CN103152731A - 3G accessed IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) privacy protection method - Google Patents
3G accessed IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) privacy protection method Download PDFInfo
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- CN103152731A CN103152731A CN2013100630444A CN201310063044A CN103152731A CN 103152731 A CN103152731 A CN 103152731A CN 2013100630444 A CN2013100630444 A CN 2013100630444A CN 201310063044 A CN201310063044 A CN 201310063044A CN 103152731 A CN103152731 A CN 103152731A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a 3G accessed IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) privacy protection method. The method comprises the following steps that a VLR (visitor location register) sends a subscriber identity request, an MS (mobile subscriber) replies the subscriber identity response; the VLR/SGSN (serving GPRS supported node) sends an authentication data request to an HLR (home location register), and the HLR replies the authentication data response; and when the MS is authorized, the VLR/SGSN sends a subscriber authorization request to the MS, and the MS replies the subscriber authorization response. Through the method, the confidentiality of the IMSI is protected by means of key identifiers and key groups; and after the user transmitted IMSI information is encrypted, the information is transmitted by means of cipher texts, so that the IMSI is avoided from being leaked. At the same time, when the HLR generates an authentication vector for the user, an encryption key which is updated in real time is distributed, so that the representation forms are different after the user encrypts the IMSI information for each time, and the user can be avoided from being tracked.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the 3G network technical field of communication safety and comprising, particularly relate to a kind of IMSI method for secret protection of 3G access.
Background technology
In 3G network, mobile subscriber's (Mobile Subscriber, MS) identity is well-determined in the world by international mobile subscriber identity (International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number, IMSI).The authentication stage of MS access 3G network is to utilize authentication and key agreement protocol (AKA) to complete, by mutually authenticating and the negotiation communication key between core net and MS interactive authentication information realization MS and network, IMSI transmits with form expressly in whole proof procedure, therefore, though the AKA agreement has effectively been improved the security breaches of gsm system, the problem that exists equally the MS identity to reveal.For this reason, in the standard of 3GPP, the interim interim identification code (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity, TMSI) of distributing of 3G network utilization replaces IMSI to protect user's identity.But, in some situation, system can't determine by TMSI user's identity, as: when the user carries out initial registration in service network when, perhaps when service network can not retrieve IMSI by the TMSI of MS, service network still requires MS that IMSI is provided, at this moment, MS will respond the expressly IMSI information of form.
And the IMSI guard method of some MS is by encrypting IMSI information or distributing another name to realize, but practicality is not strong, as: utilize attaching position register (Home Location Register, HLR) public key encryption IMSI information, and the public private key pair of HLR is upgraded in timing, this will bring larger computation burden to the network equipment, increase the time-delay of authentication; HLR and its all MS of ownership share a key, during each submission IMSI information, utilize this shared key to produce an encryption key, be used for IMSI information is carried out symmetric cryptography, but the risk that this method exists key to expose is easy to because the Key Exposure of certain MS causes all MS that belong to same HLR to be attacked; Each MS utilizes self key K
iBe encrypted, network terminal to HLR in (IMSI, the K of all storages
i) record travel through, until find correct IMSI information.This mode utilizes self key to be encrypted, although can avoid the drawback of shared key, guarantees the confidentiality of MS identity, and large in the amount of calculation of network terminal, efficient is low.
Summary of the invention
Goal of the invention: the IMSI method for secret protection that the invention provides a kind of 3G access; utilize the mode of key identification and symmetric key group to protect IMSI information; prevent the leakage of MS identity, can find easily decruption key when guaranteeing simultaneously HLR deciphering IMSI ciphertext, realize rapid authentication.
