CN110336673A - A kind of block chain design method based on secret protection - Google Patents

A kind of block chain design method based on secret protection Download PDF

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Publication number
CN110336673A
CN110336673A CN201910475375.6A CN201910475375A CN110336673A CN 110336673 A CN110336673 A CN 110336673A CN 201910475375 A CN201910475375 A CN 201910475375A CN 110336673 A CN110336673 A CN 110336673A
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China
Prior art keywords
node
signature
catenary system
elliptic curve
public key
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CN201910475375.6A
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CN110336673B (en
Inventor
钱萍
史金龙
刘镇
钱强
张笑非
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Jiangsu University of Science and Technology
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Jiangsu University of Science and Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes

Abstract

The block chain design method based on secret protection that the invention discloses a kind of.It comprises the concrete steps that: the node R in block catenary systemiUtilize the private key k of oneselfiTo information miHash functional value signature, while by information miIt is divided into l parts, is encrypted respectively with the public key of l different nodes, and l ciphertext is sent respectively to l node；Other nodes in system utilize node RiPublic key KiTo RiIdentity and miHash value verified；When arbitration organ needs to miWhen being verified, the ciphertext respectively received is decrypted respectively using respective private key by the l node chosen, and obtained plaintext is issued into arbitration organ, arbitration organ utilizes Hash function verifying signing messages m after summarizingi.Compared with prior art; in the present invention while guaranteeing that node can not be forged, non-repudiation is traded using ellipse curve signature algorithm; guarantee that the Transaction Information of node is not obtained by other nodes using ellipse curve encryption and decryption algorithm and Hash function, to protect its privacy.

