CN109753804A - A kind of trusted system - Google Patents
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- CN109753804A CN109753804A CN201811601899.7A CN201811601899A CN109753804A CN 109753804 A CN109753804 A CN 109753804A CN 201811601899 A CN201811601899 A CN 201811601899A CN 109753804 A CN109753804 A CN 109753804A
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of trusted system, the system comprises: central processing unit, credible platform control module, extension metric module EMM, starting memory, controller, credible platform mainboard；The credible platform control module starting priority is higher than the central processing unit, and the credible platform control module, extension metric module EMM, starting memory are all set on the credible platform mainboard；Central processing unit and credible platform control module are connected to control by system bus.The present invention realizes credible platform control module by way of firmware；In existing computer architecture, the trust authentication of active can be carried out to whole system by accessing credible platform control module by PCIE interface, to greatly improve the safety of whole system；And such implementation scalability is very strong, manufacturing cost is low.
Description
[technical field]
The invention belongs to trust computing field more particularly to a kind of trusted systems.
[background technique]
Current many actual secure operating system have been designed and developed.Wherein, it is most importantly based on
The dynamic strategy secure operating system of Flask architecture and subsequent occurrences of safety operation system most influential so far
The realization mechanism LSM (Linux Security Modle) of system Security Linux and it.But above system secured fashion
All it is built upon on the basis of passive detection；Operating system and the central processing unit of opening are entirely once being invaded
The safety of system is then unable to get guarantee.Security system can accomplish that independently controllably this is a basic condition, independently first
Controllable hardware and software platform can prevent the safe back door of x86 family computer, but safety protection technique is still very thin
It is weak.Just gradually grown up with the safely controllable software and hardware technology that trusted technology is support, it has also become personal terminal resists the external world
The natural barrier of invasion.Common platform merely provides a hardware foundation, and hardware, BIOS, system are easily illegally distorted.
[summary of the invention]
In order to solve the above problem in the prior art, the present invention realizes that credible platform controls mould by way of firmware
Block；In existing computer architecture, whole system can be led by accessing credible platform control module by PCIE interface
Dynamic trust authentication, to greatly improve the safety of whole system；And such implementation scalability is very strong, manufacture
It is at low cost.Based on this, the invention proposes a kind of trusted systems, comprising: central processing unit, credible platform control module, extension
Metric module EMM, starting memory, controller, credible platform mainboard；The component of the trusted system is all set in described credible
In platform motherboard；Central processing unit and credible platform control module are connected to controller by system bus.
Further, the system also includes random access memory, sequential control circuit, input/output interfaces.
Further, controller make central processing unit and credible platform control module synchronize power on；Before powering on, lead to
Controller is crossed to be arranged so that limitation central processing unit starts and realizes credible platform control module and preferentially start；Mode two: credible
Platform control module encapsulates to be formed by the way of micro-control unit, is arranged so that the priority of credible platform control module is higher than
Central processing unit.
Further, credible platform control module is reliably read the initial guide module of starting memory code, credible
Measurement root module RTM in platform control module carries out integrity measurement to the initial guide module in starting memory code,
And measurement results are stored in the memory space of credible platform control module.
Further, the extension metric module EMM is used for and measures root module RTM and cooperates to carry out integrity measurement,
To realize transitive trust.
Further, the central processing unit is used to complete the calculating task of trusted system.
Further, the central processing unit is multi-core processor.
Further, controller carries out central processing unit from the bus access request of credible platform control module secondary
It cuts out.
Further, the credible platform control module is higher than the central processing unit to the access privileges of bus.
Further, the bus includes control bus and data/address bus.
The beneficial effect comprise that realizing credible platform control module by way of firmware；In existing computer
In framework, the trust authentication of active can be carried out to whole system by accessing credible platform control module by PCIE interface, from
And greatly improve the safety of whole system；And such implementation scalability is very strong, manufacturing cost is low.
[Detailed description of the invention]
Described herein the drawings are intended to provide a further understanding of the invention, constitutes part of this application, but
It does not constitute improper limitations of the present invention, in the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is the configuration diagram of trusted system of the invention.
Fig. 2 is the connection schematic diagram of TPCM access trusted system of the invention.
Fig. 3 is the hardware structural diagram of trusted system of the invention.
[specific embodiment]
Come that the present invention will be described in detail below in conjunction with attached drawing and specific embodiment, illustrative examples therein and says
It is bright to be only used to explain the present invention but not as a limitation of the invention.
