CN106851672A - The method and device that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model builds - Google Patents
The method and device that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model builds Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses the method and device that a kind of packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model builds, the method includes：It is determined that for the whole network G of packet forwarding；Repeating process based on packet, forms forwarding alliance S；The situation of forwarding packet is participated according to all nodes in forwarding alliance S, it is determined that the characteristic function v of forwarding alliance S；Node set and characteristic function v based on N number of rationality node, so determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).Through the above way, the present invention can further provide for theory- method-technology support for the selfish inspiration problem of follow-up solution Ad hoc network interior joints.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wireless network and communication technical field, more particularly to a kind of packet forwarding Game with Coalitions pays
The method and device of model construction.
Background technology
Ad hoc networks are made up of many nodes that can be moved freely, and each node plays the part of main frame and the dual angle of router
Color, communication between node is completed by the multi-hop transmission of wireless channel, via node.The networking does not rely on any fixation
Infrastructure, no center control is complete self-organizing, therefore it has very big difference with traditional wireless network.
In traditional emergency and Military Application, the node in Ad hoc networks is all with a kind of voluntarily positive cooperation pass-through mode
Carry out work.But, recently particularly in civil area, node is due to by its own processing capabilities, memory space and battery energy
The limitation of the various resources such as amount, node can show selfish behavior, abandon the message to be forwarded, and itself money is saved so as to reach
The purpose in source, reduces the performance of network.Thus it is guaranteed that in network selfish node excitation cooperation so that Logistics networks can
Turn into one of focus of research in current Ad hoc networks with the performance at property and its networking.
Currently employed game theory is more to strengthen the cooperative research method of selfish node in Ad hoc networks, but at present
Research be all concentrated mainly on the research category of non-cooperative game.In non-cooperative game, the emphasis emphasized is mainly reflected in section
The behavior that point itself is showed：The rationality node knot that selectable strategy, game are likely to occur during packet is forwarded
Fruit selection made corresponding with node etc..And in the other research branch cooperative game of game theory, commonly assume that between node
An agreement for enforceable common action is reached, i.e., a kind of " purpose of cooperation " may be shown between node, and it is this
Cooperation purpose is interior life.Currently, how to be solved by cooperative game the selfish inspiration problem of Ad hoc network interior joints into
It is one of topmost problem.
The content of the invention
The present invention solves the technical problem of the side that a kind of packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model of offer builds
Method and device, can provide theory- method-technology support to solve the selfish inspiration problem of Ad hoc network interior joints.
In order to solve the above technical problems, one aspect of the present invention is：A kind of packet forwarding alliance is provided
The method that game payment model builds, methods described includes：It is determined that for the whole network G of packet forwarding, wherein, the net
Network G is made up of N number of rationality node, and G is any digraph；Based on the repeating process of the packet, forwarding alliance S is formed, its
InThe situation of forwarding packet is participated according to all nodes in the forwarding alliance S, the spy of the forwarding alliance S is determined
Function v is levied,Wherein, δ is to be successfully transmitted packet to mesh from source node src
Node dest the reward factor, MsrcIt is the payment cost threshold of the maximum that source node src pre-sets, C (i) is to turn
The cost for forwarding node i to be produced due to receiving and forwarding packet in hair alliance, mr(i) and mfI () is respectively in forwarding alliance
Packet number and the packet number of actual forwarding that forward node i is received；Set of node based on N number of rationality node
Close and the characteristic function v, and then determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).
Wherein, methods described also includes：According to the different character types for participating in node in the forwarding alliance come fixed respectively
Each node of justice pays the calculation of distribution, and the character types of the node include：Source node, intermediate node and purpose section
Point.
Wherein, it is i to define intermediate node, and corresponding payments of the intermediate node i is xi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf
(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i)) C (i), wherein, α and β be respectively node i due to receive and forwarding packet and from source node src
The compensation of acquisition, xi≥0。
Wherein, the corresponding payments of the destination node dest is xdest, xdest=α mr(dest)-mr(dest)·C
(dest), wherein, mr(dest) it is the packet number that purpose node dest is received, C (dest) is purpose node due to connecing
The cost received packet and produce, xdest≥0。
Wherein, the corresponding payments of the source node src is xsrc,
Wherein, the forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG meets condition：max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf), wherein,
Wherein, the reward factor delta is the function δ (S) for forwarding alliance S, wherein,
And max (α, β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, the payment for defining arbitrary node j in N is assigned as xj, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG=(N, v) branch of Major Leagues
It is v (N) to pay, and the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, then ∑j∈Nxj=v (N).
