CN109344609B - TCU module, TCU system and protection method - Google Patents
TCU module, TCU system and protection method Download PDFInfo
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- CN109344609B CN109344609B CN201811009179.1A CN201811009179A CN109344609B CN 109344609 B CN109344609 B CN 109344609B CN 201811009179 A CN201811009179 A CN 201811009179A CN 109344609 B CN109344609 B CN 109344609B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/577—Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
- G06F9/48—Program initiating; Program switching, e.g. by interrupt
- G06F9/4806—Task transfer initiation or dispatching
- G06F9/4843—Task transfer initiation or dispatching by program, e.g. task dispatcher, supervisor, operating system
- G06F9/4881—Scheduling strategies for dispatcher, e.g. round robin, multi-level priority queues
Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of automobile TCUs, and particularly discloses a TCU module, a TCU system and a protection method, which comprise a 4G module, a CPU core processing module and a CAN transceiver which are sequentially connected, wherein the CPU core processing module comprises an application component, a service component connected with the application component and an operating system connected with the service component, the operating system comprises a system interface and a kernel driver connected with the system interface, the kernel driver comprises a control gateway, the control gateway is connected with an access monitoring module and an access request module, and the access monitoring module is connected with an exception handling module.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of automobile TCUs, in particular to a TCU module, a TCU system and a protection method.
Background
With the rapid development of the internet of vehicles industry, the related technologies thereof are widely applied to the automotive electronics industry, and the development of the internet of vehicles is based on the network communication technology to complete information interconnection and intercommunication between vehicles, vehicles and roads, and vehicles and people. The automobile is no longer a simple vehicle, and is gradually developing into an important component of intelligent travel and vehicle data collection. The network function gradually becomes an important service component, the functions of the vehicle-mounted module are more and more abundant, the interaction with the internet is more frequent, and the potential safety hazard also comes with the network function.
Because the vehicle-mounted network module contains some important personal information and even controls the behavior of the vehicle to a certain extent, the vehicle-mounted network module often becomes a primary attack object of network attack, so that not only personal information is leaked, but also the life and property safety of a driver is possibly threatened. The current vehicle-mounted network module usually has a complex operating system and rich application programs, but the inside of the whole software system lacks effective access authority control and authority level management of each functional block, effective defense and alarm and system isolation cannot be carried out on system intrusion and behavior after the system intrusion, and the complex network security requirement cannot be met.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the technical problems, the invention provides a TCU module, a TCU system and a protection method which can effectively avoid the loss of drivers or property caused by network intrusion.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides the following specific scheme: a TCU module comprises a 4G module, a CPU core processing module and a CAN transceiver which are sequentially connected, wherein the CPU core processing module comprises an application component, a service component connected with the application component and an operating system connected with the service component, the operating system comprises a system interface and a kernel driver connected with the system interface, the kernel driver comprises a control gateway, the control gateway is connected with an access monitoring module and an access request module, and the access monitoring module is connected with an exception handling module.
The invention limits the access of system resources by controlling the gateway, actively analyzes abnormal authority change or illegal access of key resources when the system is invaded, gives an alarm in time after the invasion is confirmed, isolates the system, and blocks the connection with a vehicle body, thereby avoiding the loss of drivers or property caused by network invasion.
Preferably, the control gateway includes a white list management module and an access control module connected to the white list management module, the white list management module effectively configures resources and permissions that need to be accessed for specific applications and services, a network filtering module is formed in the kernel, the network filtering module compares and checks each resource access, issues an access request according with rules, blocks invalid or illegal access, and checks whether the process permission is illegally changed, the control module optimizes performance when accessing the control module, and puts the request passing access into a queue according to priority for resource access.
Preferably, the access request module includes device driver, memory management, file system, process resource and authority management.
