CN109740350A - A kind of credible platform control device - Google Patents
A kind of credible platform control device Download PDFInfo
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- CN109740350A CN109740350A CN201811603679.8A CN201811603679A CN109740350A CN 109740350 A CN109740350 A CN 109740350A CN 201811603679 A CN201811603679 A CN 201811603679A CN 109740350 A CN109740350 A CN 109740350A
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of credible platform control device, described device includes: credible platform control chip, credible platform control firmware, credible platform control support programs, auxiliary tool；The credible platform control device accesses the bus on general processor system mainboard by PCIE bus.The present invention can be accessed by bus existing computing system it is each in, compatibility is strong；Realize that credible platform controls firmware by way of solid state hard disk, scalability is strong, is easy to carry out safe encryption；Using extremely wide: can be used in has in the credible performing environment of particular/special requirement safety.
Description
[technical field]
The invention belongs to information security field more particularly to a kind of credible platform control devices.
[background technique]
With the lasting in-depth of informatization, information security issue has been increasingly becoming the main of constraint informationization development
One of obstacle.With the development of computer technology, network attack becomes more complicated and automation, conventional security risk prevention instruments
The inherent shortcoming of passivity and system itself is not enough to deal with increasing computer security threat, and cannot adequately protect calculating
The safety of machine system.The major reason for causing such case is conventional security risk prevention instruments such as firewall, antivirus software and invasion
Detection mainly using passively defense mechanism, can not active initiatively security protection is carried out to system, thus also just do not have
Immune characteristic.
[summary of the invention]
In order to solve the problems, such as that in the prior art passively defense mechanism is in safety, need now a kind of new credible
Platform controller, the present invention can be accessed by bus existing computing system it is each in, compatibility is strong；Pass through the side of solid state hard disk
Formula realizes that credible platform controls firmware, and scalability is strong, is easy to carry out safe encryption；Using extremely wide: can be used in pair
Safety has in the credible performing environment of particular/special requirement, is based on this, the invention proposes a kind of credible platform control device, the devices
It include: credible platform control chip, credible platform control firmware, credible platform control support programs, auxiliary tool；It is described credible
Platform controller accesses the bus on general processor system mainboard by PCIE bus.
Further, the credible platform control chip is computing chip, including interior processing unit, SRAM.
Further, the credible platform control chip further includes SPI, GPIO, for accessing credible platform mainboard.
Further, the credible platform control firmware being implemented on credible platform control chip is embedded/on piece operation
System, for the tasks such as active measurement control to be scheduled and executed, to realize the credible of whole system.
Further, the credible platform control support programs run on embedded/Chip Operating System inner nuclear layer, provide
The interactive interface of software view.
Further, credible platform control firmware controls support programs and central processing unit operating system by credible platform
Interior trusted software base carries out data interaction.
Further, the auxiliary tool include commissioning device, firmware write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, firmware signature.
Further, the credible platform control firmware includes command process module, initialization module, input and output driving
Module, trusted function module, active metric module.
The beneficial effect comprise that can be accessed by bus existing computing system it is each in, compatibility is strong；By solid
The mode of state hard disk realizes that credible platform controls firmware, and scalability is strong, is easy to carry out safe encryption；Using extremely wide: can
Have in the credible performing environment of particular/special requirement to be used in safety.
[Detailed description of the invention]
Described herein the drawings are intended to provide a further understanding of the invention, constitutes part of this application, but
It does not constitute improper limitations of the present invention, in the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is the configuration diagram of trusted infrastructure of the invention.
Fig. 2 is the connection schematic diagram of TPCM access trusted infrastructure of the invention.
Fig. 3 is the hardware structural diagram of trusted infrastructure of the invention.
Fig. 4 is the hierarchical structure schematic diagram of credible platform control device of the invention.
[specific embodiment]
Come that the present invention will be described in detail below in conjunction with attached drawing and specific embodiment, illustrative examples therein and says
It is bright to be only used to explain the present invention but not as a limitation of the invention.
