CN110460570B - Smart power grid data encryption method and decryption method with forward security - Google Patents

Smart power grid data encryption method and decryption method with forward security Download PDF

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CN110460570B
CN110460570B CN201910592762.8A CN201910592762A CN110460570B CN 110460570 B CN110460570 B CN 110460570B CN 201910592762 A CN201910592762 A CN 201910592762A CN 110460570 B CN110460570 B CN 110460570B
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王远亮
李肯立
徐晓阳
杨志邦
时晴
刘俊
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Abstract

The invention discloses a smart grid data encryption method with forward security, which comprises the following steps: the control center registers the aggregation gateway after receiving a registration request sent by the aggregation gateway, and sends a public key K used for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway, and the aggregation gateway receives the ith intelligent electric meter IiRegistering the intelligent electric meter after the registration request is sent to the intelligent electric meter, sending a public key K to the intelligent electric meter, setting a counter j to be 0, judging whether j is less than or equal to a time period T, and if so, judging the ith intelligent electric meter IiSelects its own ID number and generates a random number ti,jAccording to a random number ti,jCalculating a time reference variable Ri,jAnd disclose and use the random number ti,jIts own ID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri,jAnd sending the data to a control center. The invention updates the signature private key at a fixed time interval, ensures the forward security of the signature information, and completes the aggregation and verification of the digital signature without using bilinear pairings.

Description

Smart power grid data encryption method and decryption method with forward security
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of smart grid security, and particularly relates to a smart grid data encryption method and a smart grid data decryption method with forward security.
Background
The intelligent power grid is a modern power transmission network integrating communication, sensing, automation, computer, control and other technologies. The smart grid collects power supply state data of a supply end and power use state data of a user end by utilizing a communication technology, and achieves the purposes of reducing loss, saving energy and enhancing the communication safety of the power grid through coordination and control. As one of important public infrastructures for the development of countries and cities, the smart power grid has the characteristics of safety, reliability, bidirectional interaction, economy, high efficiency, compatibility, self-healing and the like. In recent years, due to rapid development of economy and network science and technology in China, the requirements of China on various aspects of a power system are continuously improved, the intelligent process is also continuously promoted, and meanwhile, the safety problem of the intelligent power grid is increasingly emphasized.
A large-scale automatic control management system exists in the smart power grid, and the system comprises a plurality of control centers, users, various devices and the like. Each of which manages the grid of a respective area, including the various devices and users of that area. Various sensors and intelligent electric meters equipped in the power grid are responsible for monitoring the running state of the power grid in real time, collecting power consumption data of users and submitting the information to a control center for processing in time. The intelligent ammeter of the user and the control center have bidirectional information flow, and the bidirectional information flow allows the user to know various information such as electricity price, power failure and the like in real time by means of a communication technology so as to make a power utilization plan suitable for the user; on the other hand, the control center can also provide the power utilization data of the users for the power company, and the power company can conveniently make control such as real-time pricing and load balancing. However, most of the existing smart meters interact with the control center in a plaintext form, the security of data is not guaranteed, and the privacy information of the user is easily leaked. On the other hand, as the number of the intelligent electric meters at the user side is large, the intelligent electric meters and the control center are often in a many-to-one relationship, when a large amount of user data are gushed into the control center, pressure can be brought to the control center, the possibility of congestion can be increased, and the network performance can be greatly influenced.
In recent years, numerous power grid data aggregation methods have been proposed at home and abroad to ensure the security of data transmission and improve the performance of transmission networks, wherein the most common aggregation methods include three methods: the method comprises the steps of carrying out homomorphic encryption-based aggregation technology, carrying out bilinear pair-free encryption aggregation algorithm and carrying out key isolation-based aggregation signature method; however, all of the three polymerization processes described above have some non-negligible drawbacks: because the homomorphic encryption needs bilinear pairings, the cost of the calculation process is high; a key pair for digital signature in an encryption aggregation algorithm based on a non-bilinear pair is kept unchanged in the whole communication process, and once the key is stolen, data privacy is revealed; the key isolation-based aggregation signature method introduces an assistor, which can increase the equipment overhead and also has the problem that the key is easy to leak.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects or the improvement requirements of the prior art, the invention provides a smart grid data encryption method, a decryption method and a decryption method with forward security, and aims to solve the technical problems of high calculation overhead, easy stealing of a key and high equipment overhead in the conventional grid data aggregation method.
