CN108683510A - A kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission - Google Patents
A kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission Download PDFInfo
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- CN108683510A CN108683510A CN201810482379.2A CN201810482379A CN108683510A CN 108683510 A CN108683510 A CN 108683510A CN 201810482379 A CN201810482379 A CN 201810482379A CN 108683510 A CN108683510 A CN 108683510A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/26—Network addressing or numbering for mobility support
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of user identity update methods of encrypted transmission, belong to user identity update method field, solve the problems, such as to impact user's charging etc. after the prior art can not prevent the access zone network of malice from taking user identity, there are access zone network since user's permanent identity caused by safety problem itself is revealed.A kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission receives the user that user terminal is sent and hides identity SUCI；According to the SUCI received, calculates and cache shared master key；Decryption SUCI obtains user identity SUPI, and new user identity SUPI_n is obtained according to the SUPI；Authentication vector AV is generated using shared master key and SUPI_n；AUTN, RAND in the authentication vector is sent to user terminal, feedback information is calculated by user terminal；Judge whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information, if the authentication is passed, update user identity SUPI is SUPI_n.The user identity that realizes encrypted transmission is online, user is noninductive, high efficiency, the update method of the low system reform.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to user identity update method field more particularly to a kind of user identity update sides of encrypted transmission
Method.
Background technology
In 3G and 4G mobile communication system, when user is attached to cell, user needs to report permanently with clear-text way
Identity (IMSI) gives base station, and base station returns to ownership place Identity Management equipment (HLR/HSS).Ownership place is looked for by user identity
Long term keys (Ki) are sought, authentication process is started.Since user identity eating dishes without rice or wine to be transmitted with clear-text way, there are quilts
The possibility of eavesdropping.
In 5G, in order to solve the Privacy Protection of user identity, user's permanent identity (SUPI) of 5G by using
ECIES (elliptic curve confidentiality and integrity protected mode) arranging keys are simultaneously encrypted, and are eating dishes without rice or wine to hide identity with user
(SUCI) mode is transmitted, and user identity is avoided to eat dishes without rice or wine directly to be ravesdropping, and user hides identity and decrypted in user identity
Decryption in function (SIDF).In the roaming mode, after completing authentication, the user data management (UDM) of belonging area network/
Service Ticket storage and processing function (ARPF) will derive KSEAFAnd by user's permanent identity SUPI and KSEAFIt is sent to visit together
The safe anchor point function (SEAF) of ground network.Network security anchor point (SEAF) will use KSEAFContinue to derive with parameters such as SUPI
The keys such as KAMF provide the key of the confidentiality and integrity protection algorism of Non-Access Stratum (NAS) and access layer (AS).In UDM,
Interim shared key (Ephemeral shared key) is negotiated using the private key of network and the temporary public key of user, and according to
Identical process can calculate encryption key and tegrity protection key.Therefore, SIDF/UDM can calculate the true of user
Real permanent identity SUPI.
Using elliptic curve cryptography, the protection for user's permanent identity is realized, avoids eating dishes without rice or wine to intercept and capture user's body
Part.But user's charging etc. is impacted after can not preventing the access zone network of malice from taking user identity；There is also visits
The problem of ground network is revealed due to user's permanent identity caused by safety problem itself.Incredible network is being had accessed, or
In the case that system thinks that user identity has exposure, then user identity is needed replacing.It is a kind of protection identity to replace SIM card
Mode, but it is very inconvenient, and also cost is higher.
Invention content
In view of above-mentioned analysis, the present invention is intended to provide a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission, to solve
The prior art can not prevent the access zone network of malice from taking user identity after to user's charging etc. impacts, there are visited places
The problem of network is revealed due to user's permanent identity caused by safety problem itself.
