CN106851672B - Method and device for constructing data packet forwarding alliance game payment model - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a device for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model, wherein the method comprises the following steps: determining the whole network G for forwarding the data packet; forming a forwarding alliance S based on the forwarding process of the data packet; determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S according to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding the data packet; and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of the data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v. Through the mode, the method and the device can further provide theoretical methods and technical support for subsequently solving the selfish excitation problem of the nodes in the Ad hoc network.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of wireless networks and communication, in particular to a method and a device for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model.
Background
The Ad hoc network is composed of a plurality of nodes which can move freely, each node plays the dual roles of a host and a router, and communication between the nodes is completed through a wireless channel and multi-hop forwarding of relay nodes. The network is completely ad hoc without any fixed infrastructure, without central control, and therefore it is very different from conventional wireless networks. In traditional emergency and military applications, nodes in Ad hoc networks operate in a voluntary and active cooperative forwarding manner. However, recently, especially in the civil field, since the nodes are limited by various resources such as self processing capability, storage space, battery energy, and the like, the nodes will exhibit selfish behavior and discard the message to be forwarded, thereby achieving the purpose of saving self resources and reducing network performance. Therefore, ensuring the excitation cooperation of selfish nodes in the network, thereby ensuring the availability of the network and the performance of the network becomes one of the hot spots studied in the current Ad hoc network.
Currently, a game theory is adopted to enhance the cooperative research method of selfish nodes in the Ad hoc network, but the current research mainly focuses on the research category of non-cooperative game. In the non-cooperative game, the emphasis is mainly given to the behavior of the nodes: the strategy that the rational node can select in the process of forwarding the data packet, the result that the game can appear and the selection correspondingly made by the node, etc. In other research branches of game theory, cooperative game generally assumes that a protocol for joint action is implemented between nodes, i.e., the nodes may exhibit an "intention to cooperate" with each other, and the intention to cooperate is endogenous. Currently, how to solve the selfish incentive problem of nodes in the Ad hoc network through cooperative gaming becomes one of the most important problems.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention mainly solves the technical problem of providing a method and a device for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model, which can provide a theoretical method and technical support for solving the selfish incentive problem of nodes in an Ad hoc network.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts a technical scheme that: a method for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model is provided, and the method comprises the following steps: determining a whole network G for forwarding a data packet, wherein the network G is composed of N rational nodes, and G is an arbitrary directed graph; forming a forwarding federation S based on the forwarding process of the data packet, wherein
Determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S according to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding data packets,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively; and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of a data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v.
Wherein the method further comprises: respectively defining a calculation mode of payment allocation of each node according to role types of different participating nodes in the forwarding alliance, wherein the role types of the nodes comprise: a source node, an intermediate node, and a destination node.
Defining an intermediate node as i, wherein the payment corresponding to the intermediate node i is xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i) C (i), where α and β are the offsets, x, respectively, that node i gets from source node src as a result of receiving and forwarding the packeti≥0。
Wherein, the payment corresponding to the destination node dest is xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest). C (dest), where mr(dest) is the number of packets received by the destination node dest, C (dest) is the cost of the destination node due to the received packets, xdest≥0。
Wherein the payment corresponding to the source node src is xsrc，
Wherein the forwarding alliance game FCG meets the condition that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
wherein the reward factor is a function (S) of a forwarding federation S, wherein,
and max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, the payment allocation of any node j in the N is defined as xjThe payment of the forwarding alliance game FCG (N, v) is v (N), and the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈NxjThen ∑j∈Nxj＝v(N)。
Wherein a large federation formed by the N rational nodes satisfies the following first and second conditionsTwo conditions, the first condition is that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) The second condition is that:
in order to solve the technical problem, the invention adopts another technical scheme that: the device for constructing the data packet forwarding alliance game payment model is provided, and comprises the following components: the system comprises a first determining module, a second determining module and a third determining module, wherein the first determining module is used for determining the whole network G for forwarding a data packet, the network G is composed of N rational nodes, and G is an arbitrary directed graph; a forming module for forming a forwarding federation S based on the forwarding process of the data packet, wherein
A second determining module, configured to determine a feature function v of the forwarding federation S according to a situation where all nodes in the forwarding federation S participate in forwarding a data packet,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively; and a third determining module, configured to further determine, based on the node sets of the N rational nodes and the feature function v, that a payment model FCG of the packet forwarding federation game is (N, v).