In order to achieve the above object, according to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a smart grid data encryption method with forward security, which is applied to a smart grid demand side including a plurality of smart meters, a plurality of aggregation gateways, and a control center, the smart grid data encryption method including the steps of:
(1) the control center registers the aggregation gateway after receiving a registration request sent by the aggregation gateway, and sends a public key K for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway;
(2) the aggregation gateway receives the ith intelligent electric meter IiRegistering the intelligent ammeter after the registration request is sent to the intelligent ammeter, and sending a public key K to the intelligent ammeter; where i ∈ [1, n ]]N represents the total number of the smart electric meters in the demand side of the smart power grid;
(3) setting a counter j equal to 0;
(4) judging whether j is less than or equal to the time period T, if so, entering the step (5), otherwise, ending the process;
(5) ith intelligent electric meter IiSelects its own ID number IDi∈{0，1}*And generating a random number
Figure GDA0003063455550000031
According to the random number ti，jCalculating a time reference variable Ri，j＝ti，jP is disclosed and a random number t is assignedi，jIts own ID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jSending the data to a control center; wherein the subscript i, j indicates that the ith intelligent electric meter has ID in the jth time periodiAn ID number indicating the ith smart meter,
Figure GDA0003063455550000032
denotes a cyclic group consisting of integers smaller than q and prime with q, and P denotes an addition cyclic group G1A generator of (2), and G1The order is q, and the generator is P.
(6) The control center is based on the random number t from the intelligent electric meteri，jID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jComputing the signature private key Di，j＝ti，j+sH1(IDi，Ri，j) As the current private key;
(7) the control center sends the current private key Di，jSending the data to the ith intelligent electric meter I through a safety channeliIn which H is1() Represents a first hash function, and
Figure GDA0003063455550000033
s represents a master key and has
Figure GDA0003063455550000034
(8) Ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the received current private key Di，jVerifying whether it is a valid private key, and if so,according to the random number ti，jAnd generating the time reference variable R in an iterative manneri，j+1＝ti，j+1P, calculation of Di，j+1＝Di，j+(ti，j+1-ti，j) P.K, and D was usedi，j+1And ti，j+1Alternative Di，jAnd ti，jThen, the step (9) is carried out, if the private key is not a valid private key, the step (4) is returned; wherein the intermediate variable
Figure GDA0003063455550000035
(9) Ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the time reference variable R after iterationi，jFor which the user data m is to be processediEncrypting, signing the encrypted result by using an elliptic curve algorithm, and sending the signed result to the aggregation gateway;
(10) the aggregation gateway is used for aggregating the data according to the ith intelligent electric meter IiJudging the user data m based on the signature resultiIf the corresponding user is a legal user, entering the step (11) if the corresponding user is the legal user, otherwise ending the process;
(11) the aggregation gateway aggregates the received signatures from the w intelligent electric meters in the jth time period to obtain a signature aggregation result Sj：
(12) The aggregation gateway aggregates ciphertexts of the w intelligent electric meters in the jth time period to obtain a ciphertext aggregation result CjAnd aggregating the ciphertext to obtain a result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjSending the data to a control center;
(13) and setting the counter j to j +1, and returning to the step (4).
Preferably, the current private key D is judgedi，jWhether the private key is valid or not is judged by Di，jP＝＝Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j) Whether or not to be realized in a standing manner, and if so, D is representedi，jValid, otherwise it is indicated as invalid.
Preferably, the elliptic curve algorithm used in step (9) is the SM2 elliptic curve algorithm, and step (9) comprises the following sub-steps:
(9-1) ith intelligent electric meter IiUser data m to be processediEncoding to elliptic curve EpA point M ofiAnd randomly generating a large integer riWherein r isi＜n；
(9-2) ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to point M on step (9-1)iAnd the generated large integer riGenerating a ciphertext Ci，j＝(CI，CII) Wherein the first part C of the ciphertextI＝Mi+riK, second part of ciphertext CII＝riG, G denote base points on the elliptic curve.
(9-3) ith intelligent electric meter IiGenerating random numbers
Figure GDA0003063455550000041
According to the generated random number yi，jObtaining a second part Y of the signaturei，j＝yi，jP, from the second part Y of the signature obtainedi，jObtaining a third part v of the signaturei，j＝H3(IDi，mi，Yi，j) From the third part v of the signaturei，jAnd a random number yi，jObtaining a first part X of a signaturei，j＝yi，j+Di，jvi，jAnd obtaining an ith intelligent electric meter I according to the first part, the second part and the third part of the obtained signatureiFor the user data m to be processed in the jth time periodiSignature S ofi，j＝{Xi，j，Yi，j，vi，j}；
(9-4) ith intelligent electric meter IiThe ciphertext C generated in the step (9-2) is processedi，jAnd the signature S generated in step (9-3)i，jAs signed result (C)i，j，Si，j) And sending to the aggregation gateway.
