CN110460570A - A kind of smart grid data ciphering method and decryption method with forward security - Google Patents
A kind of smart grid data ciphering method and decryption method with forward security Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN110460570A CN110460570A CN201910592762.8A CN201910592762A CN110460570A CN 110460570 A CN110460570 A CN 110460570A CN 201910592762 A CN201910592762 A CN 201910592762A CN 110460570 A CN110460570 A CN 110460570A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- intelligent electric
- electric meter
- signature
- ciphertext
- smart grid
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 61
- 238000006116 polymerization reaction Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 70
- 230000002776 aggregation Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 60
- 238000004220 aggregation Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 60
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 20
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 claims description 13
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000005611 electricity Effects 0.000 description 10
- 230000006854 communication Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 5
- 235000013399 edible fruits Nutrition 0.000 description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000004931 aggregating effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000007423 decrease Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008676 import Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002708 enhancing effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000203 mixture Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001737 promoting effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
- G06Q50/06—Energy or water supply
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Economics (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
- Mathematical Optimization (AREA)
- Mathematical Analysis (AREA)
- Algebra (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Public Health (AREA)
- Water Supply & Treatment (AREA)
- Pure & Applied Mathematics (AREA)
- Marketing (AREA)
- Primary Health Care (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Remote Monitoring And Control Of Power-Distribution Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of smart grid data ciphering method with forward security, it include: that control centre registers the aggregation gateway after receiving the registration request that aggregation gateway is sent to it, and the public key K for being used for encrypting plaintext data is sent to the aggregation gateway, aggregation gateway is receiving i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe intelligent electric meter is registered after the registration request being sent to it, and sends public key K to the intelligent electric meter, and counter j=0 is set, judges whether j is less than or equal to period of time T, if it is i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIt selects the ID number of its own and generates random number ti,j, according to random number ti,jCalculate time reference variable Ri,jAnd openly, and by random number ti,j, the ID number ID of its owniWith time reference variable Ri,jIt is sent to control centre.The present invention updates signature private key in the fixed period, ensure that the forward security of signing messages, while the polymerization and verifying of digital signature are completed in the case where not using Bilinear map.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to smart grid security technical fields, more particularly, to a kind of intelligence with forward security
Electric network data encryption method and decryption method.
Background technique
Smart grid is that a kind of modernization that the technologies such as communication, sensing, automation, computer, control combine together is defeated
Electric network.Smart grid utilizes the communication technology by the electricity usage situation number of the power supply status data of feed end and user terminal
According to being collected, achieve the purpose that reduce loss, energy saving and enhancing communication system of power grids safety by coordinating and controlling.As
One of the important public infrastructure of countries and cities development now, smart grid have safe and reliable, two-way interactive, economic height
The features such as effect, compatible and self-healing.In recent years, due to the rapid development of China's economy and the network technology, China is each to electric system
The demand of aspect is being continuously improved, and intelligent Process is also constantly promoting, and simultaneously, the safety problem of smart grid is also increasingly
Paid attention to.
There are a larger automation control management system in smart grid, it is by many a control centres, use
The composition such as family and various equipment.Wherein each control centre manages the power grid of a corresponding region, including this region
Various equipment and user.Equip various sensors in power grid and intelligent electric meter be responsible for real-time monitoring power grid operating status and
User power utilization data are collected, and these information are submitted into control centre's processing in time.Wherein, the intelligent electric meter of user is the same as control
There are two-way information flow between center processed, two-way information flow allows user to understand electricity price and power failure in real time by the communication technology
Equal every terms of information, to make the electricity consumption plan for being suitble to itself；On the other hand, control centre also can provide user for Utilities Electric Co.
Electricity consumption data, facilitate Utilities Electric Co. carry out Real-Time Pricing and balanced load etc. control.But current most of intelligent electric meters are all
To be interacted in the form of plaintext with control centre, the safety of data not arrive due guarantee, the privacy of user is believed
Breath is easy to be leaked.It on the other hand is often in many-to-one pass with control centre since the intelligent electric meter of user terminal is large number of
A possibility that system can bring pressure when a large amount of user data pours in control centre to control centre, and congestion occurs can increase
Greatly, it will largely effect on network performance.
Both at home and abroad and proposed numerous electric network data polymerizations in recent years, for ensureing the safety of data transmission,
And the performance of transmission network is improved, there are three types of one of the most common polymerizations: polymerization technique based on homomorphic cryptography is based on nothing
The encryption aggregating algorithm of Bilinear map and the aggregate signature method based on Key-insulated；However, above-mentioned three kinds of polymerizations are equal
Have the defects that some can not ignore: since homomorphic cryptography will use Bilinear map, the expense of calculating process is big；Based on unparalleled
Key pair in linear pair of encryption aggregating algorithm for digital signature remains unchanged in entire communication process, once key quilt
It steals, data-privacy will be leaked；Aggregate signature method based on Key-insulated introduces helper, will increase equipment and opens
Pin, while there is also keys to be easy the problem of revealing.
Summary of the invention
Aiming at the above defects or improvement requirements of the prior art, the present invention provides a kind of intelligence with forward security
Electric network data encryption method and decryption method and decryption method, it is intended that solving to deposit in existing electric network data polymerization
Computing cost is big, key is easy the technical problem being stolen, cost of device is big.