Wherein, the Major Leagues for being formed by N number of rationality node meet following first condition and second condition, described first
Condition is：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf), the second condition is：
In order to solve the above technical problems, another technical solution used in the present invention is：A kind of packet forwarding alliance is provided
The device that game payment model builds, described device includes：First determining module, for determining the whole net for packet forwarding
Network G, wherein, the network G is made up of N number of rationality node, and G is any digraph；Module is formed, for based on the packet
Repeating process, forms forwarding alliance S, whereinSecond determining module, for according to all node ginsengs in the forwarding alliance S
With the situation of forwarding packet, the characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S is determined,
Wherein, δ is the reward factor that packet to destination node dest is successfully transmitted from source node src, MsrcFor source node src is advance
Set a maximum payment cost threshold, C (i) for forwarding alliance in forward node i due to receive and forwarding packet and
The cost of generation, mr(i) and mfI () forwards the packet number that node i is received with actual forwarding in being respectively forwarding alliance
Packet number；3rd determining module, for node set and the characteristic function v based on N number of rationality node, and then
Determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).
Wherein, described device also includes：Definition module, the definition module is used for according to different ginsengs in the forwarding alliance
Define the calculation that each node pays distribution respectively with the character types of node, the character types of the node include：Source
Node, intermediate node and destination node.
Wherein, it is i to define intermediate node, and corresponding payments of the intermediate node i is xi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf
(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i)) C (i), wherein, α and β be respectively node i due to receive and forwarding packet and from source node src
The compensation of acquisition, xi≥0。
Wherein, the corresponding payments of the destination node dest is xdest, xdest=α mr(dest)-mr(dest)·C
(dest), wherein, mr(dest) it is the packet number that purpose node dest is received, C (dest) is purpose node due to connecing
The cost received packet and produce, xdest≥0。
Wherein, the corresponding payments of the source node src is xsrc,
Wherein, the forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG meets condition：max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf), wherein,
Wherein, the reward factor delta is the function δ (S) for forwarding alliance S, wherein,
And max (α, β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, the payment for defining arbitrary node j in N is assigned as xj, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG=(N, v) branch of Major Leagues
It is v (N) to pay, and the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, then ∑j∈Nxj=v (N).
Wherein, the Major Leagues for being formed by N number of rationality node meet following first condition and second condition, described first
Condition is：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf), the second condition is：
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：The situation of prior art is different from, present invention determine that for packet forwarding
Whole network G；Based on the repeating process of the packet, forwarding alliance S is formed, whereinAccording to the forwarding
All nodes participate in the situation of forwarding packet in alliance S, determine the characteristic function v of the forwarding alliance S,Wherein, δ is to be successfully transmitted packet to destination node from source node src
The reward factor of dest, MsrcIt is the payment cost threshold of the maximum that source node src pre-sets, C (i) is forwarding alliance
The cost that middle forwarding node i is produced due to receiving and forwarding packet, mr(i) and mfI () forwards section in being respectively forwarding alliance
Packet number and the packet number of actual forwarding that point i is received；Node set and institute based on N number of rationality node
State characteristic function v, so determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).Because characteristic function is to turn
The corresponding payment of hair alliance, can be the selfish inspiration problem of follow-up solution Ad hoc network interior joints in this way
Further provide for theory- method-technology support.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of the implementation method of method one that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model of the present invention builds；
Fig. 2 is the signal of specific coalition formation in the method that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model of the present invention builds
Figure；
Fig. 3 is the structural representation of the implementation method of device one that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model of the present invention builds
Figure.
Specific embodiment
Before the invention is described in detail, the pre-knowledge of Game with Coalitions first probably illustratively related to the present invention.
Classical game theory thought can be divided into non-cooperative game and cooperative game.In non-cooperative game, the ginseng of game
Decision-making is carried out according to their perceptible environment and number one with people.Participant's effectiveness depends not only on factum choosing
Select, and influenceed by other participant's behaviors.In non-cooperative game, the emphasis emphasized is mainly reflected in individual behavior：
What rationality participant selectable action in competitive environment isWhat the issuable result of game isRationality participant
Which type of decision-making can be madeIn cooperative game, it is assumed that participant has an agreement for enforceable common action, that is, cooperate
It is external.At this moment the emphasis emphasized embodies：Which type of alliance these participants can constituteIn alliance, how really
Determine the size of the power between participantHow reasonably to go to distribute the cooperation benefit (or overhead cost) obtained by alliance
In non-cooperative game, the result produced by the equilibrium between each participant is the product of competition, in general,
And it is unsatisfactory.Because they may show a kind of " purpose of cooperation ", this cooperation purpose is interior life, but this
Cooperation purpose does not have strict execution agreement.In cooperative game, an existing external cooperation agreement, this structure between participant
Into the fundamental difference of two class games.