Wherein the apparatus further comprises: a definition module, configured to respectively define a calculation manner of payment allocation for each node according to role types of different participating nodes in the forwarding federation, where the role types of the nodes include: a source node, an intermediate node, and a destination node.
Wherein the intermediate node is defined asi, the payment corresponding to the intermediate node i is xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i) C (i), where α and β are the offsets, x, respectively, that node i gets from source node src as a result of receiving and forwarding the packeti≥0。
Wherein, the payment corresponding to the destination node dest is xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest). C (dest), where mr(dest) is the number of packets received by the destination node dest, C (dest) is the cost of the destination node due to the received packets, xdest≥0。
Wherein the payment corresponding to the source node src is xsrc，
Wherein the forwarding alliance game FCG meets the condition that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
wherein the reward factor is a function (S) of a forwarding federation S, wherein,
and max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, the payment allocation of any node j in the N is defined as xjThe payment of the forwarding alliance game FCG (N, v) is v (N), and the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈NxjThen ∑j∈Nxj＝v(N)。
Wherein the big alliance formed by the N rational nodes meets a first condition and a second condition, wherein the first condition is that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) The second condition is that:
the invention has the beneficial effects that: in contrast to the prior art case, the present invention determines the entire network G for packet forwarding; forming a forwarding federation S based on the forwarding process of the data packet, wherein
Determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S according to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding data packets,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively; and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of a data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v. Due to the fact that the characteristic function is payment corresponding to the forwarding alliance, theoretical methods and technical support can be further provided for solving the selfish incentive problem of the nodes in the Ad hoc network in the follow-up mode.
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FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a method for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a specific alliance formation in the method for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model;
fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of the device for constructing the data packet forwarding alliance game payment model of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Before describing the present invention in detail, a general description of the preliminary knowledge of the league game associated with the present invention will be provided.
The classic game theory idea can be divided into non-cooperative game playing and cooperative game playing. In non-cooperative gaming, participants in the game make decisions based on their perceived environment and their own benefits. Participant utility is not only dependent on the behavior selection of itself, but is also influenced by the behavior of other participants. In non-cooperative gaming, the emphasis is mainly placed on individual behavior: what are the actions of rational participants selectable in a competitive environment? What are the results that a game may produce? What decisions should be made by rational participants? In cooperative gaming, it is assumed that the participants have an agreement to act together that the cooperation is exogenous. The emphasis here is on: what leagues these participants will constitute? How to determine the size of the competency between participants in a federation? How reasonably to distribute the corporate revenue (or amortization cost) from the federation?
In non-cooperative gaming, the results from the balance between participants are the product of competition and, in general, are unsatisfactory. Because they may exhibit an "interest in collaboration" that is endogenous, but that does not have a strict enforcement protocol. In cooperative gaming, there is an exogenous cooperative agreement between participants, which constitutes a fundamental distinction between the two types of gaming.
For the process of N participants participating in the game, I ═ 1,2, …, N, and any subset S of set I is referred to as a league.
Definition 1 (federation): let the set of participants in the game be I ═ {1,2, …, N }, any
S is called a federation of I. In the special case that the temperature of the liquid is lower than the set temperature,
and S ═ I, this case of S ═ I is known as a large union (The grand coordination).
Definition 2 (feature function): assuming that the set of participants in the game is I ═ 1,2, …, N, v(s) is defined as everything in NReal-valued functions on subsets (i.e. unions), i.e. v:2N→ R (R is a real-valued set), which satisfies:
v (S) is called a feature function.
Definition 3 (league game): given the set of participants I and the characteristic function v, the cooperative game played is a league game CG, denoted CG as (I, v).
Theoretically, all participants in a game would like to join the large league so that any two participants in the large league are collaborating with each other. Since each participant is rational and can freely choose to join different alliances according to the situation of interest acquired by the participant, it is necessary to ensure that each participant joins a large alliance as the optimal strategy of choice.
