CN104640141B - A kind of motivational techniques of more relay node cooperative games - Google Patents

A kind of motivational techniques of more relay node cooperative games Download PDF

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CN104640141B
CN104640141B CN201510051595.8A CN201510051595A CN104640141B CN 104640141 B CN104640141 B CN 104640141B CN 201510051595 A CN201510051595 A CN 201510051595A CN 104640141 B CN104640141 B CN 104640141B
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relay
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CN104640141A (en
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张晖
刘风华
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Nanjing Post and Telecommunication University
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Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of motivational techniques of more relay node cooperative games, this method is applied to wireless ubiquitous environment, solves the problems, such as the complex communication of wireless ubiquitous environment, more relay forwarding nodes are modeled using game theory, set up the utility function and cost function of forward node alliance, alliance is forwarded for the source node of data transport service is needed to select optimal relay node, is greatly promoted the enthusiasm of relay node forwarding.This method is simply easily achieved very much simultaneously, is had good application prospect, and can be avoided the problem that single mechanism well.

Description

Multi-relay-node cooperative game excitation method
Technical Field
The invention relates to an excitation method of a multi-relay node cooperative game in a wireless ubiquitous environment, and belongs to the technical field of multimedia communication.
Background
The rapid development of wireless communication technology has promoted the coming of ubiquitous network age, and the ubiquitous environment refers to a ubiquitous network environment, i.e. people are in the ubiquitous network, so that people can exchange information with any person and any object at any time and place by using any network, and ubiquitous information services and applications are provided for individuals and society by using the existing network technology and the new network technology based on the requirements of individuals and society. The method can not only greatly improve the performance of a single network, but also create conditions for introducing new services while supporting the traditional services; it can also provide higher data transmission rates, wider signal coverage and support high-rate mobility for future mobile communication systems. The networks constructed by different technologies complement each other and coexist, and a wireless ubiquitous environment with multi-network and multi-service integration is formed. However, the cluster characteristic of the user often causes the situation that the traffic flow of a certain network in the instantaneous time is suddenly increased and the adjacent other heterogeneous network services are idle, and the purposes of relieving the bottleneck effect of the congested network, balancing the traffic flow, improving the space multiplexing rate and increasing the network capacity can be realized by utilizing the characteristics of multihop relay and route forwarding of the mobile Ad-hoc network. However, in an ad hoc network, nodes are both terminals and routers, and the dual functions determine that the nodes need to ensure normal communication requirements of the nodes and provide services of forwarding data and routing for other nodes of the network, that is, the nodes need to cooperate with each other to compensate for the lack of infrastructure, otherwise, the entire network service cannot be provided. However, considering the factors of limited energy, resources and bandwidth of the nodes, especially the non-cooperation and selfishness among the nodes under the condition that the nodes belong to different organizations, the performance is particularly obvious. The main difficulty of the relay alliance incentive method serving as a research technology for incentive node cooperative forwarding is how to select a node alliance, design an alliance profit and cost function and maximize the profit difference between the cooperative alliance and the non-cooperative alliance. With the increasing popularization of wireless ubiquitous environments, the research on the node relay cooperative alliance incentive mechanism aiming at the selfishness of the nodes is also receiving more and more attention.
