholetime·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3)
In the above formula, K1+K2+K3＝1，Twholetime·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3) An accumulated evaluation factor T for the influence of the total dose damage fault of the device/single machine i on the satellite system task in the satellite life1Cumulative time, T, for system task interruption due to component damage and failure2The accumulated time T of the output power reduction of the sensitive component after the damage fault of the sensitive component3Accumulating the drift of the characteristic parameters of the sensitive component after the damage fault of the sensitive componentTime in units of d;
and if the system task is not influenced, carrying out total dose damage assessment on the next sensitive device i + 1.
step 10.1, Weak threshold PIT for Total dose Damage is setlimit j；
Assuming satellite lifetime T (years), there is a total of n for system task jjRadiation damage fault, output power reduction and performance parameter drift of each core component, and aims to ensure that the total PIT (localization-initialization-Time) evaluation factor of all core components/single units does not exceed TlimitNamely, it is
Step 10.2, identifying weak points of total dose damage;
PIT calculated for sensitive single machine/component i influencing system task jfaultime ijAnd PITlimit jBy comparison, if PITfaultime ij<PITlimit jIf the current single machine/component meets the threshold requirement, the ith single machine/component meets the threshold requirement;
otherwise, the weak point of total dose radiation damage is identified, and the radiation-resistant reinforcement optimization design is needed.
The step 10 further includes a step 10.3, where the step 10.3 is: and (4) repeating the weak identification step aiming at the (i + 1) th sensitive single machine/component.
More specifically, please refer to FIGS. 1-4. As shown in figures 1-4, the invention provides a 3-element PIT model for identifying the weak point of total dose damage of an on-orbit satellite component based on the survival probability, the fault influence probability and the on-orbit radiation damage time value of the total dose damage of an on-satellite sensitive component. The method has the advantages that irradiation test data of sensitive components and on-orbit radiation damage time are used as model input, the weak point of the satellite components for resisting total dose damage is identified through normalization processing of the fault time of the on-satellite components, the total dose damage degree is evaluated, the design of the weak point of the existing satellite total dose protection can be rapidly improved, and the future satellite on-orbit task detection requirement is met.
As shown in FIG. 1, the method of the present invention comprises the following steps:
step 1: listing all radiation sensitive components on the satellite, including an integrated circuit, a photoelectric device, a bipolar device, an FPGA, a DSP and the like, obtaining key performance parameters of the components, and simultaneously carrying out preliminary judgment on the severity of consequences possibly caused by radiation damage according to the positions and subsystems of the components on the satellite, namely whether the tasks of the satellite system level are interrupted, the work is lower than normal power and no influence is caused;
step 2: performing total dose irradiation test on the same batch of components to obtain irradiation test values of the total dose resistance of the same type of on-satellite sensitive components, and analyzing by using a sps software to obtain an average value A of the total dose resistance indexes of the same type of sensitive componentsaverageStandard deviation σ;
and step 3: calculating the total dose radiation damage failure probability P of the sensitive components on the satelliteinvalid
The components are in different tracks, different positions and different shields, and the simulation requirement values of the radiation dose values of the components are different, so that the model development component selection is optimized by adopting the design allowance. The on-orbit service life T and the design margin R of the component are subjected to Weibull distribution and the radiation damage failure probability P of the component is summarized by combining the current engineering experienceinvalidAnd the design margin InR obeys a positive Tailored distribution, i.e.
Wherein D issimulation-device radiation simulation requirement at on-satellite position, total dose refinement simulation as shown in fig. 2, aaverageAverage value of the test of the total dose resistance of the sensitive components, DsimulationAnd AaverageUnit (Rad), sigma-sensitive componentLog standard deviation against total dose test.
And 4, step 4: calculating radiation survival probability P of sensitive elementsurvive
In the above formula, Q is equal to Aaverage/DsimulationThen, then
Fitting P from different standard deviation sigma valuessurviveA Q relation curve, as shown in FIG. 4, where the value of the curve σ is 1.0-0.1 from bottom to top, and the survival probability value P of the device can be calculated by the matlab call function according to the Q value and the σ valuesurvive；
And 5: determining sensitive devices/single machines with the influence of radiation damage of electronic components on the satellite system-level task, wherein the number of the sensitive devices/single machines is n, and determining the influence effect on the system-level task (task interruption, working at a power lower than normal power and no influence);
step 6: determining damage fault impact transfer probability Ptransmit
When a certain component/single machine in the satellite is subjected to radiation damage, the fault is transmitted step by step and may be influenced by single machine backup design, parallel design, logic state and the like, and the fault may cause interruption of satellite system-level tasks. PtransmitConsidering that a certain component/single machine i and a certain system task j are independent and not related, the transmission probability is 0; if they are related to each other and have mutual influence, the transmission probability is between 0 and 1. For example, a GEO satellite atmosphere detection device 1 and a space environment monitoring device 2 are mutually independent, the atmosphere detection device 1 acquires global or Chinese area temperature and humidity profile data, the normal task of the atmosphere detector is not influenced by the abnormality of the satellite space environment monitoring device 2, and the P istransmit0; however, the atmosphere detection device 1 and the satellite attitude and orbit control channel are mutually associated, and if the attitude and orbit control channel is abnormal and the satellite attitude is unstable, the satellite system-level task is interrupted and the detection is carried outThe equipment cannot normally acquire atmosphere layer data P with large probabilitytransmitIs [0,1 ]]And (3) removing the solvent.