As shown in figs. 1 and 4, trusted infrastructure applied by credible platform control device of the present invention is carried out specifically
It is bright, the trusted infrastructure include: central processing unit, credible platform control device (TPCM), extension metric module EMM (EMM1,
EMM2, EMM3), starting memory, controller, credible platform mainboard；The component of the trusted infrastructure is all set in described credible
In platform motherboard；Central processing unit and credible platform control device are connected to controller by system bus；
The trusted infrastructure further include: random access memory, sequential control circuit, input/output interface；
Preferred: controller controls so that before central processing unit executes starting memory code, and credible platform controls
Device first starts, and credible platform control device is reliably read the initial guide module of starting memory code, credible platform control
Measurement root module RTM in device processed carries out integrity measurement to the initial guide module in starting memory code, and by degree
Amount result is stored in the memory space of credible platform control device；
The extension metric module EMM is used for and measures root module RTM cooperation to carry out integrity measurement, to realize letter
Appoint chain transmitting；
The central processing unit is used to complete the calculating task of trusted infrastructure；Preferred: the central processing unit is multicore
Processor；
Credible platform control device TPCM includes credible platform control chip, credible platform control firmware, credible platform control
Support programs processed, auxiliary tool etc.；The credible platform control chip is computing chip, including interior processing unit, SRAM, is gone back
For accessing credible platform mainboard including SPI, GPIO etc.；The credible platform control firmware being implemented on credible platform control chip
For embedded/Chip Operating System, it is scheduled and executes for measuring the tasks such as control to active, to realize whole system
It is credible；The credible platform control support programs run on embedded/Chip Operating System inner nuclear layer, provide software view
Interactive interface, credible platform control firmware pass through credible in credible platform control support programs and central processing unit operating system
Software base carries out data interaction；The auxiliary tool include commissioning device, firmware write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, firmware signature etc.；
Preferred: the credible platform control firmware includes command process module, initialization module, input and output driving mould
Block, trusted function module, active metric module；Wherein: the instruction that command process module is responsible for sending external entity solves
Analysis and execution；Initialization module is responsible for module initialization, module self-test, platform status initialization etc.；Input and output drive module
The Driver function library of input and output mainly in module；Active metric module is responsible for the active to BootRom and is measured；Trusted function
Module mainly provides basic credible support；
Preferred: the credible platform control device is minimum but is not limited to control unlatching or the pass of following input/output interface
It closes: USB, PS/2, PCIE, PCI, SATA, serial ports, network interface；
The controller is for controlling the component on credible platform mainboard；Including central processing unit and credible platform
Boot sequence, the permission height of control device are low；
The starting memory is for storing code needed for central processing unit starts and saving part divergence amount module
Code；Preferred: code needed for the starting is MBR, BOOTLOADER etc.；
Preferred: the extension metric module is realized in the form of ROM, saves static degree in the extension metric module
Measurement code involved in amount；
Preferred: the extension metric module includes 2 independent physical parts；A part is located in starting memory,
The independent access controller of another part；Wherein: the boot sequence of described a part is earlier than described another part；
As shown in Fig. 2, credible platform control device accesses the mainboard of trusted infrastructure by PCIE bus, and total by PCIE
Line and the trusted software base TSB being set in the operating system on central processing unit carry out order and data interaction；Pass through multichannel
The mode that multiplexer is multiplexed GPIO/SPI/I2C, realize to the measurement of controller and/or BIOS and and controller into
Row connection；
Preferred: credible platform control device TPCM accesses the mainboard of trusted infrastructure in a manner of pluggable card；It is being based on
During the dynamic measurement of credible platform control device, credible platform control device passes through the monitoring that trusted software base TSB is obtained
Carry out dynamic measurement of the data to central processing unit and its operating system, application program successively；
It is preferred: the memory space inside credible platform control device be credible platform control device itself it is visible, in
Memory space inside central processor is that central processing unit itself is visible；Credible platform control device and central processing unit pass through
Bus shares read-only, the readable and writable memory on credible platform mainboard；
It is preferred: read-only, readable and writable memory company of being mapped to by way of address of cache on credible platform mainboard
In continuous address space；The continuous address space in part is visible to central processing unit, and another part is continuously
Location space is sightless to central processing unit；Make in this way central processing unit and credible platform control device it
Between store isolation；
Preferred: the credible platform control device has the access authority higher than central processing unit, the credible platform
Control device can be read-only access central processing unit memory space；Preferred: controller on mainboard is in described
The read write command that central processor and credible platform control device are sent is arbitrated；
Preferred: the credible platform control device is realized in the form of solid state hard disk；