Preferably, whether the user is a legal user is verified by judging whether the following equation is true, if true, the user is a legal user, otherwise, the user is an illegal user:
Xi，jP＝＝Yi，j+(Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j))vi，j
preferably, the ciphertext aggregation result CjIs calculated as follows
Figure GDA0003063455550000051
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a smart grid data decryption method corresponding to the smart grid data encryption method, including the following steps:
(1) the control center judges the ciphertext aggregation result C from the aggregation gatewayjAnd signature aggregation result SjIf the result is reliable, the step (2) is carried out, otherwise, the result C of the ciphertext aggregation is carried outjAnd signature aggregation result SjDiscard, then the process ends;
(2) the control center uses the private key k to aggregate the result C of the ciphertextjAnd decrypting to obtain a decrypted point M, and decoding the decrypted point M to obtain a plaintext M.
Preferably, the ciphertext aggregation result C is judgedjAnd signature aggregation result SjWhether it is reliable, first from the signature aggregation result SjExtracting the parameter X thereinjAnd YjThen, judging whether the following equation is true or not according to the extracted parameters, if true, indicating that the result is reliable, otherwise, indicating that the result is unreliable:
XjP＝＝Yj+(Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j))vj
preferably, the ciphertext aggregation result C is aggregated using the private key kjDecryption is performed using the following equation:
M＝Mi+ri*K-k*ri*G
according to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a smart grid data encryption system with forward security, which is applied to a smart grid demand side including a plurality of smart meters, a plurality of aggregation gateways, and a control center, the smart grid data encryption system including:
the system comprises a first module, a second module and a third module, wherein the first module is arranged in a control center and used for registering an aggregation gateway after receiving a registration request sent by the aggregation gateway, and sending a public key K used for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway;
a second module, arranged in the aggregation gateway, for receiving the ith intelligent electric meter IiRegistering the intelligent ammeter after the registration request is sent to the intelligent ammeter, and sending a public key K to the intelligent ammeter; where i ∈ [1, n ]]N represents the total number of the smart electric meters in the demand side of the smart power grid;
a third module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiFor setting counter j to 0;
a fourth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiThe judging module is used for judging whether j is less than or equal to the time period T, if so, entering a fifth module, otherwise, ending the process;
a fifth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiFor selecting its own ID number IDi∈{0，1}*And generating a random number
Figure GDA0003063455550000061
According to the random number ti，jCalculating a time reference variable Ri，j＝ti，jP is disclosed and a random number t is assignedi，jIts own ID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jSending the data to a control center; wherein the subscript i, j indicates that the ith intelligent electric meter has ID in the jth time periodiAn ID number indicating the ith smart meter,
Figure GDA0003063455550000062
denotes a cyclic group consisting of integers smaller than q and prime with q, and P denotes an addition cyclic group G1A generator of (2), and G1The order is q, and the generator is P.
A sixth module, provided in the control center, for determining a random number t from the smart meteri，jID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jComputing the signature private key Di，j＝ti，j+sH1(IDi，Ri，j) As the current private key;
a seventh module, disposed in the control center, for assigning the current private key Di，jSending the data to the ith intelligent electric meter I through a safety channeliIn which H is1() Represents a first hash function, and
Figure GDA0003063455550000063
s represents a master key and has
Figure GDA0003063455550000064
An eighth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the received current private key Di，jVerifying whether the key is a valid private key or not, and if the key is the valid private key, determining whether the key is the valid private key according to the random number ti，jAnd generating the time reference variable R in an iterative manneri，j+1＝ti，j+1P, calculation of Di，j+1＝Di，j+(ti，j+1-ti，j) P.K, and D was usedi，j+1And ti，j+1Alternative Di，jAnd ti，jThen entering a ninth module, if the key is not a valid private key, returning to the fourth module; wherein the intermediate variable
Figure GDA0003063455550000065
A ninth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiFor referencing the variable R according to the iterated timei，jFor which the user data m is to be processediEncrypting, signing the encrypted result by using an elliptic curve algorithm, and sending the signed result to the aggregation gateway;
a tenth module, disposed in the aggregation gateway, for calculating a value of the current from the I-th smart meter IiJudging the user data m based on the signature resultiIf the corresponding user is a legal user, entering the eleventh modeBlock, otherwise the process ends;
an eleventh module, disposed in the aggregation gateway, configured to aggregate the signatures that have been received from the w smart meters in the jth time period to obtain a signature aggregation result Sj：
Figure GDA0003063455550000071
A twelfth module, disposed in the aggregation gateway, configured to aggregate the ciphertexts of the w smart meters in the jth time period to obtain a ciphertext aggregation result CjAnd aggregating the ciphertext to obtain a result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjSending the data to a control center;
and a thirteenth module, which is arranged in the control center, is used for setting the counter j ═ j +1, and returns to the fourth module.