As shown in Figure 1, a kind of trusted system applied by the present invention is described in detail, the system comprises: center
Processor, credible platform control module (TPCM), extension metric module EMM (EMM1, EMM2, EMM3), starting memory, control
Device, credible platform mainboard；The component of the trusted system is all set on the credible platform mainboard；Central processing unit and credible
Platform control module is connected to controller by system bus；
The trusted system further include: random access memory, sequential control circuit, input/output interface；
Preferred: controller controls so that before central processing unit executes starting memory code, and credible platform controls
Module first starts, and credible platform control module is reliably read the initial guide module of starting memory code, credible platform control
Measurement root module RTM in molding block carries out integrity measurement to the initial guide module in starting memory code, and by degree
Amount result is stored in the memory space of credible platform control module；
Interchangeable: the system bus is PCIE bus；Mode one: controller makes central processing unit and credible platform
Control module, which synchronizes, to be powered on；Before powering on, it is arranged by controller so that limiting central processing unit starting realizes credible put down
Platform control module preferentially starts；Mode two: credible platform control module encapsulates to be formed by the way of micro-control unit, and setting makes
The priority for obtaining credible platform control module is higher than central processing unit；
Preferred: the controller is set as BMC CPLD circuit control mode；
The extension metric module EMM is used for and measures root module RTM cooperation to carry out integrity measurement, to realize letter
Appoint chain transmitting；
The central processing unit is used to complete the calculating task of trusted system；Preferred: the central processing unit is multicore
Processor；
Preferred: bus includes control bus and data/address bus；
Credible platform control module TPCM includes credible platform control chip, credible platform control firmware, credible platform control
Support programs processed, auxiliary tool etc.；The credible platform control chip is computing chip, including interior processing unit, SRAM, is gone back
For accessing credible platform mainboard including SPI, GPIO etc.；The credible platform control firmware being implemented on credible platform control chip
For embedded/Chip Operating System, it is scheduled and executes for measuring the tasks such as control to active, to realize whole system
It is credible；The credible platform control support programs run on embedded/Chip Operating System inner nuclear layer, provide software view
Interactive interface, credible platform control firmware pass through credible in credible platform control support programs and central processing unit operating system
Software base carries out data interaction；The auxiliary tool include commissioning device, firmware write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, firmware signature etc.；
Preferred: the credible platform control firmware includes command process module, initialization module, input and output driving mould
Block, trusted function module, active metric module；Wherein: the instruction that command process module is responsible for sending external entity solves
Analysis and execution；Initialization module is responsible for module initialization, module self-test, platform status initialization etc.；Input and output drive module
The Driver function library of input and output mainly in module；Active metric module is responsible for the active to BootRom and is measured；Trusted function
Module mainly provides basic credible support；
Preferred: the credible platform control module is minimum but is not limited to control unlatching or the pass of following input/output interface
It closes: USB, PS/2, PCIE, PCI, SATA, serial ports, network interface；
The controller is for controlling the component on credible platform mainboard；Including central processing unit and credible platform
Boot sequence, the permission height of control module are low；
The starting memory is for storing code needed for central processing unit starts and saving part divergence amount module
Code；Preferred: code needed for the starting is MBR, BOOTLOADER etc.；
Preferred: the extension metric module is realized in the form of ROM, saves static degree in the extension metric module
Measurement code involved in amount；
Preferred: the extension metric module includes 2 independent physical parts；A part is located in starting memory,
The independent access controller of another part；Wherein: the boot sequence of described a part is earlier than described another part；
As shown in Fig. 2, credible platform control module accesses the mainboard of trusted system by PCIE bus, and total by PCIE
Line and the trusted software base TSB being set in the operating system on central processing unit carry out order and data interaction；Pass through multichannel
The mode that multiplexer is multiplexed GPIO/SPI/I2C, realize to the measurement of controller and/or BIOS and and controller into
Row connection；
Preferred: credible platform control module TPCM accesses the mainboard of trusted system in a manner of pluggable card；It is being based on
During the dynamic measurement of credible platform control module, credible platform control module passes through the monitoring that trusted software base TSB is obtained
Carry out dynamic measurement of the data to central processing unit and its operating system, application program successively；
It is preferred: the memory space inside credible platform control module be credible platform control module itself it is visible, in
Memory space inside central processor is that central processing unit itself is visible；Credible platform control module and central processing unit pass through
Bus shares read-only, the readable and writable memory on credible platform mainboard；
It is preferred: read-only, readable and writable memory company of being mapped to by way of address of cache on credible platform mainboard
In continuous address space；The continuous address space in part is visible to central processing unit, and another part is continuously
Location space is sightless to central processing unit；Make in this way central processing unit and credible platform control module it
Between store isolation；
Preferred: the credible platform control module has the access authority higher than central processing unit, the credible platform
Control module can be read-only access central processing unit memory space；Preferred: controller on mainboard is in described