To achieve the above object, according to one aspect of the present invention, a kind of intelligence electricity with forward security is provided
Network data encryption method is to apply to need in the smart grid including multiple intelligent electric meters, multiple aggregation gateways and control centre
Ask in side, the smart grid data ciphering method the following steps are included:
(1) control centre registers the aggregation gateway after receiving the registration request that aggregation gateway is sent to it, and to this
Aggregation gateway sends the public key K for being used for encrypting plaintext data；
(2) aggregation gateway is receiving i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe intelligent electric meter is registered after the registration request being sent to it,
And public key K is sent to the intelligent electric meter；Wherein [1, n] i ∈, n indicate the sum of intelligent electric meter in smart grid Demand-side；
(3) counter j=0 is set；
(4) judge whether j is less than or equal to period of time T, if yes then enter step (5), else process terminates；
(5) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSelect the ID number ID of its owni∈ { 0,1 }*, and generate random numberRoot
According to random number tI, jCalculate time reference variable RI, j=tI, jP and openly, and by random number tI, j, the ID number ID of its owniAnd when
Between reference variable RI, jIt is sent to control centre；Wherein subscript i, j indicate i-th of intelligent electric meter in j-th of period, IDiIt indicates
The ID number of i-th of intelligent electric meter,The cyclic group for representing less than q and constituting with q coprime integer, P indicate addition cyclic group G1
Generation member, and G1It is q for order, generates the addition cyclic group that member is P.
(6) control centre is according to the random number t from intelligent electric meterI, j, ID number IDiWith time reference variable RI, jCalculate label
Name private key DI, j=tI, j+sH1(IDi, RI, j) it is used as current secret key；
(7) control centre is by current secret key DI, jI-th of intelligent electric meter I is sent to by safe lanei, wherein H1() table
Show the first hash function, andS indicates master key, and has
(8) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the current secret key D receivedI, jVerify whether it is effective private key, if it is
Effective private key, then according to random number tI, jAnd time reference variable R is generated by way of iterationI, j+ 1=tI, j+1P is calculated
DI, j+1=DI, j+(tI, j+1-tI, j) * P*K, and D is used respectivelyI, j+1And tI, j+1Substitute DI, jAnd tI, j, subsequently into step (9), such as
Fruit is not effective private key, then return step (4)；Wherein intermediate variable
(9) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to time reference variable RI, jTo its user data m to be dealt withiIt is encrypted,
It is signed using result of the elliptic curve to encryption, and signature result is sent to aggregation gateway；
(10) aggregation gateway is according to from i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSignature result judge user data miCorresponding user
It whether is legitimate user, if yes then enter step (9), else process terminates；
(11) aggregation gateway polymerize the signature from w intelligent electric meter j-th of period having been received,
To obtain the polymerization result S that signsi:
(12) ciphertext of the aggregation gateway to w intelligent electric meter j-th of period polymerize, to obtain ciphertext polymerization knot
Fruit Cj, and by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is sent to control centre；
(13) counter j=j+1, and return step (4) are set.
Preferably, judge current secret key DI, jIt whether be effective private key is by judging DI, jP==RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi,
RI, j) whether realized at Rob Roy, D is indicated if setting upI, jEffectively, otherwise indicate that it is invalid.
Preferably, elliptic curve used in step (9) is SM2 elliptic curve, and step (9) includes following
Sub-step:
(9-1) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiBy its user data m to be dealt withiIt is encoded to elliptic curve EpOn a point
Mi, and integer r one big is generated at randomi, wherein ri< n, n indicate the length of encryption key used in elliptic curve；
(9-2) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the point M on step (7-1)iAnd the big integer r generated generates ciphertext CI, j
=(CI, CII), the wherein first part C of ciphertextI=Mi+riK, the second part C of ciphertextII=riG, G are indicated on elliptic curve
Basic point.
(9-3) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiGenerate random numberAccording to the random number y of generationI, jObtain signature
Second part YI, j=yI, jP, according to the second part Y of obtained signatureI, jObtain the Part III v of signatureI, j=H3(IDi, mi,
YI, j), according to the Part III v of signatureI, jWith random number yI, jObtain the first part X of signatureI, j=yI, j+DI, jvI, j, and according to
First part, second part and the Part III of obtained signature obtain i-th of intelligent electric meter IiJ-th of period pair
User data m to be dealt withiSignature SI, j={ XI, j, YI, j, vI, j}；
(9-4) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe ciphertext C that step (7-2) is generatedI, jThe signature S generated with step (7-3)I, j
As the result (C after signatureI, j, SI, j) it is sent to aggregation gateway.
Preferably, verify whether user is legitimate user, said if setting up by judging whether following equation is true
Bright user is legitimate user, otherwise indicates that the user is illegal user:
XI, jP==YI, j+(RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j))vI, j
Preferably, ciphertext polymerization result CjCalculating process it is as follows:
。
It is another aspect of this invention to provide that providing a kind of intelligence electricity corresponding with above-mentioned smart grid data ciphering method
Network data decryption method, comprising the following steps:
(1) control centre judges the ciphertext polymerization result C from aggregation gatewayjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, such as
Fruit is reliably then transferred to step (2), otherwise by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt abandons, then process terminates；
(2) control centre is using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjIt is decrypted, with the point M after being decrypted, to decryption
Point M afterwards is decoded, to obtain plaintext m.