The invention also provides a TCU system, which comprises the TCU module as claimed in claim 3 and a vehicle body CAN bus connected with the TCU module, wherein the 4G module is responsible for receiving and sending data with the outside, the CPU core processing module is responsible for analyzing and processing the received data and messages, the CAN transceiver is responsible for transmitting the data sent by the CPU core processing module to the vehicle body CAN bus, and all the modules are communicated through a hardware bus.
The present invention also provides a method for protecting a TCU system according to claim 4, comprising the steps of:
s1, a target program process calls a system interface to access system resources, and a control gateway checks whether the accessed resources are in the process range;
s2, accessing the resources in the process range, performing access operation and returning a result;
if the access resource is not in the process range, jumping to the step S3;
s3, the control gateway informs the access monitoring module to check whether the process accesses hardware peripherals, kernel interfaces or permission change;
if yes, jumping to the step S4; if not, the access operation is refused and the access failure is returned;
s4, the access monitoring module checks whether the process is abnormal or not;
if yes, recording the exception and informing an exception processing module to process the exception; if not, returning and recording the access failure result.
Preferably, the exception handling in step S4 specifically includes: the abnormity processing module sends preset alarm information to a system background and forbids the communication of the CAN transceiver, so that a destructive control instruction is prevented from being issued to a vehicle body through a vehicle body CAN bus, and the aim of protecting the safety of the vehicle is fulfilled.
Preferably, the step S4 of accessing the monitoring module to check whether the process has an exception specifically includes the following steps: checking whether all access records of the process have illegal operation records; checking whether the code is tampered; and checking whether the current process authority and account are valid and whether the current process authority and account are unauthorized.
Preferably, the checking whether the code is tampered or not is specifically: and comparing the program process codes stored in the storage area with the codes in the current memory.
Preferably, the step S4 of accessing the monitoring module to check whether the process has an exception further includes the following steps: and (4) memory checking, namely checking whether the current code, data and stack segment of the process are in the attribute range set by the segment.
Preferably, the access control module ranks access priorities of device drivers, memory management, file systems, process resources, and rights management.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: the invention adopts the enhanced access control to the TCU module, protects codes and data in a memory layer, continuously monitors illegal access filtered by the enhanced access control, analyzes and checks an access subject, and when an abnormal process is found in the system, the system actively alarms, performs system self-isolation and cuts off communication with a vehicle body so as to prevent a vehicle from being further invaded by issuing an instruction.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a TCU module according to a first embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a TCU system according to a second embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a conventional CPU core processing module processing external network messages;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a control gateway wrapped target application process;
fig. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a third embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to explain the technical solution of the present invention in detail, the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiment of the present invention. It is to be understood that the embodiments described are only a few embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the described embodiments of the invention without inventive step, are within the scope of protection of the invention.
The first embodiment is as follows:
referring to fig. 1, this embodiment provides a TCU module, which includes a 4G module, a CPU core processing module, and a CAN transceiver connected in sequence, where the CPU core processing module includes an application component, a service component connected to the application component, and an operating system connected to the service component, the operating system includes a system interface and a kernel driver connected to the system interface, the kernel driver includes a control gateway, the control gateway is connected to an access monitoring module and an access request module, the access monitoring module is connected to an exception handling module, the access monitoring module monitors illegal and abnormal resource access and permission transition and determines whether an attack occurs, when an illegal access and abnormal permission change request occurs, it means that a system is attacked or a program is abnormal, at this time, it needs to analyze according to an access record and an access boundary to determine whether a current system is in problem, if a process is abnormal and an intrusion is possible, the exception handling module is notified, and when the monitoring module determines that the current system is attacked or the system is abnormal, the exception handling module calls a network driver interface to send an alarm and cut off a CAN bus connection.
The control gateway comprises a white list management module and an access control module connected with the white list management module, the white list management module effectively configures resources and authorities of specific applications and services to be accessed, a network filtering module is formed in a kernel, each resource access is compared and checked, an access request conforming to a rule is issued, invalid or illegal access is blocked, whether illegal change exists in the process authority is checked, the performance is optimized when the control module is accessed, the requests passing through the access are placed into a queue according to priority for resource access, and the access request module comprises device driving, memory management, a file system, process resources and authority management.