To there is N number of participant to participate in the process of game, then I={ 1,2 ..., N }, any one subset S of set I are called
One alliance.
Define 1 (alliance)：If participant's collection of game is combined into I={ 1,2 ..., N }, arbitrarilyThen S is called of I
Alliance.In particular cases,And a kind of this situation of S=I, S=I are referred to as a Major Leagues (The Grand
Coalition)。
Define 2 (characteristic functions)：If participant's collection of game is combined into I={ 1,2 ..., N }, v (S) is defined in all of N
Real-valued function in subset (i.e. alliance), i.e. v:2N→ R (R is real-valued set), its satisfaction：Then
V (S) is called a characteristic function.
Define 3 (Game with Coalitions)：Given participant's set I and characteristic function v, the cooperative game for being carried out as alliance wins
Play chess CG, be expressed as CG=(I, v).
In theory, all participants in game want to be added in Major Leagues, in order to Major Leagues in appoint
What two participant cooperates with each other.Because each participant is rationality, can freely according to itself institute
The situation of benefit of making a profit, selection is added to different alliances, therefore, it is necessary to it is its institute to ensure that each participant adds Major Leagues
Select optimal strategy.
In Game with Coalitions theory, there is a strong concept-core (Core).It is specific as follows：
Define 4 (cores)：Game with Coalitions CG=(I, v) in, core C (v) is to meet payment that following condition is defined distribution
Vector x (x ∈ RN) set：
Wherein, xiThe payment distribution obtained by participant i.
Note：The core that Game with Coalitions is formed is a vector set, can be arbitrary size set, or empty set.
In order to ensure the core for finding is an optimal solution, it is necessary to the optimal core for being formed meets following condition：
Define 5 (optimal cores)：Game with Coalitions CG=(I, v) in, optimal core CoV the formation of () must is fulfilled for following bar
Part：
Individual rationality (Individual Rationality)：xi≥v({i}).I.e.：Any one participant is added to connection
In alliance's game, its allocated resulting payment distribution at least should be better than itself independently executing.
Alliance's rationality (Coalitional Rationality)：Due to the rationality of node, its own is possibly off current institute
The alliance of addition, and the payment distribution for obtaining it in other alliances that addition is formed reaches maximization.
Validity (Effectiveness)：I.e.：Payment distribution total value and institute of Major Leagues in Game with Coalitions
The income equality for obtaining, in the absence of more or less situation.
The present invention is described in detail with implementation method below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
Under Game with Coalitions theoretical frame, the repeating process for Ad hoc network interior joint packets carries out shape to the present invention
Formulaization is defined, and abstract is forwarding Game with Coalitions process, establishes allied member's interior joint and pays distribution model, is analyzed to ensure
The corresponding constraints that Major Leagues are formed as stable nucleus and meet.It is that excitation is set up in Ad hoc networks by building the model
Cooperation routing algorithm provides theoretical reference and reference, and the model is that the enthusiasm of effectively excitation selfish node cooperation forwarding is carried
For technical foundation, and attack influence of the selfish node on network is further reduced, the performance of network can be greatly improved.
In order to carry out formal definitions to model, first the specific situation of model is carried out as described below：
(1) whole network G (V, E) is made up of N number of rationality node, and G is any digraph, and V and E is then respectively node and profit
The line set of data formation is forwarded with link.
(2) and if only if node x, when y is in transmission range each other, link (x, y) ∈ E therebetween, and all links are equal in E
It is two-way.
(3) node is all worked when proper communication is carried out with promiscuous mode, to monitor neighbor node cooperation forwarding data
The situation of bag.
(4) in network each rationality node i participate in packet repeating process in, such as the node packet for receiving is entered
Row forwarding then its behavior be called cooperation behavior, and the node does not receive packet or do not forward packet then its behavior be called selfishness
Behavior.
(5) Game with Coalitions (referred to as " forwarding Game with Coalitions ") FCG=(N, v) (Forwarding is forwarded in packet
Coalitional Game) in, gambling process is initially transmission packet, the end of gambling process since source node src
It is untill destination node dest receives the packet of source node transmission.Wherein N=| V |, the alliance that v is obtained by FCG alliances
Pay.