Considering a single machine/component i aiming at a certain system-level task j, the damage fault influence transmission probability of the single machine/component i comprises the following factors: ptransmit ij＝fij(gij,Pinvalid i,Kij,T1,T2,T3)，gijIs the degree of association, P, of a component i with a satellite system task jinvalid iIs the total dose radiation failure probability of component i, KijFor adding design measure coefficients to component i, e.g. backup design, voting design, etc., T1、T2、T3The radiation damage failure time of the components, the output power reduction time and the electrical performance parameter drift time.
In the in-orbit service life of the satellite, the damage fault influences the transmission probability PtransmitUsing a simplified calculation method, i.e.
In the above formula, n is in totaljThe radiation damage fault of each core component is avoided,
the total dose radiation damage of the single machine/component i of the satellite system-level task j causes the system-level task interruption times, the typical single machine output power reduction times and the typical single machine electrical performance parameter drift over half times.
And 7: determining system failure time due to device radiation damage
When a certain component in the satellite is damaged and fails, the satellite system-level tasks are influenced by different degrees, including system-level task interruption, output power reduction and no influence, then the system tasks are ensured to be recovered to be normal by measures such as switching backup machines, parallel connection design and the like, and for the abnormal state, T is recorded1For the accumulated time of system task interruption caused by damage and fault of components, the system is switchedThe auxiliary machines and the like enable the satellite system to recover the normal task, and particularly if the radiation damage single machine is completely destroyed, T1The unit "d" for the start of the moment of destruction up to the end of the life; t is2The continuous accumulated time of the output power reduction of the electronic component damage fault is represented by the unit of'd'; t is3The characteristic parameter drift accumulated time is the damage fault of the component, and the unit is'd'.
And 8: determining the contribution degree of the core single machine/component i state to the system level task j
Aiming at the on-orbit task j of the satellite system, the probability of system task interruption fault caused by radiation damage of the ith core component/single machine is
Pfault ij＝(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij
Then its normal on-track operation probability is
Psuccess ij＝1-Pfault ij＝1-(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij
The contribution degree of the jth system task in the ith core component/single machine life period is
Csuccesstime ij＝Twholetime·Psuccess ij·Ttime j＝Twholetime·[1-(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij]·Ttime j
In the above formula, Psuccess ijIs the survival probability, T, for the ith core component/single machine of the jth system tasktime jNormal on-orbit working time, 1-P, in the ith component/single machine life cycle for the jth system tasksurvive ijAiming at the damage fault probability, P, of the ith component/single machine of the jth system tasktransmit ijIs the transmission probability of the system task influenced by the faults of the components/the single machine (1-P)survive ij)·Ptransmit ijAiming at the ith component/single machine of the jth system taskProbability of dose damage and affecting satellite system-level tasks, Csuccesstime ijIndicating the degree of contribution of the i state of the component to the task of the satellite system.
After the contribution degree of a typical satellite single machine/device to the system task is obtained, the system task is ranked from high to low, and the total dose damage influence evaluation and the weak point identification are carried out on the last 50 percent.
And step 9: determining evaluation factor of single machine/component i total dose damage to system task j
Judging whether the radiation damage of the ith component/single machine on the satellite affects the system task, if so, the probability model of the system task interruption fault is
Pfault ij＝(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij
The evaluation factor of the PIT model of the system-level task j caused by the total dose damage of the single machine/component i is
PITfaultime ij＝10000·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3)
In the above formula, K1+K2+K3＝1，Twholetime·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3) Cumulative evaluation factor T representing influence of total dose damage fault of device/single machine i on satellite system task in satellite life1Cumulative time, T, for system task interruption due to component damage and failure2Cumulative time, T, of output power drop for damage failure of electronic components3The characteristic parameter drift accumulated time is the damage fault of the component, and the unit is'd'.
