CN101990201A - Method, system and device for generating general bootstrapping architecture (GBA) secret key - Google Patents
Method, system and device for generating general bootstrapping architecture (GBA) secret key Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method, system and device for generating a general bootstrapping architecture (GBA) secret key. The method comprises the following steps: a bootstrapping function (BSF) acquires authentication information of a corresponding user from a home location register (HLR) and transmits random numbers in the authentication information to a user terminal, and the secret key in the authentication information is generated by the HLR according to the corresponding secret key stored by the HLR and the secret key shared by the user and a network side; the user terminal generates authentication and key agreement (AKA) authentication information according to the random numbers and the secret key shared by the user and the network side, a root secret key of the GBA secret key is generated according to the AKA authentication information and the secret key shared by the user and the network side, an authentication code is generated, and the generated authentication code is transmitted to a bootstrapping function (BSF) device; the BSF device authenticates the user terminal according to the received authentication code and then after the authentication is passes, the BSF device generates the root secret key of the GBA secret key according to the acquired authentication information; and the BSF device and the user terminal respectively generate the GBA secret keys according to the individually generated root secret keys. By using the method and the system of the invention, the safety of the GBA secret key can be improved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wireless communication field, relate in particular to the method and system and the equipment that generate the GBA key.
Background technology
Along with carrying out of data service, operator and user need reliable authentication mechanism and guarantee legal business use and correct charging.In 2G (second generation mobile communications network) business, a lot of application all need be carried out two-way authentication between terminal (for example UE) and application server, in order to verify the use of validated user to business, all need to login authentication between terminal and the operation system; If business data flow need carry out scrambling or encryption, then need to carry out secure communication between terminal and the operation system.And if numerous business uses separately and oneself independently authenticate, will cause time and again more exchange device.
For a series of problems such as the key that solves application layer is shared, service authentications, 3GPP (3G (Third Generation) Moblie standardization body) defined a kind of common authentication mechanism (General BootstrappingArchitecture, GBA).GBA provides a kind of general mechanism of sharing key of setting up between UE and server, it is realized based on the AKA authentication mechanism.The AKA authentication mechanism is a kind of mutual authentication that uses in the 2G/3G network and the mechanism of key agreement, and GBA has made full use of the advantage of AKA authentication mechanism and finished the service security bootup process.
Referring to Fig. 1, be the simple network model of GBA in the existing 2G network.As shown in the figure, BSF (Bootstrapping service function) is the network element that GBA mechanism is introduced, and can obtain the relevant user data of GBA by the Zh interface from HLR (Home Location Register attaching position register); Utilize the AKA agreement to authenticate mutually by Ub interface and UE, and set up and share key, this key will be applied between UE and the NAF (Network Application Function, network application function); Key should be shared and relevant user data passes to NAF by the Zn interface, so that carry out safe information interaction based on this shared key between UE and the NAF.Wherein, BSF obtains the HLR title of storage relevant user data by inquiry SLF (Subscription LocaterFunction, order relations positioning function).Single HLR environment and in do not need SLF.In addition, when BSF is configured to use preassigned HLR, does not require yet and use SLF.
The related procedure of GBA is divided into GBA initial phase (this stage will generate GBA keying material Ks) and usually based on Operational Visit stage of GBA (promptly use Ks to generate the GBA key and carry out service communication with this).
Based on network model shown in Figure 1, the flow process of the GBA initial phase that blocks based on SIM (Subscriber Identity Module, user identification module) in the 2G network can comprise as shown in Figure 2:
The ME of step 201, UE (Mobile Equipment, mobile device) sends the GBAbootstrapping request to BSF, carry the sign of IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, international mobile subscriber identification code) in the request as ME.
Step 202～203, BSF are to HLR request tlv triple Ciphering Key AV, HLR return with this IMSI corresponding ternary group Ciphering Key AV=(RAND, SRES, Kc).What BSF can identify that this user uses from the type of Ciphering Key is SIM card.
Step 204, BSF preserve SRES and Kc among the AV, select Ks_input at random, with 401 message random number RA ND and Ks_input are sent to ME.
Step 205, ME authenticate network as challenge with RAND, Ks_input, after authentication is passed through, with RAND, Ks_input as the GBA module in the parameter call SIM card.