The research on the node cooperation incentive mechanism in the wireless ubiquitous environment mainly includes an incentive mechanism based on reputation value, an incentive mechanism based on virtual currency and an analysis method based on game theory. The reputation value-based incentive mechanism has the respective disadvantages that the maintenance and propagation mechanism of the reputation value is complex and unreliable, which easily causes the problem of inconsistency of the reputation value; the incentive mechanism based on virtual currency can be realized only by hardware support for preventing a user from tampering information; some models in an excitation mechanism based on game theory have dependency on the topological structure of the network, and most models only prove the existence of nash balance, and do not provide a specific cooperative excitation method and the like. The present invention can solve the above problems well.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an excitation method of a multi-relay node cooperation game, which is applied to a wireless ubiquitous environment, solves the problem of complex communication of the wireless ubiquitous environment, utilizes a game theory to model multi-relay forwarding nodes, sets a utility function and a cost function of a forwarding node alliance, selects an optimal relay node forwarding alliance aiming at a source node needing data transmission service, and greatly promotes the enthusiasm of relay node forwarding. Meanwhile, the method is very simple and easy to implement, has a good application prospect, and can well avoid the problem of a single mechanism.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: the invention provides an excitation method of a multi-relay node cooperative game, which sets a communication scene of two-hop multi-node combined relay forwarding, wherein the scene comprises a source node s needing other nodes to provide forwarding service, M relay nodes capable of providing the forwarding service around the source node, and a node set R = { R = (R) } 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ,…,r M And d, the destination node. And the relay alliance formed by M relay nodes has (2) M -1) of the said one or more. Its relay alliance setFor example, the forwarding relay alliance formed by the 3 relay nodes i, j and k is { { i }, { j }, { k }, { i, j }, { i, k }, { i, j, k } }. Wherein { i }, { j }, { k } indicates that the single relay node independent alliance forms a non-cooperative game.
Selecting tau in the relay alliance set aiming at the relay alliance set i Let the relay node included therein have N (N)> = 2), i.e. τ i ={r m1 ,r m2 ,…r mN };r mj Belongs to the element R, wherein j =1,2, \8230AN; setting upNode forwarding packets consumes a resource cost of c mj The yield of successful packet forwarding by the source node s is p, ifForwarding reward gr for node participation in forwarding mj Source node s PaymentForwarding price gp mj And the source node s has the existing virtual currency V. The forwarding node may forward its packet using the won forwarding reward purchase resource. Setting c mj P and gp mj 、gr mj The same metrics and units are used. The source node and the forwarding node are required to meet the following conditions when participating in the transaction:
gr mj >c mj
p>gp mj
the invention comprises the following steps:
step 1: setting a network communication scene model, determining the specific position distribution conditions of a source node s, a relay node set R and a destination node d, and obtaining the channel condition information of each relay node through an environment perception technology, such as determining a candidate relay node alliance setObtaining channel gains of a relay node and a destination nodeBandwidth of signal transmitted by relay node to destination nodeThe average interference omega of other nodes suffered by the destination node d int And channel noise power spectral density N 0 And the like.
Step 2: initializing the maximum transmitting power p of the relay node according to the network environment and the channel condition of each relay node max Forwarding revenue p of source node and r of relay node mj (r mj E.g. R) forwarding cost c mj And source node and relay node r mj Negotiating to determine a forwarding compensation gp mj Forward bonus gr mj And so on.
And 3, step 3: selecting any relay node alliance tau from the relay node alliance set G i And the number of nodes N (N) in the federation&gt = 2), the maximization of the alliance total income is realized by establishing a maximization alliance benefit function and a minimization alliance relay node cost function. In view of the situation that the interference to the adjacent nodes is increased due to the excessive transmitting power of the relay node, so as to form the vicious competition that each node increases the power successively, the invention adopts the transmitting modeThe fairness among the nodes is ensured by a cost function taking the power and the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end as factors. The following alliance optimization model is adopted:
gr mj >c mj
p>gp mj
wherein k =1,2 \ 8230n;
wherein Z (τ) i ) Representation of relay node alliance τ i The total yield of (a) of (b),representation of relay node alliance τ i The utility function of (a) is determined,representation of relay node alliance τ i N is the relay node association tau i Number of nodes (N)>=2),λ k Represents a node r mk Signal-to-interference ratio, gamma, of the signal arriving at destination node d tar Indicating the lowest signal-to-interference ratio that the destination node d can receive, i.e. the target signal-to-interference ratio. a is a k And b k A non-negative constant weight factor, λ k Is a node r mk Is used to satisfy the signal-to-interference ratio SIR and quality of service QoS of the node.
Indicates a relay node r mk The transmission power of the antenna is set to be,indicates a relay node r mk And the link gain between destination node d.Indicating that destination node d receives relay node r mk The signal bandwidth of (a). N is a radical of 0 Representing the channel additive gaussian noise power spectral density at the destination node d. P max Representing an upper limit for the transmission power of the relay node. Omega int The method represents that the relay node signal is interfered by other relay nodes when reaching a destination node, and the mean value is 0, and the variance is omega int Gaussian distribution noise.
