CN108595964A - A kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware - Google Patents
A kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware Download PDFInfo
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- CN108595964A CN108595964A CN201810393106.0A CN201810393106A CN108595964A CN 108595964 A CN108595964 A CN 108595964A CN 201810393106 A CN201810393106 A CN 201810393106A CN 108595964 A CN108595964 A CN 108595964A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/572—Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
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Abstract
The credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware that the invention discloses a kind of, by marking off privileged domain and non-privileged domain in systems, after terminal startup, franchise domain system is preferentially set to start and self-test measurement, after measurement passes through, security measure is carried out to non-privileged domain system using franchise domain system, to realize the active inspection verification of the safety to non-privileged domain system and integrality, while critical data safety in ensureing privileged domain, ensure the safety of operation system and application in non-privileged domain, in addition, this scheme can also be applied in scene more demanding to level of confidentiality once.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to security control field, more particularly to a kind of credible platform control module realization side based on firmware
Method.
Background technology
Trust computing is as one new developing direction of information security field by more and more companies and research institution
Pay attention to.The main target of credible accounting system is the computing environment for building a user and being expected, to ensure computing resource
It will not be maliciously tampered, steal.
Universal with smart mobile phone, mobile payment becomes an important function of mobile phone end, but due to
The sensitive datas such as general data and password only there are one subregion, i.e. user partition in smart mobile phone, therefore in smart mobile phone are
It is stored together, it is difficult to ensure the safety of sensitive data.
In consideration of it, needing to seek a kind of control management method of lifting system safety.
Invention content
The present invention proposes a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware, marks off privilege in systems
Domain and non-privileged domain preferentially carry out active safety measurement to franchise domain system upon power-up of the system, after measurement results are normal,
Active safety measurement is carried out to non-privileged domain system using the franchise domain system, to ensure the safety of system operation.
A kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware is suitable for intelligent terminal, which is characterized in that in intelligence
Privileged domain and non-privileged domain two parts are marked off in energy terminal and are separately operable, and the privileged domain includes TPCM, the method
Including：
Step 1：Privileged domain System Priority starts；
Step 2：TPCM self-tests, TPCM starts if self-test is without exception, enters step 3；If self-test notes abnormalities, send out
Alarm simultaneously forbids equipment to start；
Step 3：TPCM actively initiates secure boot code in measurement piece, normally executes, enters if measuring the code if
Step 4；If measurement is abnormal, sends out alarm and equipment is forbidden to start；
Step 4：TPCM actively initiates the security measure to non-privileged domain system kernel.
When the measurement results in step 4 are normal, after non-privileged domain system starts, following step is continued to execute：
Step 5：TPCM actively initiates to measure the secure boot code in non-privileged domain, and measurement enters step after passing through
Rapid 6；Otherwise it sends out alarm and non-privileged domain system is forbidden to start；
Step 6：TPCM actively initiates the security measure to non-privileged domain system kernel, and measurement passes through rear non-privileged domain system
Normal operation, and enter step 7；Otherwise it sends out alarm and non-privileged domain system is forbidden to start；
Step 7：After non-privileged domain system starts, TPCM actively sends measurement instruction to non-privileged domain system kernel, by being
TSB in system kernel measures the application program in security domain；
Wherein, for the abnormal application found in measurement or abnormal behaviour, TSB will carry out abnormal answer according to the instruction of TPCM
Closing breaks network connection by force.
Further include：
When the measurement results in step 4 are abnormal, non-privileged domain operation system is forbidden to start.
The active safety of franchise domain system is measured and includes：
Exclusive function module in TPCM is measured, is authorized and certification.
Further include：
TPCM vacuum metrics services include carrying out credible measurement to non-privileged domain operation system start-up course, include to hardware
Measurement.
Further include：
If not privileged domain operation system needs to carry out authentication during startup, then carried out by privileged domain TPCM
Authentication allows its startup after being verified.
Further include：
When carrying out active safety metric operations, shared drive is established for franchise domain system and non-privileged domain system, for pair
The intermediary service data that security measure generates when operating are stored and are interacted.
Have Bus isolation between non-privileged domain and privileged domain, wherein non-privileged domain browsing privileged domain need dedicated interface,
Instruction.
The credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware that the invention discloses a kind of, by marking off in systems
Privileged domain and non-privileged domain preferentially start franchise domain system and are measured with self-test after terminal startup, after measurement passes through, utilize
Franchise domain system carries out security measure to non-privileged domain system, to realize the safety to non-privileged domain system and integrality
Active inspection verification, while critical data safety in ensureing privileged domain, it is ensured that in non-privileged domain operation system and
The safety of application, in addition, this scheme can also be applied in scene more demanding to level of confidentiality once.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is a kind of system framework figure of the credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware in the present invention；
Fig. 2 is a kind of flow chart of credible platform control module method in the embodiment of the present invention one；
Fig. 3 is a kind of flow chart of safe verification method in the embodiment of the present invention two；
Fig. 4 is a kind of flow chart for the method ensureing security of system in the embodiment of the present invention three；
Fig. 5 is a kind of flow chart of trusted software list updating method in the embodiment of the present invention four.
Specific implementation mode
The present invention provides a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware.To make the purpose of the present invention, skill
Art scheme and effect are clearer, clear, and the present invention is described in more detail for the embodiment that develops simultaneously referring to the drawings.It should manage
Solution, described herein specific examples are only used to explain the present invention, is not intended to limit the present invention.
Term " first ", " second ", " third " " in description and claims of this specification and above-mentioned attached drawing
The (if present)s such as four " are for distinguishing similar object, without being used to describe specific sequence or precedence.It should manage
The data that solution uses in this way can be interchanged in the appropriate case, so that the embodiments described herein can be in addition to illustrating herein
Or the sequence other than the content of description is implemented.In addition, term " comprising " and " having " and their any deformation, it is intended that
Cover it is non-exclusive include, for example, containing the process of series of steps or unit, method, system, product or equipment need not limit
In those of clearly listing step or unit, but may include not listing clearly or for these processes, method, production
The intrinsic other steps of product or equipment or unit.
Embodiment one
The credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware that the present embodiment provides a kind of, marks off in intelligent terminal
Privileged domain and non-privileged domain.It is as shown in Figure 1 the frame diagram of system in the present embodiment, wherein privileged domain is credible performing environment
(TEE), special memory, crypto module that franchise domain system uses, specially are specialized in including TPCM (credible platform control module), and
With external memory and dedicated cpu；Non-privileged domain is in mobile terminal rich in performing environment (REE), including support controlled system operation
Soft hardware equipment set.
It is illustrated in figure 2 the flow chart of credible platform control module method in the present embodiment, is included the following steps：
Step 1：Privileged domain System Priority starts.
Specifically, it is privileged domain system power supply using dedicated supply line on mainboard, ensures equipment in the standby state
Franchise domain system has just been powered.
Specifically, the standby mode refers to state when equipment has been powered on but user does not press power button also.
Specifically, if user directly presses power button progress electrifying startup, privileged domain system after enabling equipment power-on
System, which will control, powers on order, executes startup to franchise domain system in advance and active safety is measured.
Step 2：Self-test is actively measured to TPCM progress, if self-test is without exception, starts the controlled system for starting non-privileged domain
System, and enter step 3；If self-test notes abnormalities, alarms and equipment is forbidden to start.
Specifically, the franchise domain system controls the leading electrifying startups of the TPCM and carries out self-test and inside initially
Change.Self-test executes further work after initializing successfully；Self-test, initialization are unsuccessful, LED lights according to ad hoc fashion,
Buzzer is lighted according to ad hoc fashion and is piped, and prompts have exception.
Specifically, if TPCM modules are not present after electrifying startup in discovering device, prove that TPCM is maliciously moved
It removes, then will this time equipment be forbidden to start.
Specifically, if finding that TPCM firmwares measurement does not pass through after electrifying startup, illustrate that TPCM firmwares may be non-
Method hardware programming again.
Specifically, active safety measurement be franchise domain system the exclusive function module in TPCM is measured, authorize and
Certification.
Step 3：Non-privileged domain operation system starts.
Specifically, TPCM firmwares carry out integrity measurement to boot code, confirm that bootstrap is not weighed illegally
New hardware programming.
Specifically, the measurement service in TPCM carries out credible measurement to non-privileged domain operation system start-up course, including hard
The measurement of part.
Specifically, if not privileged domain operation system needs to carry out authentication during startup, then pass through privileged domain
TPCM carries out authentication, its startup is allowed after being verified.