AKA authentication module in the GBA module invokes SIM card of step 206, SIM card calculates Kc and SRES, promptly Kc ‖ SRES=AKA (Ki, RAND); Thereby can calculate GBA root key Ks=KDF (key, Ks-input, " 3gpp-gba-res ", SRES), and Ks is kept in the SIM card, key=Kc ‖ Kc ‖ RAND wherein, wherein KDF is a Key generation functions; Calculate authentication code RES=KDF (key, " 3gpp-gba-res ", SRES), RES is returned to ME.
Step 207, ME are transmitted to BSF as authentication code with RES.
Step 208, BSF calculate authentication code RES=KDF (key, " 3gpp-gba-res by the value among the AV ", SRES), the RES that returns with ME compares, and pass through as if identical then authentication, otherwise the GBA process stops; BSF by calculating K s=KDF (key, Ks-input, " 3gpp-gba-res ", SRES) produce GBA root key Ks, produce the interim indications of B-TID at random as ME, return to ME.
Step 209, BSF according to the indications (being NAF_id) of the business platform NAF of ME needs visit generate business cipher key Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks; " gba-me "; RAND; IMSI; NAF_id); the service protection key as ME communicates by letter with NAF sends to NAF with Ks_NAF by the core net escape way.
In the Operational Visit stage, ME is with before NAF communicates by letter, and ME need call the GBA module instruction of SIM card, SIM card generates business cipher key Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me according to the NAF_id needs ", RAND, IMSI, NAF_id), the service protection key of communicating by letter with NAF as SIM card; In the communication process of ME and NAF, NAF sends to ME with the Ks_NAF encrypting messages, and ME needs this encrypting messages is transmitted to SIM card, is deciphered with Ks_NAF by SIM card; The message of ME also needs to be transmitted to SIM card encrypt with Ks_NAF after, send to the NAF deciphering again, realize the safe transmission between ME and the NAF.
If ME is a believable terminal, because Ks and Ks_NAF be in SIM card, so all encryption and decryption computings all need to depend on SIM card and carry out, and should be safe based on GBA scheme of SIM card so.If ME is an illegal terminal, or the terminal of assailant's customization, by revising the handling process of ME, can there be following safety problem so:
At the GBA initial phase, after ME receives RAND, never call the GBA module of SIM card, but with RAND as the AKA authentication module in the parameter call SIM card.SIM card receives after AKA calls, and thinks the access authentication request, and the AKA authentication module of then calling in the SIM card calculates Kc and SRES, and promptly (Ki RAND), returns to ME with Kc, SRES to Kc ‖ SRES=AKA.ME utilizes the operation of SIM card in Kc, the SRES imitation normal flow return, calculate GBA root key Ks=KDF (key, Ks-input; " 3gpp-gba-res ", SRES), and Ks is kept among the ME; key=Kc ‖ Kc ‖ RAND wherein, KDF is a Key generation functions; Calculate authentication code RES=KDF (key, " 3gpp-gba-res ", SRES), RES is returned to BSF as authentication code;
In the Operational Visit stage; ME can utilize Ks calculate business cipher key Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks; " gba-me ", RAND, IMSI; NAF_id); the service protection key of communicating by letter with NAF as ME, and the GBA module of no longer calling SIM card generates Ks_NAF, like this; ME can utilize the Ks_NAF of its generation to carry out the encryption and decryption operation, and breaks away from SIM card fully.
Therefore, the SIM card that the assailant only need buy an opening and closing method is placed among this illegal ME, and this business of legal order, thereby can obtain Ks and Ks_NAF by above-mentioned flow process, and Ks and Ks_NAF are customized in the client software of copying, download use by other people.As can be seen, the fail safe of GBA key can not get due assurance, and then causes the safety in utilization of user data service poor.
Summary of the invention
The embodiment of the invention provides the method that generates the GBA key, to solve the problem of GBA key safety difference in the existing GBA key realization mechanism.
The method of the generation GBA key that one embodiment of the invention provide comprises:
After authentication service function BSF equipment receives the request of the startup GBA key flow process that user terminal sends, obtain the authentication information of relative users, and random number is wherein sent to described user terminal from the user profile memory device; Key in the described authentication information is described user profile memory device according to the corresponding secret key of its storage and this user and the generation of network side cipher key shared;
BSF equipment receives the authentication code that described user terminal sends, according to the authentication code that receives described user terminal is authenticated and when the authentication pass through after, generate the root key of GBA key according to its authentication information that gets access to, and generate according to the root key of the GBA key that generates and to be used for the GBA key between described user terminal and network application function NAF, shared.