In league game theory, there is a powerful concept-Core (Core). The method comprises the following specific steps:
definition 4 (core) in the league game CG ═ I, v, core c (v) allocates a payment vector x (x ∈ R) defined to satisfy the following conditionN) And (3) gathering:
wherein x isiThe allocation of the payment obtained for participant i.
Note that: the core formed by the league game is a vector set, which can be a set with any size or an empty set. In order to ensure that the found kernel is an optimal solution, the optimal kernel needs to be formed to satisfy the following conditions:
definition 5 (optimal kernel): in the league game CG ═ I, v, the best core Co(v) Must satisfy the following conditions:
individuality (individuality): x is the number ofi≧ v ({ i }). Namely: any participant participating in the league game will have a payout allocation that is at least better than the payout allocation itself.
Federation Rationality (national ratio): due to the reasonableness of the node, the node itself may leave the currently joined federation and join other federations formed to maximize the payment allocation it obtains.
Effectiveness (effectivenesss):
namely: the total amount of payout allocation in the league game balances the revenue obtained by the large league, and there are no more or less cases.
The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
Under the framework of the alliance game theory, the invention formally defines the forwarding process of the node data packet in the Ad hoc network, abstracts the forwarding process into the alliance game process, establishes a node payment distribution model in alliance members and analyzes corresponding constraint conditions which are met for ensuring that a large alliance is formed into a stable core. The model provides theoretical reference and reference for establishing an excitation cooperative routing algorithm in an Ad hoc network, provides a technical basis for effectively exciting the enthusiasm of selfish nodes for cooperative forwarding, further reduces the attack influence of selfish nodes on the network, and can greatly improve the performance of the network.
In order to formally define the model, the following description is made for the specific case of the model:
(1) the whole network G (V, E) is composed of N rational nodes, G is any directed graph, and V and E are respectively nodes and edge sets formed by forwarding data by using links.
(2) If and only if nodes x, y are in transmission range of each other, then there is a link (x, y) E between them, and all links in E are bi-directional.
(3) When the nodes carry out normal communication, the nodes work in a promiscuous mode so as to monitor the condition that the neighbor nodes cooperatively forward the data packet.
(4) In the process of participating in data packet forwarding, each rational node i in the network calls the behavior as cooperative behavior if the node forwards the received data packet, and calls the behavior as selfish behavior if the node does not receive the data packet or does not forward the data packet.
(5) In a packet forwarding alliance Game (referred to as a forwarding alliance Game for short), FCG (N, v) (forwarding alliance Game), a Game process starts by sending a packet from a source node src, and ends by receiving the packet sent by the source node at a destination node dest. Where N ═ V |, V is the federation payment obtained by the FCG federation.
(6) The nodes in the FCG are all rational, and the nodes can decide to join or leave the federation formed in the network according to the self income condition, but the nodes are all for the purpose of maximizing the income obtained by the nodes.
(7) The federations formed by the FCGs are non-overlapping federations, that is, any node in the network can only be added into one federation finally, and no cross-overlapping condition exists among the federations. In addition, any node in the federation is cooperative with each other.
(8) In order to ensure that the source node src completes a normal communication process with the destination node dest, the source node src needs to pay the fee for the forwarding node in the federation to forward the data packet. Therefore, the invention presets a maximum payment threshold M for the source node srcsrc。
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 1 is a flowchart of an embodiment of a method for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model, where the method includes:
step S101: and determining the whole network G for forwarding the data packet, wherein the network G is composed of N rational nodes, and G is an arbitrary directed graph.
The rational node refers to a node which is inclined to join in the alliance game when the distributed payment is better than the payment obtained by independently executing the node after the node joins in the alliance game. In other words, if a node is participating in a league game and the resulting payouts allocated are at least better than those obtained by itself executing independently, it tends to participate in the league game rather than to leave the league game.
A graph is composed of small dots (called vertices or nodes) and straight lines or curves (called edges) connecting the dots, and if each edge of the graph is defined with a direction, which is shown by an arrow indicating the direction, the resulting graph is called a directed graph, the edges are also called directed edges, and the nodes can only communicate or transmit messages in one direction.
Step S102: forming a forwarding federation S based on a packet-based forwarding process, wherein
In the process of forwarding the data packet, all nodes in the network are rational, and can freely select to join in different alliances according to the situation of benefits acquired by the nodes, thereby forming a forwarding alliance S.