Step 10.1, Weak threshold PIT for Total dose Damage is setlimit j
Assuming satellite lifetimeT (year), the system task is continued by measures such as switching stand-alone backup and parallel design after each task interruption, and n is total for the system task jjThe radiation damage fault, the output power reduction and the performance parameter drift of each core component are carried out to ensure that the total PIT model evaluation factor of all the core components/single units does not exceed the PITlimit jNamely, it is
Step 10.2, second, Total dose Damage Point identification
PIT calculated for sensitive single machine/component i influencing system task jfaultime ijAnd PITlimit jBy comparison, if PITfaultime ij<PITlimit jIf the current single machine/component meets the threshold requirement, the ith single machine/component meets the threshold requirement; otherwise, the weak point of total dose radiation damage is identified, and the radiation-resistant reinforcement optimization design is needed.
And 10.3, repeating the weak identification step aiming at the (i + 1) th sensitive single machine/component.
And 11, evaluating the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task j aiming at the system-level task j, sequencing the system-level task j from high to low through the calculated evaluation factor values to obtain an evaluation factor sequence value of the influence degree of the typical single machine/device on the satellite system task due to the total dose damage, namely the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task, and selecting 30% of components and parts before sequencing as required to perform total dose resistant overall optimization design and improvement.
Aiming at a low earth orbit satellite, the design life is 8 years, taking 3 types of sensitive devices such as a CCD, a DC/DC device and an MOS power tube on the satellite as an example for explanation, and table 1 shows the irradiation test data of each single device in the same batch:
table 13 type sensitive single machine device irradiation data and refined simulation required value
Obtaining damage interruption time T of CCD, DC/DC device and MOS power tube through ground station statistics of low-orbit satellite1Output power down time T2Performance parameter drift time T3And the injury recovery strategy is shown in Table 2
TABLE 2 Total dose Damage time and recovery strategy for CCD, DC/DC, MOS
Calculating the logarithmic mean value A of the total dose tolerance of CCD1＝178.9k，σ1＝0.11，(1-Psurvive ij)11.4153 e-04; logarithmic mean value A of DC/DC anti-total dose tolerance2＝78.3k，σ2＝0.20，(1-Psurvive ij)23.9206 e-04; logarithmic mean value A of total dose tolerance resistance of MOS power tube3＝43.6k，σ3＝0.25，(1-Psurvive ij)3Is 9.1258 e-04.
General consideration (1-P)survive ij)、Ptransmit、T2With the vulnerability threshold set to (1-P)survive ij) Value of 0.0002, PtransmitIs taken to be 0.5, T1Values of 2d, T2Is taken to be 10d, T3Taking the value of 10d, and calculating to obtain PITlimit＝1.7520。
PIT evaluation factor PIT calculated from Table 2faultimeFor CCD device PITfaultime 11.0125, DC/DC device PITfaultime 21.7029 MOS power tube PITfaultime 3＝2.6881。
Therefore, the PIT evaluation factors are sequentially an MOS power tube, a CCD and a DC/DC device, the weak point is the MOS power tube, and the MOS power tube needs to be subjected to total dose resistance optimization design and improvement.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
(1) the method for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive component can be used for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive component by combining the irradiation test data of the on-satellite sensitive component and the on-orbit damage accumulated time data, and has higher reliability; the method has the advantages that the total dose damage of the on-satellite components is scientifically evaluated, the weak points are systematically analyzed, the anti-radiation reinforcement design is carried out, and the reliability of the on-orbit satellite is improved.
In the description of the present application, it is to be understood that the terms "upper", "lower", "front", "rear", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", and the like indicate orientations or positional relationships based on those shown in the drawings, and are only for convenience in describing the present application and simplifying the description, but do not indicate or imply that the referred device or element must have a specific orientation, be constructed in a specific orientation, and be operated, and thus, should not be construed as limiting the present application.
The foregoing description of specific embodiments of the present invention has been presented. It is to be understood that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above, and that various changes or modifications may be made by one skilled in the art within the scope of the appended claims without departing from the spirit of the invention. The embodiments and features of the embodiments of the present application may be combined with each other arbitrarily without conflict.