The method of the generation GBA key that another embodiment of the present invention provides comprises:
After user terminal sends the request that starts GBA key flow process, the user's corresponding that the reception network side returns random number with described user terminal;
Described user terminal is according to described random number and this user and network side cipher key shared generation AKA authentication information, according to the root key of AKA authentication information and this user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key; And, generate according to the root key of the GBA key that generates and to be used for the GBA key between described user terminal and network application function NAF, shared.
In the above embodiment of the present invention, at network side, it is incomplete same that the user profile memory device returns to the user authentication information and the prior art of BSF equipment, key wherein is that the corresponding secret key of being stored according to the user profile memory device and user and network side cipher key shared generate, promptly, the user profile memory device is after getting access to user's authentication information, with key and the new key of user key generation wherein, replace the corresponding secret key in the authentication information of the prior art to send to BSF equipment newly-generated key, thereby make this key of BSF equipment utilization replace corresponding secret key of the prior art to generate the root key of GBA key, and and then generate the GBA key; In subscriber terminal side, utilize the root key of AKA authentication information and user key generation GBA key, and and then generation GBA key.Owing to when the root key of end side and network side generation GBA key, all introduced user key, thereby improved the fail safe of GBA key.Suppose that assailant's (or disabled user's terminal) attempt is by calling the root key that the simulation of AKA authentication module generates the GBA key, and then when generating the GBA key, because the embodiment of the invention has been introduced user key in the root key generative process of GBA key, therefore, the GBA root key that assailant's (or disabled user's terminal) generates according to existing mode is different with the root key of the legal means generation that the embodiment of the invention is provided, thereby guarantee the fail safe of GBA key, and then guaranteed that the user uses the fail safe of data service.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of system of the GBA of generation key, and the assurance of equipment aspect is provided for the method for above-mentioned generation GBA key at network side.
The system of the realization GBA key that the embodiment of the invention provides comprises:
The user profile memory device is used for sending to BSF equipment user's authentication information, and the key in the described authentication information is described user profile memory device according to the corresponding secret key of its storage and this user and the generation of network side cipher key shared;
BSF equipment is used to receive authentication information, generates the root key of the GBA key of relative users terminal according to this authentication information; And, be used for GBA key shared between relative users terminal and network application function NAF according to the root key generation that generates.
The above embodiment of the present invention, by corresponding secret key and this user and the network side cipher key shared generation new key of user profile memory device according to its storage, and replace corresponding secret key of the prior art with newly-generated key, send to BSF equipment as authentication information, thereby make BSF equipment can generate the root key of GBA key, and generate the GBA key according to this root key according to this authentication information.Owing to introduced user key in this authentication information, thereby improved the fail safe of GBA key.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of user identification module card, and the assurance of equipment aspect is provided for the method for above-mentioned realization GBA key in end side.
The user identification module card that the embodiment of the invention provides comprises:
The AKA authentication module is used for according to the random number that receives and relative users and network side cipher key shared generation AKA authentication information;
The GBA module is used for the root key according to AKA authentication information and this user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key, and, be used for GBA key shared between described user terminal and network application function NAF according to the root key generation that generates.
In the above embodiment of the present invention, the GBA module is when generating the root key of GBA key, root key according to AKA authentication information and user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key, owing in the root key process that generates the GBA key, introduced user key, thereby improved the fail safe of GBA key.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the simple network model schematic diagram of GBA in the prior art;
Fig. 2 is the realization flow schematic diagram of GBA in the prior art;
Fig. 3 is the schematic diagram of the realization flow of GBA in the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 4 is the structural representation of the user terminal in the embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
By to the analysis of existing GBA flow process as can be seen, the main cause of its safety problem is that ME can call access authentication process by calling the AKA authentication module, thereby the simulation SIM card generates the root key Ks of GBA key, and then generates the GBA key.In order to address this problem, the embodiment of the invention has been revised flow process and the algorithm that SIM card, BSF generate Ks respectively, and corresponding modify HLR return to the tlv triple Ciphering Key AV of BSF, thereby the fail safe that has improved the root key Ks of GBA key, and then the fail safe that has improved the GBA key.