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a smart grid data decryption system corresponding to the smart grid data encryption system, including:
a fourteenth module, disposed in the control center, for determining a ciphertext aggregation result C from the aggregation gatewayjAnd signature aggregation result SjIf it is reliable, it will go to the fifteenth module, otherwise it will aggregate the result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjDiscard, then the process ends;
a fifteenth module, disposed in the control center, for aggregating the ciphertext result C using the private key kjAnd decrypting to obtain a decrypted point M, and decoding the decrypted point M to obtain a plaintext M.
In general, compared with the prior art, the above technical solution contemplated by the present invention can achieve the following beneficial effects:
(1) the invention utilizes the forward security theory to dynamically update the signature private key D along with the difference of time periodsi，jAnd the signature private key of the previous time period is deleted in time, so that the forward security of the signature information of the intelligent electric meter is ensured, and meanwhile, the number of the signature private keys is greatly reducedThe calculation amount is reduced, and the calculation cost is saved.
(2) Because the invention adopts the SM2 elliptic curve encryption algorithm, the encryption algorithm is embedded into the intelligent electric meter, and the SM2 elliptic curve encryption algorithm is used for encrypting the electricity consumption data, the technical problems that the secret key is easy to steal and the safety is poor caused by using plaintext transmission in the existing power grid data aggregation method are solved;
(3) the invention does not use the assistor used in the existing method, thereby saving the equipment expense;
(4) because the aggregation gateway is added to the demand side of the smart grid, the ciphertext and the digital signature received in a fixed time period are respectively verified and aggregated under the condition of not using bilinear pairings, and the aggregated signature and the ciphertext are sent to the control center for processing, so that the problems of congestion and network performance reduction caused by the fact that a large amount of data is converged into the control center are solved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of an application environment of a smart grid data encryption method and a decryption method with forward security according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a smart grid data encryption method with forward security of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a smart grid data decryption method with forward security of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention. In addition, the technical features involved in the embodiments of the present invention described below may be combined with each other as long as they do not conflict with each other.
The invention provides a smart grid data encryption method with forward security, which can realize the encryption of power consumption data by using a SM2 elliptic curve public key encryption algorithm, dynamically updates a signature private key along with the difference of time periods and deletes the signature private key of the previous time period in time by using a forward security theory and a strong RSA hypothesis under the condition of not using bilinear pairs, thereby ensuring the forward security of signature related information at a smart meter end and greatly reducing the calculation amount. On the other hand, the aggregation gateway is added into the communication architecture, the received ciphertext and the digital signature are respectively verified and aggregated in a fixed time period under the condition of not using bilinear pairings, and the aggregated signature and the ciphertext are sent to the control center for processing, so that the problems of congestion and network performance reduction caused by the fact that a large amount of data are imported into the control center are solved.
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention is applied to a demand side of a smart grid including a plurality of smart meters, a plurality of aggregation gateways, and a control center.
The basic idea of the invention is as follows: the method comprises the steps that user electricity consumption data of the intelligent electric meter are encrypted and signed and then sent to a convergence gateway, the convergence gateway verifies the signature, if the signature is not verified, the user electricity consumption data are discarded, and a request is sent again; and if the verification is passed, the signature and the ciphertext received in the fixed time period are aggregated and sent to the control center for processing. The control center verifies the received aggregate signature, if the received aggregate signature fails to be verified, the aggregate signature is discarded, and a request is sent again; and if the verification is passed, decrypting the polymerization ciphertext by using the private key, and then decoding the decrypted result to obtain the plaintext.
