CN106797313B - 利用动态密钥生成的网络认证系统 - Google Patents

利用动态密钥生成的网络认证系统 Download PDF

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CN106797313B
CN106797313B CN201580027307.3A CN201580027307A CN106797313B CN 106797313 B CN106797313 B CN 106797313B CN 201580027307 A CN201580027307 A CN 201580027307A CN 106797313 B CN106797313 B CN 106797313B
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communications device
secure communications
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identification module
packet
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J·沃尔什
J·R·瓦尔拉本斯泰因
C·蒂姆科
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Cypress Electronics Co ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
    • G09C1/00—Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/045—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks

Abstract

具有动态密码生成的网络认证系统利于确立两个端点标识，以及使用两个终端设备(可能在单独的局域网上)之间动态生成的密钥的安全通信通道。交互式或非交互式认证协议用于确立目标终端设备的标识，并且动态密钥生成用于确立用于创建终端设备之间的加密通信通道的共享对称会话密钥。

Description

利用动态密钥生成的网络认证系统
技术领域
本公开一般地涉及网络认证，尤其而非排他地涉及通过代换来防护篡改和破坏的认证。
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请要求2014年5月22日提交的美国临时专利申请序号62/001,979的优先权的利益且该申请通过引用方式并入。
背景技术
在线通信的主要的方面是两个端点基于它们各自的标识来建立认证通道的能力。对此的一种解决方案采用公共密钥基础设施(PKI)，其中公共密钥允许终端设备被合理地确信它们仅相互通信。然而，在该方案中，端点及其标识通常是独立的，即，任意标识生成且分配给端点。
在各种设备认证方案中，物理不可克隆函数(PUF)已经被使用，使得每个设备具有本质上与该设备链接的唯一标识。Rührmair等人(“Modeling Attacks on PhysicalUnclonable Functions”，Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer andcommunications security,CCS’10,第237-249页，ACM，2010)限定了三个不同类的PUF设备：
·弱PUF通常仅用于取得私密密钥。挑战空间会受限制，并且假设响应空间永不显露。典型的构造包括SRAM(Holcomb等人，“Initial SRAM State as a Fingerprint andSource of True Random Numbers for RFID Tags”，In Proceedings of the Conferenceon RFID Security,2007)，Butterfly(Kumar等人，“Extended abstract:The ButterflyPUF Protecting IP on Every FPGA”，IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust,第67-70页,2008)，Arbiter(Lee等人，“A technique tobuild a secret key in integrated circuits for identification andauthentication applications,”，IEEE Symposium on VLSI Circuits:Digest ofTechnical Papers,第176-179页,2004)，Ring Oscillator(Suh等人，“PhysicalUnclonable Functions for Device Authentication and Secret Key Generation”，Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference,DAC’07，第9-14页，ACM,2007)，以及Coating(Tuyls等人，“Read-Proof Hardware from ProtectiveCoatings”，Proceedings of the 8th international conference on CryptographicHardware and Embedded Systems,CHES’06,第369-383页，Springer，2006)PUF。