Description

A kind of block chain design method based on secret protection
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of information security technology, are related to cryptography and block chain interleaving techniques, specifically relate to one Kind is for the nodal information method for secret protection in block catenary system.
Background technique
Block chain is the novel of the computer technologies such as Distributed Storage, point-to-point transmission, common recognition mechanism, Encryption Algorithm Application model, it is substantially the database of a decentralization.As the Floor layer Technology of bit coin, block chain is a string of uses Cryptography method is associated the data block generated, contains the information of a batch bit coin network trading in each data block, For verifying the validity (anti-fake) of its information and generating next block.Transaction record is by being distributed in difference in block catenary system Multiple nodes in place are completed jointly, and what each node recorded is complete account, therefore they can be participated in Supervision transaction legitimacy, while can also testify jointly for it.Can be controlled in this way to avoid single node or by bribery and A possibility that remembering false account.Also due to accounting nodes are enough, theoretically except not all node is destroyed, otherwise account is not just It can lose, to ensure that the safety of account data.
The secret protection to node Transaction Information is difficult to realize in common block catenary system, because All Activity needs All nodes are disclosed, to avoid note false account the case where.For this problem, the present invention designs a kind of area based on secret protection Block chain design method, while guaranteeing that node can not be forged, non-repudiation is traded using ellipse curve signature algorithm, utilization is ellipse Circular curve enciphering and deciphering algorithm and Hash function guarantee that the Transaction Information of node is not obtained by other nodes, so that its privacy be protected to believe Breath.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the present invention is in view of the defects existing in the prior art, propose a kind of block chain with privacy protection function Design method.
In order to achieve the above objectives, the present invention is realised by adopting the following technical scheme.
A kind of block chain design method based on secret protection, includes the following steps:
1, determine that the equation of elliptic curve E is y by block catenary system first2=x3+ ax+b, elliptic curve basic point G, it is oval Curve order is n, and these parameters is informed each node in block catenary system；
2, each node in block catenary system determines the private key k of oneselfi, calculate public key Ki=kiG, and by public key KiIt accuses Know other nodes in block catenary system；
3, node RiUtilize private key kiTo information miHash functional value eiIt signs, wherein ei=h (mi), h () is Hash letter Number operation；
4、RiBy miL parts are randomly divided into, m is obtainedi1,mi2,……,mil, mi1+mi2+……+mil=mi, RiFrom block linkwork L node R is randomly selected in system1,R2,……,Rl, respectively with the public key K of each node1,K2,……,KlTo mi1, mi2,……,milEncryption, obtains ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l)；RiSignature is sent to block linkwork Each node in system, by ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l) it is sent respectively to node R1,R2,……,Rl；
5, other nodes in block catenary system utilize RiPublic key KiWith signature (t, si, ei) verifying node RiIdentity and The Hash functional value e of signing messagesi, it is proved to be successful then each nodes records corresponding information, verifying is unsuccessful, does not record corresponding letter Breath；
6, in the case where being proved to be successful, when arbitration organ A needs to verify signing messages miWhen, then by node R1, R2,……,RlFirst respectively with the private key k of oneself1,k2,……,klTo ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l) Decryption, then the plaintext m that will be obtained respectivelyi1,mi2,……,milIt is sent to A, A verifies h (mi1+mi2+……+mil)=eiWhether at It is vertical, set up then miIt is proved to be successful.
It is further preferred that the particular content and method of signature described in step 3 are as follows:
RiChoose a random numberCalculate riG=(xi, yi), t=xiModn is selected again if t=0 Take ri, calculate ri -1Modn, si=ri -1[h(ei)+kiT] modn, obtain (t, si, ei) it is RiSignature.
It is further preferred that the particular content and method of encryption described in step 4 are as follows:
RiIt will be to sending point RjPlaintext mijWhen,A random number is chosen first And by plaintext m to be transmittedijIt is encoded to the upper point M of elliptic curve Eij, carried out according still further to following formula using elliptic curve Computations:
C1j=qjG
C2j=qjKj+Mij
Obtain ciphertext (C1j,C2j), wherein KjFor node RjPublic key.
It is further preferred that the particular content and method of signature verification described in step 5 are as follows:
Calculate w=si -1Modn, u1=h (ei) wmodn, u2=twmodn, u1G+u2Ki=(x0,y0), v=x0Modn, such as Fruit v=t then signs effectively, is proved to be successful, and otherwise signature is invalid, verifies unsuccessful.
It is further preferred that in the particular content and method of decryption described in step 6, node RjUtilize the private key k of oneselfj Calculating is decrypted using elliptic curve according to following formula:
Cj=kjC1j=kj(qjG)=qjKj
C2j- Cj=qjKj+Mij- qiKj=Mij
Gray code obtains plaintext m againij。
Each node is verifying some node R in the present inventioniIdentity and when signing messages, be not directly to signing messages miIt is verified, but verifies its Hash functional value ei, each node cannot obtain miValue.It meets in block catenary system in this way Authentication and anti-fake demand, in turn ensure the privacy of node signing messages.By R in block catenary systemiThe l selected at random A node can decrypt m respectivelyiPartial information, when there is arbitration organ to need to verify signing messages miWhen, the l node The partial information respectively decrypted is sent to arbitration structure and summarizes verifying.In this way in protection RiSigning messages privacy it is same When, further ensuring it can not forge and deny.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the block chain design method flow chart of the invention based on secret protection.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, right The present invention is described in further detail.It should be appreciated that specific embodiment described herein is used only for explaining the present invention, It is not intended to limit the present invention.
As shown in Figure 1, being a kind of block chain design method based on secret protection of the invention, particular content and step are such as Under:
(1) determine that the equation of elliptic curve E is y by block catenary system first2=x3+ ax+b, elliptic curve basic point G, it is oval Curve order is n, and these parameters is informed each node in block catenary system；
(2) each node in block catenary system determines the private key k of oneselfi, calculate public key Ki=kiG, and by public key KiIt accuses Know other nodes in block catenary system；
(3) work as node RiIt needs to information miWhen being signed, RiChoose a random numberCalculate riG= (xi, yi), t=xiModn chooses r if t=0 againi, calculate ri -1Modn calculates si=ri -1[h(ei)+kiT] modn, Wherein ei=h (mi), h () is Hash functional operation, (t, si, ei) it is RiSignature；
(4)RiBy miL parts are randomly divided into, m is obtainedi1,mi2,……,mil, mi1+mi2+……+mil=mi, RiFrom block chain L node R is randomly selected in system1,R2,……,Rl, respectively with the public key K of each node1,K2,……,KlTo mi1, mi2,……,milEncryption；
R when encryptioniA random number is chosen firstAnd by plaintext to be transmitted mijIt is encoded to the upper point M of elliptic curve Eij, computations are carried out using elliptic curve according still further to following formula:
C1j=qjG
C2j=qjKj+Mij
Obtain ciphertext (C1j,C2j), wherein KjFor node RjPublic key, further obtain all ciphertext (C11,C21), (C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l)；
(5)RiEach node that signature is sent in block catenary system, by ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……, (C1l,C2l) it is sent respectively to node R1,R2,……,Rl；
(6) other nodes in block catenary system utilize RiPublic key KiWith signature (t, si, ei) verifying node RiIdentity With the Hash functional value e of signing messagesi, calculate w=si -1Modn, u1=h (ei) wmodn, u2=twmodn, u1G+u2Ki=(x0, y0), v=x0Modn signs effectively if v=t, is proved to be successful, each nodes records corresponding information, and signature is then verified not in vain Success, does not record corresponding information；
(7) in the case where being proved to be successful when arbitration organ A needs to verify signing messages miWhen, then by node R1, R2,……,RlFirst respectively with the private key k of oneself1,k2,……,klTo ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l) Decryption；
Node R when decryptionjUtilize the private key k of oneselfjCalculating is decrypted using elliptic curve according to following formula:
Cj=kjC1j=kj(qjG)=qjKj
C2j- Cj=qjKj+Mij- qiKj=Mij
Gray code obtains plaintext m againij；
Node R1,R2,……,RlThe plaintext m that will be obtained respectively againi1,mi2,……,milIt is sent to A；
(8) A verifies h (mi1+mi2+……+mil)=eiIt is whether true, set up then miIt is proved to be successful.
The foregoing is intended to be a preferred embodiment of the present invention.Certainly, the present invention can also have other a variety of implementations Example, without deviating from the spirit and substance of the present invention, anyone skilled in the art, when can according to this Various corresponding equivalent change and modification are made in invention, all should fall within the scope of protection of the appended claims of the present invention.