Preferably, judge ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, it is from signature polymerization result first
SjExtract parameter X thereinjAnd Yj, then judge whether following equation is true according to the parameter extracted, said if setting up
Bright result is reliable, otherwise illustrates that result is unreliable:
XjP==Yj+(RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j))vj。
Preferably, using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjBe decrypted is using following equation:
M=Mi+ri*K-k*ri*G。
It is another aspect of this invention to provide that a kind of smart grid data encryption system with forward security is provided,
It is to apply in the smart grid Demand-side for including multiple intelligent electric meters, multiple aggregation gateways and control centre, the intelligence
Electric network data encryption system includes:
First module is arranged in control centre, for after receiving the registration request that aggregation gateway is sent to it
The aggregation gateway is registered, and sends the public key K for being used for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway；
Second module is arranged in aggregation gateway, for receiving i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe registration being sent to it
The intelligent electric meter is registered after request, and sends public key K to the intelligent electric meter；Wherein [1, n] i ∈, n indicate smart grid Demand-side
The sum of middle intelligent electric meter；
Third module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for counter j=0 to be arranged；
4th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for judging whether j is less than or equal to period of time T, such as
Fruit is then to enter the 5th module, and else process terminates；
5th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for selecting its own ID number IDi∈ { 0,1 }*, and
Generate random numberAccording to random number tI, jCalculate time reference variable RI, j=tI, jP and openly, and by random number
tI, j, the ID number ID of its owniWith time reference variable RI, jIt is sent to control centre；Wherein subscript i, j indicate i-th of intelligence electricity
Table is in j-th of period, IDiIndicate the ID number of i-th of intelligent electric meter,It represents less than q and is followed with what q coprime integer was constituted
Ring group, P indicate addition cyclic group G1Generation member, and G1It is q for order, generates the addition cyclic group that member is P.
6th module, is set in control centre, for according to the random number t from intelligent electric meterI, j, ID number IDiWith
Time reference variable RI, jCalculate the signature private key DI, j=tI, j+sH1(IDi, RI, j) it is used as current secret key；
7th module, is set in control centre, is used for current secret key DI, jI-th of intelligence is sent to by safe lane
It can ammeter Ii, wherein H1() indicates the first hash function, andS indicates master key, and has
8th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for according to the current secret key D receivedI, jVerify it
It whether is effective private key, if it is effective private key, then according to random number tI, jAnd time reference variable is generated by way of iteration
RI, j+1=tI, j+1P calculates DI, j+1=DI, j+(tI, j+1-tI, j) * P*K, and D is used respectivelyI, j+1And tI, j+1Substitute DI, jAnd tI, j, then
Into the 9th module, if not effective private key, then the 4th module is returned to；Wherein intermediate variable
9th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for according to time reference variable RI, jTo at it
The user data m of reasoniIt is encrypted, is signed using result of the elliptic curve to encryption, and signature result is sent
To aggregation gateway；
Tenth module, is set in aggregation gateway, for according to from i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSignature result judgement
User data miWhether corresponding user is legitimate user, and if yes then enter the 11st module, else process terminates；
11st module, is set in aggregation gateway, for coming from w intelligent electric meter in jth to what is had been received
The signature of a period is polymerize, to obtain the polymerization result S that signsj:
12nd module, is set in aggregation gateway, for w intelligent electric meter j-th of period ciphertext into
Row polymerization, to obtain ciphertext polymerization result Cj, and by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is sent to control centre；
13rd module, is set in control centre, for counter j=j+1 to be arranged, and returns to the 4th module.
It is another aspect of this invention to provide that providing a kind of intelligence electricity corresponding with above-mentioned smart grid data encryption system
Network data decryption system, comprising:
14th module, is set in control centre, for judging the ciphertext polymerization result C from aggregation gatewayjWith
Sign polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, it is transferred to the 15th module if reliable, otherwise by ciphertext polymerization result CjIt polymerize with signature
As a result SjIt abandons, then process terminates；
15th module, is set in control centre, for using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjIt is decrypted,
With the point M after being decrypted, the point M after decryption is decoded, to obtain plaintext m.
In general, through the invention it is contemplated above technical scheme is compared with the prior art, can obtain down and show
Beneficial effect:
(1) present invention utilizes forward security theory, signature private key is dynamically updated with the difference of period
DI, j, and the signature private key of previous period is deleted in time, to ensure that the forward security of the signing messages of intelligent electric meter, together
When greatly reduce calculation amount, save computing cost.
(2) since present invention employs the close SM2 elliptic curve encryption algorithm of state, which is embedded into intelligent electric meter
In, electricity consumption data is encrypted using state's close SM2 elliptic curve encryption algorithm, so that it is poly- to solve existing electric network data
It is easy to be stolen using key caused by plaintext transmission in conjunction method, the technical problem of safety difference；
(3) since the present invention is there is no using the helper used in existing method, cost of device is saved；
(4) aggregation gateway joined in smart grid Demand-side due to the present invention, the case where not using Bilinear map
Under, ciphertext and digital signature that fixed time period receives are verified and polymerize respectively, and by signature after polymerization and close
Text is sent to control centre's processing, avoid a large amount of data import control centre and caused by congestion and network performance decline ask
Topic.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is that the present invention has the smart grid data ciphering method of forward security and the application environment of decryption method
Figure；
Fig. 2 is the flow chart for the smart grid data ciphering method that the present invention has forward security；
Fig. 3 is the flow chart for the smart grid data decryption method that the present invention has forward security.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, right
The present invention is further elaborated.It should be appreciated that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention, and
It is not used in the restriction present invention.As long as in addition, technical characteristic involved in the various embodiments of the present invention described below
Not constituting a conflict with each other can be combined with each other.