As shown in fig. 2, the present invention provides a smart grid data encryption method with forward security, which is applied to a smart grid demand side including a plurality of smart meters, a plurality of aggregation gateways, and a control center, and includes the following steps:
(1) the control center registers the aggregation gateway after receiving a registration request sent by the aggregation gateway, and sends a public key K for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway;
(2) the aggregation gateway receives the ith intelligent electric meter IiRegistering the intelligent ammeter after the registration request is sent to the intelligent ammeter, and sending a public key K to the intelligent ammeter; where i ∈ [1, n ]]N represents the total number of the smart electric meters in the demand side of the smart power grid;
(3) setting a counter j equal to 0;
(4) judging whether j is less than or equal to the time period T, if so, entering the step (5), otherwise, ending the process; wherein T represents a time period, the value range of which is (0, 1000000],
(5) ith intelligent electric meter IiSelects its own ID number IDi∈{0，1}*And generating a random number
Figure GDA0003063455550000091
According to the random number ti，jCalculating a time reference variable Ri，j＝ti，jP is disclosed and a random number t is assignedi，jIts own ID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jSending the data to a control center;
in the present invention, the subscript i, j indicates that the ith smart meter is in the jth time period.
Wherein the IDiAn ID number indicating the ith smart meter,
Figure GDA0003063455550000101
denotes a cyclic group consisting of integers smaller than q and prime with q, and P denotes an addition cyclic group G1A generator of (2), and G1The order is q, and the generator is P.
(6) The control center is based on the random number t from the intelligent electric meteri，jID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jComputing the signature private key Di，j＝ti，j+sH1(IDi，Ri，j) As the current private key;
(7) the control center sends the current private key Di，jSending the data to the ith intelligent electric meter I through a safety channeliIn which H is1() Represents a first hash function, and
Figure GDA0003063455550000102
s represents a master key and has
Figure GDA0003063455550000103
(8) Ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the received current private key Di，jVerifying whether the key is a valid private key or not, and if the key is the valid private key, determining whether the key is the valid private key according to the random number ti，jAnd generating the time reference variable R in an iterative manneri，j+1＝ti，j+1P, calculation of Di，j+1＝Di，j+(ti，j+1-ti，j) P.K, and D was usedi，j+1And ti，j+1Alternative Di，jAnd ti，jThen, the step (9) is carried out, if the private key is not a valid private key, the step (4) is returned; wherein the intermediate variable
Figure GDA0003063455550000104
Specifically, the current private key D is judgedi，jWhether the private key is valid or not is judged by Di，jP＝＝Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j) Whether or not to be realized in a standing manner, and if so, D is representedi，jValid, otherwise it is indicated as invalid.
(9) Ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the time reference variable R after iterationi，jFor which the user data m is to be processediEncrypting, signing the encrypted result by using an elliptic curve algorithm, and sending the signed result to the aggregation gateway;
specifically, the elliptic curve algorithm used in this step is the SM2 elliptic curve algorithm.
The method comprises the following substeps:
(9-1) ith intelligent electric meter IiUser data m to be processediEncoding to elliptic curve EpA point M ofiAnd randomly generating a large integer riWherein r isi＜n；
(9-2) ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to point M on step (9-1)iAnd the generated large integer riGenerating a ciphertext Ci，j＝(CI，CII) Wherein the first part C of the ciphertextI＝Mi+riK, second part of ciphertextIs divided into CII＝riG, G denote base points on the elliptic curve.
(9-3) ith intelligent electric meter IiGenerating random numbers
Figure GDA0003063455550000111
According to the generated random number yi，jObtaining a second part Y of the signaturei，j＝yi，jP, from the second part Y of the signature obtainedi，jObtaining a third part v of the signaturei，j＝H3(IDi，mi，Yi，j) From the third part v of the signaturei，jAnd a random number yi，jObtaining a first part X of a signaturei，j＝yi，j+Di，jvi，jAnd obtaining an ith intelligent electric meter I according to the first part, the second part and the third part of the obtained signatureiFor the user data m to be processed in the jth time periodiSignature S ofi，j＝{Xi，j，Yi，j，vi，j}；
(9-4) ith intelligent electric meter IiThe ciphertext C generated in the step (9-2) is processedi，jAnd the signature S generated in step (9-3)i，jAs signed result (C)i，j，Si，j) Sending to the aggregation gateway;
(10) the aggregation gateway is used for aggregating the data according to the ith intelligent electric meter IiJudging the user data m based on the signature resultiIf the corresponding user is a legal user, entering the step (11) if the corresponding user is the legal user, otherwise ending the process;
specifically, whether the user is a legal user is verified, whether the following equation is satisfied is judged, if so, the user is a legal user, and if not, the user is an illegal user:
Xi，jP＝＝Yi，j+(Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j))vi，j，
(11) the aggregation gateway aggregates the received signatures from the w intelligent electric meters in the jth time period to obtain a signature aggregation result Sj：
Figure GDA0003063455550000112
(12) The aggregation gateway aggregates ciphertexts of the w intelligent electric meters in the jth time period to obtain a ciphertext aggregation result CjAnd aggregating the ciphertext to obtain a result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjSending the data to a control center;
wherein the ciphertext aggregate result CjThe calculation process of (2) is as follows:
Figure GDA0003063455550000113
(13) and setting the counter j to j +1, and returning to the step (4).