Example two:
referring to fig. 1 and 2, the present embodiment provides a TCU system, including a TCU module in the first embodiment and a vehicle body CAN bus connected to the TCU module, a 4G module in the TCU module is responsible for receiving and sending data from and to the outside, a CPU core processing module is responsible for analyzing and processing received data and messages, a CAN transceiver is responsible for transmitting data sent by the CPU core processing module to the vehicle body CAN bus, and each module performs communication through a hardware bus.
When network attack occurs, an attacker CAN permeate a CPU core processing module through a 4G module in the form of a network message, disguise a normal program process by using a system or program bug, access key resources or promote access authority to control the CPU core processing module by injecting destructive codes, and further transmit destructive instructions to a vehicle body CAN bus through a CAN transceiver, as the CAN transceiver and the 4G module are taken as communication transceiving modules and do not usually have identification and filtering capabilities of the network message, and the attacker usually also takes the control CPU core processing module as an intrusion target, taking a background remote control vehicle as an example, as shown in FIG. 3, a background instruction is driven into the system through APN (access point name) equipment in the form of the network message, the network service module receives the message through a network communication interface provided by an operating system, usually except for transceiving of the message, the module is also responsible for encryption and decryption of communication, and primarily analyzes the message according to a format, the network service module forwards the message to an application program with a corresponding processing function according to the analyzed command word, the remote control processing application further obtains specific instructions and CAN parameters, and issues the instructions through a communication interface of the CAN transceiver; the CAN transceiver communication driving module sends the sent message to a corresponding ECU through a vehicle body CAN bus, when network attack occurs, an attacker CAN acquire access authority by utilizing a vulnerability of an application program, a service program or an operating system, or pretend to be a normal program to carry out system call to access key resources, and then sends a destructive instruction through injecting or tampering the program. Therefore, the network service interface, the network service module and the application program CAN be attacked, so that the defense detection of the CPU core processing module is taken as a main implementation means in the implementation, when an intruder penetrates the CPU core processing module and tries to acquire authority or access key resources in an unauthorized way, when the intruder passes through the firewall and the white list management module, abnormal operation CAN be refused, the system CAN detect abnormal behaviors of the program, the intruded program is actively analyzed, after the intrusion is confirmed, the network service module sends an alarm to a background and isolates the system by a method of cutting off the communication of the CAN transceiver, and a destructive control instruction is prevented from being issued to a vehicle body through a vehicle body CAN bus, so that the aim of protecting the safety of the vehicle is fulfilled.
As shown in fig. 4, in the system, a program is logically wrapped by a control gateway as a target process, and all resource accesses including a memory, a CPU, a Flash, a bus and the like need to be authenticated through the access control gateway and then be readable and writable. Generally, a process loads executable binary code into a memory at startup, reads data from the memory during operation, and places temporary data generated during operation into a stack, where all code and data are placed in different segments according to type, such as code in code segments, temporary data in stacks, constants in data segments, and so on. Therefore, in order to prevent the codes and data of the memory from being tampered, besides configuring the white list management module of the access segment range according to each program process, each memory segment also needs to set a boundary attribute, each process can only access the resources allowed by the white list management module, and when the resources except the white list management module are denied, the access monitoring module records a log and scans whether the process is abnormal or not.
The main prevention of network intrusion in this embodiment is mainly through: (1) The enhanced access control of the program process sets access attribute and authority through a white list management module to prevent an attacker from tampering or injecting codes. For example, when an attacker attempts to modify the memory data with a vulnerability, the read-only property in the memory will refuse the operation; (2) By forcibly accessing and isolating the problem process, after an attacker successfully modifies the application program by using the vulnerability, the attacker is prevented from further damaging the system even if the behavior of the process is controlled due to the limitations of authority and access; (3) When illegal access or unauthorized operation occurs, the system checks the operation or the subject of the access to judge whether the operation or the subject of the access is invaded; (4) And when the system is confirmed to be invaded, actively alarming and cutting off the connection of the vehicle body through the network.
