CN107483209A - A kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system - Google Patents

A kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system Download PDF

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Publication number
CN107483209A
CN107483209A CN201710654898.8A CN201710654898A CN107483209A CN 107483209 A CN107483209 A CN 107483209A CN 201710654898 A CN201710654898 A CN 201710654898A CN 107483209 A CN107483209 A CN 107483209A
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ciphertext
recipient
key
calculate
private key
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CN107483209B (en
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金春花
赵建洋
陈冠华
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Huaian Fun Sofware Co ltd
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Huaiyin Institute of Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/006—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system, comprise the following steps：System initialization step；Key generation step based on IBC；Key generation step based on PKI；Sender utilizes the private key of oneself, identity information, the public key of recipient and given message m, by dot product, hash function and XOR, obtains the ciphertext to be exported；Given ciphertext σ, the public key of senderWith the private key x of recipientr, recipient, checking equation is calculated by point multiplication operation, XOR and Bilinear map computing.If being verified, this ciphertext and output message m are received.Deny, refusal ciphertext and output error symbol ⊥.The present invention protects the secure communication of intelligent electric meter and electric administrative department, and realizes confidentiality and authentication property between them, has reached certain safety and privacy requirement.

Description

A kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of Signcryption method, for intelligent grid, the confidentiality belonged in intelligent grid and certification Property technical field.
Background technology
Compared with traditional power network, intelligent grid has merged advanced information and communication technology (ICT), realizes and is cut with traditional power network So different power network theory and system.Intelligent grid allows the transmission of two-way electric current and information flow, and allows user autonomous The electricity consumption period is selected, participates in the operational management of system.
Intelligent electric meter includes process chip and memory cell, and it is the key component in intelligent grid.Intelligent electric meter energy The enough and household electrical appliance in user family and the management equipment in electric administrative department are communicated.Due to having used intelligent electricity Table, intelligent grid can monitor transmission and the consumption information of electric power in real time, subscribe to the use of electric power and more entering for relevant electric power The demand of one step, and the output and use of management electric power.Therefore, the generation to user and electric power and use are brought greatly Benefit.According to the real-time electricity usage situation of user, electric administrative department can monitor and analyze the state of whole intelligent grid. Then electric power according to demand, electric administrative department can dynamically adjust the generation, transmission and distribution of electric power, and it is high to reduce electricity consumption The demand at peak, avoid potentially powering off.These management informations of electric administrative department will be transmitted in real time by intelligent electric meter Into user family.Then user readjusts the use of electric power according to current electricity consumption situation, and the electricity consumption time from peak when Phase goes to peak absences.
Intelligent grid brings great benefit to user and electric administrative department.Its success depends on communication System.But the safety of communication system can significantly influence the normal operation of intelligent grid.In the worst case, its energy It is enough that serious destruction is brought to whole infrastructure, and immeasurable influence is caused on economic, society and the people life. Therefore, safety also just turns into the subject matter in intelligent grid.First, in intelligent grid, except intelligent electric meter and power pipe Reason department, any third party not can know that the electricity consumption data of user.Otherwise, attacker is possible to according to these sensitivity letters Cease and the personal property of user is threatened.Secondly, electricity consumption data should be certified.Otherwise these data do not have Convincingness.Again, electricity consumption data can not be tampered during transmission.If these data are tampered, attacker's Tampering should be able to be detected.Then, if the electricity consumption data of user have been sent to electricity by intelligent electric meter Power management department, intelligent electric meter can not deny the behavior of its own.Finally, can not be extracted in these electricity consumption data extra Information help third party's identification intelligent ammeter and electric administrative department.