The purpose of the present invention is mainly achieved through the following technical solutions：
A kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission,
It receives the user that user terminal is sent and hides identity SUCI；
According to the SUCI received, calculates and cache shared master key Kmaster；
Decryption SUCI obtains user identity SUPI, and new user identity SUPI_n is obtained according to the SUPI；
Use shared master key KmasterAuthentication vector AV is generated with SUPI_n；
AUTN, RAND in the authentication vector is sent to user terminal, feedback information is calculated by user terminal；
Judge whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information, if the authentication is passed, update user identity SUPI is SUPI_
n。
The present invention has the beneficial effect that：The user identity update method of encrypted transmission provided by the invention, can dispatch and
Distributing user identity generates the random number used in authentication vector using new user identity, and generates and replace what identity used
Authentication vector.The method of the invention can solve after the prior art can not prevent the access zone network of malice from taking user identity
User's charging etc. is impacted, there are access zone network since user's permanent identity leakage caused by safety problem itself is asked
The problem of topic.
On the basis of said program, the present invention has also done following improvement：
Further, further include that update XRES generates XRES*；The feedback information calculated by user terminal is RES*；
The RES* and XRES* for comparing user terminal transmission, if unanimously, the authentication is passed.
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：By comparing user terminal send RES* and XRES*, if one
It causes, the authentication is passed；It provides one kind and completing the newer method of user identity under interaction scenario successively.
Further, the feedback information calculated by user terminal is AUTS, if the SQN in AUTS is verified, and AUTS
In MAC-S it is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, then the authentication is passed.
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：Relevant information is directly carried using AUTS directly judges user's body
Whether part is updated successfully, and provides another completion newer method of user identity.
Further, the RAND acquisitions step includes：
Utilize shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate
Shared key Ksh,
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, obtains RAND.
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：A kind of method obtaining RAND is provided, convenient for this field
Technical staff's method according to the present invention obtains RAND.
Further, the RAND acquisitions step includes：
A random number rand is generated, K is utilizedmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities
SUPI generates shared key Ksh,
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, the bit stream of regular length is generated together with rand,
As RAND.
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：Another method for obtaining RAND is provided, this field is convenient for
Technical staff's method according to the present invention obtain RAND.
In another embodiment, a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission is disclosed,
It generates user and hides identity SUCI, and send SUCI to network-side；
Receive AUTN, RAND of network-side feedback；
XMAC is generated using preset key and RAND, if XMAC is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, network passes through user authentication；
Decryption obtains new user identity SUPI_n,
Feedback information is calculated according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side.
The present invention has the beneficial effect that：The user identity update method of encrypted transmission provided by the invention, can dispatch and
Distributing user identity generates the random number used in authentication vector using new user identity, and generates and replace what identity used
Authentication vector.The method of the invention can solve after the prior art can not prevent the access zone network of malice from taking user identity
User's charging etc. is impacted, there are access zone network since user's permanent identity leakage caused by safety problem itself is asked
The problem of topic.User terminal and network-side can be completed at the same time two-way authentication and the replacement of user identity, not increase additional information
Interaction.
Further, the decryption obtains new user identity SUPI_n and includes：
Use shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate
Shared key Ksh, utilize KshSUPI_n is calculated, completeness check is carried out to SUPI_n, if passing through, decryption obtains new use
Family identity SUPI_n；Update SUPI_p is SUPI, and update SUPI is SUPI_n.
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：The mistake of new user identity SUPI_n is obtained by providing decryption
Journey can decrypt in the case where possessing threshold value key and obtain new user identity SUPI_n, have good concealment, institute
The method of stating should be readily appreciated that and realize.
Further, the feedback information is RES*,
RES* obtains step：
Initial R ES* is generated using preset key and RAND；
New RES_n* is generated according to the protocol rule with network-side using SUPI_n and Initial R ES*, as final
RES*。
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：Using RES* as feedback information, provides one kind and once handing over
The newer method of user identity is completed in the case of mutually.
Further, the feedback information is AUTS, and AUTS obtaining steps include：
Pressure thinks that SQN is asynchronous,
AUTS is calculated and updates the MAC-S in AUTS,
Updated MAC-S is generated by SUPI_n and initial MAC-S according to the agreement of network-side.
Advantageous effect using above-mentioned further scheme is：Using AUTS as feedback information, provides another completion and use
The newer method of family identity.