The read write command that central processor and credible platform control module are sent is arbitrated；
Preferred: the credible platform control module is realized in the form of solid state hard disk；
Credible platform control module is obtained by the memory space of read-only access central processing unit needed for actively measurement
Data, credible platform control module is based on Metric policy and measures to the data, and measurement results is stored in described
In the memory space of credible platform control module；Central processing unit cannot access the system storage of the credible platform control module
Area；In this way, it ensure that the independence of credible platform control module, and then ensure that its safety；
Preferred: the data needed for actively measuring are stored in the user data memory block of credible platform control module,
The central processing unit and credible platform control module are carried out based on the user data memory block of the credible platform control module
Data interaction, to carry out the intermodule communication based on mainboard；
Preferred: central processing unit and credible platform control module carry out data by the shared memory space of address of cache
Interaction；The shared memory space is mapped as visible to central processing unit and credible platform control module；
Central processing unit and the memory space of credible platform control module include system memory block and user data storage
Area, system memory block are invisible to hard disk user (using the user of standard disk store function), and use a variety of secure storages
Wherein content realizes piecemeal protection to key pair；
The user data saved in user data memory block is the data that hard disk user behavior generates, and (is used using with region
Family) corresponding media key M-Key carries out data encrypting and deciphering；Preferred: user storage area includes one or more regions, often
A region corresponds to one or more user；There is its corresponding media key in each region；It realizes in this way solid
State hard disk is independent for the physics of user, to ensure that the safety of user storage space；
It is described that using a variety of secure storage key pairs, wherein content realizes piecemeal protection, specifically: credible platform controls mould
In the system memory block of block comprising credible platform control firmware storage areas, solid state hard disk firmware storage areas, sensitive data memory block,
Policies store, the memory block NV, log memory block, TSB program storage area, the memory block OPROM；
Credible platform control firmware storage areas is encrypted using R-key；
The solid state hard disk firmware is encrypted using S-KEY, and S-KEY must successfully add in trusted firmware and security information
After load, use just can be carried out；
Sensitive data storage section mainly saves the critical datas such as endorsement key (EK) and storage root key (SMK),
And by the encipherment protection of R-key key；
The policies store be can not tampered region, issued for storing credible platform control module side trusted software base
Configuration strategy；The configuration strategy is for configuring credible platform control module；
The memory block NV is nonvolatile storage, can be used to store certificate for being measured and being encrypted and
Key；
The log memory block is for storing integrity measurement log and command operation record information；
The memory block OPROM is used to store expansion ROM program；
As shown in figure 3, including in the hardware configuration of trusted system: central processing unit, host interface HIF, on-chip memory,
Memory etc. is connected by bus；Credible platform control module TPCM accesses bus by host interface HIF；
Preferred: the host interface HIF is PCIE host interface；
Preferred: the trusted system further includes that SPI is responsible for TCM offer low speed data access interface, is mainly used for passing
Defeated metric, core data etc.；SMx is responsible for providing national secret algorithm computing capability, mainly includes that SM2/SM3/SM4 three classes are calculated
Method；OTP is responsible for storage hardware configuration information and the unique root key of chip and the part public key data for sign test；CPU is negative
The execution of duty operation service logic control；GPIO is responsible for issuing control signal and status signal to outside；LDPC is responsible for providing number
According to error correction recovery capability, lifting system reliability；The external SDRAM of DDR connection, expands the RAM capacity of platform；TIMER timing
Device is to piece internal clock step-by-step counting；On Chip Memory on piece memory, being mainly used for caching interim data and internal firmware makes
With；DMA is connected memory and the peripheral hardware with DMA ability by dedicated bus；RAID is responsible for the data on flash
Higher level protection, lifting system reliability are provided；After the function of sign test for the first time and volume production when ROM mainly includes volume production
The safe guiding function of system；TRNG real random number generator, for generating a random number at random.It is mainly used for key generation to answer
With；I2C is responsible for TPCM and provides low speed data access interface, is mainly used for custom command interaction；
Preferred: media key M-Key is protected by encryption key En-Key；Encryption key En-Key must be in user PIN
Code and security information could be obtained correctly after all matching is correct；Security information is encrypted by root key R-KEY.It is logical
Such a set of mechanism is crossed, guarantees that each user has independent encryption key En-Key and media key M-Key, while again
Protection by a whole set of key management system and encryption system；
In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that disclosed method and terminal can pass through it
Its mode is realized.For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely exemplary, for example, the division of the module, only
Only a kind of logical function partition, there may be another division manner in actual implementation.
In addition, the technical solution in above-mentioned several embodiments can be combined with each other and replace in the case where not conflicting
It changes.
The module as illustrated by the separation member may or may not be physically separated, aobvious as module
The component shown may or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, or may be distributed over multiple
In network unit.Some or all of the modules therein can be selected to realize the mesh of this embodiment scheme according to the actual needs
's.