(6) node in FCG is all rationality, and node can decide addition in its sole discretion or move back according to the situation of Profit of oneself
Go out the alliance formed in network, but node is provided to for the purpose of the maximum revenue for being obtained it.
(7) alliance that FCG is formed can only finally be added to an alliance for any node in non-overlapped alliance, i.e. network
In, and in the absence of juxtaposition situation between alliance.Additionally, being cooperated with each other between any node in alliance.
(8) source node src with destination node dest in order to ensure completing normal communication process, it is necessary to join in paying alliance
The expense produced for its forwarding packet with forward node.Therefore, the present invention is that source node src pre-sets a maximum
Pay cost threshold Msrc。
Refering to Fig. 1, Fig. 1 is the stream of the implementation method of method one that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model of the present invention builds
Cheng Tu, the method includes：
Step S101：It is determined that for the whole network G of packet forwarding, wherein, network G is made up of N number of rationality node, G
It is any digraph.
Rationality node refers to after node in network is added in Game with Coalitions, in its allocated resulting payment at least
When payment than itself independently executing acquisition will be good, its tendency is incorporated into the node in Game with Coalitions.In other words, if
After node is added in Game with Coalitions, its allocated resulting payment paid at least than itself independently executing acquisition is good
When, it is intended to be added in Game with Coalitions, without being intended in disengaging Game with Coalitions.
One figure by some dots (referred to as summit or node) and link these round dots straight line or curve (referred to as side)
Composition, if specifying a direction to each edge of figure, it is exactly an arrow direction indication to show, then the figure for obtaining
Referred to as digraph, its side is also referred to as directed edge, and node can only one-way communication or transmission message.
Step S102：Repeating process based on packet, forms forwarding alliance S, wherein
In repeating process, the node in network is all rationality to packet, freely can be made a profit according to itself
The situation of benefit, selection is added in different alliances, thus forms forwarding alliance S.
Referring to Fig. 2, Fig. 2 is the schematic diagram of specific coalition formation, and 11 nodes form Liang Ge alliances in Fig. 2 (a)：Alliance
1 and alliance 2.It has been correspondingly formed in Fig. 2 (b) comprising 11 Major Leagues of node.
Step S103：The situation of forwarding packet is participated according to all nodes in forwarding alliance S, it is determined that forwarding alliance S
Characteristic function v,
Wherein, δ is the reward factor that packet to destination node dest is successfully transmitted from source node src, MsrcIt is source node
The payment cost threshold of the maximum that src pre-sets, C (i) is for forwarding node i is due to reception in forwarding alliance and forwards number
The cost produced according to bag, mr(i) and mfI () is respectively the packet number and reality in forwarding alliance forwarding node i to receive
The packet number of forwarding.
The characteristic function v for forwarding alliance S is actually forward alliance and obtained because of the forwarding that participates in packet net total
Income,δ·MsrcProduced for forwarding alliance includes reception and forwarding packet
Raw cost in interior total revenue,For forwarding alliance receive and forwarding packet and produce into
This.
Step S104：Node set and characteristic function v based on N number of rationality node, and then determine packet forwarding alliance
Game payment model FCG=(N, v).
Forwarding alliance quantity and characteristic function that node set according to N number of rationality node is formed, it may be determined that number
According to bag forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).
Embodiment of the present invention determines the whole network G for packet forwarding；Repeating process based on packet, forms
Forwarding alliance S, whereinThe situation of forwarding packet is participated according to all nodes in forwarding alliance S, it is determined that forwarding alliance S
Characteristic function v,Wherein, δ is to be successfully transmitted packet from source node src
To the reward factor of destination node dest, MsrcIt is the payment cost threshold of the maximum that source node src pre-sets, C (i)
It is the cost for forwarding node i to be produced due to receiving and forwarding packet in forwarding alliance, mr(i) and mfI () is respectively forwarding connection
Packet number and the actual packet number for forwarding that node i is received are forwarded in alliance；Set of node based on N number of rationality node
Close and characteristic function v, and then determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).Because characteristic function is
The corresponding payment of forwarding alliance, can be that the selfish excitation of follow-up solution Ad hoc network interior joints is asked in this way
Topic further provides for theory- method-technology support.
The method also includes：Each node is defined respectively according to the different character types for participating in node in forwarding alliance to pay
The calculation of distribution, the character types of node include：Source node, intermediate node and destination node.