Referring to fig. 2, fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a specific federation formation, and 11 nodes in fig. 2(a) form two federations: federation 1 and federation 2. The correspondence in fig. 2(b) forms a large federation of 11 nodes.
Step S103: according to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding the data packet, determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively.
The characteristic function v of the forwarding federation S is actually the net total revenue that the forwarding federation obtains for participating in forwarding of packets,
·Msrcthe total revenue for the forwarding federation including the cost of receiving and forwarding packets,
the cost incurred for the forwarding federation to receive and forward packets.
Step S104: and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of the data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v.
According to the number of forwarding unions formed by the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function, the payment model FCG (N, v) of the data packet forwarding union game can be determined.
The embodiment of the invention determines the whole network G for forwarding the data packet; forming a forwarding federation S based on a packet-based forwarding process, wherein
According to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding the data packet, determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively; and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of the data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v. Due to the fact that the characteristic function is payment corresponding to the forwarding alliance, theoretical methods and technical support can be further provided for solving the selfish incentive problem of the nodes in the Ad hoc network in the follow-up mode.
The method further comprises the following steps: respectively defining the calculation mode of payment allocation of each node according to the role types of different participating nodes in the forwarding alliance, wherein the role types of the nodes comprise: a source node, an intermediate node, and a destination node.
Defining the intermediate node as i, and the payment corresponding to the intermediate node i is xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i) C (i), where α and β are the offsets, x, respectively, that node i gets from source node src as a result of receiving and forwarding the packeti≥0。
The intermediate node refers to a transition node participating in forwarding a data packet, and the intermediate node in the forwarding alliance is a main node except a source node and a destination node. During communication, such nodes mainly assume roles: and receiving the transmitted data packet from the neighbor node of the previous hop and forwarding the data packet to the neighbor node of the next hop. Thus, in embodiments, the impact of the node's receive and forward behavior on its payment distribution is primarily considered.
The payment corresponding to the intermediate node i is xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i))·C(i)，α·mr(i)+β·mf(i) Total compensation for costs incurred by the intermediate node from the source node src due to receiving and forwarding the data packet, including the cost incurred by receiving and forwarding the data packet, (m)r(i)+mf(i) C (i) the cost incurred for the intermediate node to receive and forward the packet. To ensure node reasonableness, xi≥0。
By the method, the final net payment condition of any intermediate node, namely the condition of the benefit obtained by the intermediate node can be obtained.
Wherein, the payment corresponding to the destination node dest is xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest). C (dest), where mr(dest) is the number of packets received by the destination node dest, C (dest) is the cost of the destination node due to the received packets, xdest≥0。
The destination node is the end node where the packet finally arrives. The destination node mainly plays a role in the forwarding alliance: the special case of no forwarding behavior of the intermediate node can be considered as the only passive reception of the transmitted data packet from the neighbor nodes around the last hop.
The payment corresponding to the destination node dest is xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest)·C(dest)，α·mr(dest) Total offset of the cost incurred by the destination node from the source node src due to the received packet, mr(dest). C (dest) is the cost incurred for the destination node to receive the packet. To ensure node reasonableness, xi≥0。
By the method, the final net payment condition of the destination node, namely the condition of the benefit obtained by the destination node, can be obtained.
Wherein, the payment corresponding to the source node src is xsrc，
The source node is the start-stop node for the initial transmission of the data packet. In order to establish normal communication with a destination node, a source node only sends a data packet to the destination node in the whole forwarding alliance, and corresponding compensation is paid to an intermediate node and the destination node in the forwarding alliance.
By the method, the final net payment condition of the source node, namely the condition of the benefit obtained by the source node, can be obtained.