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing the embodiment of the invention is described in detail.
Referring to Fig. 3, the schematic flow sheet of GBA initial phase in the 2G network that provides for the embodiment of the invention.UE side and the prior related algorithm of arranging to have consistent GBA key of network side (BSF).At the GBA initial phase, when ME need adopt the GBA secure communication mechanism, detect whether the GBA key is arranged, if do not have, then carry out following steps:
The ME of step 301, UE sends GBAbootstrapping request (the GBA key starts request) to BSF, wherein carries the sign of IMSI as ME.
Step 302, BSF be to HLR request tlv triple Ciphering Key AV, and can further to identify this message in request message be GBA request message (as carrying the sign of GBA request message in the message).
Step 303, HLR receive the AV request message, further judge it is behind the GBA request message (as identifying GBA request message sign) from BSF, according to the user ID of carrying in the request message (as IMSI) obtain this user tlv triple Ciphering Key AV=(RAND, SRES, Kc) and user key Ki, and calculating K c '=KDF (Kc, Ki), wherein KDF is the key generating function, and HLR is with tlv triple AV '=(RAND, SRES, Kc ') returns to BSF.
Step 304, BSF are preserved SRES and the Kc ' among the AV ', select Ks_input at random, send RAND, Ks_input with the form of 401 message to ME.
After step 305, ME receive RAND, as challenge network is authenticated with RAND, Ks_input, after authentication is passed through, with RAND, Ks_input as the GBA module in the parameter call SIM card (or other subscriber cards, as the subscriber identification module usim card).
After the GBA module of step 306, SIM card received RAND, Ks_input, the AKA authentication module of calling in the SIM card calculated Kc and SRES, i.e. Kc ‖ SRES=AKA (Ki, RAND), (Kc Ki), utilizes Kc ' to calculate GBA root key Ks=KDF (key then to utilize Kc to calculate Kc '=KDF again, Ks-input, " 3gpp-gba-res " SRES), and is kept at Ks in the SIM card, key=Kc ' ‖ Kc ' ‖ RAND wherein, KDF is a Key generation functions; The GBA module also utilizes Kc ' to calculate authentication code RES=KDF, and (key, " 3gpp-gba-res " SRES), and return to ME with the RES that calculates.
Step 307, ME receive the RES that SIM card is returned, and RES is transmitted to BSF as authentication code.
After step 308, BSF receive RES, calculate authentication code RES=KDF (key by the value among the ternary Ciphering Key AV ', " 3gpp-gba-res ", SRES), key=Kc ' ‖ Kc ' ‖ RAND wherein, KDF is a Key generation functions, the RES that returns with ME is relatively, if identical then authentication is passed through, otherwise the GBA process stops; (" 3gpp-gba-res " SRES) produces GBA root key Ks to BSF, and produces the interim indications of B-TID as ME at random, returns to ME for key, Ks-input by calculating K s=KDF.
Step 309, follow-up BSF generate business cipher key Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND according to the indications (being NAF_id) of the NAF of ME needs visit; IMSI; NAF_id), the service protection key as ME communicates by letter with NAF sends to NAF with Ks_NAF by the core net escape way.
In the Operational Visit stage, ME need call the GBA module instruction of SIM card with before NAF communicates by letter, the GBA module generates business cipher key Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND according to the NAF_id needs, IMSI, NAF_id), the service protection key of communicating by letter with NAF as SIM card; In the communication process of ME and NAF, NAF sends to ME with the Ks_NAF encrypting messages, and ME needs this encrypting messages is transmitted to SIM card, is deciphered with Ks_NAF by SIM card; The message of ME also needs to be transmitted to SIM card encrypt with Ks_NAF after, send to the NAF deciphering again, realize the safe transmission between ME and the NAF.