As shown in fig. 3, the present invention provides a smart grid data decryption method with forward security, which is applied to a smart grid demand side including a plurality of smart meters, a plurality of aggregation gateways, and a control center, and includes the following steps:
(1) the control center judges the ciphertext aggregation result C from the aggregation gatewayjAnd signature aggregation result SjIf the result is reliable, the step (2) is carried out, otherwise, the result C of the ciphertext aggregation is carried outjAnd signature aggregation result SjDiscard, then the process ends;
specifically, the ciphertext aggregation result C is judgedjAnd signature aggregation result SjWhether it is reliable, first from the signature aggregation result SjExtracting the parameter X thereinjAnd YjThen, judging whether the following equation is true or not according to the extracted parameters, if true, indicating that the result is reliable, otherwise, indicating that the result is unreliable:
XjP＝＝Yj+(Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j))υj
(2) the control center uses the private key k to aggregate the result C of the ciphertextjDecrypting to obtain decrypted pointM, decoding the decrypted point M to obtain a plaintext M;
in particular, the private key k is the key from Z of the control center during the system initialization phasepAnd the private key K corresponds to the public key K used to encrypt the plaintext data.
In this step, the result C is aggregated to the ciphertext using the private key kjDecryption is performed using the following equation:
M＝Mi+ri*K-k*ri*G；
in summary, the smart grid data encryption method with forward security provided by the invention applies the aggregate signature and the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to the smart grid, guarantees the forward security of the signature information on the basis of not using bilinear pairs, and simultaneously effectively reduces the calculated amount.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the invention, and that any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. The smart grid data encryption method with forward security is applied to a smart grid demand side comprising a plurality of smart meters, a plurality of aggregation gateways and a control center, and is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
(1) the control center registers the aggregation gateway after receiving a registration request sent by the aggregation gateway, and sends a public key K for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway;
(2) the aggregation gateway receives the ith intelligent electric meter IiRegistering the intelligent ammeter after the registration request is sent to the intelligent ammeter, and sending a public key K to the intelligent ammeter; where i ∈ [1, n ]]N represents the total number of the smart electric meters in the demand side of the smart power grid;
(3) setting a counter j equal to 0;
(4) judging whether j is less than or equal to the time period T, if so, entering the step (5), otherwise, ending the process;
(5) ith intelligent electric meter IiSelects its own ID number IDi∈{0，1}*And generating a random number
Figure FDA0003063455540000011
According to the random number ti，jCalculating a time reference variable Ri，j＝ti，jP is disclosed and a random number t is assignedi，jIts own ID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jSending the data to a control center; wherein the subscript i, j indicates that the ith intelligent electric meter has ID in the jth time periodiAn ID number indicating the ith smart meter,
Figure FDA0003063455540000012
denotes a cyclic group consisting of integers smaller than q and prime with q, and P denotes an addition cyclic group G1A generator of (2), and G1The order is q, and the generator is P.