Wherein, the FCG of the forwarding alliance game satisfies the condition that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
in order to ensure the node reasonability, the forwarding alliance game FCG needs to meet the condition that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
the demonstration process is as follows:
and (3) proving that: in the theory of big alliance formation, all nodes in the alliance are proved to meet individual rationality, namely, the payment distribution of any node i is proved to meet xi≥v({i})。
Case 1, payment allocation for intermediate node i: if the intermediate node i forms an independent federation { i }, then v (i) ═ 0; at the same time due to mr(i)＝mf(i) X is 0i0, i.e. xi＝v({i})。
Case 2, payment allocation for destination node dest: if the destination node dest forms an independent federation { dest }, v ({ dest }) -0; for the same reason, mr(dest) is 0, then xdest0, i.e. xdest＝v({dest})。
Case 3, payment allocation for source node src: similar to cases 1 and 2, the source node src forms an independent federation { src }, with a payment of v ({ src }) ═ 0. And according to the payment distribution formula of the source node, the payment distribution of the source node src is xsrc：
To achieve individuality of the source node src, i.e. xsrc≧ v ({ src }), but since v ({ src }) is 0, it is only necessary to ensure xsrcNot less than 0, and calculating the inequality to obtain the precondition to be satisfied, wherein max (α) is not more than Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein the reward factor is a function (S) of the forwarding federation S, wherein,
and max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
If the nodes in the federation do not meet the rational conditions of the federation, the nodes may leave the large federation and join other federations formed to maximize the payment allocation they obtain. In order to facilitate analysis of federation rationality, the embodiment redefines the reward factor, i.e., constructs as a federation
Function (S) of (a): for antithetical coupletsThe nodes in the alliance S transfer data packets (transfer and receiving actions) to each other to generate cooperative actions. The calculation method of (S) is specifically defined as follows:
in the above equation, (S) is the ratio of the total number of received and forwarded packets generated at all nodes except the source node in federation S to the total number of packets correspondingly generated at all nodes in the large federation. Obviously, when nodes in a large federation cooperate with each other, it can be found that: (S) ═ 1. Herein, by introducing (S), the calculation formula of the federation payment v (S) is further updated as follows:
therefore, how to ensure that any node in the big league does not produce behavior that deviates from the big league? I.e. any node is voluntarily joined in the big league keeping the payment distribution obtained in the big league at a maximum. The present embodiment proves the above problem by the following conclusion that the conditions need to be satisfied.
And (4) conclusion: in the forwarding federation game FCG ═ (N, v), an arbitrary federation is assumed
The payment v (S) of the corresponding alliance is as follows:
in order to ensure that the formed alliance meets alliance rationality, the following condition that max (α) ≦ M needs to be metsrc/(mr+mf). I.e. to ensure that any rational node in a large federation is reluctant to leave the large federation and join other federations.
And (3) proving that: case 1, suppose that federation S includes src node, an intermediate node i, and dest node. Thus, the federation rationality certification of this section for federation S translates into individual rationality certification. As can be seen from the individuality described above, the federation S satisfies the federation rationality in this case.
Case 2, if src and dest nodes are included in federation S, with several of its intermediate nodes in S.A sum of v (S) and the payment allocation obtained in federation S by the partial nodes in the large federation (∑) is required hereini∈Sxi) By contrast, it is clear that if ∑i∈Sxi≧ v (S), it means that the federation that is unlikely to have any subset of nodes gets a larger federation payment than the sum of the corresponding obtained payment allocations in the large federation. Therefore, the present embodiment only needs to prove Σi∈SxiThe specific demonstration process is as follows:
therefore, to ensure ∑i∈SxiMore than or equal to v (S), the precondition to be satisfied is obtained by calculating an inequality that max (α) is more than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
In order to ensure that the payment allocation of all nodes in a large federation in an FCG is effective, the present embodiment only needs to compare the sum of the payment allocation of all nodes with the federation payment condition corresponding to the federation in a trade-off manner, and requires that there is a possibility that the payment allocation cannot be reached more or less. Let the payment allocation of any node j in N be xjAnd the federation payment of the major federation is v (N), the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈NxjThe following two conclusions can be drawn.
Wherein, the payment allocation of any node j in the N is defined as xjThe payment of the forwarding alliance game FCG (N, v) is v (N), and the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈NxjThen ∑j∈Nxj＝v(N)。
Wherein the big alliance formed by the N rational nodes meets the following first condition and second condition, the first condition is that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) The second condition is:
conclusion in the big league, in order for the payment allocation of all nodes in the big league to be valid, the following condition is satisfied, ∑j∈Nxj＝v(N)。
Prove that the sum of the payment distribution of all the nodes in N is ∑ because the source node src and the destination node dest are included in the large alliancej∈NxjAccording to the formulas corresponding to the intermediate node, the destination node and the source node, ∑j∈NxjThe calculation is as follows:
it is clear that the payment distribution of all nodes of a large federation is valid.