And 4, step 4: when selected relay node alliance tau i When determined, the set of relay nodes { r } it contains m1 ,r m2 ,…r mN Is also determined, i.e. when the federation utility functionWhen the maximum value is taken, the control of the node transmitting power in the relay node alliance is considered so that the cost function is achievedAt minimum, the federation optimization model described in step 1 above can be simplified to:
whereinRepresentation of relay alliance tau i A cost function of forwarding the packet, andthen it indicates a relay node association tau i And the relay node adopts the optimal transmitting power to ensure that the cost function value of the relay alliance is minimum.
Step 5, calculating the relay alliance tau i Optimum total relay revenue, i.e.Z(τ i ) Representation of relay alliance tau i When the alliance nodes respectively adopt the optimal transmitting powerThen the relay alliance tau can be obtained i Optimal total relay return Z (τ) i ) * (ii) a Selecting different candidate relay alliances in the relay alliance set G again, repeating the step 3 and the step 4, and comparing the optimal total relay income of the different candidate relay alliances to obtain the optimal relay alliance tau * The following formula is satisfied:
has the advantages that:
1. the method comprises the steps of firstly setting an assumed scene of relay node forwarding, respectively establishing a utility function and a cost function of the relay alliance by utilizing virtual currency transactions and wireless communication channel environments, and well obtaining the optimal transmitting power of the relay alliance nodes by solving an optimization model through complete mathematical derivation.
2. The invention effectively promotes the enthusiasm of the relay node for participating in forwarding by maximizing the total income of the relay alliance, and the method is simple and easy to realize and has good application prospect.
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FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention exists in various heterogeneous networks in a wireless ubiquitous communication environment, such as: the communication model is set to be that a source node s is in a base station range to connect with a base station network, the source node s needs to send a packet to a destination node d, the destination node is not in the communication range of the source node s, and the source node s can select a relay node in a multi-network overlapping area between the source node s and the destination node to assist the source node to forward data. Suppose there are M relay nodes around the source node, where the set of relay nodes R = { R = { (R) } 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ,…,r M }, the formed relay node alliance has (2) M -1) Relay alliance setsIf the alliance set only comprises one node, the non-cooperative game model can be regarded as a single relay node.
Due to the limitation of the energy resource and the bandwidth of the network node, the selfishness of the relay node is realized in the forwarding process, namely a non-cooperative strategy is adopted, and the relay node considers the forwarding only under the condition that the obtained forwarding reward is higher than the forwarding cost. The incentive mechanism of the invention is established on the basis of virtual currency, if a source node s needs to provide services for other nodes, the virtual currency amount of the source node s is higher than the forwarding compensation sum provided by a relay node, the currency amount V of the source node s is set, and if the transaction can be smoothly carried out, the following requirements are met:
gr mj >c mj
p>gp mj
for source node s and relay node(r mj Epsilon is R), the strategy space of the source node is an expression { C } corresponding to { sending and abandoning } s ,I s }. While the relay nodeIs an expression C corresponding to forwarding and rejecting r ,I r }. Then the game process has four optional strategy sets { (C) s ,C r ),(C s ,I r ),(I s ,C r ),(I s ,I r ) And the benefits of the two parties corresponding to different policy sets are as follows:
U(C s ,C r )=(p-gp mj ,gr mj -c mj )
U(C s ,I r )=U(I s ,C r )=U(I s ,I r )=0
where p denotes packet success byForwarding the benefit, gp, obtained by the source node s mj Indicating that the source node s requires paymentCompensation of (2). gr is a group of mj To representReward gained by the node forwarding packets, c mj To representThe cost consumed by the node to forward the packet. When only the source node and the relay node adopt the cooperation strategy at the same time, the source node obtains the benefit P due to the successful transmission of the data and pays the compensation gp of the relay node mj Then the benefit of the strategy set source node is (p-gp) mj ). Relay nodeObtaining a forwarding packet reward gr mj Consumption forwarding cost c mj Then the strategy set relay nodeThe benefit is (gr) mj -c mj ). And other strategies collect the source node or the relay node and adopt the abandoning and rejecting strategy, the whole transaction fails, both parties do not have profit and cost, the respective benefits are fixed to be zero, and obviously, the cooperation strategy is the optimal strategy for both parties for the source node and the relay node.