(6) The control center is based on the random number t from the intelligent electric meteri，jID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jComputing the signature private key Di，j＝ti，j+sH1(IDi，Ri，j) As the current private key;
(7) the control center sends the current private key Di，jSending the data to the ith intelligent electric meter I through a safety channeliIn which H is1() Represents a first hash function, and H1：
Figure FDA0003063455540000013
s represents a master key and has
Figure FDA0003063455540000014
(8) Ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the received current private key Di，jVerifying whether the key is a valid private key or not, and if the key is the valid private key, determining whether the key is the valid private key according to the random number ti，jAnd generated by means of iterationInter-reference variable Ri，j+1＝ti，j+1P, calculation of Di，j+1＝Di，j+(ti，j+1-ti，j) P.K, and D was usedi，j+1And ti，j+1Alternative Di，jAnd ti，jThen, the step (9) is carried out, if the private key is not a valid private key, the step (4) is returned; wherein the intermediate variable
Figure FDA0003063455540000021
(9) Ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the time reference variable R after iterationi，jFor which the user data m is to be processediEncrypting, signing the encrypted result by using an elliptic curve algorithm, and sending the signed result to the aggregation gateway;
(10) the aggregation gateway is used for aggregating the data according to the ith intelligent electric meter IiJudging the user data m based on the signature resultiIf the corresponding user is a legal user, entering the step (11) if the corresponding user is the legal user, otherwise ending the process;
(11) the aggregation gateway aggregates the received signatures from the w intelligent electric meters in the jth time period to obtain a signature aggregation result Sj：
(12) The aggregation gateway aggregates ciphertexts of the w intelligent electric meters in the jth time period to obtain a ciphertext aggregation result CjAnd aggregating the ciphertext to obtain a result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjSending the data to a control center;
(13) and setting the counter j to j +1, and returning to the step (4).
2. The smart grid data encryption method as claimed in claim 1, wherein determining the current private key Di，jWhether the private key is valid or not is judged by Di，jP＝＝Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j) Whether or not to be realized in a standing manner, and if so, D is representedi，jValid, otherwise it is indicated as invalid.
3. The smart grid data encryption method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the elliptic curve algorithm used in step (9) is SM2 elliptic curve algorithm, and step (9) comprises the following sub-steps:
(9-1) ith intelligent electric meter IiUser data m to be processediEncoding to elliptic curve EpA point M ofiAnd randomly generating a large integer riWherein r isi＜n；
(9-2) ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to point M on step (9-1)iAnd the generated large integer riGenerating a ciphertext Ci，j＝(CI，CII) Wherein the first part C of the ciphertextI＝Mi+riK, second part of ciphertext CII＝riG, G denote base points on the elliptic curve.
(9-3) ith intelligent electric meter IiGenerating random numbers
Figure FDA0003063455540000022
According to the generated random number yi，jObtaining a second part Y of the signaturei，j＝yi，jP, from the second part Y of the signature obtainedi，jObtaining a third part v of the signaturei，j＝H3(IDi，mi，Yi，j) From the third part v of the signaturei，jAnd a random number yi，jObtaining a first part X of a signaturei，j＝yi，j+Di，jvi，jAnd obtaining an ith intelligent electric meter I according to the first part, the second part and the third part of the obtained signatureiFor the user data m to be processed in the jth time periodiSignature S ofi，j＝{Xi，j，Yi，j，vi，j}；
(9-4) ith intelligent electric meter IiThe ciphertext C generated in the step (9-2) is processedi，jAnd the signature S generated in step (9-3)i，jAs signed result (C)i，j，Si，j) And sending to the aggregation gateway.
4. The smart grid data encryption method according to claim 3, wherein whether the user is a legal user is verified by judging whether the following equation is true, if true, the user is a legal user, otherwise, the user is an illegal user:
Xi，jP＝＝Yi，j+(Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j))vi，j。
5. the smart grid data encryption method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the ciphertext aggregation result CjThe calculation process of (2) is as follows:
Figure FDA0003063455540000031
6. a smart grid data decryption method with forward security, which corresponds to the smart grid data encryption method with forward security according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the smart grid data decryption method comprises the following steps:
(1) the control center judges the ciphertext aggregation result C from the aggregation gatewayjAnd signature aggregation result SjIf the result is reliable, the step (2) is carried out, otherwise, the result C of the ciphertext aggregation is carried outjAnd signature aggregation result SjDiscard, then the process ends;
(2) the control center uses the private key k to aggregate the result C of the ciphertextjAnd decrypting to obtain a decrypted point M, and decoding the decrypted point M to obtain a plaintext M.