And (4) conclusion: in the forwarding federation game FCG ═ (N, v), an arbitrary federation is assumed
The payment v (S) of the corresponding alliance is as follows:
the payment allocation of any node j in N is xjIf the following two conditions are satisfied:
the condition 1: α and β parameters meet the condition that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)
Condition 2:
the payment assignments for all nodes in N have the characteristics of a core and the large federation formed at this time has stable and non-empty federation configuration characteristics.
Through the determination of the payment allocation of the forwarding alliance game FCG nodes, on one hand, the payment income obtained by the nodes is maximized, on the other hand, each node is willing to join in a large alliance and is willing to participate in the forwarding of data packets actively, and a selfish non-cooperative behavior does not exist, so that the stability of the forwarding alliance structure is ensured to be converged effectively, and the cooperative performance among network nodes is kept in a stable state.
Referring to fig. 3, fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of the device for constructing the data packet forwarding alliance game payment model of the present invention, which can perform the steps in the above method, and the detailed description of the related contents refers to the above method section and is not repeated herein.
The device includes: a first determination module 101, a formation module 102, a second determination module 103, and a third determination module 104.
The first determining module 101 is configured to determine a whole network G for forwarding a data packet, where the network G is composed of N rational nodes, and G is an arbitrary directed graph;
the forming module 102 is used for forming a forwarding federation S based on a packet forwarding process, wherein
The second determining module 103 is configured to determine a characteristic function v of the forwarding federation S according to a situation where all nodes in the forwarding federation S participate in forwarding a data packet,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively;
the third determining module 104 is configured to determine a payment model FCG ═ N, v of the packet forwarding federation game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the feature function v.
The embodiment of the invention determines the whole network G for forwarding the data packet; based onA process of forwarding the data packet, forming a forwarding federation S, wherein
According to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding the data packet, determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is preset for the source node src, c (i) the cost of the forwarding node i in the forwarding federation due to the reception and forwarding of packets, mr(i) And mf(i) The number of the data packets received by the forwarding node i in the forwarding alliance and the number of the data packets actually forwarded are respectively; and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of the data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v. Due to the fact that the characteristic function is payment corresponding to the forwarding alliance, theoretical methods and technical support can be further provided for solving the selfish incentive problem of the nodes in the Ad hoc network in the follow-up mode.
The device further comprises a definition module, wherein the definition module is used for respectively defining the calculation mode of payment allocation of each node according to the role types of different participating nodes in the forwarding alliance, and the role types of the nodes comprise: a source node, an intermediate node, and a destination node.
Defining the intermediate node as i, and the payment corresponding to the intermediate node i is xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i) C (i), where α and β are the offsets, x, respectively, that node i gets from source node src as a result of receiving and forwarding the packeti≥0。
Wherein, the payment corresponding to the destination node dest is xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest). C (dest), where mr(dest) is the number of packets received by destination node dest, C (dest) is the resultant of destination node receiving packetsThis, xdest≥0。
Wherein, the payment corresponding to the source node src is xsrc，
Wherein, the FCG of the forwarding alliance game satisfies the condition that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
wherein the reward factor is a function (S) of the forwarding federation S, wherein,
and max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, the payment allocation of any node j in the N is defined as xjThe payment of the forwarding alliance game FCG (N, v) is v (N), and the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈NxjThen ∑j∈Nxj＝v(N)。
Wherein the big alliance formed by the N rational nodes meets the following first condition and second condition, the first condition is that max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf) The second condition is:
the above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and all modifications of equivalent structures and equivalent processes performed by the present specification and drawings, or directly or indirectly applied to other related technical fields, are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (18)
1. A method for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model is characterized by comprising the following steps:
determining a whole network G for forwarding a data packet, wherein the network G is composed of N rational nodes, and G is an arbitrary directed graph;
forming a forwarding federation S based on the forwarding process of the data packet, wherein