The relay node alliance refers to that a plurality of relay nodes jointly form a interest group, and alliance individuals achieve game agreement through a trusted third party. And the relay nodes in the alliance uniformly adopt a forwarding strategy. Setting a relay node alliance tau composed of selections ii E G), wherein the set of relay nodes tau i ={r m1 ,r m2 ,…r mN };r mj Belongs to R, wherein j =1,2, \8230N; n is tau i The number of relay nodes. The utility function of the forwarding strategy for the relay node alliance is represented as follows:
in a common alliance game, alliances pursue maximum profit and simultaneously reduce loss among the alliances as much as possible. For a single node, the higher the signal-to-interference ratio is, the better the service quality is, the better the transmission efficiency is, but the energy resource and other losses of the node can be increased, meanwhile, the interference of other nodes in the alliance can be increased, and a vicious circle situation that the transmission power of other nodes is increased for increasing the signal-to-interference ratio can be caused. The cost function is expressed as follows:
wherein k =1,2 \ 8230n;
wherein N is a relay node alliance tau i Number of nodes (N)>=2),λ k Represents a node r mk Signal-to-interference ratio, gamma, of the signal arriving at destination node d tar Indicating the lowest signal-to-interference ratio that the destination node d can receive, i.e. the target signal-to-interference ratio. a is k And b k A non-negative constant weight factor, λ k Is node r mk Is used to satisfy the signal-to-interference ratio SIR and quality of service QoS of the node.Indicates a relay node r mk The transmission power of (a) is set,indicates a relay node r mk And the link gain between destination node d.Indicating destination node d is connectedReceiving relay node r mk The signal bandwidth of (a). N is a radical of 0 Representing the channel additive gaussian noise power spectral density at the destination node d. P max Representing an upper limit for the transmission power of the relay node. Omega int Indicating that the relay node signal is interfered by other relay nodes when reaching the destination node.
Therefore, the total revenue of the multi-relay node alliance incentive in the wireless ubiquitous environment can be expressed as the difference of the utility function and the cost function of the alliance, and the optimal relay node alliance is obtained by maximizing the utility of the alliance and minimizing the cost function of the alliance. Alliance tau i The total profit expression of (2) can be obtained:
gr mj >c mj
p>gp mj
wherein k =1,2 \ 8230n;
when relay node alliance tau i When determined, the source node and the relay node can know through transactionAnd the relay alliance cost function adjusts the transmitting power of each node in the alliance,and minimizing the cost function of the nodes in the alliance. I.e. solving for a minimum value for the cost function:
wherein k =1,2 \ 8230n;
will be paired withEach node transmit power is differentiated such that its partial derivative is 0:
similarly, a partial derivative formula of any relay node in the alliance can be obtained;
adjustment of a j 、b j And λ j (j =1,2, \ 8230; N) factor such thatCan be solved to obtain
Due to the functionThe second order partial derivative on the node power is positive, that is:
and the first derivative solution is unique, thenIn the interval [0, P ] max ]With and with only one point of minimum value
The relay alliance tau is obtained by the formula i Optimal total yield:
selecting different relay alliances in the relay alliance set G, repeating the optimization solution, and comparing and calculating the total benefits of the alliances under different candidate relay alliances to obtain the optimal relay node forwarding alliance tau * And satisfies the following formula:
as shown in fig. 1, the relay alliance incentive method of the present invention comprises the following steps:
setting a network communication scene model, determining the specific position distribution conditions of a source node s, a relay node set R and a destination node d, obtaining the channel condition information of each relay node through an environment perception technology, and determining a candidate relay node alliance setObtaining channel gains of a relay node and a destination nodeBandwidth of signal transmitted by relay node to destination nodeThe average interference omega of other nodes suffered by the destination node d int And channel noise power spectral density N 0 And the like.