Technical scheme: a kind of IMSI method for secret protection of 3G access comprises the steps:
(1) VLR initiates the identify label request to the user, request user's permanent identification IMSI;
(2) the MS response MSIN information of encrypting consists of the IMSI information of encryption jointly with the routing iinformation HLR_ID of HLR, submits simultaneously encryption key identification number K_ID to
oldMS need to utilize the symmetric key encryption MSIN that is assigned to, and then combines the enciphered message of common formation IMSI with MCC||MNC;
(3) after VLR/SGSN received the user identity response message, according to the routing iinformation HLR_ID of HLR, namely MCC||MNC, sent authentication data request message to HLR, and content comprises IMSI information and the encryption key identification number K_ID after encryption
old
(4) HLR is according to the K_ID that receives
oldFind corresponding encryption key K from cipher key store
old, deciphering IMSI; Then with K_ID
oldCorresponding recording status changes FREE into; Then for this IMSI produces the Ciphering Key group, distribute simultaneously new key identification K_ID
newWith new encryption key K
newObtain the Ciphering Key of embedded key information, subsequently with new Ciphering Key group AV
sSend VLR/SGSN to together with IMSI information;
(5) the VLR/SGSN storage is from the Ciphering Key group AV of HLR
sWith IMSI information, and with authentication information RAND
IN(i) || AUTN (i) sends to MS;
(6) MS utilizes the inverse function F ' of imbedding function F from RAND
INIn extract random parameter RAND and K_ID
new|| K
newCalculate XMAC=f1
k(SQN||RAND||AMF), judge whether equation MAC=XMAC sets up, calculate response RES=f2 if set up
k(RAND) send to VLR/SGSN, and with K_ID
newAnd K
newBe stored as new IMSI encryption key identification number and encryption key;
(7) after VLR/SGSN obtains the RES of MS transmission, judge whether equation XRES=RES sets up, and sets up authentication success, otherwise authentification failure.
Wherein, HLR need to safeguard a cipher key store, and its size determines according to the quantity of MS under HLR, and every record comprises four attributes, that is: key identification KEY_ID, encryption key KEY, key use state STATUS and update time TIME.
The present invention adopts technique scheme, has following beneficial effect: in the present invention, owing to providing IMSI information to HLR, be all that the form of encrypting transmits, the assailant can't obtain the plaintext form of IMSI at every turn.Secondly, can redistribute an encryption key when HLR produces Ciphering Key for the user to the user, namely the user to encrypt the form of expression after IMSI information be all different at every turn, thereby avoid the user tracked.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the IMSI structural representation of embodiment in the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the cipher key store structural representation of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is the key identification process chart of the HLR of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is the AKA protocol figure of the protection privacy of user of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 5 is that the imbedding function F of the embodiment of the present invention produces RAND
INProcedure chart;
Fig. 6 is that the imbedding function F of the embodiment of the present invention obtains K_ID
new|| K
newProcess.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with specific embodiment, further illustrate the present invention, should understand these embodiment only is used for explanation the present invention and is not used in and limits the scope of the invention, after having read the present invention, those skilled in the art all fall within the application's claims limited range to the modification of the various equivalent form of values of the present invention.
A kind of implementation process of IMSI method for secret protection of 3G access is as follows:
1, the initialization of system
Fig. 1 is the IMSI structural representation of embodiment in the present invention, and each MS has a different IMSI.Each HLR produces 1 and forms cipher key store by many records, the size of cipher key store determines according to the quantity of MS under HLR, every record comprises four attributes, is respectively that key identification KEY_ID, encryption key KEY, key use state STATUS, update time TIME.Key use state refers to whether this key is assigned to the user for the IMSI encryption at present, is not denoted as FREE if use, otherwise is USED; Update time, TIME referred to the reformed up-to-date time of this recording status.Key K of random selection from cipher key store
iWith key identification K_ID
iBe kept at the USIM(Universal Subscriber Identity Module whole world Subscriber Identity Module of MS) on card.Fig. 2 is the cipher key store structural representation of the embodiment of the present invention.Fig. 3 is the key identification process chart of the HLR of the embodiment of the present invention.