Determining a characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S according to the situation that all nodes in the forwarding alliance S participate in forwarding data packets,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is predefined for the source node src, c (i) the cost of receiving and forwarding packets for the intermediate node i in the forwarding federation responsible for forwarding, mr(i) And mf(i) Respectively determining the number of data packets received by an intermediate node i in charge of forwarding in a forwarding union and the number of data packets actually forwarded;
and further determining a payment model FCG (N, v) of a data packet forwarding alliance game based on the node set of the N rational nodes and the characteristic function v.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: respectively defining a calculation mode of payment allocation of each node according to role types of different participating nodes in the forwarding alliance, wherein the role types of the nodes comprise: a source node, an intermediate node, and a destination node.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the intermediary node i has a corresponding payment of xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i) C (i), where α and β are the offsets, x, respectively, obtained by the node from the source node src as a result of receiving and forwarding the packet, xi≥0。
4. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the payment for the destination node dest is xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest). C (dest), where mr(dest) is the number of packets received by the destination node dest, C (dest) is the cost of the destination node due to the received packets, xdest≥0。
5. The method of claim 3, wherein the payment for the source node src is xsrc，
6. The method according to any of the claims 3-5, wherein the forwarding federation game FCG satisfies the condition max (α). ltoreq.Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
7. the method according to claim 6, characterized in that the reward factor is a function (S) of a Forwarding Union S, wherein,
and max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the payment allocation of any node j in N is defined as xjThe payment of the forwarding alliance game FCG (N, v) is v (N), and the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈N(xj) Then ∑j∈N(xj)＝v(N)。
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the big federation formed by the N rational nodes satisfies a first condition and a second condition, the first condition being max (α) ≦ Msrc/(mr+mf) The second condition is that:
10. an apparatus for constructing a data packet forwarding alliance game payment model, the apparatus comprising:
the system comprises a first determining module, a second determining module and a third determining module, wherein the first determining module is used for determining the whole network G for forwarding a data packet, the network G is composed of N rational nodes, and G is an arbitrary directed graph;
a forming module for forming a forwarding federation S based on the forwarding process of the data packet, wherein
A second determining module, configured to determine a feature function v of the forwarding federation S according to a situation where all nodes in the forwarding federation S participate in forwarding a data packet,
wherein M is a reward factor for successful transmission of a data packet from the source node src to the destination node destsrcA maximum threshold for payment, which is predefined for the source node src, c (i) the cost of receiving and forwarding packets for the intermediate node i in the forwarding federation responsible for forwarding, mr(i) And mf(i) Respectively determining the number of data packets received by an intermediate node i in charge of forwarding in a forwarding union and the number of data packets actually forwarded;
and a third determining module, configured to further determine, based on the node sets of the N rational nodes and the feature function v, that a payment model FCG of the packet forwarding federation game is (N, v).
11. The apparatus of claim 10, further comprising: a definition module, configured to respectively define a calculation manner of payment allocation for each node according to role types of different participating nodes in the forwarding federation, where the role types of the nodes include: a source node, an intermediate node, and a destination node.
12. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the intermediary node i has a corresponding payment of xi，xi＝α·mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i) C (i), where α and β are the offsets, x, respectively, obtained by the node from the source node src as a result of receiving and forwarding the packet, xi≥0。
13. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the destination node dest corresponds to a payment of xdest，xdest＝α·mr(dest)-mr(dest). C (dest), where mr(dest) is the number of packets received by the destination node dest, C (dest) is the cost of the destination node due to the received packets, xdest≥0。
14. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the payment for the source node src is xsrc，
15. The apparatus according to any of the claims 12-14, wherein the forwarding federation game FCG satisfies the condition max (α). ltoreq.Msrc/(mr+mf) Wherein, in the step (A),
16. the apparatus of claim 15, wherein the reward factor is a function (S) of a Forwarding Union S, wherein,
and max (α) is less than or equal to Msrc/(mr+mf)。
17. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein a payment allocation of any node j in N is defined as xjThe payment of the forwarding alliance game FCG (N, v) is v (N), and the sum of the payment allocations of all nodes in N is ∑j∈N(xj) Then ∑j∈N(xj)＝v(N)。
18. The apparatus of claim 17, wherein a big federation formed by the N rational nodes satisfies a first condition and a second condition, the first condition being max (α) ≦ Msrc/(mr+mf) The second condition is that:
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