Example three:
the embodiment provides a protection method based on the TCU system in the second embodiment, which includes the following steps: s1, a target program process calls a system interface to access system resources, and a control gateway checks whether the accessed resources are in the process range; s2, accessing the resources in the process range, performing access operation and returning a result; if the access resource is not in the process range, jumping to the step S3; s3, the control gateway informs the access monitoring module to check whether the process accesses hardware peripherals, kernel interfaces or permission change; if yes, jumping to the step S4; if not, refusing the access operation and returning to the access failure; s4, the access monitoring module checks whether the process is abnormal, namely, checks whether all access records of the process have illegal operation records; checking whether the code is tampered, and comparing the program process code stored in the storage area with the code in the current memory; checking whether the current process authority and account are valid and whether the current process authority and account are unauthorized; checking the memory, namely checking whether the current code, data and stack segment of the process are in the attribute range set by the segment; if yes, recording the exception and informing an exception processing module to perform exception processing; if not, returning and recording the access failure result.
The exception handling in step S4 specifically includes: the abnormity processing module sends preset alarm information to a system background and forbids the communication of the CAN transceiver, so that a destructive control instruction is prevented from being issued to a vehicle body through a vehicle body CAN bus, and the aim of protecting the safety of the vehicle is fulfilled.
The access control module arranges the access priorities of the device driver, the memory management, the file system, the process resource and the authority management, and the specific arrangement sequence can be arranged according to the importance of the access priorities, as shown in fig. 5, after the system receives an access request, the control gateway checks whether the accessed resource is in the process range, and if the accessed resource is in the process range, the access control module enters the queue according to the priority, performs access operation and returns a result; if the access resource is not in the process range, judging whether to access key resources or change the authority, wherein the key resources comprise hardware peripherals, kernel interfaces and the like, and if not, refusing the access operation and returning access failure; if yes, checking the access record, checking the process code change and checking the memory interval, and if the result is abnormal, recording the abnormal condition and informing the network module to alarm and cut off the communication of the CAN controller; if not, returning and recording the access failure result.
The embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail with reference to the drawings, but the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and various changes can be made within the knowledge of those skilled in the art without departing from the gist of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. The utility model provides a TCU module, includes 4G module, CPU core processing module and the CAN transceiver that connects gradually, its characterized in that: the CPU core processing module comprises an application component, a service component connected with the application component and an operating system connected with the service component, wherein the operating system comprises a system interface and a kernel driver connected with the system interface, the kernel driver comprises a control gateway, the control gateway is connected with an access monitoring module and an access request module, and the access monitoring module is connected with an exception processing module; the program is taken as a target process and logically wrapped by the control gateway, and the access of hardware resources needs to be verified by the access control gateway and then read and written;
the TCU module is used for executing the following protection methods:
s1, a target program process calls a system interface to access system resources, and a control gateway checks whether the accessed resources are in the range of the process;
s2, accessing the resources within the process range, performing access operation and returning a result;
if the access resource is not in the range of the process, jumping to the step S3;
s3, the control gateway informs the access monitoring module to check whether the process accesses hardware peripherals, kernel interfaces or permission change;
if yes, jumping to the step S4; if not, the access operation is refused and the access failure is returned;
s4, the access monitoring module checks whether the process is abnormal or not;
if yes, recording the exception and informing an exception processing module to process the exception; if not, returning and recording the access failure result;
the step S4 of accessing the monitoring module to check whether the process is abnormal specifically includes the following steps: checking whether all access records of the process have illegal operation records; checking whether the code is tampered; checking whether the current process authority and account are valid and whether the current process authority and account are unauthorized;
the control gateway checks whether the accessed resource is in the range of the process, including:
if the access resource is not in the range of the process, judging whether to access key resources or change the authority, wherein the key resources comprise hardware peripherals and kernel interfaces, and if not, refusing the access operation and returning access failure; if yes, checking the access record, checking the process code change and checking the memory interval, and if the result is abnormal, recording the abnormal condition and informing the network module to alarm and cut off the communication of the CAN controller; if not, returning and recording the access failure result.
