CN109493053A - A kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system - Google Patents

A kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system Download PDF

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CN109493053A
CN109493053A CN201811399691.1A CN201811399691A CN109493053A CN 109493053 A CN109493053 A CN 109493053A CN 201811399691 A CN201811399691 A CN 201811399691A CN 109493053 A CN109493053 A CN 109493053A
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node
transaction
public key
alliance
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韩卫灵
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Chengdu Quality Starker Technology Co Ltd
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Quality Chain Network Technology Chengdu Co Ltd
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/383Anonymous user system
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves

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Abstract

The invention belongs to block chain transaction technology fields, disclose a kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system.The present invention includes UTXO distributing method and transaction method for secret protection;UTXO distributing method includes: other each common recognition nodes for firstly generating the elliptic curve of finite field and parameter being sent in current alliance's block chain;Then the sub- public key Q of each node is receivediComposite homomorphism public key Q;Then it generates the cost private key of the UTXO currently issued and spends public key.Transaction method for secret protection includes: that transaction produces node and generates the cost private key currently traded and spend public key and send best friend and easily produces node;Send the common recognition node of destination address to current alliance's block chain;Then contract of transferring accounts is generated, and contract of transferring accounts is sent to and is verified in the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain and completes to trade.The dual secret protection that the present invention realizes the amount of money of both parties and the address of both parties can be hidden.

