CN106296441B - Method, device and equipment for physical process failure of application passive system - Google Patents
Method, device and equipment for physical process failure of application passive system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
A method, a device and equipment for physical process failure of a passive system are provided. A method for applying passive system physical process failure comprises the following steps: searching whether an event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains a question header related to the passive system; if yes, determining the specific meaning of the header related to the passive system in the event tree; and connecting the passive system physical process failure into the event tree according to the specific meaning.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of nuclear power station probability safety evaluation, in particular to a method, a device and equipment for applying passive system physical process failure in nuclear power station probability safety evaluation.
Background
The probability safety evaluation method is accepted by the industry after the Sanli island nuclear accident and is widely applied to the safety evaluation process of the nuclear power plant, along with the further development and application of the method, in many nuclear safety laws and regulations and guidance documents, the idea of risk guidance is increasingly mentioned and popularized, and the probability safety evaluation method is also more widely and deeply applied to the design, evidence obtaining, operation, maintenance, post-treatment of fuel and other links of the nuclear power plant.
In order to improve the safety level of the nuclear power station and avoid the occurrence of similar accidents and serious consequences caused by the similar accidents, the passive safety system is applied to a reactor type of a new generation to ensure that the nuclear power station can still be maintained in a safe state through the passive system for a long time without human intervention, and the adoption of a passive design is also a main trend of the development of the current nuclear power station.
Passive systems generally rely on natural laws of gravity, natural convection, and heat transfer to operate without the need for external power. The passive system has the advantages of simple structure, less dependence on external control signals and personnel operation and the like, and the reliability of the passive system is improved. However, since the passive system operates according to the natural law, the driving force is weak, the passive system is more sensitive to the dependence on environmental conditions and parameters than the active system, and the physical process failure also becomes an important factor of the passive system operation failure, the reliability evaluation process should be fully considered, which is the biggest difference from the traditional active system reliability analysis.
Since the last 90 s, some european research and development organizations and organizations have conducted research on Passive System Reliability methods, and after twenty years of development, Passive System Reliability Evaluation methods represented by Reliability Evaluation of Passive Safety Systems in europe (Reliability Evaluation of Passive Safety Systems: RMPS) and Passive System Reliability Evaluation in india (Assessment of Passive System Reliability: APSRA) have been developed. The RMPS method is based on an evaluation of the failure probability of the system to perform the desired function for a given set of scenarios, taking into account the uncertainty of those physical and geometrical parameters whose deviations may cause the system to fail. However, it is complicated to consider physical process failures in the probabilistic safety assessment model proposed by the RMPS method. In the APSRA method, the failure surface is generated by considering all those comparison parameters that affect the performance of the system. The cause of the deviation of these parameters is then found by root diagnostics. However, the APSRA method is the same as the probabilistic safety evaluation method of the conventional active nuclear power plant, and only hardware is evaluated, and physical process failure is not considered. And no specific method or flow for applying the passive system reliability evaluation result to the PSA model is given in any of the RMPS method and the APSRA method, and this patent describes in detail in this section.
In terms of nuclear power plant safety, there have been many methods for assessing risk in nuclear power plants. Calculating a risk assessment of the nuclear power plant under a risk-based real-time evaluation model according to a maintenance type equipment state value as proposed in invention 1 (CN 10710400B); invention 2 (CN 103685490A) proposes to evaluate the safety level of a power plant based on the performance status of the power plant system/equipment and the power plant system/equipment information recorded in the power plant system/failure database; in an article, calculating the physical failure probability of a passive system of a seawater desalination reactor by using a self-adaptive Monte Carlo method, researching the physical failure probability of the passive system by using a self-adaptive Monte Carlo method and other methods existing at present in 31 st phase 1 and 61-64 pages of Schopper et al, Yu Mei, Yu hong star, Li Ji, Thoron, nuclear power engineering; in the article "analysis method for reliability of passive system", Chenjuan et al, Hua electric technology, vol.35, No. 2, pages 14-17 "and" analysis method for reliability of passive system ", Yuyu et al, the reliability of passive system of nuclear power plant was analyzed for the specificity of less hardware failure and more physical process failure.
The existing literature is investigated to find that the conventional probabilistic safety evaluation method of the passive nuclear power station only evaluates the factors such as hardware, human factors and the like, or only proposes how to calculate the failure probability of the physical process of the passive system, but does not propose how to simply and effectively apply the physical process failure of the passive system to a probabilistic safety evaluation model. With the popularization of passive nuclear power plants and the deepening of people's knowledge of passive systems, how to reflect the reliability of the physical process failure of the passive systems in the process of evaluating the probability safety of the nuclear power plants becomes a problem to be solved.