Claims (10)
1. A weak point identification method for total dose damage of on-satellite sensitive components is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1, enumerating radiation sensitive components on a satellite, and judging the consequences and severity of radiation damage to the radiation sensitive components;
step 2, carrying out total dose irradiation test on the radiation sensitive components in the same batch to obtain radiation of the total dose resistance of the radiation sensitive components in the same batchAccording to the test value, calculating to obtain the logarithmic mean value A of the total dose resistance index of the radiation sensitive components in the same batchaverageAnd the logarithmic standard deviation σ;
step 3, calculating the total dose radiation damage failure probability P of the radiation sensitive componentinvalid；
Step 4, calculating the radiation survival probability P of the radiation sensitive componentsurvive；
Step 5, determining the number of radiation sensitive components which have influence on the satellite system-level task after radiation damage, and determining the influence result on the system-level task;
step 6, determining damage fault influence transmission probability Ptransmit；
Step 7, determining the accumulated time of system faults caused by radiation damage of the radiation sensitive element;
step 8, determining the contribution degree of the state of the radiation sensitive component i to the system-level task j;
step 9, determining an evaluation factor of the total dose damage of the radiation sensitive component i to the system task j;
step 10, setting a weakness threshold PIT for total dose damagelimitIdentifying weak points of the total dose radiation damage of satellite ionization;
and 11, evaluating the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task j, wherein the evaluation is directed at the satellite system task j, and the evaluation factor values are ranked from high to low through the calculated evaluation factor values to obtain an evaluation factor sequence value of the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task of the typical device, namely the influence degree of the total dose damage on the satellite system task.
2. The method for identifying the weak points of the total dose damage of the on-board sensitive components as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step 3 is to calculate the failure probability P of the total dose radiation damage of the radiation sensitive componentsinvalidThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
the radiation dose of the radiation sensitive element is influenced by the track, the position and whether the radiation sensitive element is shielded or not, and the radiation damage failure probability P of the radiation sensitive elementinvalidAnd design margin InR obeys positiveAre too distributed, i.e.
Wherein D issimulationThe radiation simulation required value of the radiation sensitive component at the on-satellite position is obtained; dsimulationHas the unit of Rad, AaverageThe unit of (d) is Rad.
3. The method for identifying the weak points of the total dose damage of the on-board sensitive components as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step 4 is to calculate the radiation survival probability P of the radiation sensitive componentssurviveThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
in the above formula, Q is equal to Aaverage/DsimulationThen, then
Wherein D issimulationThe radiation simulation required value of the radiation sensitive component at the on-satellite position is obtained;
fitting P according to different standard deviation sigma valuessurviveA Q relation curve, calculating radiation survival probability P of the radiation sensitive component according to the Q value and the sigma valuesurvive。
4. The method for identifying the weak points of the total dose damage of the satellite sensitive components according to claim 1, wherein the step 5 is to determine the number of the radiation sensitive components which have an influence on the satellite system-level task after radiation damage, and determine the influence effect on the system-level task, wherein the influence effect on the system-level task is task interruption, lower-than-normal-power operation or no influence.
5. According to the claimsThe method for identifying the weak point of the total dose damage of the satellite sensitive components and parts in the step 1 is characterized in that the step 6 is to determine the damage fault influence transmission probability PtransmitThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
considering a certain radiation sensitive component i aiming at a certain system-level task j, the damage fault influence transmission probability is as follows: ptransmit ij＝fij(gij,Pinvalid i,Kij,T1,T2,T3) In the on-orbit service life of the satellite, the damage fault influences the transmission probability PtransmitUsing a simplified calculation method, i.e.
In the above formula, n is in totaljThe radiation damage fault of each radiation sensitive component,
the method comprises the following steps that total dose radiation damage occurs to radiation sensitive components i of a satellite system-level task j, so that system-level task interruption times, typical single-machine output power reduction times and typical single-machine electrical performance parameters drift over half times;
where i is a radiation sensitive device, j is a system-level task, and gijIs the degree of association, K, between a radiation-sensitive component i and a satellite system task jijDesigning an anti-addition measure coefficient, T, of the ith radiation-sensitive component for the jth system-level task1For radiation damage failure time, T, of radiation-sensitive components2For the output power down time, T, of radiation-sensitive components3For the drift time, P, of the electrical property parameter of the radiation-sensitive componentinvalid iRepresents the failure probability of the radiation sensitive component i caused by total dose radiation damage,
1, 2 and 3 respectively correspond to the radiation sensitive elementThe emission damage guarantee time T1, the output power reduction time T2 and the electrical performance parameter drift time T3;
fijprobability function representing the effect of total dose damage failure, passed to the next stage, its value and gij、Pinvalid i、Kij、T1、T2、T3(ii) related; n isjIs represented by njRadiation damage is generated on each radiation sensitive component, so that the faults are caused; n is a radical ofij 123Three conditions of the radiation damage guarantee time T1, the output power drop time T2 and the electrical performance parameter drift time T3 of the radiation sensitive component are shown.