Credible platform control device is obtained by the memory space of read-only access central processing unit needed for actively measurement
Data, credible platform control device is based on Metric policy and measures to the data, and measurement results is stored in described
In the memory space of credible platform control device；Central processing unit cannot access the system storage of the credible platform control device
Area；In this way, it ensure that the independence of credible platform control device, and then ensure that its safety；
Preferred: the data needed for actively measuring are stored in the user data memory block of credible platform control device,
The central processing unit and credible platform control device are carried out based on the user data memory block of the credible platform control device
Data interaction, to carry out the intermodule communication based on mainboard；
It is preferred: the shared memory space progress data that central processing unit and credible platform control device pass through address of cache
Interaction；The shared memory space is mapped as visible to central processing unit and credible platform control device；
The memory space of central processing unit and credible platform control device includes system memory block and user data storage
Area, system memory block are invisible to hard disk user (using the user of standard disk store function), and use a variety of secure storages
Wherein content realizes piecemeal protection to key pair；
The user data saved in user data memory block is the data that hard disk user behavior generates, and (is used using with region
Family) corresponding media key M-Key carries out data encrypting and deciphering；Preferred: user storage area includes one or more regions, often
A region corresponds to one or more user；There is its corresponding media key in each region；It realizes in this way solid
State hard disk is independent for the physics of user, to ensure that the safety of user storage space；
It is described that using a variety of secure storage key pairs, wherein content realizes piecemeal protection, specifically: credible platform control dress
In the system memory block set comprising credible platform control firmware storage areas, solid state hard disk firmware storage areas, sensitive data memory block,
Policies store, the memory block NV, log memory block, TSB program storage area, the memory block OPROM；
Credible platform control firmware storage areas is encrypted using R-key；
The solid state hard disk firmware is encrypted using S-KEY, and S-KEY must successfully add in trusted firmware and security information
After load, use just can be carried out；
Sensitive data storage section mainly saves the critical datas such as endorsement key (EK) and storage root key (SMK),
And by the encipherment protection of R-key key；
The policies store be can not tampered region, issued for storing credible platform control device side trusted software base
Configuration strategy；The configuration strategy is for configuring credible platform control device；
The memory block NV is nonvolatile storage, can be used to store certificate for being measured and being encrypted and
Key；
The log memory block is for storing integrity measurement log and command operation record information；
The memory block OPROM is used to store expansion ROM program；
As shown in figure 3, including in the hardware configuration of trusted infrastructure: central processing unit, host interface HIF, on-chip memory,
Memory etc. is connected by bus；Credible platform control device TPCM accesses bus by host interface HIF；
Preferred: the host interface HIF is PCIE host interface；
Preferred: the trusted infrastructure further includes that SPI is responsible for TCM offer low speed data access interface, is mainly used for passing
Defeated metric, core data etc.；SMx is responsible for providing national secret algorithm computing capability, mainly includes that SM2/SM3/SM4 three classes are calculated
Method；OTP is responsible for storage hardware configuration information and the unique root key of chip and the part public key data for sign test；CPU is negative
The execution of duty operation service logic control；GPIO is responsible for issuing control signal and status signal to outside；LDPC is responsible for providing number
According to error correction recovery capability, lifting system reliability；The external SDRAM of DDR connection, expands the RAM capacity of platform；TIMER timing
Device is to piece internal clock step-by-step counting；On Chip Memory on piece memory, being mainly used for caching interim data and internal firmware makes
With；DMA is connected memory and the peripheral hardware with DMA ability by dedicated bus；RAID is responsible for the data on flash
Higher level protection, lifting system reliability are provided；After the function of sign test for the first time and volume production when ROM mainly includes volume production
The safe guiding function of system；TRNG real random number generator, for generating a random number at random.It is mainly used for key generation to answer
With；I2C is responsible for TPCM and provides low speed data access interface, is mainly used for custom command interaction；
Preferred: media key M-Key is protected by encryption key En-Key；Encryption key En-Key must be in user PIN
Code and security information could be obtained correctly after all matching is correct；Security information is encrypted by root key R-KEY.It is logical
Such a set of mechanism is crossed, guarantees that each user has independent encryption key En-Key and media key M-Key, while again
Protection by a whole set of key management system and encryption system；
Preferred: credible platform control device accesses the bus on processor system mainboard by PCIE bus, after, it is setting
It synchronizes and powers on for the equipment in PCIE bus when powering on, CPU starting is limited by BMC CPLD circuit control mode before
And it realizes TPCM and preferentially starts；
In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that disclosed method and terminal can pass through it
Its mode is realized.For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely exemplary, for example, the division of the module, only
Only a kind of logical function partition, there may be another division manner in actual implementation.