By above flow process as can be seen, compare with existing GBA initialization flow process, in the embodiment of the invention, at network side, HLR returns to the tlv triple Ciphering Key AV difference of BSF, AV=(RAND of the prior art, SRES, Kc), the AV ' in the embodiment of the invention=(RAND, SRES, Kc '), wherein Kc '=KDF (Kc, Ki), promptly, HLR is after getting access to user's tlv triple Ciphering Key, and Kc and user key Ki generation Kc ' with wherein replace the Kc in the original tlv triple Ciphering Key to send to BSF Kc ', thereby make BSF utilize Kc ' to replace Kc of the prior art to generate Ks, and and then generate GBA key K s_NAF; In the UE side, the mechanism that the AKA authentication module generates authentication parameter Kc and SRES does not change, but the GBA module has increased following function: the Kc and the user key Ki that utilize the AKA authentication module to generate generate Kc ', and GBA module later use Kc ' replaces Kc of the prior art to generate Ks, and and then generation GBA key K s_NAF.
Suppose that assailant (or illegal ME) generates authentication parameter Kc with aforementioned the same manner by calling the AKA authentication module, utilize Kc to generate Ks, utilize Ks to generate the GBA key, and when attempting to use this cipher key access NAF, because the embodiment of the invention has been carried out new definition to the input parameter Kc of Ks generating function, be that Kc is generated by Kc of the prior art and user key Ki, and assailant (or illegal ME) can't be known the user key Ki in the SIM card, therefore its GBA key that calculates is different with the GBA key that legal means calculates, thereby guarantee the fail safe of GBA key, and then guaranteed that the user uses the fail safe of data service.
In addition, in the embodiment of the invention, BSF carries out in the verification process UE, and the authentication code RES that receives from UE obtains like this: the SIM card of UE utilizes Kc ' to generate key, and the parameters such as SRES of utilizing key and AKA authentication module to generate again generate RES; Accordingly, BSF also utilizes Kc ' mode according to a preconcerted arrangement to generate authentication code, thereby UE is authenticated.Same hypothesis assailant (or illegal ME) generates authentication parameter SRES by calling the AKA authentication module, utilize SRES and Kc to generate authentication code again, the authentication code that legal means in the authentication code that this mode generates and the embodiment of the invention generates is different, therefore, BSF can be by in time finding assailant (or illegal ME) to the UE verification process, and finish the GBA flow process thereafter, thereby eliminate safe hidden trouble.
Certainly, UE and BSF also can adopt existing mode to generate authentication code RES, in this case, even assailant (or illegal ME) can authenticate by BSF, but different because of the GBA key of its generation with the GBA key that legal means generates, then still can't use its illegal GBA cipher key access NAF that generates.
Need to prove, involved algorithmic function in the above embodiment of the invention, as, generate the algorithmic function of Ks and RES etc., all adopted algorithmic function same as the prior art, only be the part input parameter unlike the prior art, doing like this can few as far as possible improving prior art, but should be appreciated that, also can use other functions to generate Ks and RES etc., appoint algorithm in advance as long as guarantee network side and end side, and introduce user key Ki at least in the input parameter of algorithm.In addition, the algorithmic function of Kc ' also can be substituted by other functions, but will guarantee to comprise in the input parameter with Kc and user key Ki.
Need to prove that also the above embodiment of the invention is that example is described with the GBA flow process in the 2G network, this mechanism is equally applicable to 3G network.In 3G network, the relevant parameter that relates in network entity relevant with the GBA flow process and the GBA flow process can be with reference to the GBA flow process of the 3G network of 3GPP agreement regulation.
Based on identical technical conceive, the embodiment of the invention also provides the structure of a kind of user terminal and user identification module card thereof.
Referring to Fig. 4, the user terminal that provides for the embodiment of the invention and the structural representation of user identification module card thereof.As shown in the figure, user terminal comprises user identification module card 41 and ME 42, user identification module card 41 can be that SIM card also can be Subscriber Identity Modules such as usim card, store user and network side cipher key shared in the user identification module card 41, user identification module card 41 comprises: AKA authentication module 411 and GBA module 412, also comprise the interface module 413 that communicates with ME 42, wherein:
Wherein, the mode of AKA authentication module 411 generation authentication informations and GBA module 412 generation GBA root keys and GBA key can not repeat them here as previously mentioned.
Obviously, those skilled in the art can carry out various changes and modification to the present invention and not break away from the spirit and scope of the present invention.Like this, if of the present invention these are revised and modification belongs within the scope of claim of the present invention and equivalent technologies thereof, then the present invention also is intended to comprise these changes and modification interior.