Wherein, it is i to define intermediate node, and corresponding payments of intermediate node i is xi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr
(i)+mf(i)) C (i), wherein, α and β is respectively what node i was obtained due to receiving and forwarding packet from source node src
Compensation, xi≥0。
Intermediate node refers to the transition node for participating in forwarding packet, the intermediate node in forwarding alliance be except source node and
The main node existed outside destination node.In communication process, the role that this kind of node mainly undertakes：From upper hop neighbours
Node receives the packet for sending and gives next-hop neighbor node with forwarding packet.Therefore, in embodiments, then it is main to consider
The reception and forwarding behavior of node pay the influence that distribution is produced to it.
The corresponding payments of intermediate node i is xi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i)) C (i), α mr
(i)+β·mf(i) for intermediate node due to receive and forward packet and from source node src obtain including receive and forwarding number
The cost produced according to bag is in interior total compensation, (mr(i)+mf(i)) C (i) for intermediate node receive and forwarding packet and produce
Cost.In order to ensure the rationality of node, xi≥0。
Through the above way, the final net payout status of any one intermediate node are obtained in that, i.e. intermediate node is made a profit
The situation of benefit.
Wherein, the corresponding payments of destination node dest is xdest, xdest=α mr(dest)-mr(dest) C (dest),
Wherein, mr(dest) it is the packet number that purpose node dest is received, C (dest) is purpose node due to receiving packet
And the cost for producing, xdest≥0。
Destination node is the end node that packet is eventually arrived at.Destination node main angle for undertaking in alliance is forwarded
Color：Transmitted packet is simply passively received from upper hop surrounding neighbours node, intermediate node is can be regarded as without turning
The special circumstances being distributed as.
The corresponding payments of destination node dest is xdest, xdest=α mr(dest)-mr(dest) C (dest), α mr
(dest) for the cost produced including receiving packet that purpose node is obtained due to receiving packet from source node src exists
Interior total compensation, mr(dest) cost that C (dest) is produced for purpose node receives packet.In order to ensure the reason of node
Property, xi≥0。
Through the above way, be obtained in that the final net payout status of destination node, i.e. destination node make a profit benefit feelings
Condition.
Wherein, the corresponding payments of source node src is xsrc,Source
Node is the start-stop node that packet initially sends.Source node normally communicates to complete to be set up with destination node, whole
Forwarding alliance on the one hand simply to destination node send packet, on the other hand will also to forwarding alliance in intermediate node and
Destination node pays corresponding compensation.
Through the above way, be obtained in that the final net payout status of source node, i.e. source node make a profit benefit situation.
Wherein, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG meets condition：max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf), wherein,
In order to ensure node rationality, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG needs to meet condition：max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf),
Wherein,Proof procedure is as follows：
Prove：In Major Leagues form theory, it was demonstrated that all nodes all meet individual rationality in alliance, that is, need to prove to appoint
The payment distribution of node i of anticipating meets xi≥v({i})。
Situation 1, for the payment distribution of intermediate node i：Such as intermediate node i forms an independent alliance { i }, then v (i)
=0；Simultaneously because mr(i)=mf(i)=0, then xi=0, i.e. xi=v ({ i }).
Situation 2, for the payment distribution of destination node dest：As destination node dest forms an independent alliance
{ dest }, then v ({ dest })=0；Similarly due to mr(dest)=0, then xdest=0, i.e. xdest=v ({ dest }).
Situation 3, for the payment distribution of source node src：Similar to situation 1 and situation 2, source node src forms one solely
Vertical alliance { src }, the corresponding payment of the alliance is v ({ src })=0.And distribute formula, source according to the payment of above-mentioned source node
The payment of node src is assigned as xsrc：
In order to reach the individual rationality of source node src, i.e. xsrc>=v ({ src }), but due to v ({ src })=0, therefore
X only need to be ensuredsrc>=0, then show that the precondition of needs satisfaction is as follows by calculating inequality：max(α,β)≤δ·
Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, reward factor delta is the function δ (S) for forwarding alliance S, wherein,And max
(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
If the node in alliance is unsatisfactory for the condition of alliance's rationality, node is possible to leave Major Leagues, and adds and formed
Other alliances in come make its obtain payment distribution reach maximization.For the ease of being analyzed to alliance's rationality, this implementation
Mode for reward factor delta redefined, will δ be configured to allianceFunction δ (S)：Saved in alliance S
Mutually forwarding packet (forwarding and reception behavior features) and the cooperation behavior proportion that produces between point.Specifically by the calculating of δ (S)
Method is defined as follows：
In above formula, all nodes that δ (S) is in alliance S in addition to source node are produced and received and forwarding packet
Corresponding with all nodes in the Major Leagues generation of sum the total ratio of packet.It will be apparent that when in Major Leagues, node it
Between all cooperate with each other, it can be deduced that：δ (S)=1.Herein by δ (S) is introduced, alliance is further paid the calculating of v (S)
Formula is updated as follows：
Therefore, how to ensure that any node in Major Leagues does not produce the behavior for deviateing Major LeaguesI.e. any node is all
Voluntarily it is added in Major Leagues very much, the payment distribution being maintained at obtained in Major Leagues is maximum.Present embodiment is by following knot
The required condition for meeting is drawn by line justification is entered to problem above.