Design one meets that the scheme of above-mentioned requirements is extremely difficult simultaneously.In addition, we are also contemplated that intelligence Limited calculating and the communication resource in ammeter, and electric administrative department has enough calculating and the communication resource.Based on this, isomery Stopover sites are well suited for designing the safe hetero-com-munication in intelligent grid.
Huang et al. proposes the stopover sites of an isomery.In this scenario, sender belongs to ID-ased cryptography System (IBC), and recipient belongs to the cryptographic system (PKI) based on PKIX.But their scheme only allows base The recipient based on PKI is sent messages in IBC sender.Li and Xiong proposes the label of the on-line/off-line of an isomery Close scheme.The program, which will be signed, close is divided into off-line phase and on-line stage.In off-line phase, the larger computing of amount of calculation is all at this Stage completes, and this stage is not related to the computing of message m.In on-line stage, the computing of only some lightweights exists This stage completes, and this stage is related to the computing of message m.2013, Li et al. proposed two based on isomery Stopover sites.Sender belongs to the cryptographic system based on PKI in first stopover sites, and recipient belongs to based on IBC's Cryptographic system.Sender belongs to the cryptographic system based on IBC in second stopover sites, and recipient belongs to based on PKI's Cryptographic system.Recently, Li et al. proposes the ring stopover sites based on isomery.The program can protect sensor node Privacy, and in this scenario, sensor node belongs to IBC cryptographic systems, and server belongs to PKI cryptographic systems.2016, Li et al. proposes one from wireless sensor network (WSNs) to the stopover sites of the isomery of the webserver (server). In the program, WSNs belongs to the cryptographic system (CLC) of no certificate, and server belongs to PKI cryptographic system.
The content of the invention
Goal of the invention：For problems of the prior art, the present invention provides one kind and is used for smart grid security isomery The method of communication.
Technical scheme：A kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system, comprises the following steps：
1) system initialization step：
Security parameter k 1-1) is given, private key generation center (PKG) selects bilinear map group (G of the rank for q first1,G2), Group G1Generation member P and bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2。
1-2) select main private keyCalculate Your Majesty's key Ppub=sP.
1-3) select three Hash numbers:H1:{0,1}*→G1,N is represented Sign close message-length.
1-4) system public parameter is { G1,G2,e,q,P,Ppub,n,H1,H2,H3}。
2) key generation (IBC-KE) step based on IBC：
2-1) based on the sender in IBC its identity information IDsIt is sent to PKG.
2-2) PKG calculates its public keyAnd private keyIssue sender.
3) key generation (PKI-KE) step based on PKI：
A random number 3-1) is selected based on the recipient in PKIAs its private key.
3-2) recipient calculates yr=xrP is as corresponding public key.
4) close (SC) step is signed：Given message m, the private key of senderWith the public key of recipientSender performs Following steps：
4-1) select random numberAnd calculate U=rP.
4-2) calculate h2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr)。
4-3) calculate
4-4) calculate
4-5) send ciphertext σ=(U, V, W).
5) solution signs close (USC) step:Given ciphertext σ, the public key of senderWith the private key x of recipientr, recipient holds Row following steps：
5-1) calculate T=xrU。
5-2) calculate
5-3) calculate h2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr)。
5-4) verify equation e (P, V)=e (Ppub,QIDs)e(U,h2) whether equal.If condition is set up, ciphertext is received simultaneously Output message m；Otherwise, ciphertext and output error symbol ⊥ are refused.
The present invention is based on that Diffie-Hellman difficult problems can be calculated.It can be realized simultaneously in same logic step Confidentiality and authentication property.Simultaneously, it is contemplated that limited computing resource and communication overhead in intelligent electric meter, and in electric administrative department There are powerful computing resource and communication overhead.Therefore, heterogeneous system is well suited for such characteristic.It is close in the label of the heterogeneous system In scheme, intelligent electric meter is based on IBC cryptographic systems, therefore certificate management problem is not present, and electric administrative department is close based on PKI Code system, certificate management problem can be afforded.
The invention has the advantages that protecting the secure communication of intelligent electric meter and electric administrative department, and realize Confidentiality and authentication property between them, certain safety and privacy requirement are reached.