·强PUF假设：(i)物理上不可能克隆，(ii)不可能在合理的时间内收集挑战响应对的完整集合(典型地花费数周的数量级的时间)，以及(iii)难以预测对随机挑战的响应。例如，Rührmair所描述的超高信息含量(SHIC)PUF(“Applications of High-CapacityCrossbar Memories in Cryptography”，IEEE Trans.Nanotechnol.，卷10，第3：489-498,2011)可被视为强PUF。
·受控PUF满足了强PUF的所有标准，并且另外地实现了能够计算更先进功能以通过密码学增强协议的辅助控制单元。
PUF输出是有噪声的，因为尽管评估相同的输出其会略微变化。这通常是利用模糊提取来解决的，模糊提取是一种开发用来消除生物计量测量值的噪声的方法。(参见Juels等人，“A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme”，Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference onComputer and Communications Security,CCS’99，第28-36页，ACM，1999)。模糊提取可以部分地用在具有PUF的设备内，例如用在辅助控制单元内，使得输出对于固定输入是恒定的。模糊提取(或者逆模糊提取)可以例如采用“安全略图”，如Juels等人所说明的，以存储待重构的敏感值V和用于恢复V的帮助字符串P。输入字符串O的安全略图SS可以例如定义为
Figure BDA0001158675750000021
其中ECC是能够校正t个误差的长度为n的二进制(n,k,2t+1)误差纠正码并且V←{0，1}k是k位值。利用误差纠正码ECC和O’的译码方案D，给定在O的最大Hamming距离内的帮助字符串P和输入O’，原始值V则可以再现为
Figure BDA0001158675750000031
绑定到设备d的物理不可克隆函数
Figure BDA0001158675750000038
优选地呈现出以下特性：
1、不可克隆性：
Figure BDA0001158675750000039
利用克隆PUF P’来复制PUF P而使得其输出分布t统计接近的概率小于某足够小的∈1。
2、不可预测性：期望的是对于大于可忽略概率的挑战c对手不能预测设备的PUF响应(至少在不对设备进行物理访问的情况下)，并且该帮助数据不会向对手透露有关PUF响应的任何信息。假定所有实体被约束于概率多项式时间(PPT)，即，仅能关于全局安全参数λ(其是指相应参数中的位数)高效地执行在多项式上需要很多操作的计算，则
Figure BDA0001158675750000032
表示对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000033
猜测PUF P对挑战c的正确响应r的概率，优选地在k2上可忽略。这可以例如通过对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000034
与PUF设备P之间的、将来自长度为k1的挑战空间
Figure BDA0001158675750000035
的输入字符串映射到长度为k2的响应空间
Figure BDA0001158675750000036
的游戏：
Figure BDA00011586757500000310
来评估，其中是λ协议的安全参数，一元地给定为1λ。
PUF-PRED：PUF预测游戏
Figure BDA0001158675750000037
Figure BDA0001158675750000041
游戏如下进行：
1、对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000042
以多项式发布多个(关于安全参数λ)挑战
Figure BDA0001158675750000043
到PUF设备P，其中
Figure BDA0001158675750000044
挑战集合是整个挑战空间
Figure BDA0001158675750000045
的正确子集。
2、PUF设备P返回响应{ri|ri←P(ci)}到
Figure BDA0001158675750000046
3、对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000047
最终输出不再挑战查询的原始集合
Figure BDA0001158675750000048
内的挑战c。不允许对手关于提交的挑战c查询PUF设备P。
4、对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000049
可能再次发布新的多项式形式的多挑战集合
Figure BDA00011586757500000410
到PUF设备P。不允许对手关于所提交的挑战c查询PUF设备P。
5、PUF设备P返回响应{r′i|r′i←P(c′i)}给
Figure BDA00011586757500000411
6、对手
Figure BDA00011586757500000412
最终输出P对所提交的挑战c的响应的猜测(guess)r’。
仅当猜测r’等于P对
Figure BDA00011586757500000413
的所提交的挑战c的实际响应r←P(c)时，对手才赢得游戏。(如所提到的，PUF的输出有噪声且将对于任何固定输入略微变化，因此相等通常是关于模糊提取器的输出来考虑的(例如，Dodis等人，“Fuzzy Extractors:How to GenerateStrong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data”，SIAM J.Comput,卷38，no.1:97-139,2008))。