Disclosure of Invention
To this end, a method, apparatus and device are provided herein for simply and efficiently applying passive system physical process failures in a probabilistic security evaluation model.
According to one aspect of the invention, a method for applying passive system physical process failure is provided, which comprises the following steps: searching whether an event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains a question header related to the passive system; if yes, determining the specific meaning of the header related to the passive system in the event tree; and connecting the passive system physical process failure into the event tree according to the specific meaning.
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an apparatus for physical process failure using a passive system, comprising: the searching module is used for searching whether the event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains the question header related to the passive system; the determining module is used for determining the specific meaning of the topic head related to the passive system in the event tree if the topic head related to the passive system in the event tree is contained; and the connection module is used for connecting the passive system physical process failure to the event tree according to the specific significance.
According to still another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an apparatus for physical process failure using a passive system, comprising: the device is used for searching whether the event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains the question header related to the passive system; means for determining, if included, a specific meaning of a passive system related header in the event tree; and means for fail-connecting the passive system physical process into the event tree according to the specific meaning.
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The principles of the present invention will become more apparent to those skilled in the art after reading the embodiments in accordance with the present invention as described in conjunction with the following drawings.
FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of a method of applying passive physical process failure, according to an embodiment of the invention.
FIG. 2 illustrates a flow diagram of a method of applying passive physical process failure according to further embodiments of the present invention.
FIG. 3 shows a simplified block diagram of an apparatus employing passive physical process failure, according to an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 4 shows a simplified block diagram of an apparatus for applying passive physical process failure according to a further embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 shows a schematic diagram of a failure tree model of a passive system.
FIG. 6 shows a schematic diagram of an exemplary pressure vessel external cooling (ERVC) system fault tree.
Detailed Description
In the following detailed description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of embodiments of the invention. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be practiced without these specific details.
FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of a method 100 of applying passive physical process failure, according to an embodiment of the invention. Before the application of the method, a passive system reliability result is obtained according to a passive system reliability evaluation method such as RMPS or APSRA.
First, in step S101, an event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model is determined.
Then, in step S102, it is searched whether the event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model includes a topic associated with the passive system.
Next, if the passive system related header is included in the event tree, in step S103, the specific meaning of the passive system related header in the event tree is determined. In the probabilistic security evaluation model, the headings of the event tree describe the course of an accident.
Finally, at step S104, the passive system physical process failures are tied into the event tree according to the specific significance. The passive system reliability result obtained according to the passive system reliability averaging method is connected to the event tree in a numerical mode and serves as an input parameter for calculation according to the probability safety analysis model.
Through the process, the physical process failure of the passive system can be applied to the probability safety evaluation process, the probability safety analysis model of the passive power station is perfected, and an effective method is provided for ensuring the correctness and the rationality of the model. On the basis, a good foundation can be provided for the overall safety evaluation of the nuclear power station, the optimization of system design, the identification of important equipment, the subsequent operation maintenance or risk real-time monitoring of the nuclear power station and other work.
The application of the passive system physical process failure in the nuclear power plant probabilistic safety analysis model is further described in more detail below with reference to FIG. 2. FIG. 2 illustrates a flow diagram of a method of applying passive physical process failure according to further embodiments of the present invention. Prior to application of the method, passive system reliability results are obtained according to a passive system reliability averaging method such as RMPS or APSRA.
As in fig. 1, first, in step S201, an event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model is determined.
Then, in step 202, it is searched whether the event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model contains a topic related to the passive system. For the case where the passive system related header is not included, it is also determined whether the incident sequence is related to a passive system at step S204. This is because the probability of system physical process failure is not considered when some accident scenarios have confirmed the hardware success of the passive system or have satisfied the condition of the passive system operation, and thus is not reflected in the event tree header. If the accident sequence is associated with a passive system, then in step S205, the header associated with the passive system is added.
Next, if the passive system related header is included in the event tree or added, the specific meaning of the passive system related header in the event tree is determined in step S203 as in fig. 1. In step S206, it is determined whether the failure of the hardware of the passive system needs to be considered at the topic according to the specific meaning of the topic associated with the passive system in the event tree. The evaluation method of hardware failure is mature and is applied to the traditional probability safety evaluation process.