2. The TCU module of claim 1, wherein: the control gateway comprises a white list management module and an access control module connected with the white list management module.
3. The TCU module of claim 2, wherein: the access request module comprises device driving, memory management, a file system, process resources and authority management.
4. The TCU module according to claim 1, wherein the exception handling in step S4 specifically comprises: and the abnormity processing module sends preset alarm information to a system background and prohibits the communication of the CAN transceiver.
5. The TCU module of claim 1, wherein the checking whether the code is tampered with is specifically: the program process code stored in the memory area is compared with the code currently in memory.
6. The TCU module of claim 1, wherein the step S4 of checking the process for exceptions by the access monitor module further comprises the following steps: and (4) memory checking, namely checking whether the current code, data and stack segment of the process are in the attribute range set by the segment.
7. The TCU module of claim 1, wherein: the access control module ranks access priorities of device drivers, memory management, file systems, process resources, and rights management.
8. A TCU system, comprising: comprising a TCU module according to claim 3 and a body CAN bus connected to the TCU module.
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| JP2020167607A (en) * | 2019-03-29 | 2020-10-08 | マツダ株式会社 | Automobile arithmetic system and reception data processing method |
| CN110266717A (en) * | 2019-07-03 | 2019-09-20 | 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 | Information detecting method and device |
| CN111314354B (en) * | 2020-02-19 | 2021-11-16 | 北京天融信网络安全技术有限公司 | Intelligent vehicle communication method and device, electronic equipment and readable storage medium |
| CN111464417A (en) * | 2020-04-09 | 2020-07-28 | 东风汽车集团有限公司 | Vehicle-mounted network architecture based on gigabit Ethernet bus and communication method |
| CN112258683B (en) * | 2020-10-20 | 2022-07-01 | 云账户技术(天津)有限公司 | Inspection method and device for business system |
| CN115223273B (en) * | 2021-04-21 | 2024-02-23 | 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 | TCU data monitoring method and device, terminal equipment and storage medium |
| CN115102706B (en) * | 2022-04-27 | 2023-10-20 | 麦格纳斯太尔汽车技术（上海）有限公司 | HOST-IDS safety detection system and method of vehicle ECU |
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| JP5138949B2 (en) * | 2007-02-07 | 2013-02-06 | 日立オートモティブシステムズ株式会社 | In-vehicle gateway device |
| CN101446830A (en) * | 2008-12-25 | 2009-06-03 | 奇瑞汽车股份有限公司 | Vehicle fault diagnosis instrument and fault diagnosis method |
| CN102416872A (en) * | 2011-10-14 | 2012-04-18 | 奇瑞汽车股份有限公司 | Method and device for acquiring vehicle speed signal for automobile combination instrument |
| US9173100B2 (en) * | 2011-11-16 | 2015-10-27 | Autoconnect Holdings Llc | On board vehicle network security |
| CN103112459B (en) * | 2011-11-17 | 2015-07-29 | 中国北车股份有限公司 | Locomotive control device, system and method |
| CN105867314A (en) * | 2015-01-20 | 2016-08-17 | 株式会社日立制作所 | Remote monitoring system and communication method thereof |
| CN105553946B (en) * | 2015-12-08 | 2018-08-14 | 严威 | Onboard system based on CAN bus fire wall and its control method |
| CN106357633A (en) * | 2016-09-07 | 2017-01-25 | 惠州市德赛西威汽车电子股份有限公司 | Method and device for protecting car TCU data |
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