3、鲁棒性：
Figure BDA00011586757500000414
即，固定PUFP对于相同的输入x产生响应t距离的概率小于某足够小的∈2。
4、不可区分性：PUF设备的输出(典型地是模拟提取器的输出)优选地在计算上不能区分于相同长度
Figure BDA0001158675750000051
的随机字符串，使得PPT对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000052
的优点
Figure BDA0001158675750000053
至多可忽略地大于
Figure BDA0001158675750000054
PUF的不可区分性可以通过例如这样的游戏来评估“请对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000055
区分用于PUF P的模糊提取器的输出r与相同长度
Figure BDA0001158675750000056
的随机选择的字符串
Figure BDA0001158675750000057
PUF-IND：PUF不可区分性游戏
Figure BDA0001158675750000058
该游戏如下进行：
1、对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000059
对于任何挑战
Figure BDA00011586757500000510
执行注册阶段。
2、PUF设备从Gen的输出返回相应的帮助字符串Hi。将该挑战-帮助对(ci，Hi)的集合记为
Figure BDA00011586757500000511
3、对手
Figure BDA00011586757500000512
现在对于任何
Figure BDA00011586757500000513
请求PUF响应ri＝P(ci)。将该步骤中的所请求的挑战的集合记为
Figure BDA0001158675750000061
4、对于所有请求
Figure BDA0001158675750000062
PUF设备返回集合{ri|ri←P(ci)}。
5、对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000063
选择挑战
Figure BDA0001158675750000064
使得对于c，
Figure BDA0001158675750000065
具有Hi，而不是Ri。PUF设备随机均匀地选择位b∈{0，1}。
6、如果b＝0，则
Figure BDA0001158675750000066
被给定Ri＝Rep(P(c)＝ri，Hi)。否则，如果b＝1，则
Figure BDA0001158675750000067
被给定随机字符串
Figure BDA0001158675750000068
7、允许对手
Figure BDA0001158675750000069
对于
Figure BDA00011586757500000610
查询PUF设备，只要不是c′i＝c。
8、对于所有的请求c′i≠c，PUF设备返回集合{r′i|r′i←P(c′i)}。
9、对手输出猜测位b’，并且当b’＝b时成功。
PUF的相关评估是由如下文献给出：Hori等人，“Quantitative and StatisticalPerformance Evaluation of Arbiter Physical Unclonable Fuctions on FPGA”，2010International Conference on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGA(ReConFig)，第298-303页，2010；Maiti，A Systematic Approach to Design an Eficient PhysicalUnclonable Function,dissertation,Virginia Tech,2012,以及其它。
各种认证方案使用知识的零知识证据，这是一种假设给定的陈述为真，同时不透露任何超越该事实的内容。零知识证据是两方之间的交互：希望确立陈述的有效性的证明者
Figure BDA00011586757500000611
以及必须确信陈述为真的验证者
Figure BDA00011586757500000612
必须以真的陈述实际上为真的压倒性概率使验证者确信。利用知识的零知识证据，验证者不会使用来自先前证据的消息来使新的一方确信陈述的有效性，并且消息仅透露了单位信息：证明者
Figure BDA00011586757500000613
是否具有秘密。有两种普通类的零知识证据：交互式零知识证据，其中一系列消息在证明者
Figure BDA00011586757500000614
与验证者
Figure BDA00011586757500000615
之间交换，以及非交互式零知识证据，其中证明者
Figure BDA00011586757500000616
传达单一消息
Figure BDA00011586757500000617
而不与
Figure BDA00011586757500000618
交互，而使
Figure BDA00011586757500000619
确信
Figure BDA00011586757500000620
具有秘密。许多(交互式)零知识证据系统要求多次迭代来确立陈述的有效性。也即，每次交互可以以某概率成功，即使证明者不具有秘密(或陈述为假)。因此，如果当陈述为假时成功的概率是p，则协议运行n次，直至1-(p)n充分接近1。
发明内容