Description

A kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system
Technical field
The invention belongs to block chain transaction technology fields, and in particular to a kind of anonymous deal for alliance's block catenary system Method.
Background technique
Block chain technology is a kind of novel decentralization agreement, can safely store digital cash transaction or other data, Information can not be forged and be distorted, and the trade confirmation on block chain is completed jointly by all nodes on block chain, by common recognition algorithm Guarantee its consistency, a public account book is safeguarded on block chain, the remaining sum of all users in memory block chain network is public Account book is located at any node in memory block as it can be seen that guarantee that it can not forge and distort altogether.
Elliptic curve, is a kind of asymmetrical Encryption Algorithm, and the key schedule of elliptic curve executes Shi Huisheng Public and private key in a pair.The account address of user is exactly public key on block chain, and the private key of user is exactly its corresponding private key.This hair Bright that elliptic curve is used to generate a destination address as the address of transferring accounts of contract, destination address is generated by sender What the public key of random number combination recipient generated, only transaction acceptance person could obtain the private key of destination address, therefore, block chain On can not learn the true identity of recipient in addition to the other users of transaction sender.Equally, it trades for traditional block chain Transaction Information full disclosure the problem of causing the identity of both parties to be completely exposed, the application of this method can make on block chain User realize anonymous receipt on account function.
For publicly-owned block chain this for bit coin, all transaction are all open and clear on chain, can according to address To trace back to all Transaction Informations, including transaction amount and both parties.Certain methods in the prior art such as ring signatures, can To obscure transaction address but transaction amount cannot be hidden, transaction address can not do absolute hide;Meanwhile similar zcash Encryption token used zk-znark zero-knowledge proof realization, but can only generate create generation block when make be arranged, Token can not be issued in pilot process, i.e., cannot be operated when block chain runs intermediate.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the above problems existing in the present technology, it is an object of that present invention to provide one kind to be used for alliance's block linkwork The anonymous deal method of system.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
A kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system, including UTXO distributing method and transaction secret protection side Method;The UTXO distributing method the following steps are included:
S101. the distribution node for issuing UTXO generates the elliptic curve of finite field, and the parameter of current elliptic curve is sent out Send other each common recognition nodes into current alliance's block chain;
S102. other in current alliance's block chain are after respectively common recognition node receives the parameter of current elliptic curve, respectively according to It is secondary to generate sub- private key kiWith sub- public key Qi, and by sub- public key QiIt is sent to distribution node, wherein i is the serial number of present node;
S103. distribution node receives the sub- public key Q from other each common recognition nodes respectivelyiAfterwards, composite homomorphism public key Q;
S104. distribution node generates the cost private key of the UTXO currently issued and spends public key, and then issuing node will send out Amount information, homomorphism public key Q and the current cost public key of row UTXO is sent in the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain, i.e., complete At the distribution of UTXO;
The transaction method for secret protection the following steps are included:
S201. transaction acceptance node generates the cost private key currently traded and spends public key, and the cost that will currently trade Public key is sent to transaction and produces node;
S202. all common recognition sections that node generates and sends corresponding transaction id to current alliance's block chain are produced in transaction Point;
S203. transaction produces node and generates contract of transferring accounts, and contract of transferring accounts is sent to the common recognition of current alliance's block chain It is verified in node and completes to trade;
Whether the S204. current transaction of transaction recipient node real-time circulation detection is completed;
S205. when the testing result of step S204, which is, is, the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain is completed to spend balance And save the information currently traded.
Preferably, in the step S101, the parameter for the current elliptic curve that distribution node generates include equation C, Order n and basic point G.
Preferably, each node sends sub- public key Q to distribution node respectively in the step S102i(Qi);It is any The sub- private key k of nodeiWith sub- public key QiCalculation formula it is as follows:
ki=random (1, n-1), Qi=ki*G。
Preferably, the calculation formula of homomorphism public key Q is as follows in the step S103:
Wherein, N is other each common recognition number of nodes, and P is that homomorphism calculates point, and R is the random points issuing node and generating.
Preferably, amount information includes the plaintext m and ciphertext E that will issue the amount of money of UTXO in the step S104 (m);The calculation formula of the ciphertext E (m) is as follows:
E (m)=mP+rR,
Wherein, r is the random number issuing node and generating.
Preferably, distribution node generates the UTXO's currently issued by RSA cryptographic algorithms in the step S104 It spends private key and spends public key;In the step S201, transaction produces what node was currently traded by RSA cryptographic algorithms generation It spends private key and spends public key.
Preferably, in the step S204, when whether the current transaction of transaction recipient node real-time circulation detection is completed, Steps are as follows:
S204a. contract of transferring accounts all on the transaction current alliance's block chain of recipient node real-time query, and extract every and turn Cost public key in account contract is compared with the cost public key in contract of currently transferring accounts;
S204b. the comparison result of such as step S204a is consistent, then continues step S205, such as the comparison result of step S204a It is inconsistent, then repeatedly step S204a.
Preferably, the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain is completed after spending balance, currently in the step S205 The calculation formula of the plaintext m and ciphertext E (m) of the amount of money of the UTXO of transaction acceptance node are as follows:
M=m1+m2, E (m)=E (m1)+E (m2),
Wherein, m1 is the plaintext for the amount of money that current transaction acceptance node does not carry out the UTXO before the transaction, and m2 is current The plaintext that node carries out the amount of money of the UTXO produced when the transaction is produced in transaction.
The invention has the benefit that
1) the dual anonymous protection that the address of the amount of money and both parties that realize both parties can be hidden, dimension The personal secrets for having protected both parties in same alliance's block chain are carried out the calculating of homomorphism public key by elliptic curve, guaranteed It solves the problems, such as encrypted transaction common recognition while personal secrets, uses and spend private key signature transaction and spend public key verifications The mode of doing business of signature solves the transaction in process of exchange so that the address of both parties and the address of UTXO are unbinding The problem of both sides address exposure;