It, can also be in addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present invention can integrate in one processing unit
It is that each unit physically exists alone, can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units.Above-mentioned integrated list
Member both can take the form of hardware realization, can also realize in the form of hardware adds software function module.
It is obvious to a person skilled in the art that invention is not limited to the details of the above exemplary embodiments, Er Qie
In the case where without departing substantially from spirit or essential attributes of the invention, the present invention can be realized in other specific forms.Therefore, no matter
From the point of view of which point, the present embodiments are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the present invention is by appended power
Benefit requires rather than above description limits, it is intended that all by what is fallen within the meaning and scope of the equivalent elements of the claims
Variation is included in the present invention.Any attached associated diagram label in claim should not be considered as right involved in limitation to want
It asks.Furthermore, it is to be understood that one word of " comprising " does not exclude other units or steps, odd number is not excluded for plural number.It is stated in system claims
Multiple modules or device can also be implemented through software or hardware by a module or device.The first, the second equal words
It is used to indicate names, and does not indicate any particular order.
Finally it should be noted that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical scheme of the present invention and are not limiting, although reference
Preferred embodiment describes the invention in detail, those skilled in the art should understand that, it can be to of the invention
Technical solution is modified or equivalent replacement, without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of trusted system, which is characterized in that the system includes: central processing unit, credible platform control module, extension measurement
Module EMM, starting memory, controller, credible platform mainboard；
The credible platform control module starting priority is higher than the central processing unit, and the credible platform control module expands
Exhibition metric module EMM, starting memory are all set on the credible platform mainboard；Central processing unit and credible platform control mould
Block is connected to controller by system bus.
2. trusted system according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the system also includes: random access memory, when
Sequence control circuit, input/output interface.
3. trusted system according to claim 1, which is characterized in that controller makes central processing unit and credible platform control
Module synchronization processed powers on；Before powering on, it is arranged by controller so that limiting central processing unit starting realizes credible platform
Control module preferentially starts；Mode two: credible platform control module encapsulates to be formed by the way of micro-control unit, setting so that
The priority of credible platform control module is higher than central processing unit.
4. trusted system according to claim 3, which is characterized in that credible platform control module reads starting memory generation
The initial guide module data of code, measurement root module RTM in credible platform control module in starting memory code just
Beginning guiding module carries out integrity measurement, and measurement results are stored in the memory space of credible platform control module.
5. trusted system according to claim 4, which is characterized in that the extension metric module EMM is used for and measures root
Module RTM cooperates to carry out integrity measurement, to realize transitive trust.
6. trusted system according to claim 5, which is characterized in that the central processing unit is for completing trusted system
Calculating task.
7. trusted system according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the central processing unit is multi-core processor.
8. trusted system according to claim 7, which is characterized in that controller comes from credible platform control to central processing unit
The bus access request of molding block is arbitrated.
9. trusted system according to claim 8, which is characterized in that access of the credible platform control module to bus
Priority is higher than the central processing unit.
10. trusted system according to claim 9, which is characterized in that the bus includes control bus and data/address bus.
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| CN201811601899.7A CN109753804A (en) | 2018-12-26 | 2018-12-26 | A kind of trusted system |
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| CN201811601899.7A CN109753804A (en) | 2018-12-26 | 2018-12-26 | A kind of trusted system |
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN110321714A (en) * | 2019-07-08 | 2019-10-11 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | The dynamic measurement method and device of credible calculating platform based on dual Architecture |
| CN113190880A (en) * | 2020-01-29 | 2021-07-30 | 慧与发展有限责任合伙企业 | Determining whether to perform an action on a computing device based on an analysis of endorsement information of a security co-processor |
| WO2022057720A1 (en) * | 2020-09-16 | 2022-03-24 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Trusted verification system and method, motherboard, micro-board card, and storage medium |
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Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110321714A (en) * | 2019-07-08 | 2019-10-11 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | The dynamic measurement method and device of credible calculating platform based on dual Architecture |
| CN110321714B (en) * | 2019-07-08 | 2022-03-29 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | Dynamic measurement method and device of trusted computing platform based on dual-architecture |
| CN113190880A (en) * | 2020-01-29 | 2021-07-30 | 慧与发展有限责任合伙企业 | Determining whether to perform an action on a computing device based on an analysis of endorsement information of a security co-processor |
| CN113190880B (en) * | 2020-01-29 | 2023-12-08 | 慧与发展有限责任合伙企业 | Determining whether to perform an action on a computing device based on analysis of endorsement information of a security co-processor |
| WO2022057720A1 (en) * | 2020-09-16 | 2022-03-24 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Trusted verification system and method, motherboard, micro-board card, and storage medium |
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Application publication date: 20190514 |