In another embodiment, a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission is provided, network-side and user are utilized
The two-way interactive at end completes user identity more new task jointly.
The present invention has the beneficial effect that：The user identity update method of encrypted transmission provided by the invention, can dispatch and
Distributing user identity generates the random number used in authentication vector using new user identity, and generates and replace what identity used
Authentication vector.The method of the invention can solve after the prior art can not prevent the access zone network of malice from taking user identity
User's charging etc. is impacted, there are access zone network since user's permanent identity leakage caused by safety problem itself is asked
The problem of topic.
It in the present invention, can also be combined with each other between above-mentioned each technical solution, to realize more preferred assembled schemes.This
Other feature and advantage of invention will illustrate in the following description, also, certain advantages can become from specification it is aobvious and
It is clear to, or understand through the implementation of the invention.The purpose of the present invention and other advantages can by specification, claims with
And it realizes and obtains in specifically noted content in attached drawing.
Description of the drawings
Attached drawing is only used for showing the purpose of specific embodiment, and is not considered as limitation of the present invention, in entire attached drawing
In, identical reference mark indicates identical component.
Fig. 1 is user identity renewal process schematic diagram；
The user identity renewal process schematic diagram that Fig. 2 is feedback information when being RES*.
Specific implementation mode
Specifically describing the preferred embodiment of the present invention below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein attached drawing constitutes the application part, and
It is used to illustrate the principle of the present invention together with embodiments of the present invention, be not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.
Embodiment 1
One embodiment of the present of invention 1, discloses a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission, and this method is applied to
Network side, the network element being related to include SEAF (SEcurity Anchor Function, network security anchor point function), AUSF
(Authentication ServerFunction, authentication service function) and UDM (Unified Data Management, system
One data management platform)..As shown in Figure 1, including the following steps：
Step S1, it receives the user that user terminal is sent and hides identity SUCI (SUbscriber Concealed
Identity, user hide identity)；
The step includes：
According to 3GPP normal process, in attachment, receives the user that user terminal is sent and hide identity SUCI；
According to 3GPP normal process, SEAF initiates authentication request, starts verification process.By SUCI and network name
The AUSF for claiming information such as (SN-name) to be sent to belonging area network；
According to 3GPP normal process, the information such as SUPI, SN-name are sent to UDM by the AUSF of belonging area network.
Step S2, it according to the SUCI received, calculates and caches shared master key Kmaster；
Step S3, decryption SUCI obtains user identity SUPI, and new user identity SUPI_n is obtained according to the SUPI；
The step includes：
Use ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrate Encrypt Scheme, the elliptic curve of 3GPP standards
Confidentiality and integrity protected mode) process, SUCI is decrypted, new user identity SUPI_n is obtained.
Step S4, using shared master key KmasterAuthentication vector AV is generated with SUPI_n
(AuthenticationVector), AV include AUTN (AuthenticationToken, authentication token), RAND (random number),
XRES (Expected Response, expected response), CK (Cipher Key, encryption key), IK (Integrity Key, it is complete
Whole property protects key)；；
Parameter RAND in AV obtains step：
A random number rand is generated, K is utilizedmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities
SUPI generates shared key Ksh。
Those skilled in the art should be understood that, shared key KshExisting various ways may be used to generate,
Such as hash, details are not described herein again.
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, the bit stream of regular length is generated together with rand,
As RAND.
Those skilled in the art should be understood that confidentiality and integrity protection refers to using shared key KshIt is right
SUPI_n is encrypted, and encryption can be used existing multiple encryption algorithms and realize, such as SM encryption methods, and details are not described herein again.
Other parameters in AV, AUTN etc., the mode that can be used in existing field realize that acquisition pattern is not belonging to this
Where embodiment inventive point, and will not be described here in detail.
Step S5, AUTN, RAND in the authentication vector are sent to user terminal, feedback information is calculated by user terminal；
The step includes：
UDM updates XRES and generates XRES*, generates 5G HEAV (5G Home Environment AV, 5G ownership place certifications
Vector), and it is sent to AUSF together with SUPI_n.