The invention proposes a kind of smart grid data ciphering method with forward security, this method can be close using state
SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptographic algorithm realizes the encryption of electricity consumption data, and can utilize in the case where not using Bilinear map
Forward security is theoretical and strong P-congruence pair, with the period Different Dynamic update signature private key, when deleting previous in time
The signature private key of section, to ensure that the forward security of intelligent electric meter end signature-related information, while greatly reducing calculating
Amount.On the other hand, aggregation gateway is added in the present invention in communication construction, in the case where not using Bilinear map, when to fixing
Between section the ciphertext received and digital signature are verified and are polymerize respectively, by after polymerization signature and ciphertext be sent to control
Center processing, avoid a large amount of data import control centre and caused by congestion and network performance decline problem.
As shown in Figure 1, it is including multiple intelligent electric meters, multiple aggregation gateways and control centre that the present invention, which applies,
In smart grid Demand-side.
Basic ideas of the invention are as follows: the user power utilization data of intelligent electric meter are sent to polymerization after encryption and signature
Gateway, aggregation gateway verifying signature, not by then abandoning, request is retransmitted for verifying；It is verified then to fixed time period institute
The signature and ciphertext received is polymerize and is sent to control centre's processing.Control centre carries out the aggregate signature received
Verifying abandons if verifying does not pass through, and request retransmits；Polymerization ciphertext is decrypted with private key if being verified, then will decryption
Result afterwards decodes up in plain text.
As shown in Fig. 2, the present invention provides a kind of smart grid data ciphering method with forward security, is application
In the smart grid Demand-side for including multiple intelligent electric meters, multiple aggregation gateways and control centre, and including following step
It is rapid:
(1) control centre registers the aggregation gateway after receiving the registration request that aggregation gateway is sent to it, and to this
Aggregation gateway sends the public key K for being used for encrypting plaintext data；
(2) aggregation gateway is receiving i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe intelligent electric meter is registered after the registration request being sent to it,
And public key K is sent to the intelligent electric meter；Wherein [1, n] i ∈, n indicate the sum of intelligent electric meter in smart grid Demand-side；
(3) counter j=0 is set；
(4) judge whether j is less than or equal to period of time T, if yes then enter step (5), else process terminates；Wherein T
Indicate the time cycle, value range be (0,1000000],
(5) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSelect the ID number ID of its owni∈ { 0,1 } *, and generate random numberRoot
According to random number tI, jCalculate time reference variable RI, j=tI, jP and openly, and by random number tI, j, the ID number ID of its owniAnd when
Between reference variable RI, jIt is sent to control centre；
In full text of the invention, subscript i, j indicate i-th of intelligent electric meter j-th of period.
Wherein IDiIndicate the ID number of i-th of intelligent electric meter,The circulation for representing less than q and being constituted with q coprime integer
Group, P indicate addition cyclic group G1Generation member, and G1It is q for order, generates the addition cyclic group that member is P.
(6) control centre is according to the random number t from intelligent electric meterI, j, ID number IDiWith time reference variable RI, jCalculate label
Name private key DI, j=tI, j+sH1(IDi, RI, j) it is used as current secret key；
(7) control centre is by current secret key DI, jI-th of intelligent electric meter I is sent to by safe lanei, wherein H1() table
Show the first hash function, andS indicates master key, and has
(8) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the current secret key D receivedI, jVerify whether it is effective private key, if it is
Effective private key, then according to random number tI, jAnd time reference variable R is generated by way of iterationI, j+1=tI, j+1P calculates DI, j+1
=DI, j+(tI, j+1-tI, j) * P*K, and D is used respectivelyI, j+1And tI, j+1Substitute DI, jAnd tI, j, subsequently into step (9), if not
It is effective private key, then return step (4)；Wherein intermediate variable
Specifically, judging current secret key DI, jIt whether be effective private key is by judging DI, jP==RI, j+P*K*H1
(IDi, RI, j) whether realized at Rob Roy, D is indicated if setting upI, jEffectively, otherwise indicate that it is invalid.
(9) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to time reference variable RI, jTo its user data m to be dealt withiIt is encrypted,
It is signed using result of the elliptic curve to encryption, and signature result is sent to aggregation gateway；
Specifically, elliptic curve used in this step is SM2 elliptic curve.
This step includes following sub-step:
(9-1) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiBy its user data m to be dealt withiIt is encoded to elliptic curve EpOn a point
Mi, and integer r one big is generated at randomi, wherein ri< n, n indicate the length of encryption key used in elliptic curve；
(9-2) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the point M on step (7-1)iAnd the big integer r generated generates ciphertext CI, j
=(CI, CII), the wherein first part C of ciphertextI=Mi+riK, the second part C of ciphertextII=riG, G are indicated on elliptic curve
Basic point.