Claims (5)

1. a kind of block chain design method based on secret protection, for realizing Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem and Hash letter is based on Number, which is characterized in that comprise the steps of:
(1) determine that the equation of elliptic curve E is y by block catenary system2=x3+ ax+b, elliptic curve basic point G, elliptic curve order For n, and these parameters are informed into each node in block catenary system；
(2) each node in block catenary system determines the private key k of oneselfi, calculate public key Ki=kiG, and by public key KiInform area Other nodes in block catenary system；
(3) node RiUtilize private key kiTo information miHash functional value eiIt signs, wherein ei=h (mi), h () is Hash function Operation；
(4)RiBy miL parts are randomly divided into, m is obtainedi1,mi2,……,mil, mi1+mi2+……+mil=mi, RiFrom block catenary system Randomly select l node R1,R2,……,Rl, respectively with the public key K of each node1,K2,……,KlTo mi1,mi2,……,mil Encryption, obtains ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l)；RiEach section that signature is sent in block catenary system Point, by ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l) it is sent respectively to node R1,R2,……,Rl；
(5) other nodes in block catenary system utilize RiPublic key KiWith signature (t, si, ei) verifying node RiIdentity and label The Hash functional value e of name informationi, it is proved to be successful then each nodes records corresponding information, verifying is unsuccessful, does not record corresponding information；
(6) in the case where being proved to be successful, when arbitration organ A needs to verify signing messages miWhen, then by node R1,R2,……,Rl First respectively with the private key k of oneself1,k2,……,klTo ciphertext (C11,C21),(C12,C22),……,(C1l,C2l) decryption, then divide The plaintext m that will not obtaini1,mi2,……,milIt is sent to A, A verifies h (mi1+mi2+……+mil)=eiIt is whether true, it sets up then miIt is proved to be successful.
2. a kind of block chain design method based on secret protection according to claim 1, which is characterized in that step (3) Described in signature content and method it is as follows:
RiChoose a random numberCalculate riG=(xi, yi), t=xiModn works as t=0, then chooses r againi, Calculate ri -1Modn, si=ri -1[h(ei)+kiT] modn, obtain (t, si, ei) it is RiSignature.
3. a kind of block chain design method based on secret protection according to claim 1, which is characterized in that step (4) Described in encryption content and method it is as follows:
RiIt will be to sending point RjPlaintext mijWhen,First choose a random numberAnd it will be to The plaintext m of transmissionijIt is encoded to the upper point M of elliptic curve Eij, encryption meter is carried out using elliptic curve according still further to following formula It calculates:
C1j=qjG
C2j=qjKj+Mij
Obtain ciphertext (C1j,C2j), wherein KjFor node RjPublic key.
4. a kind of block chain design method based on secret protection according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in step (5) The content and method of the signature verification are as follows:
Calculate w=si -1Modn, u1=h (ei) wmodn, u2=twmodn, u1G+u2Ki=(x0,y0), v=x0Modn works as v=t Then signature effectively, is proved to be successful, and otherwise signature is invalid, is verified unsuccessful.
5. a kind of block chain design method based on secret protection according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in step (6) In the content and method of the decryption, node RjUtilize the private key k of oneselfjIt is carried out according to following formula using elliptic curve Decryption calculates:
Cj=kjC1j=kj(qjG)=qjKj
C2j- Cj=qjKj+Mij- qiKj=Mij
Gray code obtains plaintext m againij。
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CN111080296A (en) * 2019-12-05 2020-04-28 深圳前海微众银行股份有限公司 Verification method and device based on block chain system
CN111738726A (en) * 2020-08-04 2020-10-02 卓尔智联(武汉)研究院有限公司 Resource verification method and device based on block chain and computer equipment
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CN110535916A (en) * 2019-08-09 2019-12-03 江苏科技大学 A kind of supply guarantee management method based on block chain
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CN111080296A (en) * 2019-12-05 2020-04-28 深圳前海微众银行股份有限公司 Verification method and device based on block chain system
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CN111738726B (en) * 2020-08-04 2020-11-20 卓尔智联(武汉)研究院有限公司 Resource verification method and device based on block chain and computer equipment
WO2022068362A1 (en) * 2020-09-29 2022-04-07 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 Block chain-based information processing method and apparatus, device, and medium

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