According to 3GPP normal process, AUSF stores XRES*, and calculates HXRES* (Hash eXpected RESponse lead to
Cross the expected response Hash Value that XRES* is derived), generate 5GAV.
According to 3GPP normal process, AUSF sends 5GAV and SUPI_n to SEAF, and under roaming scence, this SEAF is roaming
The SEAF on ground.
According to 3GPP normal process, AUTN, RAND are sent to user terminal by SEAF.
Step S6-1, judge whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information, if the authentication is passed, update user identity
SUPI is SUPI_n.
Compared with prior art, the user identity update method of encrypted transmission provided in this embodiment can prevent malice
Access zone network take user identity after user's charging etc. is impacted；Also access zone network can be solved since itself pacifies
The problem of user's permanent identity caused by full problem is revealed.The risk of identity information leakage is reduced, while in authentication process, used
Family end and network-side can be completed at the same time two-way authentication and the replacement of user identity.
Preferably, preset key is the root key of the long term keys individually stored or user terminal storage, what network side used
Preset key is consistent with the preset key that user terminal uses.
Optionally, the RAND can also be obtained in the following manner：Utilize shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use
User identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate shared key Ksh,
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, obtains RAND.
The feedback information of user terminal can be by multiple choices mode, and corresponding concrete scheme is referring to embodiment 2,3.
The method for obtaining RAND, the specific implementation process is as follows：
【With reference to realization 1】KmasterFor 256bit, Ksh_ MSB is KshHigh 128bit, Ksh_ LSB is KshLow 128bit,
SUPI, SUPI_p and SUPI_n length are 64bit.
Ksh=KDF [Kmaster,SUPI_p,SUPI] (1)
RAND=Cph_SUPIn | | MAC_SUPIn (4)
Explanation：Formula (a-1) can use HMAC or hash function, with Kmaster, SUPI_p and SUPI be as input, meter
Calculate Ksh；Formula (a-2) uses Ksh_ LSB generates 64bit key streams and SUPI_n is encrypted, and obtains Cph_SUPIn；(a-3)
Using modes such as HMAC, with Ksh_ MSB is as key, with Cph_SUPIn | | SUPI (SUPI is serially connected in behind Cph_SUPIn) makees
For input, message authentication code is calculated, and intercept low 64bit as authenticating tag；(a-4) RAND is Cph_SUPIn | | MAC_
SUPIn, wherein | | indicate concatenation.
Note：If using the above method, UDM needs to store the used public key of user within the scope of certain time, detection
The randomness that client public key generates.If frequently using regular key, UDM will identify the user, and isolation is taken to arrange
It applies.If SUPI_p and SUPI and UDM that user's statement uses are not inconsistent, UDM also needs to record this anomalous event, and will regard feelings
Condition takes quarantine measures.
Generate a random number rand.Use Kmaster, the user identity SUPI_p of preceding first use, active user's body
Part SUPI, generates shared key Ksh, use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, length is generated together with rand
Degree is the bit stream of 128bit, as RAND, such as：
【With reference to realization 2】KmasterFor 256bit, Ksh_ MSB is KshHigh 128bit, Ksh_ LSB is KshLow 128bit,
SUPI, SUPI_p and SUPI_n length are considered 64bit.
Ksh=KDF [Kmaster,SUPI_p,SUPI] (5)
RAND=rand | | Cph_SUPIn | | MAC_SUPIn (8)
Explanation：(b-1) HMAC or hash function can be used, with Kmaster, SUPI_p and SUPI as input, calculate
Go out Ksh；(b-2) K is usedsh_ LSB generates 64bit key streams and SUPI_n is encrypted, and obtains Cph_SUPIn；(b-3) it uses
The modes such as HMAC are with Ksh_ MSB is key, with rand | | Cph_SUPIn | | SUPI is that input generates message authentication code, and interception is low
32bit, as authenticating tag；(b-4) RAND is rand | | Cph_SUPIn | | MAC_SUPIn.
Note：If using the above method, UDM needs to store the used public key of user within the scope of certain time, detection
The randomness that client public key generates.If frequently using regular key, UDM will identify the user, and take quarantine measures.