(9-3) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiGenerate random numberAccording to the random number y of generationI, jObtain signature
Second part YI, j=yI, jP, according to the second part Y of obtained signatureI, jObtain the Part III v of signatureI, j=H3(IDi, mi,
YI, j), according to the Part III v of signatureI, jWith random number yI, jObtain the first part X of signatureI, j=yI, j+DI, jvI, j, and according to
First part, second part and the Part III of obtained signature obtain i-th of intelligent electric meter IiJ-th of period pair
User data m to be dealt withiSignature SI, j={ XI, j, YI, j, vI, j)；
(9-4) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe ciphertext C that step (7-2) is generatedI, jThe signature S generated with step (7-3)I, j
As the result (C after signatureI, j, SI, j) it is sent to aggregation gateway；
(10) aggregation gateway is according to from i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSignature result judge user data miCorresponding user
It whether is legitimate user, if yes then enter step (11), else process terminates；
Specifically, whether verifying user is legitimate user, it is by judging whether following equation is true, if setting up
Illustrate that user is legitimate user, otherwise indicate that the user is illegal user:
XI, jP==YI, j+(RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j))vI,J,
(11) aggregation gateway polymerize the signature from w intelligent electric meter j-th of period having been received,
To obtain the polymerization result S that signsj:
(12) ciphertext of the aggregation gateway to w intelligent electric meter j-th of period polymerize, to obtain ciphertext polymerization knot
Fruit Cj, and by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is sent to control centre；
Wherein ciphertext polymerization result CjCalculating process it is as follows:
(13) counter j=j+1, and return step (4) are set.
As shown in figure 3, the present invention provides a kind of smart grid data decryption method with forward security, is application
In the smart grid Demand-side for including multiple intelligent electric meters, multiple aggregation gateways and control centre, and including following step
It is rapid:
(1) control centre judges the ciphertext polymerization result C from aggregation gatewayjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, such as
Fruit is reliably then transferred to step (2), otherwise by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt abandons, then process terminates；
Specifically, judging ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, it is from signature polymerization knot first
Fruit SjExtract parameter X thereinjAnd Yj, then judge whether following equation is true according to the parameter extracted, if setting up
Illustrate that result is reliable, otherwise illustrate that result is unreliable:
XjP==Yj+(RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j))vj
(2) control centre is using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjIt is decrypted, with the point M after being decrypted, to decryption
Point M afterwards is decoded, to obtain plaintext m；
Specifically, private key k is control centre in system initialisation phase from ZpIn randomly selected integer, and the private key
K is corresponding with the public key K for encrypting plaintext data.
In this step, using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjBe decrypted is using following equation:
M=Mi+ri*K-k*ri*G；
In conclusion a kind of smart grid data ciphering method with forward security proposed by the present invention, will polymerize
Signature and the close SM2 public key encryption algorithm of state have been applied in smart grid, have ensured label on the basis of not using Bilinear map
The forward security of name information, simultaneously effective reduces calculation amount.
As it will be easily appreciated by one skilled in the art that the foregoing is merely illustrative of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, not to
The limitation present invention, any modifications, equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should all include
Within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of smart grid data ciphering method with forward security, be apply include multiple intelligent electric meters, it is multiple
In the smart grid Demand-side of aggregation gateway and control centre, which is characterized in that the smart grid data ciphering method packet
Include following steps:
(1) control centre registers the aggregation gateway after receiving the registration request that aggregation gateway is sent to it, and to the polymerization
Gateway sends the public key K for being used for encrypting plaintext data；
(2) aggregation gateway is receiving i-th of intelligent electric meter IiRegister the intelligent electric meter after the registration request being sent to it, and to
The intelligent electric meter sends public key K；Wherein [1, n] i ∈, n indicate the sum of intelligent electric meter in smart grid Demand-side；
(3) counter j=0 is set；
(4) judge whether j is less than or equal to period of time T, if yes then enter step (5), else process terminates；
(5) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSelect the ID number ID of its owni∈ { 0,1 }*, and generate random numberAccording to random
Number tI, jCalculate time reference variable RI, j=tI, jP and openly, and by random number tI, j, the ID number ID of its owniAnd time reference
Variable RI, jIt is sent to control centre；Wherein subscript i, j indicate i-th of intelligent electric meter in j-th of period, IDiIt indicates i-th
The ID number of intelligent electric meter,The cyclic group for representing less than q and constituting with q coprime integer, P indicate addition cyclic group G1Generation
Member, and G1It is q for order, generates the addition cyclic group that member is P.