Claims (19)
1. a method that generates common authentication mechanism GBA key is characterized in that, comprising:
After authentication service function BSF equipment receives the request of the startup GBA key flow process that user terminal sends, obtain the authentication information of relative users, and random number is wherein sent to described user terminal from the user profile memory device; Key in the described authentication information is described user profile memory device according to the corresponding secret key of its storage and this user and the generation of network side cipher key shared;
BSF equipment receives the authentication code that described user terminal sends, according to the authentication code that receives described user terminal is authenticated and when the authentication pass through after, generate the root key of GBA key according to its authentication information that gets access to, and generate according to the root key of the GBA key that generates and to be used for the GBA key between described user terminal and network application function NAF, shared.
2. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, BSF equipment is specially according to the root key of the authentication information generation GBA key that gets access to:
Generate the root key of GBA key according to the mode of the key in the authentication information that gets access to and authentication code, employing and user terminal agreement.
3. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, BSF equipment authenticates described user terminal according to the authentication code that receives, and is specially:
The authentication information that BSF equipment basis gets access to generates authentication code, compares with the authentication code that receives by the authentication code that will generate described user terminal is authenticated, and when authentication is not passed through, finishes to generate the flow process of GBA key.
4. method as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that, BSF equipment generates authentication code according to the authentication information that gets access to, and is specially:
Mode according to the key in the authentication information that gets access to and authentication code, employing and user terminal agreement generates authentication code.
5. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, BSF equipment obtains the authentication information of relative users from the user profile memory device, comprising:
BSF sends the request message of the authentication information that obtains relative users to described user profile memory device, wherein carries GBA request message sign and user ID;
After described user profile memory device identifies GBA request message sign, obtain authentication information and this user and the network side cipher key shared of the relative users of its storage according to the user ID of carrying in the request message, according to the key in the authentication information that gets access to and this user and the new key of network side cipher key shared generation, newly-generated key is carried on authentication information sends to BSF equipment.
6. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, after described user terminal receives random number, comprises step:
User and network side cipher key shared according to described random number and described user terminal correspondence generate the AKA authentication information, according to the root key of AKA authentication information and this user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key; And, generate according to the root key of the GBA key that generates and to be used for the GBA key between described user terminal and network application function NAF, shared.
7. as each described method of claim 1-6, it is characterized in that the method for described generation GBA key is applied to the 2G communication system, described user profile memory device is attaching position register HLR.
8. a method that generates the GBA key is characterized in that, comprising:
After user terminal sends the request that starts GBA key flow process, the user's corresponding that the reception network side returns random number with described user terminal;
Described user terminal is according to described random number and this user and network side cipher key shared generation AKA authentication information, according to the root key of AKA authentication information and this user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key; And, generate according to the root key of the GBA key that generates and to be used for the GBA key between described user terminal and NAF, shared.
9. method as claimed in claim 8 is characterized in that, described user terminal is specially according to the root key of AKA authentication information and described user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key:
The user identification module card of described user terminal generates new key according to the described user and the network side cipher key shared of the key in the AKA authentication information and its storage;
Generate the root key of GBA key according to the mode of the authentication code in newly-generated key and the AKA authentication information, employing and BSF equipment agreement.
10. method as claimed in claim 8 is characterized in that, described user terminal also comprises after generating the AKA authentication information:
The user identification module card of described user terminal is according to the described user and network side cipher key shared generation authentication code of described AKA authentication information and its storage, and described authentication code is sent to BSF equipment carries out authentication to described user terminal.
11. method as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that, the user identification module card of described user terminal generates authentication code according to the described user and the network side cipher key shared of described AKA authentication information and its storage, is specially:
According to the key in the AKA authentication information and described user and the new key of network side cipher key shared generation;
Mode according to the authentication code in newly-generated key and the AKA authentication information, employing and BSF equipment agreement generates authentication code.
12. a system that generates the GBA key is characterized in that, comprising:
The user profile memory device is used for sending to BSF equipment user's authentication information, and the key in the described authentication information is described user profile memory device according to the corresponding secret key of its storage and this user and the generation of network side cipher key shared;
BSF equipment is used to receive authentication information, generates the root key of the GBA key of relative users terminal according to this authentication information; And, be used for GBA key shared between relative users terminal and network application function NAF according to the root key generation that generates.