If SUPI_p and SUPI and UDM that user's statement uses are not inconsistent, UDM also needs to record this anomalous event, and will optionally adopt
Take quarantine measures.
Embodiment 2
In the present embodiment by user terminal calculate feedback information be RES*, as shown in Fig. 2, step 1- steps 5 and embodiment
1 is identical；
Step S6-2, the RES* and XRES* for comparing user terminal transmission, if unanimously, the authentication is passed.
The step includes：
SEAF receives the RES* that user terminal is sent, and SEAF calculates HRES* and is compared with HXRES*；
SEAF sends RES* to AUSF；
AUSF compares the RES* and XRES* of user terminal transmission, if unanimously, the authentication is passed, update user identity SUPI is
SUPI_n.If inconsistent, authentication does not pass through, and user identity is not updated successfully, requires to initiate authentication process again.
Embodiment 3
By the feedback information that user terminal calculates it is AUTS in the present embodiment, step S1- steps S5 is same as Example 1；
Step S6-3：UDM receives the AUTS that user terminal is sent, and the SQN in AUTS is verified in UDM, if being verified,
And the MAC-S in AUTS is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, then the authentication is passed.
Embodiment 4
Present embodiment discloses a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission, this method is applied to user side, is related to
To USIM.As shown in Figure 1, including the following steps：
Step 1) generates user and hides identity SUCI, and sends SUCI to network-side, for make network-side calculate authentication to
Measure AV；
The step includes：
In attachment, user itself generates a pair of of public private key pair, and it is close that shared master is negotiated together with the network public key to prestore
Key Kmaser；
According to ECIES workflow managements SUCI as defined in 3GPP；
USIM sends user according to network requirement, to network-side and hides identity SUCI；
Step 2), AUTN, the RAND for receiving network-side feedback；
Step 3) generates XMAC using preset key and RAND, if XMAC is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, network passes through use
Family certification；
The step includes：
According to 3GPP normal process, check SQN (SequenceNumber, sequence number), if synchronous, using preset key and
RAND generates XMAC, if XMAC is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, network passes through user authentication；
Step 4), decryption obtain new user identity SUPI_n,
Use shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate
Shared key Ksh, utilize KshSUPI_n is calculated, completeness check is carried out to SUPI_n, if passing through, decryption obtains new use
Family identity SUPI_n；Update SUPI_p is SUPI, and update SUPI is SUPI_n.
Step 5) calculates feedback information according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side.
When the feedback information difference sent to network-side, corresponding specific implementation mode is referring to specific embodiment 5,6.
Embodiment 5
The feedback information sent to network-side in the present embodiment is RES*, as shown in Fig. 2, step 1) is to step 4) and in fact
It is identical to apply example 5；
Step 5) calculates RES* according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side,
In the step,
RES* obtains step：
Initial R ES* is generated using preset key and RAND；
New RES_n* is generated according to the protocol rule with network-side using SUPI_n and Initial R ES*, as final
RES*。
Embodiment 6
The feedback information sent to network-side in the present embodiment is AUTS, and step 1) is same as Example 5 to step 4)；
Step 5) calculates AUTS according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side,
AUTS obtaining steps include：
It is asynchronous to enforce SQN,
AUTS is calculated and updates the MAC-S in AUTS,
Updated MAC-S is generated by SUPI_n and initial MAC-S according to the agreement of network-side.
Embodiment 7
This embodiment disclose a kind of user identity update methods of encrypted transmission, can be completed at the same time two-way authentication and use
Family identity update.Involved method is combined and is obtained by embodiment 1, embodiment 4 in the embodiment, as shown in Figure 1, specific mistake
Journey is as follows：
Step (1) generates the hiding identity SUCI of user, and sends SUCI to network-side；
The step includes：
In attachment, user itself generates a pair of of public private key pair, and it is close that shared master is negotiated together with the network public key to prestore
Key Kmaser；
According to ECIES workflow managements SUCI as defined in 3GPP；
USIM sends user according to network requirement, to network-side and hides identity SUPI；
Step (2) receives the hiding identity SUCI of user that user terminal is sent；
The step includes：
According to 3GPP normal process, in attachment, receives the user that user terminal is sent and hide identity SUCI；
According to 3GPP normal process, SEAF initiates authentication request, starts verification process.By SUCI and network name
(SN-name) etc. information are sent to the AUSF of belonging area network；
According to 3GPP normal process, the information such as SUPI, SN-name are sent to UDM by the AUSF of belonging area network.