(6) control centre is according to the random number t from intelligent electric meterI, j, ID number IDiWith time reference variable RI, jCalculate the signature is private
Key DI, j=tI, j+sH1(IDi, RI, j) it is used as current secret key；
(7) control centre is by current secret key DI, jI-th of intelligent electric meter I is sent to by safe lanei, wherein H1() indicates first
Hash function, and H1:S indicates master key, and has
(8) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the current secret key D receivedI, jVerify whether it is effective private key, if it is effective private
Key, then according to random number tI, jAnd time reference variable R is generated by way of iterationI, j+1=tI, j+1P calculates DI, j+1=DI, j+
(tI, j+1-tI, j) * P*K, and D is used respectivelyI, j+1And tI, j+1Substitute DI, jAnd tI, j, subsequently into step (9), if not effective
Private key, then return step (4)；Wherein intermediate variable
(9) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to time reference variable RI, jTo its user data m to be dealt withiIt is encrypted, is used
Elliptic curve signs to the result of encryption, and signature result is sent to aggregation gateway；
(10) aggregation gateway is according to from i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSignature result judge user data miWhether corresponding user
It is legitimate user, if yes then enter step (9), else process terminates；
(11) aggregation gateway polymerize the signature from w intelligent electric meter j-th of period having been received, to obtain
Must sign polymerization result Sj:
(12) ciphertext of the aggregation gateway to w intelligent electric meter j-th of period polymerize, to obtain ciphertext polymerization result Cj,
And by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is sent to control centre；
(13) counter j=j+1, and return step (4) are set.
2. smart grid data ciphering method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that judge current secret key DI, jWhether
It is effective private key is by judging DI, jP==RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j) whether realized at Rob Roy, D is indicated if setting upI, j
Effectively, otherwise indicate that it is invalid.
3. smart grid data ciphering method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that ellipse used in step (9)
Curved line arithmetic is SM2 elliptic curve, and step (9) includes following sub-step:
(9-1) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiBy its user data m to be dealt withiIt is encoded to elliptic curve EpOn a point Mi, and
It is random to generate integer r one bigi, wherein ri< n, n indicate the length of encryption key used in elliptic curve；
(9-2) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the point M on step (7-1)iAnd the big integer r generated generates ciphertext CI, j=
(CI, CII), the wherein first part C of ciphertextI=Mi+riK, the second part C of ciphertextII=riG, G indicate the base on elliptic curve
Point.
(9-3) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiGenerate random numberAccording to the random number y of generationI, jObtain second of signature
Divide YI, j=yI, jP, according to the second part Y of obtained signatureI, jObtain the Part III v of signatureI, j=H3(IDi, mi, YI, j),
According to the Part III v of signatureI, jWith random number yI, jObtain the first part X of signatureI, j=yI, j+DI, jvI, j, and according to obtaining
The first part of signature, second part and Part III obtain i-th of intelligent electric meter IiJ-th of period to being wanted
The user data m of processingiSignature SI, j={ XI, j, YI, j, vI, j}；
(9-4) i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe ciphertext C that step (7-2) is generatedI, jThe signature S generated with step (7-3)I, jAs label
Result (C after nameI, j, SI, j) it is sent to aggregation gateway.
4. smart grid data ciphering method according to claim 3, which is characterized in that whether verifying user is legal use
Family is to illustrate that user is legitimate user by judging whether following equation is true if setting up, otherwise indicate user's right and wrong
Method user:
XI, jP==YI, j+(RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j))vI, j。
5. smart grid data ciphering method according to claim 4, which is characterized in that ciphertext polymerization result CjCalculating
Process is as follows:
。
6. a kind of smart grid data decryption method with forward security, be with according to claim 1 to any one of 5
The smart grid data ciphering method with forward security is corresponding, which is characterized in that the smart grid data deciphering
Method the following steps are included:
(1) control centre judges the ciphertext polymerization result C from aggregation gatewayjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, if can
By being then transferred to step (2), otherwise by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt abandons, then process terminates；
(2) control centre is using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjIt is decrypted, with the point M after being decrypted, after decryption
Point M is decoded, to obtain plaintext m.
7. smart grid data decryption method according to claim 6, which is characterized in that judge ciphertext polymerization result CjWith
Sign polymerization result SjIt is whether reliable, it is from signature polymerization result S firstjExtract parameter X thereinjAnd Yj, then basis mentions
The parameter of taking-up judges whether following equation is true, illustrates that result is reliable if setting up, otherwise illustrates that result is unreliable:
XjP==Yj+(RI, j+P*K*H1(IDi, RI, j))vj。
8. smart grid data decryption method according to claim 7, which is characterized in that polymerize using private key k to ciphertext
As a result CjBe decrypted is using following equation:
M=Mi+ri*K-k*ri*G。
9. a kind of smart grid data encryption system with forward security, be apply include multiple intelligent electric meters, it is multiple
In the smart grid Demand-side of aggregation gateway and control centre, which is characterized in that the smart grid data encryption system packet
It includes:
First module is arranged in control centre, for registering after receiving the registration request that aggregation gateway is sent to it
The aggregation gateway, and the public key K for being used for encrypting plaintext data is sent to the aggregation gateway；
Second module is arranged in aggregation gateway, for receiving i-th of intelligent electric meter IiThe registration request being sent to it
After register the intelligent electric meter, and send public key K to the intelligent electric meter；Wherein [1, n] i ∈, n indicate intelligence in smart grid Demand-side
The sum of energy ammeter；
Third module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for counter j=0 to be arranged；
4th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for judging whether j is less than or equal to period of time T, if it is
Into the 5th module, else process terminates；
5th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for selecting its own ID number IDi∈ { 0,1 }*, and generate
Random numberAccording to random number tI, jCalculate time reference variable RI, j=tI, jP and openly, and by random number tI, j, its
The ID number ID of itselfiWith time reference variable RI, jIt is sent to control centre；Wherein subscript i, j indicate i-th of intelligent electric meter the
J period, IDiIndicate the ID number of i-th of intelligent electric meter,The cyclic group for representing less than q and being constituted with q coprime integer, P
Indicate addition cyclic group G1Generation member, and G1It is q for order, generates the addition cyclic group that member is P.