Embodiment
With reference to specific embodiment, the present invention is furture elucidated, it should be understood that these embodiments are merely to illustrate the present invention Rather than limitation the scope of the present invention, after the present invention has been read, various equivalences of the those skilled in the art to the present invention The modification of form falls within the application appended claims limited range.
The symbol description used in implementation see the table below：
A kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system, comprises the following steps：
(1) system initialization (Setup)：PKG generates main private key and system public parameter
1) security parameter k, PKG are given and selects bilinear map group (G of the rank for q1,G2), group G1Generation member P and two-wire Property mapping G1×G1→G2。
2) PKG selects main private keyYour Majesty's key Ppub=sP and three hash function H1:{0,1}*→G1,Wherein n represents to be signed the length of close message m.
3) system public parameter is { G1,G2,e,q,P,Ppub,n,H1,H2,H3}。
(2) cipher key-extraction (IBC-KE) of ID-based cryptosystem system:PKG is generated according to the identity information of sender and sent out The public key for the person of sending and the private key for calculating sender, and the private key of generation is sent to sender.
1) identity information ID of the sender in IBC cryptographic systems itsIt is sent to PKG.
2) PKG is calculatedAnd private keyThe sender being sent in IBC cryptographic systems.
(3) cipher key-extraction (PKI-KE) based on PKIX cryptographic system:Recipient selects a random number life Into oneself private key and calculate the public key of oneself.
Recipient in PKI cryptographic systems selects a random numberAs oneself private key and calculate corresponding Public key yr=xrP。
3-2) recipient calculates yr=xrP is as corresponding public key.
(4) close (SC) is signed:Sender utilizes the private key of oneself, identity information, the public key of recipient and given message M, by dot product, hash function and XOR, obtain the ciphertext to be exported.
1) sender selects random numberAnd calculate U=rP.
2) sender calculates hash function value h2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr)。
3) sender's computer is signed
4) sender's computer is encrypted
5) sender exports ciphertext σ=(U, V, W).
(5) solution signs close (USC):Recipient utilizes private key, public key and the given ciphertext of oneself, by point multiplication operation, XOR and Bilinear map computing calculate checking equation.If being verified, this ciphertext and output message m are received.It is no Recognize, refusal ciphertext and output error symbol ⊥.
1) recipient calculates T=xrU。
2) recipient calculates XOR value
3) recipient calculates hash function value h2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr)。
4) recipient verifies equationIt is whether equal.If condition is set up, ciphertext is received And output message m；Otherwise, ciphertext and output error symbol ⊥ are refused.
The simplification flow graph such as following table of above-mentioned embodiment：
The present invention protects the electricity usage data of user and the managing control information of electric administrative department, and ensure that The data that transmitted before intelligent electric meter can not be denied, certain safety and privacy requirement are reached, it is described as follows：
1) data security：In the communication of intelligent electric meter and electric administrative department, message m is transmitted in the form of ciphertext 's.The random number of sender's selectionAnd the private key of oneself only has and oneself known, disabled user can not possibly be from ciphertext σ Message m is recovered, the ciphertext can be decrypted by only really possessing the intelligent electric meter of private key.So this agreement can realize confidentiality.
2) authentication property：If it is not known that the private key of intelligent electric meterOpponent can not then produce legal signature information V, its Inh2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr).Electric administrative department is by verifying that V correctness can be with authentication intelligent ammeter. So this agreement can provide authentication property.
3) integrality：The electricity usage data m of user is included in hash function h2In W, wherein h2=H2(m,U,IDs, yr),Opponent can not be from cryptographic Hash h2In obtain m because hash function is one-way function. M can not be obtained from W because only that intelligent electric meter oneself knows random number r.So this agreement can provide integrality.
Non-repudiation：In stopover sites, the private key of intelligent electric meter has been usedAnd only intelligent electric meter is knownValue.Therefore, in the communication of whole smart grid security, intelligent electric meter, which can not be denied oneself take part in, this time to communicate, and The data being transmitted across before can not be denied.So this agreement can realize non-repudiation.