The second step: initializing the maximum transmitting power p of the relay node according to the network environment and the channel condition of each relay node max Forwarding profit P by source node and relay node r mj (r mj E.g. R) forwarding cost c mj And source node and relay node r mj Negotiating to determine a forwarding compensation gp mj Forward bonus gr mj And so on.
The third step: establishing any relay alliance tau according to the parameter information obtained in the first step and the second step ii E G) is selected.
The fourth step: by relay alliance τ i Solving the optimal transmitting power set of each relay node in the alliance by the cost functionLet relay alliance τ i The cost function value of (a) is minimal.
The fifth step: substituting the optimal transmitting power set obtained in the fourth step into the total profit function of the alliance to solve the optimal total profit Z (tau) i ) * And different relay alliances are replaced in the relay alliance G, the total income of the different relay alliances is compared, and finally the best relay node forwarding alliance tau formed by the source nodes s is selected *
In summary, the excitation scheme for solving the optimal relay node association in the wireless ubiquitous environment provided by the embodiment of the present invention is described in detail above, and a person skilled in the art may change the concept of the embodiment of the present invention in the specific implementation and application scope.

Claims (7)

1. An excitation method of a multi-relay-node cooperative game is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1, setting a network communication scene model, determining the specific position distribution conditions of a source node s, a relay node set R and a destination node d, obtaining the channel condition information of each relay node through an environment perception technology, and determining a candidate relay node alliance setWherein M relay nodes form 2 M A federation of 1 relay node, obtaining a relay node r mj E R and destination node d channel gainObtaining a relay node r mj Signal bandwidth to destination node dObtaining the average interference power omega of the received signal of the destination node subjected to other relay nodes int And channel noise power spectral density N 0 A parameter;
and 2, step: initializing the maximum transmitting power p of the relay node according to the network environment and the channel condition of each relay node max Forwarding profit p of source node and relay node r mj Forwarding cost c mj A source node and a relay node r mj Negotiation-determined forwarding compensation gp mj And forwarding bonus gr mj
And 3, step 3: selecting any relay node alliance tau i And the number of nodes N in the alliance&=2, establishing a federation utility function according to the forwarding reward and the forwarding cost in the step 2Adopting a alliance cost function which takes node transmitting power and receiving end signal-to-interference ratio as factors and ensures node fairness and effectivenessExpressing the difference between the alliance utility function and the cost function as the total income function Z (tau) of the alliance i ) The maximization of the alliance total profit function is realized by maximizing the alliance utility function and minimizing the alliance cost function;
and 4, step 4: when selecting relay node alliance tau i Time, corresponding set of relay nodes { r } m1 ,r m2 ,…r mN Is determined, so as to work as a federation utility functionWhen taking the maximum value, for the alliance tau i In each relay node { r m1 ,r m2 ,…r mN Transmitting power of } in a wireless communication systemControl is performed so that the alliance cost functionMinimum, i.e. solve to obtain the coalition τ i Optimal transmission power of each relay node
Step 5, calculating the relay alliance tau i Is most preferredThe total revenue of relaying, i.e.Z(τ i ) Representation of relay alliance tau i When the alliance nodes respectively adopt the optimal transmitting powerThen the relay alliance tau can be obtained i Optimal total relay return Z (τ) i ) * (ii) a Selecting different relay alliances in the relay alliance set G again, repeating the step 3 and the step 4, and comparing the optimal relay total income of different candidate relay alliances to obtain the optimal relay alliance tau * The following formula is satisfied:
2. the method for exciting a multi-relay-node cooperative gaming according to claim 1, wherein the method step 3 is to adopt the following alliance optimization model, comprising:
gr mj >c mj
p>gp mj
wherein k =1,2 \ 8230n;
wherein, Z (τ) i ) Representation of relay node alliance tau i The total gain function of (a) is,representation of relay node alliance tau i The utility function of (a) is determined,representation of relay node alliance tau i Cost function of, N> =2 is relay node alliance tau i Number of nodes of (a), γ k Representing relay nodesSignal-to-interference ratio, gamma, of the signal arriving at destination node d tar Indicating the lowest acceptable signal-to-interference ratio, i.e. the target signal-to-interference ratio, a, of the destination node d k And b k A non-negative constant weight factor, λ k Is a relay node r mk For adjusting the centering relay node r mk The signal-to-interference ratio of and the quality of service requirements,indicates the relay node r mk The transmission power of (a) is set,indicates a relay node r mk And the link gain, W, between destination node d rmk Indicating that destination node d receives relay node r mk Signal bandwidth of, N 0 Representing the additive Gaussian noise power spectral density, P, of the channel at the destination node d max Represents the upper limit, omega, of the transmission power of the relay node int The received signal representing the destination node is subject to further relayingAverage interference power of the nodes, the average interference obeying a gaussian distribution.