2, the IMSI method for secret protection step of 3G access, as shown in Figure 4:
(1) VLR (Visitor Location Register, VLR Visitor Location Register) initiates the identify label request to the user, request user's permanent identification IMSI;
(2) the MSIN(Mobile Subscriber Identification Number that reply to encrypt of MS, identification number of mobile subscriber) information consists of the IMSI information of encryption jointly with the routing iinformation HLR_ID of HLR.Submit simultaneously encryption key identification number K_ID to
old, size is 128bit; The MS response message is:
HLR_ID||K_ID
old|| f
11(K
old, MSIN), f wherein
11Be the function of encryption IMSI information,
Can preserve an initial key identification number and encryption key in usim card, this initial value when usim card generates by the Random assignment of HLR cipher key store;
(3) VLR/SGSN(Visitor Location Register/Serving GPRS SUPPORT NODE VLR Visitor Location Register/GPRS serving GPRS support node) receive the user identity response message from MS after, routing iinformation HLR_ID according to HLR, be MCC||MNC, send authentication data request message to HLR, content comprises IMSI information and the key identification K_ID after encryption
old
(4) HLR is according to the K_ID that receives
oldFind corresponding encryption key K from cipher key store
old, size is 128bit, wherein, utilizes this secret key decryption to obtain IMSI, then with K_ID
oldCorresponding state recording changes FREE into; Then produce Ciphering Key group AV for this IMSI
s:
AV＝RAND||XRES||CK||IK||AUTN
MAC＝f1
K(SQN||RAND||AMF)
XRES＝f2
K(RAND)AK＝f5
K(RAND)
CK＝f3
K(RAND)IK＝f4
K(RAND)
Wherein, RAND is that random number, XRES are that encryption key, IK are that Integrity Key, AUTN are authentication token for expectation response, CK;
Distribute simultaneously new key identification K_ID
newWith new encryption key K
new(size is 128bit), and will both be embedded into AV
sRandom parameter RAND in, imbedding function is F, as shown in Figure 5.Obtain the Ciphering Key of embedded key information: AV
IN=RAND
IN|| XRES||CK||IK||AUTN sends new Ciphering Key group to VLR/SGSN:AV subsequently together with IMSI information
s|| IMSI;
(5) the VLR/SGSN storage is from the Ciphering Key group AV of HLR
sWith IMSI information, take out a not Ciphering Key of use in the time need to authenticating MS, then send user authentication request message to MS, content comprises the RAND in vector
IN(i) || AUTN (i);
(6) MS utilizes the inverse function F ' of imbedding function F from RAND
INIn extract random parameter RAND and K_ID
new|| K
new, as shown in Figure 6.Calculate XMAC=f1
k(SQN||RAND||AMF), judge whether equation MAC=XMAC sets up.Continue to verify whether SQN belongs in normal range (NR) if set up, if SQN does not belong to normal range (NR), send synchronization failure message and finish proof procedure to VLR/SGSN, otherwise the user is to the network ID authentication success.Follow MS calculated response value RES=f2
k(RAND), this value is sent to VLR/SGSN, and calculate CK=f3
K(RAND) and IK=f4
KEncryption key and Integrity Key when (RAND) conduct is with network service are simultaneously with K_ID
newAnd K
newBe stored as new IMSI encryption key sign and encryption key;
(7) after VLR/SGSN obtains the RES of MS transmission, judge whether equation XRES=RES sets up.If set up, network is to user's authentication success, encryption key and Integrity Key when VLR/SGSN takes out CK conduct is communicated by letter with this MS with IK from Ciphering Key, otherwise network is to user authentication failure.