2) by using elliptic curve to carry out the calculating of homomorphism public key in UTXO is issued, transaction amount encryption is realized Problem, meanwhile, pass through the setting for spending public key and spending private key, it was demonstrated that the cost power of current distribution node, it is highly-safe, altogether Know easy;
3) it carries out spending public key by the RSA cryptographic algorithms of the address onrelevant with both parties and spends the meter of private key The problem of calculating, further solving hiding transaction address, so that the present invention realizes non-stop layer in a manner of low cost The transaction encryption of alliance's block chain.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow diagram of the invention.
Specific embodiment
With reference to the accompanying drawing and specific embodiment does further explaination to the present invention.
Embodiment 1:
As shown in Figure 1, the present embodiment provides a kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system, including UTXO hair Row method and transaction method for secret protection.In the network of bit coin, UTXO model is (UnspentTransactionOutput does not spend transaction to export) is the basic unit of bit coin transaction, passes through the defeated of transaction Enter and export, fund is changing into one piece of data structure by bit coin network, and being different from Credit Card Payments must be in encryption safe net It is transmitted in network, why not the data of bit coin in office can be transmitted in certain safe network, and it is hair that UTX0 model, which can be regarded as, Bit coin monetary unit that row node (i.e. the owner of private key) locks and by entire bit coin Network Recognition.In UTXO mould In type, input of trading is referred to as by the UTXO of some transaction consumption, output of trading is referred to as by the UTXO of transaction creation.Pass through This mode, a certain amount of bit coin shift between different all nodes of private key, and transaction chain in constantly consumption and Issue new UTXO;One bit coin transaction produces the private key signature of node by distribution node or transaction to unlock UTXO, and It is locked by using the bit coin address of new transaction acceptance node and creates UTXO.In the present invention, trade secret protection side Method is run based on UTXO distributing method, because only that any node can trade after having UTXO.
UTXO distributing method the following steps are included:
S101. the distribution node for issuing UTXO generates the elliptic curve of finite field, and the parameter of current elliptic curve is sent out Send other each common recognition nodes into current alliance's block chain;Wherein, when negotiating public key, it is desirable that current alliance block chain In at least 4 nodes;Other each common recognition nodes are all nodes in current alliance's block chain other than issuing node.
In the present embodiment, the parameter for the current elliptic curve that distribution node generates includes equation C, order n and basic point G.
S102. other in current alliance's block chain are after respectively common recognition node receives the parameter of current elliptic curve, respectively according to It is secondary to generate sub- private key kiWith sub- public key Qi, and by sub- public key QiIt is sent to distribution node, wherein i is the serial number of present node, i= 1,2,3,…,n。
In the present embodiment, each node sends sub- public key Q to distribution node respectivelyi(Qi);The sub- private key k of any nodeiWith Sub- public key QiCalculation formula it is as follows:
ki=random (1, n-1), Qi=ki*G;
KiIt is a random number between (1, n-1), the sub- private key that each node generates is not identical, corresponding sub- public key It also can not be identical.
S103. distribution node receives the sub- public key Q from other each common recognition nodes respectivelyiAfterwards, composite homomorphism public key Q;
In the present embodiment, the calculation formula of homomorphism public key Q is as follows:
Wherein, N is other each common recognition number of nodes, and P is that homomorphism calculates point, and R is the random points issuing node and generating;P The encryption of the plaintext m of the amount of money for UTXO.
S104. distribution node generates the cost private key of the UTXO currently issued and spends public key, and then issuing node will send out Amount information, homomorphism public key Q and the current cost public key of row UTXO is sent in the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain, i.e., complete At the distribution of UTXO;Wherein, by the cost private key for the UTXO currently issued that knows together and cost public key, reach the current distribution of proof The purpose of the cost power of node, the transaction in later period is carried out convenient for distribution node.
In the present embodiment, amount information includes the plaintext m and ciphertext E (m) that will issue the amount of money of UTXO;The meter of ciphertext E (m) It is as follows to calculate formula:
E (m)=mP+rR,
Wherein, r is the random number issuing node and generating, for guaranteeing the intensity of encryption.
In the present embodiment, distribution node generates cost private key and the cost of the UTXO currently issued by RSA cryptographic algorithms Public key;In step S201, transaction produces node and generates the cost private key currently traded by RSA cryptographic algorithms and spend public key.
Trade method for secret protection the following steps are included:
S201. transaction acceptance node generates the cost private key currently traded and spends public key, and the cost that will currently trade Public key is sent to transaction and produces node;Wherein, private key signature transaction is spent, spends public key verifications signature, thus
S202. all common recognition sections that node generates and sends corresponding transaction id to current alliance's block chain are produced in transaction Point;It should be noted that any transaction is that the whole network is known together, and all common recognition nodes herein include in alliance's block chain All nodes in current alliance block chain other than trading and producing node.
S203. transaction produces node and generates contract of transferring accounts, and contract of transferring accounts is sent to the common recognition of current alliance's block chain It is verified in node and completes to trade;
Whether the S204. current transaction of transaction recipient node real-time circulation detection is completed;
In the present embodiment, when whether the current transaction of transaction recipient node real-time circulation detection is completed, steps are as follows:
S204a. contract of transferring accounts all on the transaction current alliance's block chain of recipient node real-time query, and extract every and turn Cost public key in account contract is compared with the cost public key in contract of currently transferring accounts;
S204b. the comparison result of such as step S204a is consistent, then continues step S205, such as the comparison result of step S204a It is inconsistent, then repeatedly step S204a.
S205. when the testing result of step S204, which is, is, the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain is completed to spend balance And save the information currently traded.
In the present embodiment, the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain is completed after spending balance, current transaction acceptance node The calculation formula of the plaintext m and ciphertext E (m) of the amount of money of UTXO are as follows:
M=m1+m2, E (m)=E (m1)+E (m2),
Wherein, m1 is the plaintext for the amount of money that current transaction acceptance node does not carry out the UTXO before the transaction, and m2 is current The plaintext that node carries out the amount of money of the UTXO produced when the transaction is produced in transaction.
The present invention is not limited to above-mentioned optional embodiment, anyone can show that other are each under the inspiration of the present invention The product of kind form.Above-mentioned specific embodiment should not be understood the limitation of pairs of protection scope of the present invention, protection of the invention Range should be subject to be defined in claims, and specification can be used for interpreting the claims.