The SUCI that step (3), basis receive, calculates and caches shared master key Kmaster；
Step (4), decryption SUCI obtain user identity SUPI, and new user identity SUPI_n is obtained according to the SUPI；
The step includes：
Using the ECIES processes of 3GPP standards, SUCI is decrypted, new user identity SUPI_n is obtained.
Step (5) uses shared master key KmasterAuthentication vector AV is generated with SUPI_n；
The RAND obtains step：
A random number rand is generated, K is utilizedmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities
SUPI generates shared key Ksh,
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, the bit stream of regular length is generated together with rand,
As RAND.
AUTN, RAND in the authentication vector is sent to user terminal by step (6), and feedback information is calculated by user terminal；
The step includes：
UDM updates XRES and generates XRES*, generates 5G HE AV, and be connected to SUPI_n and be sent to AUSF.
According to 3GPP normal process, AUSF stores XRES*, and calculates HXRES*, generates 5GAV.
According to 3GPP normal process, AUSF sends 5GAV and SUPI_n to SEAF, and under roaming scence, this SEAF is roaming
The SEAF on ground.
According to 3GPP normal process, AUTN, RAND are sent to user terminal by SEAF.
Step (7), AUTN, the RAND for receiving network-side feedback；
Step (8) generates XMAC using preset key and RAND, if XMAC is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, network passes through
User authentication；
The step includes：
It checks whether SQN synchronizes, if synchronous, XMAC is generated using preset key and RAND, if the MAC in XMAC and AUTN
Unanimously, network passes through user authentication；
The step includes：
According to 3GPP normal process, check SQN, if synchronous, XMAC generated using preset key and RAND, if XMAC with
MAC in AUTN is consistent, and network passes through user authentication；
Step (9), decryption obtain new user identity SUPI_n,
Use shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate
Shared key Ksh, utilize KshSUPI_n is calculated, completeness check is carried out to SUPI_n, if passing through, decryption obtains new use
Family identity SUPI_n；Update SUPI_p is SUPI, and update SUPI is SUPI_n.
Step (10) calculates feedback information according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side.
Step (11) judges whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information, if the authentication is passed, updates user identity
SUPI is SUPI_n.
Embodiment 8
This embodiment disclose a kind of user identity update methods of encrypted transmission, can be completed at the same time two-way authentication and use
Family identity update.Involved method is combined and is obtained by embodiment 2, embodiment 5 in the embodiment, as shown in Figure 1, specific mistake
Journey is as follows：
The present embodiment and the step (1) in embodiment 7 are identical to step (9),
Step (10) calculates feedback information RES* according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side.
The step includes：
Initial R ES* is generated using preset key and RAND；
New RES_n* is generated according to the protocol rule with network-side using SUPI_n and Initial R ES*, as final
RES*。
Step (11) judges whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information RES*, if the authentication is passed, updates user's body
Part SUPI is SUPI_n.
SEAF receives the RES* that user terminal is sent, and SEAF calculates HRES* and is compared with HXRES*；
SEAF sends RES* to AUSF；
AUSF compares the RES* and XRES* of user terminal transmission, if unanimously, the authentication is passed, update user identity SUPI is
SUPI_n。
Embodiment 9
This embodiment disclose a kind of user identity update methods of encrypted transmission, can be completed at the same time two-way authentication and use
Family identity update.Involved method is obtained by implementing the combination of 3, embodiment 6 in the embodiment, as shown in Figure 1, detailed process
It is as follows：
The present embodiment and the step (1) in embodiment 9 are identical to step (9),
Step (10) calculates feedback information AUTS according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side.