7. The smart grid data decryption method of claim 6, wherein the ciphertext aggregation result C is judgedjAnd signature aggregation result SjWhether it is reliable, first from the signature aggregation result SjExtracting the parameter X thereinjAnd YjThen, judging whether the following equation is true or not according to the extracted parameters, if true, indicating that the result is reliable, otherwise, indicating that the result is unreliable:
XjP＝＝Yj+(Ri，j+P*K*H1(IDi，Ri，j))υj。
8. the smart grid data decryption method of claim 7, wherein the ciphertext aggregation result C is aggregated by using a private key kjDecryption is performed using the following equation:
M＝Mi+ri*K-k*ri*G。
9. the utility model provides a smart power grids data encryption system with forward security is used in the smart power grids demand side that includes a plurality of smart electric meters, a plurality of aggregation gateway and control center, its characterized in that, smart power grids data encryption system includes:
the system comprises a first module, a second module and a third module, wherein the first module is arranged in a control center and used for registering an aggregation gateway after receiving a registration request sent by the aggregation gateway, and sending a public key K used for encrypting plaintext data to the aggregation gateway;
a second module, arranged in the aggregation gateway, for receiving the ith intelligent electric meter IiRegistering the intelligent ammeter after the registration request is sent to the intelligent ammeter, and sending a public key K to the intelligent ammeter; where i ∈ [1, n ]]N represents the total number of the smart electric meters in the demand side of the smart power grid;
a third module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiFor setting counter j to 0;
a fourth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiThe judging module is used for judging whether j is less than or equal to the time period T, if so, entering a fifth module, otherwise, ending the process;
a fifth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiFor selecting its own ID number IDi∈{0，1}*And generating a random number
Figure FDA0003063455540000041
According to the random number ti，jCalculating a time reference variable Ri，j＝ti，jP is disclosed and a random number t is assignedi，jIts own ID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jSending the data to a control center; wherein the subscript i, j indicates that the ith intelligent electric meter has ID in the jth time periodiAn ID number indicating the ith smart meter,
Figure FDA0003063455540000051
denotes a cyclic group consisting of integers smaller than q and prime with q, and P denotes an addition cyclic group G1A generator of (2), and G1The order is q, and the generator is P.
A sixth module, provided in the control center, for determining a random number t from the smart meteri，jID number IDiAnd a time reference variable Ri，jComputing the signature private key Di，j＝ti，j+sH1(IDi，Ri，j) As the current private key;
a seventh module, disposed in the control center, for assigning the current private key Di，jSending the data to the ith intelligent electric meter I through a safety channeliIn which H is1() Represents a first hash function, and H1：
Figure FDA0003063455540000052
s represents a master key and has
Figure FDA0003063455540000053
An eighth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiAccording to the received current private key Di，jVerifying whether the key is a valid private key or not, and if the key is the valid private key, determining whether the key is the valid private key according to the random number ti，jAnd generating the time reference variable R in an iterative manneri，j+1＝ti，j+1P, calculation of Di，j+1＝Di，j+(ti，j+1-ti，j) P.K, and D was usedi，j+1And ti，j+1Alternative Di，jAnd ti，jThen entering a ninth module, if the key is not a valid private key, returning to the fourth module; wherein the intermediate variable
Figure FDA0003063455540000054
A ninth module arranged at the ith intelligent electric meter IiFor referencing the variable R according to the iterated timei，jFor which the user data m is to be processediEncrypting, signing the encrypted result by using an elliptic curve algorithm, and sending the signed result to the aggregation gateway;
a tenth module, disposed in the aggregation gateway, for calculating a value of the current from the I-th smart meter IiJudging the user data m based on the signature resultiWhether the corresponding user is a legal user or not is judged, if so, the eleventh module is entered, and if not, the process is ended;
an eleventh module, disposed in the aggregation gateway, configured to aggregate the signatures that have been received from the w smart meters in the jth time period to obtain a signature aggregation result Sj：
Figure FDA0003063455540000055
A twelfth module, disposed in the aggregation gateway, configured to aggregate the ciphertexts of the w smart meters in the jth time period to obtain a ciphertext aggregation result CjAnd aggregating the ciphertext to obtain a result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjSending the data to a control center;
and a thirteenth module, which is arranged in the control center, is used for setting the counter j ═ j +1, and returns to the fourth module.
10. A smart grid data decryption system with forward security corresponding to the smart grid data encryption system with forward security according to claim 9, wherein the smart grid data decryption system comprises:
a fourteenth module, disposed in the control center, for determining a ciphertext aggregation result C from the aggregation gatewayjAnd signature aggregation result SjIf it is reliable, it will go to the fifteenth module, otherwise it will aggregate the result CjAnd signature aggregation result SjDiscard, then the process ends;
a fifteenth module, disposed in the control center, for aggregating the ciphertext result C using the private key kjAnd decrypting to obtain a decrypted point M, and decoding the decrypted point M to obtain a plaintext M.
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