Claims (8)

1. a kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: including UTXO distributing method and transaction Method for secret protection;The UTXO distributing method the following steps are included:
S101. the distribution node for issuing UTXO generates the elliptic curve of finite field, and the parameter of current elliptic curve is sent to Other each common recognition nodes in current alliance block chain;
S102. other in current alliance's block chain are successively given birth to respectively after respectively common recognition node receives the parameter of current elliptic curve At sub- private key kiWith sub- public key Qi, and by sub- public key QiIt is sent to distribution node, wherein i is the serial number of present node;
S103. distribution node receives the sub- public key Q from other each common recognition nodes respectivelyiAfterwards, composite homomorphism public key Q;
S104. distribution node generates the cost private key of the UTXO currently issued and spends public key, and then issuing node will issue Amount information, homomorphism public key Q and the current cost public key of UTXO is sent in the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain, that is, is completed The distribution of UTXO;
The transaction method for secret protection the following steps are included:
S201. transaction acceptance node generates the cost private key currently traded and spends public key, and the cost public key that will currently trade It is sent to transaction and produces node;
S202. all common recognition nodes that node generates and sends corresponding transaction id to current alliance's block chain are produced in transaction;
S203. transaction produces node and generates contract of transferring accounts, and contract of transferring accounts is sent to the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain In verified and complete to trade;
Whether the S204. current transaction of transaction recipient node real-time circulation detection is completed;
S205. when the testing result of step S204, which is, is, the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain is completed to spend and balances and protect Deposit the information currently traded.
2. the anonymous deal method according to claim 1 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S101, the parameter for the current elliptic curve that distribution node generates includes equation C, order n and basic point G.
3. the anonymous deal method according to claim 2 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S102, each node sends sub- public key Q to distribution node respectivelyi(Qi);The sub- private key k of any nodeiWith sub- public key Qi's Calculation formula is as follows:
ki=random (1, n-1), Qi=ki*G。
4. the anonymous deal method according to claim 3 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S103, the calculation formula of homomorphism public key Q is as follows:
Wherein, N is other each common recognition number of nodes, and P is that homomorphism calculates point, and R is the random number point issuing node and generating.
5. the anonymous deal method according to claim 4 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S104, amount information includes the plaintext m and ciphertext E (m) that will issue the amount of money of UTXO;The calculating of the ciphertext E (m) is public Formula is as follows:
E (m)=mP+rR,
Wherein, r is the random number issuing node and generating.
6. the anonymous deal method according to claim 1 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S104, distribution node generates the cost private key of the UTXO currently issued by RSA cryptographic algorithms and spends public key;Described In step S201, transaction produces node and generates the cost private key currently traded by RSA cryptographic algorithms and spend public key.
7. the anonymous deal method according to claim 6 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S204, when whether the current transaction of transaction recipient node real-time circulation detection is completed, steps are as follows:
S204a. contract of transferring accounts all on the transaction current alliance's block chain of recipient node real-time query, and extract every conjunction of transferring accounts Cost public key in about is compared with the cost public key in contract of currently transferring accounts;
S204b. the comparison result of such as step S204a is consistent, then continues step S205, the comparison result such as step S204a is different It causes, then repeatedly step S204a.
8. the anonymous deal method according to claim 5 for alliance's block catenary system, it is characterised in that: the step In rapid S205, the common recognition node of current alliance's block chain is completed after spending balance, the amount of money of the UTXO of current transaction acceptance node Plaintext m and ciphertext E (m) calculation formula it is as follows:
M=m1+m2, E (m)=E (m1)+E (m2),
Wherein, m1 is the plaintext for the amount of money that current transaction acceptance node does not carry out the UTXO before the transaction, and m2 is current transaction Produce the plaintext that node carries out the amount of money of the UTXO produced when the transaction.
CN201811399691.1A 2018-11-22 2018-11-22 A kind of anonymous deal method for alliance's block catenary system Pending CN109493053A (en)

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