Conclusion：Forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG=(N, v) in, it is assumed that any allianceIts corresponding alliance pays
V (S) is：In order to ensure the alliance for being formed
Meet alliance's rationality, then need to meet following condition：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf).I.e., it is ensured that any rationality in Major Leagues
Node is all unwilling to leave Major Leagues and be added in other alliances.
Prove：Situation 1, if alliance S includes src nodes, intermediate node i and dest a node.Therefore this section pair
Alliance's rationality of alliance S proves to be converted into the proof to individual rationality.From above-mentioned individual rationality, alliance S in the case of this
Meet alliance's rationality.
Situation 2, if alliance S includes src and dest nodes, in the presence of the situation of its some intermediate node in S.Need herein
Sum (∑ is distributed in the payment that alliance S is obtained by part of nodes to v (S) and in Major Leaguesi∈Sxi) contrasted.It is very aobvious
So, if ∑i∈Sxi>=v (S), then it represents that the alliance that the alliance that can not possibly have the subset of any node to be formed obtains pays ratio and exists
The payment distribution sum that correspondence is obtained in Major Leagues is big.Therefore, present embodiment only needs to prove Σi∈Sxi>=v (S), tool
Body proof procedure is as follows：
Therefore, in order to ensure ∑i∈Sxi>=v (S), only then need to draw the precondition for needing to meet by calculating inequality
：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
In order to the payment distribution for ensureing all nodes in Major Leagues in FCG has validity, present embodiment only need to be to institute
Payment distribution corresponding with the alliance alliance's payout status of summation for having node carry out balance contrast, it is desirable to can not exist or more or
It is few all not reach the possibility for paying distribution.Assuming that the payment of arbitrary node j is assigned as x in Nj, and the alliance of Major Leagues pays
It is v (N) that then the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, there is following two conclusions.
Wherein, the payment for defining arbitrary node j in N is assigned as xj, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG=(N, v) branch of Major Leagues
It is v (N) to pay, and the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, then ∑j∈Nxj=v (N).
Wherein, the Major Leagues for being formed by N number of rationality node meet following first condition and second condition, and first condition is：
max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf), second condition is：
Conclusion：In Major Leagues, in order to the payment distribution of all nodes in Major Leagues has validity, then need to meet as follows
Condition：∑j∈Nxj=v (N).
Prove：Due to containing source node src and destination node dest in Major Leagues, then the payment of all nodes divides in N
It is ∑ with sumj∈Nxj.According to above-mentioned intermediate node, destination node and the corresponding formula of source node, then ∑j∈NxjIt is calculated as follows：
It will be apparent that the payment distribution of all nodes of Major Leagues has validity.
Conclusion：Forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG=(N, v) in, it is assumed that any allianceIts corresponding alliance pays
V (S) is：The payment distribution of arbitrary node j in N
It is xjIf meeting following two conditions：
Condition 1：α and β parameters meet：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)
Condition 2：
Then the payment distribution of all nodes has the characteristic of core in N, and the Major Leagues for now being formed are with stable and non-
Empty coalition structure characteristic.
By paying the determination of distribution to forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG nodes, on the one hand cause that the payment that node is obtained is received
Benefit is maximized, and on the other hand causes that each node is all ready to be added in Major Leagues, is all energetically willing to participate in turning for packet
Hair, in the absence of selfish non-cooperation behavior, so that it is guaranteed that the stability of forwarding coalition structure is effectively restrained, network node
Between cooperative keep stabilization state.
Referring to Fig. 3, Fig. 3 is the knot of the implementation method of device one that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model of the present invention builds
Structure schematic diagram, the device of present embodiment can perform the step in the above method, and the detailed description of related content is referred to
Method part is stated, is no longer gone to live in the household of one's in-laws on getting married chat herein.