Claims (3)
1. the IMSI method for secret protection of a 3G access, is characterized in that, comprises the steps:
(1) VLR initiates the identify label request to the user, request user's permanent identification IMSI;
(2) the MS response MSIN information of encrypting consists of the IMSI information of encryption jointly with the routing iinformation HLR_ID of HLR, submits simultaneously encryption key identification number K_ID to
old
(3) after VLR/SGSN received the user identity response message, according to the routing iinformation HLR_ID of HLR, namely MCC||MNC, sent authentication data request message to HLR, and content comprises IMSI information and the encryption key identification number K_ID after encryption
old
(4) HLR is according to the K_ID that receives
oldFind corresponding encryption key K from cipher key store
old, deciphering IMSI; Then with K_ID
oldCorresponding recording status changes FREE into; Then for this IMSI produces the Ciphering Key group, distribute simultaneously new encryption key sign K_ID
newWith new encryption key K
newObtain the Ciphering Key of embedded key information, subsequently with new Ciphering Key group AV
sSend VLR/SGSN to together with IMSI information;
(5) the VLR/SGSN storage is from the Ciphering Key group AV of HLR
sWith IMSI information, and with authentication information RAND
IN(i) || AUTN (i) sends to MS;
(6) MS utilizes the inverse function F ' of imbedding function F from RAND
INIn extract random parameter RAND and K_ID
new|| K
newCalculate XMAC=f1
k(SQN||RAND||AMF), judge whether equation MAC=XMAC sets up, calculate response RES=f2 if set up
k(RAND) send to VLR/SGSN, and with K_ID
newAnd K
newBe stored as new IMSI encryption key identification number and encryption key;
(7) after VLR/SGSN obtains the RES of MS transmission, judge whether equation XRES=RES sets up, and sets up authentication success, otherwise authentification failure.
2. the IMSI method for secret protection of a kind of 3G access as claimed in claim 1; it is characterized in that: described HLR need to safeguard a cipher key store; its size determines according to the quantity of MS under HLR; every record comprises four attributes, that is: encryption key identification number KEY_ID, encryption key KEY, key use state STATUS and update time TIME.
3. the IMSI method for secret protection of a kind of 3G access as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that: in described step (2), MS need to utilize the symmetric key encryption MSIN that is assigned to, and then combines the enciphered message of common formation IMSI with MCC||MNC.
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| CN2013100630444A CN103152731A (en) | 2013-02-27 | 2013-02-27 | 3G accessed IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) privacy protection method |
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|---|---|---|---|
| CN2013100630444A CN103152731A (en) | 2013-02-27 | 2013-02-27 | 3G accessed IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) privacy protection method |
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ID=48550549
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Cited By (15)
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| CN104270737A (en) * | 2014-10-17 | 2015-01-07 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Protection method and device for international mobile subscriber identification number (IMSI) |
| CN104754581A (en) * | 2015-03-24 | 2015-07-01 | 河海大学 | Public key password system based LTE wireless network security certification system |
| CN105208552A (en) * | 2015-09-06 | 2015-12-30 | 集怡嘉数码科技（深圳）有限公司 | Realization method for binding of mobile terminal and smart card |
| GB2529391A (en) * | 2014-08-12 | 2016-02-24 | Vodafone Ip Licensing Ltd | Machine-to-machine cellular communication security |
| WO2017219673A1 (en) * | 2016-06-21 | 2017-12-28 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Vowifi network access method and system, and terminal |
| CN107896370A (en) * | 2017-12-27 | 2018-04-10 | 海能达通信股份有限公司 | The method, apparatus of network is accessed under a kind of fail soft mode |
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| CN108347404A (en) * | 2017-01-24 | 2018-07-31 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | A kind of identity identifying method and device |
| CN108683510A (en) * | 2018-05-18 | 2018-10-19 | 兴唐通信科技有限公司 | A kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission |
| CN109155775A (en) * | 2016-05-09 | 2019-01-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of mobile device, network node and its method |
| CN109691058A (en) * | 2016-07-18 | 2019-04-26 | 瑞典爱立信有限公司 | Use the operation related with user equipment of password identifiers |