6th module, is set in control centre, for according to the random number t from intelligent electric meterI, j, ID number IDiAnd the time
Reference variable RI, jCalculate the signature private key DI, j=tI, j+sH1(IDi, RI, j) it is used as current secret key；
7th module, is set in control centre, is used for current secret key DI, jI-th of intelligence is sent to by safe lane
Ammeter Ii, wherein H1() indicates the first hash function, and H1:S indicates master key, and has
8th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for according to the current secret key D receivedI, jVerify its whether be
Effective private key, if it is effective private key, then according to random number tI, jAnd time reference variable R is generated by way of iterationI, j+1=
tI, j+1P calculates DI, j+1=DI, j+(tI, j+1-tI, j) * P*K, and D is used respectivelyI, j+1And tI, j+1Substitute DI, jAnd tI, j, then into
Enter the 9th module, if not effective private key, then returns to the 4th module；Wherein intermediate variable
9th module is set to i-th of intelligent electric meter IiIn, for according to time reference variable RI, jTo its use to be dealt with
User data miIt is encrypted, is signed using result of the elliptic curve to encryption, and signature result is sent to polymerization
Gateway；
Tenth module, is set in aggregation gateway, for according to from i-th of intelligent electric meter IiSignature result judge user
Data miWhether corresponding user is legitimate user, and if yes then enter the 11st module, else process terminates；
11st module, is set in aggregation gateway, when for having been received from w intelligent electric meter at j-th
Between the signature of section polymerize, to obtain the polymerization result S that signsj:
12nd module, is set in aggregation gateway, gathers for the ciphertext to w intelligent electric meter j-th of period
It closes, to obtain ciphertext polymerization result Cj, and by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result SjIt is sent to control centre；
13rd module, is set in control centre, for counter j=j+1 to be arranged, and returns to the 4th module.
10. a kind of smart grid data decryption system with forward security, be with have according to claim 9 it is preceding to
The smart grid data encryption system of safety is corresponding, which is characterized in that the smart grid data decryption system includes:
14th module, is set in control centre, for judging the ciphertext polymerization result C from aggregation gatewayjIt is poly- with signature
Close result SjIt is whether reliable, it is transferred to the 15th module if reliable, otherwise by ciphertext polymerization result CjWith signature polymerization result Sj
It abandons, then process terminates；
15th module, is set in control centre, for using private key k to ciphertext polymerization result CjIt is decrypted, to obtain
Point M after decryption is decoded the point M after decryption, to obtain plaintext m.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910592762.8A CN110460570B (en) | 2019-07-03 | 2019-07-03 | Smart power grid data encryption method and decryption method with forward security |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910592762.8A CN110460570B (en) | 2019-07-03 | 2019-07-03 | Smart power grid data encryption method and decryption method with forward security |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN110460570A true CN110460570A (en) | 2019-11-15 |
| CN110460570B CN110460570B (en) | 2021-07-23 |
Family
ID=68482023
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910592762.8A Active CN110460570B (en) | 2019-07-03 | 2019-07-03 | Smart power grid data encryption method and decryption method with forward security |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN110460570B (en) |
Cited By (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110868298A (en) * | 2019-11-22 | 2020-03-06 | 深圳供电局有限公司 | Power grid communication encryption method |
| CN111178986A (en) * | 2020-02-18 | 2020-05-19 | 电子科技大学 | User-commodity preference prediction method and system |
| CN111770553A (en) * | 2020-06-22 | 2020-10-13 | 深圳中兴网信科技有限公司 | Internet of things equipment access system and method, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112073406A (en) * | 2020-09-03 | 2020-12-11 | 北京工业大学 | Extensible grouping multidata protection method based on bilinear mapping |
| CN112702341A (en) * | 2020-12-23 | 2021-04-23 | 国网山东省电力公司信息通信公司 | Privacy protection-based user electricity consumption data sharing method and system |
| CN113364595A (en) * | 2021-05-24 | 2021-09-07 | 南方电网数字电网研究院有限公司 | Power grid private data signature aggregation method and device and computer equipment |
| CN114189339A (en) * | 2021-12-07 | 2022-03-15 | 贵州亨达集团信息安全技术有限公司 | Certificateless aggregation signature method and certificateless aggregation signature system supporting parallel key isolation |
| CN116015751A (en) * | 2022-12-08 | 2023-04-25 | 武汉理工大学 | Intelligent power grid bidirectional authentication system and method |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105245326A (en) * | 2015-09-10 | 2016-01-13 | 电子科技大学 | Intelligent power grid safety communication method based on combination cipher |
| US20180048463A1 (en) * | 2017-09-12 | 2018-02-15 | QED-it Systems LTD | Method and system for generating private randomness for the creation of public randomness |
| CN109905371A (en) * | 2019-01-24 | 2019-06-18 | 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Two-way encrypted authentication system and its application method |
-
2019
- 2019-07-03 CN CN201910592762.8A patent/CN110460570B/en active Active
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105245326A (en) * | 2015-09-10 | 2016-01-13 | 电子科技大学 | Intelligent power grid safety communication method based on combination cipher |