根据本发明的实施方案的认证系统利于两个端点标识的确立，以及利用两个终端设备(可能在单独的局域网上)之间的动态生成的密钥的安全通信通道。交互式或非交互式认证协议用于确立目标终端设备的标识，并且动态密钥生成用于确立用来创建终端设备之间的加密通信通道的共享的对称会话密钥。在一个实施方案中，共享的对称会话密钥则会如所期望地更新，并且在新动态生成的密钥下加密。
附图说明
图1是示出在本发明的实施方案中设备之间的动态密钥生成的示意图。
具体实施方式
本详细说明基于使用密码学椭圆曲线(包括相关联的术语和协约)的实施方案的实施例，但是本文发明构思和教导同样适用于其它各种密码学方案，诸如采用比如离散对数或因数化的不同问题的方案。同样，本发明不受可能利用或借助本发明所采用的本文所述的各种附加特征限制。
为了构造设备的本质标识，生成设备的标识的公共表示(此处称为注册记号或公共密钥)。可以使用椭圆曲线数学架构，但是本领域技术人员将认识到，其它架构(例如，离散对数架构，在这方面美国专利第8,918,647号通过引用并入此处)将提供相同的功能。响应于服务器的挑战查询(或多个查询)，从每个PUF设备d收集密码学注册记号(或一系列记号){(cd，Pd，Ad mod p)}。每个设备从空间{0，1}λ随机地均匀地选择私有密钥
Figure BDA0001158675750000071
其中λ是安全参数(例如，模量p中的位数)并且计算
Figure BDA0001158675750000072
作为设备的公共密钥，其中G是在
Figure BDA0001158675750000073
中椭圆曲线上的阶q的基点。优选地，没有敏感信息在通信通道上传输或者存储在非易失性存储器中(例如，设备可以在生成Ad后丢弃
Figure BDA0001158675750000074
)。当需要
Figure BDA0001158675750000075
来认证设备时，注册记号(cd，Pd，Ad mod p)允许设备d再生成
Figure BDA0001158675750000076
并且完成证据。算法1以伪码描述了示范性的注册协议。
Figure BDA0001158675750000081
(注册过程优选地应当仅需要一次，并且优选地应当确保在安全违背的情形下设备能够通过服务器侧的微小变化而保持活跃，而无需再注册。如在通过引用方式合并于本文的美国专利第8,918,647中所描述的，可构造挑战-响应树，其中仅根节点直接从PUF响应得到，所得到的记号从注册期间收集的那些中生成)。
PUF使能的设备可以优选地在本地存储和取回敏感值，而不将任何敏感信息存储在非易失性存储器中。算法2示出了了使用PUF存储敏感值(例如，
Figure BDA0001158675750000082
)，并且算法3示出了敏感值的再生成。设备d的挑战cd和帮助数据helperd可以是公共的，因为任何一者均没有透露任何有关敏感值的内容。虽然本实施例使用了利用异或
Figure BDA0001158675750000083
对敏感值加密，可替代地，该值可以例如用于形成其它加密算法(例如，AES)的密钥来使能任意大小的值的存储和取回。
Figure BDA0001158675750000091
Figure BDA0001158675750000092
每当O和O′是t接近时，错误校正码ECC可以传递到译码算法D来恢复敏感值。
认证阶段允许服务器验证客户端设备经认证而发布请求。在椭圆曲线实施方案中，在接收到来自设备的请求时，服务器可以构造Chaum等人(“An Improved Protocol forDemonstrating Possession of Discrete Logarithms and some Generalizations”，Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Theory andapplication of cryptographic techniques,EUROCRYPT’87,第127-141页，Springer，1988)的与设备d的零知识证据协议椭圆曲线变体以确立执行请求的许可，如算法4所示的。
Figure BDA0001158675750000101
对交互式零知识证据中来自验证终端设备的通信的要求是获得特定于当前证据的当前值。这防止了偷听的对手使用来自有效设备的先前证据来成功地完成认证协议且伪装为终端设备。
非交互式零知识证据去除了该通信要求，并且允许证据在不与验证端点交互的情况下完成。算法4的非交互式构造要求设备以防止证明终端设备操纵证据的方式代表验证者生成当前。作为一个实施例，证明终端设备可以构造当前N为
Figure BDA0001158675750000102
其中H是哈希函数，τ是时间戳，x|y表示x和y的级联。时间戳确保通过证明终端设备构造的先前证据未来不会被对手重播，而哈希函数确保证明终端设备不能以对手的方式操纵挑战。时间戳优选地无需在到达证明者时匹配当前的时间戳，验证端点反而校验时间戳合理地是当前的(例如，第二粒度级)并且单调地增加以防止重播攻击。算法5提供了非交互式认证协议。
Figure BDA0001158675750000111
可以采用非交互式认证从而提供零知识中的第一分组认证。例如，通过证明终端设备发送的第一分组可以包含以下认证记号，其足以使得验证终端设备确立证明的终端设备的标识：
Figure BDA0001158675750000112
认证是第一分组，因为在构造认证记号之前，与接收(验证)终端设备的任何通信都是不必要的。此外，发送(证明)终端设备的验证在不与发送(证明)终端设备通信的情况下完成。观察到分组auth的偷听对手将不能重播分组，因为时间戳τ不再是当前的。算法6示出了设备到设备第一分组相互认证。
Figure BDA0001158675750000121