The device includes：First determining module 101, the module 102 that formed, the second determining module 103 and the 3rd determine mould
Block 104.
First determining module 101 is used for the whole network G for determining to be forwarded for packet, wherein, network G is by N number of rationality
Node is constituted, and G is any digraph；
Forming module 102 is used for the repeating process based on packet, forms forwarding alliance S, wherein
Second determining module 103 is used to participate in the situation of forwarding packet according to all nodes in forwarding alliance S, it is determined that turning
The characteristic function v of alliance S is sent out,Wherein, δ is successfully to be sent out from source node src
Send packet to the reward factor of destination node dest, MsrcIt is the payment expense threshold of the maximum that source node src pre-sets
Value, C (i) is the cost for forwarding node i to be produced due to reception and forwarding packet in forwarding alliance, mr(i) and mf(i) difference
It is the packet number and the packet number of actual forwarding that forward node i to receive in forwarding alliance；
3rd determining module 104 is used for node set and characteristic function v based on N number of rationality node, and then determines data
Bag forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).
Embodiment of the present invention determines the whole network G for packet forwarding；Repeating process based on packet, forms
Forwarding alliance S, whereinThe situation of forwarding packet is participated according to all nodes in forwarding alliance S, it is determined that forwarding alliance S
Characteristic function v,Wherein, δ is to be successfully transmitted packet from source node src
To the reward factor of destination node dest, MsrcIt is the payment cost threshold of the maximum that source node src pre-sets, C (i)
It is the cost for forwarding node i to be produced due to receiving and forwarding packet in forwarding alliance, mr(i) and mfI () is respectively forwarding connection
Packet number and the actual packet number for forwarding that node i is received are forwarded in alliance；Set of node based on N number of rationality node
Close and characteristic function v, and then determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).Because characteristic function is
The corresponding payment of forwarding alliance, can be that the selfish excitation of follow-up solution Ad hoc network interior joints is asked in this way
Topic further provides for theory- method-technology support.
Wherein, the device also includes definition module, and this definition module is used for according to different participation nodes in forwarding alliance
Character types define the calculation that each node pays distribution respectively, and the character types of node include：Source node, intermediate node
And destination node.
Wherein, it is i to define intermediate node, and corresponding payments of intermediate node i is xi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr
(i)+mf(i)) C (i), wherein, α and β is respectively what node i was obtained due to receiving and forwarding packet from source node src
Compensation, xi≥0。
Wherein, the corresponding payments of destination node dest is xdest, xdest=α mr(dest)-mr(dest) C (dest),
Wherein, mr(dest) it is the packet number that purpose node dest is received, C (dest) is purpose node due to receiving packet
And the cost for producing, xdest≥0。
Wherein, the corresponding payments of source node src is xsrc,
Wherein, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG meets condition：max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf), wherein,
Wherein, reward factor delta is the function δ (S) for forwarding alliance S, wherein,And max
(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
Wherein, the payment for defining arbitrary node j in N is assigned as xj, forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG=(N, v) branch of Major Leagues
It is v (N) to pay, and the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, then ∑j∈Nxj=v (N).
Wherein, the Major Leagues for being formed by N number of rationality node meet following first condition and second condition, and first condition is：
max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf), second condition is：
Embodiments of the present invention are the foregoing is only, the scope of the claims of the invention is not thereby limited, it is every using this
Equivalent structure or equivalent flow conversion that description of the invention and accompanying drawing content are made, or directly or indirectly it is used in other correlations
Technical field, is included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (18)
1. a kind of method that packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model builds, it is characterised in that methods described includes：
It is determined that for the whole network G of packet forwarding, wherein, the network G is made up of N number of rationality node, and G is any oriented
Figure；
Based on the repeating process of the packet, forwarding alliance S is formed, wherein
The situation of forwarding packet is participated according to all nodes in the forwarding alliance S, the feature letter of the forwarding alliance S is determined
Number v,Wherein, δ is to be successfully transmitted packet to purpose section from source node src
The reward factor of point dest, MsrcIt is the payment cost threshold of the maximum that source node src pre-sets, C (i) joins for forwarding
The cost for forwarding node i to be produced due to receiving and forwarding packet in alliance, mr(i) and mfI () forwards in being respectively forwarding alliance
Packet number and the packet number of actual forwarding that node i is received；
Node set and the characteristic function v based on N number of rationality node, and then determine packet forwarding Game with Coalitions
Payment model FCG=(N, v).