| CN109803251A (en) * | 2017-11-16 | 2019-05-24 | 诺基亚技术有限公司 | Method and apparatus for the privacy management entity selection in communication system |
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| US11438317B2 (en) | 2017-01-31 | 2022-09-06 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | Device identification encryption |
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| US9992670B2 (en) | 2014-08-12 | 2018-06-05 | Vodafone Ip Licensing Limited | Machine-to-machine cellular communication security |
| GB2529391A (en) * | 2014-08-12 | 2016-02-24 | Vodafone Ip Licensing Ltd | Machine-to-machine cellular communication security |
| CN104270737A (en) * | 2014-10-17 | 2015-01-07 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Protection method and device for international mobile subscriber identification number (IMSI) |
| CN104270737B (en) * | 2014-10-17 | 2018-07-03 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | The guard method of IMSI and device |
| CN104754581A (en) * | 2015-03-24 | 2015-07-01 | 河海大学 | Public key password system based LTE wireless network security certification system |
| CN104754581B (en) * | 2015-03-24 | 2018-01-19 | 河海大学 | A kind of safety certifying method of the LTE wireless networks based on public-key cryptosystem |
| CN105208552A (en) * | 2015-09-06 | 2015-12-30 | 集怡嘉数码科技（深圳）有限公司 | Realization method for binding of mobile terminal and smart card |
| CN109155775A (en) * | 2016-05-09 | 2019-01-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of mobile device, network node and its method |
| CN109155775B (en) * | 2016-05-09 | 2020-11-17 | 华为技术有限公司 | Mobile device, network node and method thereof |
| WO2017219673A1 (en) * | 2016-06-21 | 2017-12-28 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Vowifi network access method and system, and terminal |
| CN107529160A (en) * | 2016-06-21 | 2017-12-29 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A kind of VoWiFi method for network access and system, terminal and wireless access points equipment |
| CN107529160B (en) * | 2016-06-21 | 2022-07-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | VoWiFi network access method and system, terminal and wireless access point equipment |
| CN109691058A (en) * | 2016-07-18 | 2019-04-26 | 瑞典爱立信有限公司 | Use the operation related with user equipment of password identifiers |
| US11539683B2 (en) | 2016-07-18 | 2022-12-27 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Operation related to user equipment using secret identifier |
| US11870765B2 (en) | 2016-07-18 | 2024-01-09 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Operation related to user equipment using secret identifier |
| CN108347404B (en) * | 2017-01-24 | 2021-10-26 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Identity authentication method and device |
| CN108347404A (en) * | 2017-01-24 | 2018-07-31 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | A kind of identity identifying method and device |
| US11438317B2 (en) | 2017-01-31 | 2022-09-06 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | Device identification encryption |
| CN109803251A (en) * | 2017-11-16 | 2019-05-24 | 诺基亚技术有限公司 | Method and apparatus for the privacy management entity selection in communication system |
| CN109803251B (en) * | 2017-11-16 | 2021-11-26 | 诺基亚技术有限公司 | Method and apparatus for privacy management entity selection in a communication system |
| CN107896370B (en) * | 2017-12-27 | 2020-12-18 | 海能达通信股份有限公司 | Method and device for accessing network under failure weakening mode |
| CN107896370A (en) * | 2017-12-27 | 2018-04-10 | 海能达通信股份有限公司 | The method, apparatus of network is accessed under a kind of fail soft mode |
| CN108683510A (en) * | 2018-05-18 | 2018-10-19 | 兴唐通信科技有限公司 | A kind of user identity update method of encrypted transmission |
| CN112134831B (en) * | 2019-06-25 | 2023-02-21 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and device for sending and processing access request |
| CN112134831A (en) * | 2019-06-25 | 2020-12-25 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and device for sending and processing access request |
| CN110621016B (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2022-08-12 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | User identity protection method, user terminal and base station |
| CN110621016A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2019-12-27 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | User identity protection method, user terminal and base station |
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Application publication date: 20130612 |