13. system as claimed in claim 12 is characterized in that, described BSF equipment also is used for, and sends the request message of the authentication information that obtains relative users to described user profile memory device, wherein carries GBA request message sign and user ID;
Described user profile memory device sends the process of user's authentication information to BSF equipment, comprise: after described user profile memory device identifies GBA request message sign, obtain authentication information and this user and the network side cipher key shared of the relative users of its storage according to the user ID of carrying in the request message, according to the key in the authentication information that gets access to and this user and the new key of network side cipher key shared generation, newly-generated key is carried on authentication information sends to BSF equipment.
14. system as claimed in claim 12 is characterized in that, BSF equipment is specially according to the root key of the authentication information generation GBA key that receives:
Generate the root key of GBA key according to the mode of the key in the authentication information that gets access to and authentication code, employing and user terminal agreement.
15. system as claimed in claim 12 is characterized in that, BSF equipment also comprised before the root key that generates the GBA key:
Receive the authentication code that user terminal sends;
Authentication information according to this user terminal that receives from described user profile memory device generates authentication code, compare with the authentication code that receives by the authentication code that will generate this user terminal is authenticated, if authentication is passed through, then generate the root key of the GBA key of this user terminal; Otherwise end realizes the flow process of GBA key.
16. a user identification module card is characterized in that, comprising:
The AKA authentication module is used for according to the random number that receives and relative users and network side cipher key shared generation AKA authentication information;
The GBA module is used for the root key according to AKA authentication information and this user and network side cipher key shared generation GBA key, and, be used for GBA key shared between described user terminal and network application function NAF according to the root key generation that generates.
17. user identification module card as claimed in claim 16, it is characterized in that, described GBA module generates the root key of GBA key, be specially: this user and network side cipher key shared according to key in the AKA authentication information and the storage of described user identification module generate new key, generate the root key of GBA key according to the mode of the authentication code in newly-generated key and the AKA authentication information, employing and BSF equipment agreement.
18. user identification module card as claimed in claim 16 is characterized in that, described GBA module also is used for, according to described user and the network side cipher key shared generation authentication code and the transmission of described AKA authentication information and its storage.
19. user identification module card as claimed in claim 18, it is characterized in that, described GBA module generates authentication code, be specially: this user and network side cipher key shared according to key in the AKA authentication information and the storage of described user identification module generate new key, and the mode of arranging according to the authentication code in newly-generated key and the AKA authentication information, employing and BSF equipment generates authentication code.
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| CN200910090198.6A CN101990201B (en) | 2009-07-31 | 2009-07-31 | Method, system and device for generating general bootstrapping architecture (GBA) secret key |
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| CN112311543A (en) * | 2020-11-17 | 2021-02-02 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | GBA key generation method, terminal and NAF network element |
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| CN114449515A (en) * | 2020-10-20 | 2022-05-06 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Verification method, system, application platform and terminal |
| CN114531254A (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2022-05-24 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Authentication information acquisition method and device, related equipment and storage medium |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN103188229A (en) * | 2011-12-30 | 2013-07-03 | 上海贝尔股份有限公司 | Method and equipment for secure content access |
| CN103313244A (en) * | 2012-03-14 | 2013-09-18 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | Authentication method and device based on generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) |
| CN103313244B (en) * | 2012-03-14 | 2016-12-14 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | A kind of authentication method based on GBA and device |
| CN105306406A (en) * | 2014-05-26 | 2016-02-03 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | Negotiation method of authentication and key negotiation algorithm, network side equipment and user equipment |
| CN107027117A (en) * | 2016-02-02 | 2017-08-08 | 普天信息技术有限公司 | A kind of method of dynamic generation root key |
| CN113365243A (en) * | 2020-03-05 | 2021-09-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | Communication method, device, equipment and system |
| CN113365243B (en) * | 2020-03-05 | 2023-10-20 | 华为技术有限公司 | Communication method, device, equipment and system |
| CN114449515A (en) * | 2020-10-20 | 2022-05-06 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Verification method, system, application platform and terminal |
| CN114531254A (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2022-05-24 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Authentication information acquisition method and device, related equipment and storage medium |
| CN114531254B (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2023-03-31 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Authentication information acquisition method and device, related equipment and storage medium |
| CN112311543A (en) * | 2020-11-17 | 2021-02-02 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | GBA key generation method, terminal and NAF network element |
| CN112311543B (en) * | 2020-11-17 | 2023-04-18 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | GBA key generation method, terminal and NAF network element |
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