Step 4：TPCM actively initiates to operate the security measure of non-privileged domain system, if measurement results are normal, into
Enter step 5；Otherwise, non-privileged domain operation system is forbidden to start.
Specifically, the active measurement service being located under TPCM environment actively initiates countermeasure according to the opportunity that specific policy is specified
The metric operations of slightly specified object, in general, default metric object is the system core content in non-privileged system, such as system
Kernel code section, the code segment of trusted software, read-only data section, policy data etc..
Specifically, when carrying out active safety metric operations, shared drive is established for franchise domain system and non-privileged domain system,
The intermediary service data generated when for being operated to security measure are stored and are interacted.
Step 5：After measurement passes through, the trusted software in non-privileged system is notified to continue to measure subsequent content, if measurement knot
Fruit is normal, then enters step 6；Otherwise, non-privileged domain operation system is forbidden to start.
Specifically, in the case of the active measurement results of core content are normal in TPCM is to non-privileged domain system, swash
Credible metric software in non-privileged domain system living, by the non-privileged domain of the credible measurement software metrics in non-privileged domain system
Other function modules in system, such as service application code segment, network connection state, access control policy.
Step 6：System enters normal operating conditions.
Technical solution in the present embodiment marks off privileged domain and non-privileged domain in systems, after terminal startup, preferentially
Make franchise domain system start to measure with self-test, after measurement passes through, degree of safety is carried out to non-privileged domain system using franchise domain system
Amount, it is crucial in ensureing privileged domain to realize the active inspection verification of the safety to non-privileged domain system and integrality
While Information Security, it is ensured that the safety of operation system and application in non-privileged domain.
Embodiment two
The present embodiment provides a kind of safe verification method, workflow is as shown in figure 3, using system as described in Figure 1
Frame, transmission and verification for carrying out sensitive data when running application program in non-privileged domain, includes the following steps：
Step 1：Sensitive data is sent to the trusted application in privileged domain by the first application program in non-privileged domain.
Specifically, the operation of the trusted application is based on the TPCM.
Specifically, first application program is any application program that can be run in intelligent terminal, and described first answers
With sensitive data is stored in program, for carrying out sensitive operation, such as verification and payment when needed.If for example, institute
It is payment class application to state the first application program, then it can be wechat wallet or millet wallet etc., and silver can be related under payment scenario
The data such as row card card number, electronic key and transaction voucher, these data are higher to security requirement, therefore can be used as in the present embodiment
Sensitive data；Alternatively, in such as traffic scene, in the voice communication content or information that some Content of communciation may be related to
Appearance may relate to trade secret and individual privacy etc., have preserve need in the case of requirement of these data to safety also compare
Higher, first application program is also required to consider that these data want safety when preserving these Content of communciation
It asks, therefore can also be used as the sensitive data in the present embodiment.
Specifically, the non-privileged domain further includes control module, for receiving the sensitive number in first application program
According to；Further, the control module credible is answered by data channel by what the sensitive data sent in the privileged domain
With.
Specifically, the data channel is shared drive, can meet privileged domain and non-privileged domain be carried out at the same time access and
Carry out the access of data.
Step 2：Trusted application in privileged domain handles the sensitive data.
Specifically, the processing can be the processing such as preservation and operation, and generate corresponding handling result.
Step 3：The trusted application sends the handling result to the non-privileged domain.
Specifically, the trusted application passes the handling result of the sensitive data by dedicated instruction, interface
It passs.
Specifically, the handling result is received by the control module in non-privileged domain, and is passed by the control module
First application program is passed, first application program is further operated using the handling result.
Technical solution in the present embodiment marks off privileged domain and non-privileged domain in systems, and first in non-privileged domain
When application program carries out sensitive operation, sensitive data is transferred to the trusted application in privileged domain by data transmission channel and is carried out
Processing, and handling result is returned into first application program and carries out subsequent operation, it is sensitive in application program to ensure that
The safety of operation.
Embodiment three
Based on previous embodiment, the present embodiment provides a kind of method ensureing security of system, workflow such as Fig. 4 institutes
Show, using system framework as described in Figure 1, journey is applied for being carried out when running application program in non-privileged domain operation system
The safety verification of sequence, includes the following steps：
Step 1：The first trusted software list is stored in the control module in the non-privileged domain.
Specifically, it is software program trusty that the software in the first trusted software list, which is verified, described
The title and digital signature information of the software program trusty are stored in one trusted software list.