2. method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that methods described also includes：According to it is described forwarding alliance in not
Define the calculation that each node pays distribution, the character types bag of the node respectively with the character types for participating in node
Include：Source node, intermediate node and destination node.
3. method according to claim 2, it is characterised in that definition intermediate node is i, the intermediate node i is corresponding
It is x to payi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i)) C (i), wherein, α and β is respectively node i due to receiving
The compensation obtained from source node src with packet is forwarded, xi≥0。
4. method according to claim 2, it is characterised in that the corresponding payments of the destination node dest is xdest, xdest
=α mr(dest)-mr(dest) C (dest), wherein, mr(dest) it is the packet number that purpose node dest is received,
The cost that C (dest) is produced for purpose node due to receiving packet, xdest≥0。
5. method according to claim 2, it is characterised in that the corresponding payments of the source node src is xsrc,
6. the method according to claim any one of 2-5, it is characterised in that the forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG meets condition：
max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf), wherein,
7. method according to claim 6, it is characterised in that the reward factor delta is the function δ (S) for forwarding alliance S,
Wherein,And max (α, β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
8. method according to claim 7, it is characterised in that the payment for defining arbitrary node j in N is assigned as xj, forwarding connection
(N, the v) payment of Major Leagues is v (N) to alliance game FCG=, and the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, then ∑j∈Nxj
=v (N).
9. method according to claim 8, it is characterised in that the Major Leagues formed by N number of rationality node meet with
Lower first condition and second condition, the first condition is：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf), the second condition is：
10. the device that a kind of packet forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model builds, it is characterised in that described device includes：
First determining module, for determining the whole network G for packet forwarding, wherein, the network G is by N number of rationality section
Point is constituted, and G is any digraph；
Module is formed, for the repeating process based on the packet, forwarding alliance S is formed, wherein
Second determining module, the situation for participating in forwarding packet according to all nodes in the forwarding alliance S, it is determined that described
The characteristic function v of alliance S is forwarded,Wherein, δ is from source node src successes
Send the reward factor of packet to destination node dest, MsrcIt is the payment expense of the maximum that source node src pre-sets
Threshold value, C (i) is the cost for forwarding node i to be produced due to reception and forwarding packet in forwarding alliance, mr(i) and mf(i) point
The packet number and the actual packet number for forwarding for forwarding node i to receive in alliance Wei not forwarded；
3rd determining module, for node set and the characteristic function v based on N number of rationality node, and then determines number
According to bag forwarding Game with Coalitions payment model FCG=(N, v).
11. devices according to claim 10, it is characterised in that described device also includes：Definition module, the definition mould
Block is used to define the calculating that each node pays distribution respectively according to the different character types for participating in node in the forwarding alliance
Mode, the character types of the node include：Source node, intermediate node and destination node.
12. devices according to claim 11, it is characterised in that definition intermediate node is i, the intermediate node i correspondences
Payment be xi, xi=α mr(i)+β·mf(i)-(mr(i)+mf(i)) C (i), wherein, α and β is respectively node i due to connecing
Receipts and the compensation for forwarding packet and being obtained from source node src, xi≥0。
13. devices according to claim 11, it is characterised in that the corresponding payments of the destination node dest is xdest,
xdest=α mr(dest)-mr(dest) C (dest), wherein, mr(dest) packet for receiving for purpose node dest
Number, the cost that C (dest) is produced for purpose node due to receiving packet, xdest≥0。
14. devices according to claim 11, it is characterised in that the corresponding payments of the source node src is xsrc,
15. device according to claim any one of 11-14, it is characterised in that the forwarding Game with Coalitions FCG meets bar
Part：max(α,β)≤δ·Msrc/(mr+mf), wherein,
16. devices according to claim 15, it is characterised in that the reward factor delta is the function δ for forwarding alliance S
(S), wherein,And max (α, β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf)。
17. devices according to claim 16, it is characterised in that the payment for defining arbitrary node j in N is assigned as xj, forwarding
(N, the v) payment of Major Leagues is v (N) to Game with Coalitions FCG=, and the payment distribution sum of all nodes is ∑ in Nj∈Nxj, then ∑j∈ Nxj=v (N).
18. devices according to claim 17, it is characterised in that the Major Leagues formed by N number of rationality node meet
Following first condition and second condition, the first condition is：max(α,β)≤Msrc/(mr+mf), the second condition is：
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