In addition, the technical solution in above-mentioned several embodiments can be combined with each other and replace in the case where not conflicting
It changes.
The module as illustrated by the separation member may or may not be physically separated, aobvious as module
The component shown may or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, or may be distributed over multiple
In network unit.Some or all of the modules therein can be selected to realize the mesh of this embodiment scheme according to the actual needs
's.
It, can also be in addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present invention can integrate in one processing unit
It is that each unit physically exists alone, can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units.Above-mentioned integrated list
Member both can take the form of hardware realization, can also realize in the form of hardware adds software function module.
It is obvious to a person skilled in the art that invention is not limited to the details of the above exemplary embodiments, Er Qie
In the case where without departing substantially from spirit or essential attributes of the invention, the present invention can be realized in other specific forms.Therefore, no matter
From the point of view of which point, the present embodiments are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the present invention is by appended power
Benefit requires rather than above description limits, it is intended that all by what is fallen within the meaning and scope of the equivalent elements of the claims
Variation is included in the present invention.Any attached associated diagram label in claim should not be considered as right involved in limitation to want
It asks.Furthermore, it is to be understood that one word of " comprising " does not exclude other units or steps, odd number is not excluded for plural number.It is stated in system claims
Multiple modules or device can also be implemented through software or hardware by a module or device.The first, the second equal words
It is used to indicate names, and does not indicate any particular order.
Finally it should be noted that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical scheme of the present invention and are not limiting, although reference
Preferred embodiment describes the invention in detail, those skilled in the art should understand that, it can be to of the invention
Technical solution is modified or equivalent replacement, without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of credible platform control device, which is characterized in that the device includes: credible platform control chip, credible platform control
Firmware processed, credible platform control support programs, auxiliary tool；The credible platform control device is handled by the access of PCIE bus
Bus on device system board.
2. credible platform control device according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the credible platform control chip is meter
Calculate chip, including interior processing unit, SRAM.
3. credible platform control device according to claim 2, which is characterized in that the credible platform control chip also wraps
SPI, GPIO are included, for accessing credible platform mainboard.
4. credible platform control device according to claim 3, which is characterized in that be implemented on credible platform control chip
Credible platform control firmware be embedded/Chip Operating System, for active measurement control etc. tasks be scheduled and hold
Row, to realize the credible of whole system.
5. credible platform control device according to claim 4, which is characterized in that the credible platform controls support programs
It runs on embedded/Chip Operating System inner nuclear layer, the interactive interface of software view is provided.
6. credible platform control device according to claim 5, which is characterized in that credible platform control firmware passes through credible
Trusted software base in platform courses support programs and central processing unit operating system carries out data interaction.
7. credible platform control device according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the auxiliary tool includes that debugging is set
Standby, firmware writes with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, firmware signature.
8. credible platform control device according to claim 7, which is characterized in that the credible platform controls firmware and includes
Command process module, initialization module, input and output drive module, trusted function module, active metric module.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811603679.8A CN109740350A (en) | 2018-12-26 | 2018-12-26 | A kind of credible platform control device |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN201811603679.8A CN109740350A (en) | 2018-12-26 | 2018-12-26 | A kind of credible platform control device |
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| CN201811603679.8A Pending CN109740350A (en) | 2018-12-26 | 2018-12-26 | A kind of credible platform control device |
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Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101295340A (en) * | 2008-06-20 | 2008-10-29 | 北京工业大学 | Credible platform module and active measurement method thereof |
| CN108595964A (en) * | 2018-04-27 | 2018-09-28 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | A kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware |
-
2018
- 2018-12-26 CN CN201811603679.8A patent/CN109740350A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101295340A (en) * | 2008-06-20 | 2008-10-29 | 北京工业大学 | Credible platform module and active measurement method thereof |
| CN108595964A (en) * | 2018-04-27 | 2018-09-28 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | A kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware |
Non-Patent Citations (3)
| Title |
|---|
| 周振柳 等: "太行安全BIOS可信体系结构与实现研究", 《计算机工程与应用》 * |
| 张兴: "无干扰可信模型及可信平台体系结构实现研究", 《中国博士学位论文全文数据库 信息科技辑》 * |
| 曹慧渊 等: "基于Openrisc的TPCM架构设计", 《信息工程大学学报》 * |
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Application publication date: 20190510 |