两个通信设备能够如所期望地(即，动态地)利用算法6(再)认证并且同时通过发送包括认证记号和新会话密钥的auth-update消息来确立新会话密钥。参考图1，例如，如果设备D1希望向设备D5证明第一分组上的标识，则同时与设备D5确立新的会话密钥，auth-update分组则是
Figure BDA0001158675750000122
该设备的一个实施方案可以包括配备有例如215,000个逻辑单元、13兆字节的块随机存取存储器以及700个数字信号处理(DSP)片的Xilinx Artix 7现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)平台。在采用例如椭圆曲线密码学的实施方案中，硬件数学引擎可以被例示在板上DSP片中，PUF构造位于逻辑单元内，并且逻辑处理核包括到PUF的输入和输出并且构造为控制那些以及该设备的外部输入和输出并且执行算法(发送椭圆曲线和其它数学计算到数学引擎)，如上文所描述的那些。如此构造的设备(图1中的D1-D8)随后可以连接(例如，经由网络)并且执行非交互式相互认证和动态密钥生成。若干其它物理实施方案是显而易见的，诸如在较大的集成电路上使用涂层PUF，等等。
在另一实施方案中，目标终端设备的新的“公共密钥”可以生成，而无需与目标终端设备通信来对新的随机会话密钥加密，新的随机会话密钥加密将取代当前的会话密钥。新的公共密钥可以利用如在该方面通过引用方式并入的美国专利第8,918,647中所描述的取得的记号如所期望的那样来生成。
本领域技术人员将认识到，示范性的特征和算法的其它组合和改动可以用于不同的应用，并且设备的硬件标识的使用可应用于不受所提供的实施例的零知识方面所限制的各种密码学认证技术。例如，希望与系统通信的设备可以初始地执行认证，诸如根据算法5来在第一分组中认证系统并且系统随后可以利用设备执行动态会话密钥确立协议(通过auth-update消息)以开始安全通信通道。此外，认证协议无需限于零知识，并且可以基于用于确立标识的其它密码学构造。例如，服务器可以向设备发送挑战消息，设备利用其硬件标识(例如使用由设备PUF再生成的私有密钥和标准签名算法)对该挑战消息进行数字签名并且在返回服务器的分组报头(例如，TCP选项报头(TCP Options Header)包括该签名。在接收到时，服务器利用设备的公共密钥验证其挑战上的数字签名是有效的。
因为本发明的一个实施方案依赖于椭圆曲线数学架构，本领域技术人员将认识到，其可以扩展以支持基于密码学强制角色的访问控制(RBAC)。也即，数据访问策略和设备证书可以数学方式规定，并且RBAC算法计算映射策略
Figure BDA0001158675750000131
和证书
Figure BDA0001158675750000132
到{0，1}中的访问决策的函数
Figure BDA0001158675750000133
这通常是通过构造双线性配对(例如，Weil或Tate配对)来实现的。

Claims (15)

1.安全通信设备，包括：
a.通信输入和通信输出；
b.硬件标识模块，其包括所述设备独有的硬件固有标识；以及
c.逻辑处理器，其与所述通信输入和通信输出连接且与所述硬件标识模块连接；
其中所述安全通信设备被配置为通过经由所述通信输出向期望的接收设备发送包含零知识证据认证令牌的第一分组来执行非交互式认证，所述零知识证据认证令牌是针对所述安全通信设备的公共密钥可验证的且基于所述安全通信设备的所述硬件固有标识，并且其中所述安全通信设备被进一步配置为生成加密的会话密钥且在所述第一分组中包括所述加密的会话密钥。
2.如权利要求1所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备被进一步配置为利用非对称加密和所述期望接收设备的公共密钥对包含在所述第一分组中的会话密钥加密。
3.如权利要求1所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备被进一步配置为在所述第一分组中包括所述安全通信设备对所述会话密钥的加密签名。
4.如权利要求2所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备被进一步配置为在所述第一分组中包括所述安全通信设备对所述会话密钥的加密签名。
5.如权利要求1、2、3或4所述的安全通信设备，其中所述认证令牌基于时间戳。
6.如权利要求1、2、3或4所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备被配置为发送包括基于所述安全通信设备的硬件固有标识的认证令牌且包括新会话密钥的认证更新分组。
7.如权利要求1、2、3或4所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备还包括数学引擎。
8.如权利要求7所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备被配置为执行椭圆曲线密码学，并且所述数学引擎被配置为执行椭圆曲线计算。
9.如权利要求1、2、3或4所述的安全通信设备，其中所述安全通信设备被进一步配置为发送包含更新后的公共密钥的认证更新分组。
10.如权利要求1、2、3或4所述的安全通信设备，其中所述硬件标识模块是物理不可克隆函数。
11.如权利要求5所述的安全通信设备，其中所述硬件标识模块是物理不可克隆函数。
12.如权利要求6所述的安全通信设备，其中所述硬件标识模块是物理不可克隆函数。
13.如权利要求7所述的安全通信设备，其中所述硬件标识模块是物理不可克隆函数。
14.如权利要求8所述的安全通信设备，其中所述硬件标识模块是物理不可克隆函数。
15.如权利要求9所述的安全通信设备，其中所述硬件标识模块是物理不可克隆函数。
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