The step includes：
AUTS obtaining steps include：
It is asynchronous to enforce SQN,
AUTS is calculated and updates the MAC-S in AUTS,
Updated MAC-S is generated by SUPI_n and initial MAC-S according to the agreement of network-side.
Step (11) judges whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information AUTS, if the authentication is passed, updates user's body
Part SUPI is SUPI_n.
The step includes：
UDM receives the AUTS that user terminal is sent, and the SQN in AUTS is verified in UDM, if it is verified, and in AUTS
MAC-S is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, then the authentication is passed.
Than existing, the present invention realizes that online, user is noninductive, inexpensive, high efficiency, the use of the low system reform
Family identity is issued, is replaced, and protects subscriber identity information, convenient update user identity to provide after identity disclosure risk occurs for user
Powerful measure；When towards incredible access zone network, belonging area network can use temporary identity, avoid incredible
Access zone network reveals user real identification.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that realizing all or part of flow of above-described embodiment method, meter can be passed through
Calculation machine program is completed to instruct relevant hardware, and the program can be stored in computer readable storage medium.Wherein, institute
It is disk, CD, read-only memory or random access memory etc. to state computer readable storage medium.
The foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto,
Any one skilled in the art in the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, the change or replacement that can be readily occurred in,
It should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission, which is characterized in that
It receives the user that user terminal is sent and hides identity SUCI；
According to the SUCI received, calculates and cache shared master key Kmaster；
Decryption SUCI obtains user identity SUPI, and new user identity SUPI_n is obtained according to the SUPI；
Use shared master key KmasterAuthentication vector AV is generated with SUPI_n；
AUTN, RAND in the authentication vector is sent to user terminal, feedback information is calculated by user terminal；
Judge whether that the authentication is passed according to client feeds back information, if the authentication is passed, update user identity SUPI is SUPI_n.
2. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that, further including that update XRES generates XRES*；It is described by user terminal
The feedback information of calculating is RES*；
The RES* and XRES* for comparing user terminal transmission, if unanimously, the authentication is passed.
3. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that, it is described by user terminal calculate feedback information be AUTS, if
SQN in AUTS is verified, and the MAC-S in AUTS is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, then the authentication is passed.
4. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that, RAND acquisitions step includes：
Utilize shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate shared
Key Ksh,
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, obtains RAND.
5. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that, RAND acquisitions step includes：
A random number rand is generated, K is utilizedmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI,
Generate shared key Ksh,
Use KshConfidentiality and integrity protection is carried out to SUPI_n, the bit stream of regular length is generated together with rand, as
RAND。
6. a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission, which is characterized in that
It generates user and hides identity SUCI, and send SUCI to network-side, for making network-side generate authentication vector；
Receive AUTN, RAND of network-side feedback；
XMAC is generated using preset key and RAND, if XMAC is consistent with the MAC in AUTN, network passes through user authentication；
Decryption obtains new user identity SUPI_n,
Feedback information is calculated according to AUTN, RAND and is sent to network-side.
7. user identity delivery method according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the decryption obtains new user identity
SUPI_n includes：
Use shared master key Kmaster, preceding first use user identity SUPI_p, current user identities SUPI, generate shared
Key Ksh, utilize KshSUPI_n is calculated, completeness check is carried out to SUPI_n, if passing through, decryption obtains new user's body
Part SUPI_n；Update SUPI_p is SUPI, and update SUPI is SUPI_n.
8. user identity delivery method according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the feedback information is RES*,
RES* obtains step：
Initial R ES* is generated using preset key and RAND；
New RES_n* is generated according to the protocol rule with network-side using SUPI_n and Initial R ES*, as final RES*.
9. according to the method described in claim 6, it is characterized in that, the feedback information is AUTS, AUTS obtaining steps include：
Pressure thinks that SQN is asynchronous,
AUTS is calculated and updates the MAC-S in AUTS,
Updated MAC-S is generated by SUPI_n and initial MAC-S according to the agreement of network-side.
10. a kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission, which is characterized in that including method described in claim 1 and power
Profit requires the method described in 6.
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