Claims (6)

1. a kind of safe label decryption method based on heterogeneous system, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps：
1) system initialization step；
2) key generation (IBC-KE) step based on IBC；
3) key generation (PKI-KE) step based on PKI；
4) close (SC) step is signed：Sender utilizes the private key of oneself, identity information, the public key of recipient and given message m, By dot product, hash function and XOR, the ciphertext to be exported is obtained；
5) solution signs close (USC) step:Given ciphertext σ, the public key of senderWith the private key x of recipientr, recipient, pass through a little Multiplication, XOR and Bilinear map computing calculate checking equation.If being verified, receive this ciphertext and output disappears Cease m.Deny, refusal ciphertext and output error symbol ⊥.
2. the label decryption method based on heterogeneous system of safety as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that system initialization step Including：
Security parameter k 1-1) is given, private key generation center (PKG) selects bilinear map group (G of the rank for q first1,G2), group G1 Generation member P and bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2；
1-2) select main private keyCalculate Your Majesty's key Ppub=sP；
1-3) select three Hash numbers:H1:{0,1}*→G1,N represents to sign Close message-length；
1-4) system public parameter is { G1,G2,e,q,P,Ppub,n,H1,H2,H3}。
3. the label decryption method based on heterogeneous system of safety as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that the key based on IBC Generation (IBC-KE) step includes：
2-1) based on the sender in IBC its identity information IDsIt is sent to PKG；
2-2) PKG calculates its public keyAnd private keyIssue sender.
4. the label decryption method based on heterogeneous system of safety as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that the key based on PKI Generation (PKI-KE) step includes：
A random number 3-1) is selected based on the recipient in PKIAs its private key；
3-2) recipient calculates yr=xrP is as corresponding public key.
5. the label decryption method based on heterogeneous system of safety as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that close (SC) the step bag of label Include：
4-1) select random numberAnd calculate U=rP；
4-2) calculate h2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr)；
4-3) calculate
4-4) calculate
4-5) send ciphertext σ=(U, V, W).
6. the label decryption method based on heterogeneous system of safety as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that given ciphertext σ, send The public key of personWith the private key x of recipientr, recipient's execution following steps：
5-1) calculate T=xrU。
5-2) calculate
5-3) calculate h2=H2(m,U,IDs,yr)。
5-4) verify equationIt is whether equal；If condition is set up, receive ciphertext and output disappears Cease m；Otherwise, ciphertext and output error symbol ⊥ are refused.
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CN108566274A (en) * 2018-03-15 2018-09-21 中国地质大学（武汉） Method, equipment and the storage device of slitless connection between a kind of block chain Verification System
CN109088893A (en) * 2018-10-23 2018-12-25 桂林电子科技大学 Close Multiuser is signed based on polymerization under a kind of cloud environment and authenticates communication means
CN110113150A (en) * 2019-04-08 2019-08-09 淮阴工学院 The encryption method and system of deniable authentication based on no certificate environment
CN110120939A (en) * 2019-04-08 2019-08-13 淮阴工学院 A kind of encryption method and system of the deniable authentication based on heterogeneous system
CN112383397A (en) * 2020-09-15 2021-02-19 淮阴工学院 Heterogeneous signcryption communication method based on biological characteristics
CN114024683A (en) * 2021-09-28 2022-02-08 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from CLC environment to PKI environment
CN114039724A (en) * 2021-11-05 2022-02-11 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from CLC environment to IBC environment
CN114285580A (en) * 2021-11-12 2022-04-05 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from certificateless to public key infrastructure
CN115499834A (en) * 2022-04-19 2022-12-20 电子科技大学 Intelligent Internet-of-vehicles lightweight heterogeneous signcryption method based on fog calculation block chain fusion

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN108566274A (en) * 2018-03-15 2018-09-21 中国地质大学（武汉） Method, equipment and the storage device of slitless connection between a kind of block chain Verification System
CN109088893B (en) * 2018-10-23 2020-11-06 桂林电子科技大学 Multi-user group authentication communication method based on aggregation signcryption in cloud environment
CN109088893A (en) * 2018-10-23 2018-12-25 桂林电子科技大学 Close Multiuser is signed based on polymerization under a kind of cloud environment and authenticates communication means
CN110120939B (en) * 2019-04-08 2021-06-08 淮阴工学院 Encryption method and system capable of repudiation authentication based on heterogeneous system
CN110120939A (en) * 2019-04-08 2019-08-13 淮阴工学院 A kind of encryption method and system of the deniable authentication based on heterogeneous system
CN110113150A (en) * 2019-04-08 2019-08-09 淮阴工学院 The encryption method and system of deniable authentication based on no certificate environment
CN110113150B (en) * 2019-04-08 2021-09-17 淮阴工学院 Encryption method and system based on non-certificate environment and capable of repudiation authentication
CN112383397A (en) * 2020-09-15 2021-02-19 淮阴工学院 Heterogeneous signcryption communication method based on biological characteristics
CN114024683A (en) * 2021-09-28 2022-02-08 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from CLC environment to PKI environment
CN114024683B (en) * 2021-09-28 2024-03-26 淮阴工学院 Online offline signcryption method from CLC environment to PKI environment
CN114039724A (en) * 2021-11-05 2022-02-11 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from CLC environment to IBC environment
CN114285580A (en) * 2021-11-12 2022-04-05 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from certificateless to public key infrastructure
CN114285580B (en) * 2021-11-12 2024-03-26 淮阴工学院 Online and offline signcryption method from certificate-free to public key infrastructure
CN115499834A (en) * 2022-04-19 2022-12-20 电子科技大学 Intelligent Internet-of-vehicles lightweight heterogeneous signcryption method based on fog calculation block chain fusion

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