Step 2：When running first application program in non-privileged domain, judge first application program whether be
Software program trusty.
Specifically, when running first application program, the control module, acquisition is called to be stored in the control mould
First trusted software list in the block is arranged using the title of first application program to be launched in first trusted software
It is traversed in table, if finding the list items of same names, continues the number for judging first application program to be launched
Signing messages whether with the digital signature information corresponding to first application program that is stored in the first trusted software list
It is whether consistent, if unanimously, judging first application program for trusted application, and allow its operation；If described
The list items of same names are not found in one trusted software list, or are found that while that title is consistent but digital signature by contrast
Information is inconsistent, then judges that first application program is not trusted application, and forbid its operation.
Step 3：When it is trusted application to judge first application program, controls first application program and exist
It is run in privileged domain and non-privileged domain.
Specifically, first application program is run in non-privileged domain system, and is monitored described first in real time and applied journey
Sequence calls the control module using shared drive as data channel when sensitive operation occurs for first application program
The processing result data generated to sensitive data and according to this is transmitted.
Technical solution in the present embodiment marks off privileged domain and non-privileged domain in systems, the control mould in non-privileged domain
The first trusted software list is preserved in block, when user is intended to start the first application program in non-privileged domain, calls the control
Whether mould the first trusted software list in the block is trusted software to judge first application program to be started, when being judged as
Just allow its operation when trusted software, and by the cooperation of non-privileged domain and privileged domain ensures to be generated by the first application program quick
Feel the safety of operation, through this embodiment in technical solution can effectively ensure the safety of sensitive operation in application program
Property.
Example IV
Based on previous embodiment, the present embodiment provides a kind of update method of trusted software list, workflow such as Fig. 5
It is shown, using system framework as described in Figure 1, include the following steps：
Step 1：When the non-privileged domain system starts, using the second trusted software list preserved in privileged domain to institute
The the first trusted software list stated in non-privileged domain is updated.
Specifically, the second trusted software list is stored in special memory or the special external memory of the privileged domain, from
And can guarantee the second trusted software list will not be tampered.
Specifically, after carrying out security measure to the non-privileged domain using TPCM and measurement results are normal, pass through
The the second trusted software list preserved in the privileged domain is sent to the control module in the non-privileged domain by shared drive,
Whether the control module compares the first trusted software list that the second trusted software list is preserved with itself identical, if phase
It is same then without updating the first trusted software list；Using the second trusted software list to described first if differing
Trusted software list carries out cover type update.
Step 2：When needing to update the second trusted software list preserved in the privileged domain, pass through the non-privileged domain
In the second application program receive third trusted software list.
Specifically, second application program is run in the non-privileged domain system, and second application program is used for
Receive the trusted software list that user newly defines, i.e. third trusted software list.
Step 3：The control module in non-privileged domain is called, by shared drive by the third trusted software list
Send the trusted application in privileged domain to.
Step 4：The trusted application in privileged domain receives the third trusted software list, to what is preserved in privileged domain
The second trusted software list carries out cover type update.
Specifically, the second trusted software list is stored in the path in the special memory of the privileged domain or special external memory
Information preservation is in the trusted application, when trusted application receives the third trusted software row that non-privileged domain is sent
After table, the second trusted software list in specified path is covered using the third trusted software list.
A kind of method of update trusted software list is present embodiments provided, marks off privileged domain and non-privileged in systems
Domain preserves the first trusted software list in non-privileged domain, is preserved in privileged domain for updating first trusted software
The second trusted software list of list can all call described second credible soft when the franchise domain system starts every time
Part list is updated the first trusted software list, when needing to update second software matrix, calls described non-
Second application program in privileged domain sends the third trusted software list to the franchise domain system to cover
The second trusted software list is stated, to can guarantee the second trusted software list real-time update in the non-privileged domain, into
And improve the safety of system.
In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that disclosed method and terminal can pass through it
Its mode is realized.For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely exemplary, for example, the division of the module, only
Only a kind of division of logic function, formula that in actual implementation, there may be another division manner.
In addition, in the case where not conflicting, the technical solution in above-mentioned several embodiments can be combined with each other and replace
It changes.
The module illustrated as separating component may or may not be physically separated, aobvious as module
The component shown may or may not be physical unit, you can be located at a place, or may be distributed over multiple
In network element.Some or all of module therein can be selected according to the actual needs to realize the mesh of this embodiment scheme
's.