| US20180048463A1 (en) * | 2017-09-12 | 2018-02-15 | QED-it Systems LTD | Method and system for generating private randomness for the creation of public randomness |
| CN109905371A (en) * | 2019-01-24 | 2019-06-18 | 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Two-way encrypted authentication system and its application method |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| 陈亮,林永峰: "基于同态加密的智能电网安全数据融合技术", 《现代电子技术》 * |
Cited By (13)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110868298B (en) * | 2019-11-22 | 2023-02-03 | 深圳供电局有限公司 | Power grid communication encryption method |
| CN110868298A (en) * | 2019-11-22 | 2020-03-06 | 深圳供电局有限公司 | Power grid communication encryption method |
| CN111178986A (en) * | 2020-02-18 | 2020-05-19 | 电子科技大学 | User-commodity preference prediction method and system |
| CN111178986B (en) * | 2020-02-18 | 2023-04-07 | 电子科技大学 | User-commodity preference prediction method and system |
| CN111770553A (en) * | 2020-06-22 | 2020-10-13 | 深圳中兴网信科技有限公司 | Internet of things equipment access system and method, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112073406A (en) * | 2020-09-03 | 2020-12-11 | 北京工业大学 | Extensible grouping multidata protection method based on bilinear mapping |
| CN112073406B (en) * | 2020-09-03 | 2023-01-13 | 北京工业大学 | Extensible grouping multidata protection method based on bilinear mapping |
| CN112702341A (en) * | 2020-12-23 | 2021-04-23 | 国网山东省电力公司信息通信公司 | Privacy protection-based user electricity consumption data sharing method and system |
| CN113364595A (en) * | 2021-05-24 | 2021-09-07 | 南方电网数字电网研究院有限公司 | Power grid private data signature aggregation method and device and computer equipment |
| CN114189339A (en) * | 2021-12-07 | 2022-03-15 | 贵州亨达集团信息安全技术有限公司 | Certificateless aggregation signature method and certificateless aggregation signature system supporting parallel key isolation |
| CN114189339B (en) * | 2021-12-07 | 2024-01-26 | 贵州亨达集团信息安全技术有限公司 | Certificate-free aggregation signature method and system supporting parallel key isolation |
| CN116015751A (en) * | 2022-12-08 | 2023-04-25 | 武汉理工大学 | Intelligent power grid bidirectional authentication system and method |
| CN116015751B (en) * | 2022-12-08 | 2024-05-03 | 武汉理工大学 | Intelligent power grid bidirectional authentication system and method |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN110460570B (en) | 2021-07-23 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN110460570A (en) | A kind of smart grid data ciphering method and decryption method with forward security | |
| Wang | An identity-based data aggregation protocol for the smart grid | |
| Cui et al. | An efficient and safe road condition monitoring authentication scheme based on fog computing | |
| CN111131148B (en) | Aggregation method and system capable of protecting privacy data and facing smart power grid | |
| Li et al. | An efficient merkle-tree-based authentication scheme for smart grid | |
| Zuo et al. | Privacy-preserving multidimensional data aggregation scheme without trusted authority in smart grid | |
| CN101807818B (en) | Device access authentication method of distribution network automated communication system based on ID | |
| CN110138538A (en) | The smart grid security and secret protection data aggregation method calculated based on mist | |
| CN110489982B (en) | Smart power grid data aggregation and encryption method with forward security | |
| CN102946603B (en) | Based on the unified identity authentication method of social characteristic in power cloud system | |
| CN110430050A (en) | A kind of smart grid collecting method based on secret protection | |
| CN105610773B (en) | A kind of communication encryption method of electric energy meter remote meter reading | |
| CN103618610A (en) | Information safety algorithm based on energy information gateway in smart power grid | |
| Chu et al. | Privacy-preserving smart metering with regional statistics and personal enquiry services | |
| CN107483209A (en) | A kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system | |
| CN101958793A (en) | Double public key cryptograph identity identification, secrete key verification and digital signing integrated solution | |
| CN111770060A (en) | Data transmission method for power internet of things and power internet of things | |
| CN109586924A (en) | A kind of intelligent distribution network data safe transmission method based on cloud computing | |
| Zhang et al. | PADA: Privacy-aware data aggregation with efficient communication for power injection in 5G smart grid slice | |
| CN114915399B (en) | Homomorphic encryption-based energy big data security system | |
| Yukun et al. | A security privacy protection scheme for data collection of smart meters based on homomorphic encryption | |
| Ahmed et al. | Signcryption based authenticated and key exchange protocol for EI-based V2G environment | |
| CN106790024B (en) | Privacy protection method based on power injection under AMI and 5G intelligent power grid | |
| CN115473623A (en) | Method for safely aggregating multidimensional user data in smart power grid | |
| CN107231353A (en) | Batch authentication method based on binary tree in a kind of intelligent grid |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20220708 Address after: 410000 No. 102, Heguang Road, Xianghu street, Furong district, Changsha City, Hunan Province Patentee after: Hunan Kuangan Network Technology Co.,Ltd. Address before: 410082 Building 1, Changsha National Supercomputing Center, 252 Lushan South Road, Yuelu District, Changsha City, Hunan Province Patentee before: Hunan Kuangan Network Technology Co.,Ltd. Patentee before: Hunan University |