6. The method for identifying the weak spot of the total dose damage of the on-satellite sensitive components as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step 7 is to determine the accumulated time of the system fault caused by the radiation damage of the components, and specifically comprises the following steps: when a certain radiation sensitive element in the satellite has damage and fault, the satellite system level task is influenced by different degrees, including system level task interruption, output power reduction, electrical performance parameter drift and no influence,
determining T1 as radiation damage guarantee time of the radiation sensitive element in unit of'd';
determining T2 as the output power reduction time of the damage fault of the radiation sensitive component, wherein the unit is'd';
and determining T3 as the drift time of the electrical performance parameter of the damaged fault of the radiation sensitive element, wherein the unit is'd'.
7. The method for identifying the weak points of the total dose damage of the on-board sensitive components according to claim 1, wherein the step 8 is to determine the contribution degree of the state of the core sensitive component i to the system-level task j, and specifically comprises the following steps:
the contribution degree of the ith radiation sensitive component of the jth system task of the satellite in the life cycle is
Csuccesstime ij＝Twholetime·Psuccess ij·Ttime j＝Twholetime·[1-(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij]·Ttime j
In the above formula, Psuccess ijAiming at the survival probability of the ith radiation sensitive component of the jth subsystem task, standing at the angle of the jth subsystem, when the ith radiation sensitive component of the jth subsystem task fails, transmitting the failure result to the previous stage, and calculating to obtain the survival probability of the jth subsystem task by subtracting the probability that the current task is not completed by 1, wherein the ith radiation sensitive component of the jth subsystem task fails to be completed by the previous stage; t istime ijFor normal on-orbit working time in the ith radiation sensitive component life cycle of the jth system task, (1-P)survive ij) For the damage fault probability, P, of the ith radiation-sensitive component of the jth system tasktransmit ijIn order for a fault in a radiation sensitive component to affect the probability of a transfer of a system task,
the survival probability of the ith radiation sensitive component in the jth system task under the radiation environment is obtained through simple calculation; csuccesstime ijAnd (4) evaluating the total dose damage influence of the last 50 percent after the contribution of the i state of the radiation sensitive component of the jth system task to the satellite system task is obtained.
8. The method for identifying the weak points of the total dose damage of the on-board sensitive components according to claim 1, wherein the step 9 is to determine an evaluation factor of the total dose damage of the radiation sensitive components i to the system task j, and specifically comprises the following steps:
judging whether the radiation damage of the ith radiation sensitive component on the satellite affects the system task,
if the system task is influenced, the probability model of the system task interruption fault is
Pfault ij＝(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij
The total dose damage of the radiation sensitive element i is the evaluation factor of the PIT model of the system-level task j
PITfaultime ij＝Twholetime·(1-Psurvive ij)·Ptransmit ij·(K1T1+K2T2+K3T3)
In the above formula, K1+K2+K31, T1 is radiation damage guarantee time of the radiation sensitive component, T2 is output power reduction time of a damage fault of the radiation sensitive component, and T3 is electrical performance parameter drift time of the damage fault of the radiation sensitive component, and the unit is d; PIT (particle image transfer)faultime ijRepresenting a PIT model evaluation factor of a total dose damage fault of a radiation sensitive component i to a satellite system task j in a satellite life period;
and if the system task is not influenced, carrying out total dose damage assessment on the next sensitive device i + 1.
9. The method for identifying weak points of total dose damage of sensitive components on satellite as claimed in claim 1, wherein step 10 is to set a weak threshold PIT of total dose damagelimitAnd identifying weak points of the total dose radiation damage of satellite ionization specifically as follows:
step 10.1, Weak threshold PIT for Total dose Damage is setlimit j(ii) a Assuming satellite lifetime T, there is a total of n for system task jjRadiation damage fault, output power reduction and performance parameter drift of each radiation sensitive component, and aims to ensure that the total PIT model (probability-influx-Time) evaluation factor of all the radiation sensitive components does not exceed TlimitNamely, it is
Step 10.2, identifying weak points of total dose damage;
PIT calculated for radiation sensitive components i influencing system task jfaultime ijAnd PITlimit jBy comparison, if PITfaultime ij<PITlimit jIf so, the ith radiation-sensitive component meets the threshold requirement;
otherwise, the weak point of total dose radiation damage is identified, and the radiation-resistant reinforcement optimization design is needed.
10. The method for identifying weak points of total dose damage of sensitive components on a satellite as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step 10 further comprises a step 10.3, and the step 10.3 is: and repeating the weak identification step for the (i + 1) th radiation sensitive component.
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