In addition, each function module in each embodiment of the present invention can be integrated in a processing unit, it can also
It is that each unit physically exists alone, it can also be during two or more units be integrated in one unit.Above-mentioned integrated list
The form that hardware had both may be used in member is realized, can also be realized in the form of hardware adds software function module.
It is obvious to a person skilled in the art that invention is not limited to the details of the above exemplary embodiments, Er Qie
In the case of without departing substantially from spirit or essential attributes of the invention, the present invention can be realized in other specific forms.Therefore, no matter
From the point of view of which point, the present embodiments are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the present invention is by appended power
Profit requires rather than above description limits, it is intended that all by what is fallen within the meaning and scope of the equivalent requirements of the claims
Variation includes within the present invention.Should not any attached associated diagram label in claim be considered as the involved right of limitation to want
It asks.Furthermore, it is to be understood that one word of " comprising " is not excluded for other units or step, odd number is not excluded for plural number.It is stated in system claims
Multiple modules or device can also be realized by software or hardware by a module or device.The first, the second equal words
It is used to indicate names, and does not represent any particular order.
Finally it should be noted that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical scheme of the present invention and are not limiting, although reference
Preferred embodiment describes the invention in detail, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that, it can be to the present invention's
Technical solution is modified or equivalent replacement, without departing from the spirit of the technical scheme of the invention and range.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware is suitable for intelligent terminal, which is characterized in that in intelligence
Privileged domain and non-privileged domain two parts are marked off in terminal and are separately operable, and the privileged domain includes TPCM, the method packet
It includes：
Step 1：Privileged domain System Priority starts；
Step 2：TPCM self-tests, TPCM starts if self-test is without exception, enters step 3；If self-test notes abnormalities, alarm is sent out
And equipment is forbidden to start；
Step 3：TPCM actively initiates secure boot code in measurement piece, normally executes, enters step if measuring the code if
4；If measurement is abnormal, sends out alarm and equipment is forbidden to start；
Step 4：TPCM actively initiates the security measure to non-privileged domain system kernel.
2. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that work as step
When measurement results in rapid 4 are normal, after non-privileged domain system starts, following step is continued to execute：
Step 5：TPCM actively initiates to measure the secure boot code in non-privileged domain, and measurement enters step 6 after passing through；
Otherwise it sends out alarm and non-privileged domain system is forbidden to start；
Step 6：TPCM actively initiates the security measure to non-privileged domain system kernel, and measurement is normal by rear non-privileged domain system
Operation, and enter step 7；Otherwise it sends out alarm and non-privileged domain system is forbidden to start；
Step 7：After non-privileged domain system starts, TPCM actively sends measurement instruction to non-privileged domain system kernel, by system
TSB in core measures the application program in security domain；
Wherein, for the abnormal application found in measurement or abnormal behaviour, TSB will extremely be applied according to the instruction of TPCM
Close or break by force network connection.
3. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that also wrap
It includes：
When the measurement results in step 4 are abnormal, non-privileged domain operation system is forbidden to start.
4. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that spy
The active safety of power domain system, which is measured, includes：
Exclusive function module in TPCM is measured, is authorized and certification.
5. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as claimed in claim 4, which is characterized in that also wrap
It includes：
TPCM vacuum metrics services include carrying out credible measurement to non-privileged domain operation system start-up course, include the degree to hardware
Amount.
6. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as claimed in claim 5, which is characterized in that also wrap
It includes：
If not privileged domain operation system needs to carry out authentication during startup, then identity is carried out by privileged domain TPCM
Verification, allows its startup after being verified.
7. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that also wrap
It includes：
When carrying out active safety metric operations, shared drive is established for franchise domain system and non-privileged domain system, for safety
The intermediary service data generated when metric operations are stored and are interacted.
8. a kind of credible platform control module implementation method based on firmware as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that non-spy
There is Bus isolation between power domain and privileged domain, wherein non-privileged domain browsing privileged domain needs dedicated interface, instruction.
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| CN109861970A (en) * | 2018-12-18 | 2019-06-07 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | A kind of system based on credible strategy |
| CN112016090A (en) * | 2019-05-30 | 2020-12-01 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Secure computing card, and measurement method and system based on secure computing card |
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