3. The method for exciting a multi-relay-node cooperative game according to claim 1, wherein the league optimization model of the method step 4 is simplified as follows:
0≤p rmk ≤p max
wherein the content of the first and second substances,representing the cost function, gamma, of a relay association, τ i, forwarding a packet k Representing relay nodesSignal-to-interference ratio, gamma, of the signal arriving at destination node d tar Represents the lowest acceptable signal-to-interference ratio of the destination node d, i.e. the target signal-to-interference ratio, a k And b k A non-negative constant weight factor, λ k Is a relay node r mk For adjusting the centering relay node r mk The signal-to-interference ratio of (c) and the quality of service requirements,indicates the relay node r mk The transmission power of the antenna is set to be,indicates the relay node r mk And the link gain between the destination node d,indicating that destination node d receives relay node r mk Signal bandwidth of, N 0 Representing the additive Gaussian noise power spectral density, P, of the channel at the destination node d max Represents the upper limit, omega, of the transmission power of the relay node int The average interference power of the received signal of the destination node is represented by the average interference power of other relay nodes, the average interference follows Gaussian distribution, and each relay node adopts the optimal transmitting powerThe relay alliance cost function can be minimized.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: setting a communication scene of two-hop multi-node combined relay forwarding, wherein the scene has a source node s which needs other nodes to provide forwarding service, and a relay node set R = { R, namely M relay nodes which can provide forwarding service around the source node 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ,…,r M There is 2 relay alliance composed of d, M relay nodes as destination node M -1, so relay alliance setThe set of relay alliances formed by the 3 relay nodes i, j and k is { { i }, { j }, { k }, { i, j }, { i, k }, { j, k }, { i, j, k } }, wherein the { i }, { j }, and { k } represent single relay node alliances to form a non-cooperative game; selecting relay alliance tau from relay alliance set i The included relay node is provided with N&gt =2, then τ i ={r m1 ,r m2 ,…r mN In which r is mj Belongs to R and j =1,2, \8230AnN; setting relay nodeForwarding sub-divisionCost of group and resource consumption is c mj The profit of the source node s successfully forwarding the packet is p, and the source node s pays the relay nodeWith forwarding compensation of gpmj, relay nodeParticipation in forward earned forward bonus gr mj And the existing virtual currency amount of the source node s is V; setting V, c mj 、p、gpm j 、gr mj By adopting the same measuring mechanism and unit, the following conditions are required to be met when the source node and the relay node participate in the transaction:
gr mj >c mj
p>gp mj
5. the excitation method of the multi-relay-node cooperative game as claimed in claim 1, wherein the method utilizes game theory to model the multi-relay forwarding nodes, establishes utility functions and cost functions of relay node alliances, and selects an optimal relay node alliance for a source node requiring data transmission service.
6. The method for motivating multi-relay node cooperative gaming according to claim 1, wherein the method is characterized in that the total profit function of multi-relay node alliances in a wireless ubiquitous environment is expressed as the difference between an alliance utility function and an alliance cost function, and the optimal relay node alliance is obtained by maximizing the alliance utility function and minimizing the alliance cost function.
7. The method for exciting multi-relay-node cooperative gaming according to claim 1, wherein the method is applied to a wireless ubiquitous environment.
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