For the case that the hardware failure of the passive system does not need to be considered, in step S207, the passive system physical process failure is connected to the header of the event tree as a basic event. The physical process failure is used as a basic event, and the failure probability value is the reliability analysis result and can be obtained through RMPS (remote math platform systems), for example. The passive system reliability result obtained according to the passive system reliability averaging method is connected to the event tree in a numerical mode and serves as an input parameter for calculation according to the probability safety analysis model.
In the case that the hardware failure of the passive system needs to be considered, in step S208, a fault tree of the passive system is established. The fault tree can comprise a hardware failure part and a physical process failure part, and is connected under the top event of the failure of the passive system in an OR relationship, because the failure of the hardware of the passive system or the physical process can cause the failure of the whole system. In fig. 5, a schematic diagram of such a passive system failure fault tree model is shown. The hardware failure part can be subdivided according to a traditional method until a basic event of a hardware level, the physical process failure serves as a basic event, and the failure probability value is a reliability analysis result of the physical process failure, and can be obtained through RMPS (remote math platform). Wherein the passive system reliability results obtained according to the passive system reliability averaging method are included as a basic event in the fault tree for calculation according to the probabilistic safety analysis model.
After the fault tree is established, the fault tree is connected to the head of the event tree in step S209. And calculating the failure probability of the passive system by using the established new fault tree of the passive system.
After the event tree is updated, for example, after the passive system physical process failure is connected to the subject of the event tree as a basic event or the fault tree including the passive system hardware failure and the physical process failure is connected to the subject of the event tree, in step S210, the probabilistic safety evaluation model is analyzed, for example, to obtain the probability of core damage or radioactive material mass release.
According to the method, the failure of the physical process of the passive system can be reflected in the probability safety analysis model of the whole nuclear power station, the safety state of the nuclear power station is reflected more truly, the probability of large-scale release of a new containment can be obtained, and a new minimum cut set, importance and sensitivity analysis result is given, so that great help is provided for guiding and discovering weak links of the design and operation of the nuclear power station. In addition, the probability safety analysis model after the method is improved can support the contents of safety inspection, design optimization, operation maintenance and the like of the nuclear power station, improve the safety and the economy of the nuclear power station, and play a positive promoting role in the development of the probability safety evaluation technology of the passive nuclear power station.
An apparatus employing passive physical process failure according to an embodiment of the present invention is described below with reference to fig. 3 and 4.
FIG. 3 shows a simplified block diagram of an apparatus 300 for employing passive physical process failure, according to an embodiment of the invention. The apparatus 300 comprises a look-up module 301, a determination module 302, and a connection module 303.
In this embodiment, the searching module 301 searches whether the event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model includes a topic header related to the passive system, and sends the search result to the determining module 302.
The determination module 302 receives the lookup result. And if the search result indicates that the passive system-related header is included, the determining module 302 determines the specific meaning of the passive system-related header in the event tree. The connection module 303 is configured to connect the passive system physical process failure to the event tree according to the specific meaning determined by the determination module 302.
It should be understood that apparatus 300 may also include other modules, including, for example, a module for determining an event tree in a probabilistic security evaluation model, a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a memory, a communication unit, etc., as the invention is not limited in this respect.
Fig. 4 shows a simplified block diagram of an apparatus 400 for applying passive physical process failure according to a further embodiment of the present invention. In addition to the search module 401, the determination module 402 and the connection module 403 as the modules shown in fig. 3, the apparatus 400 further comprises an analysis module 404, and the connection module 403 further comprises a judgment module 403-1 and a tree building module 403-2.
In this embodiment, the searching module 401 searches whether the event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model includes a topic header related to the passive system, and sends the search result to the determining module 402. In addition, the lookup module 401 is also used to determine whether the incident sequence is associated with a passive system and, if so, to add a header associated with the passive system.
The determination module 402 receives the lookup result. And if the search result indicates that the passive system-related header is included (or added), the determining module 402 determines the specific meaning of the passive system-related header in the event tree.
In the apparatus 400, the connection module 403 further includes a judgment module 403-1 and a tree building module. The judging module 403-1 judges whether the hardware failure of the non-kinetic energy system needs to be considered at the question head according to the specific meaning of the question head related to the non-kinetic energy system in the event tree. If the determining module 403-1 determines that the passive system hardware failure does not need to be considered at the header, the connecting module 403 connects the passive system physical process failure as a basic event to the header of the event tree. If the judging module 403-1 judges that the failure of the hardware of the passive system needs to be considered at the subject, the tree establishing module 403-2 establishes a failure tree of the passive system, and the connecting module 403 connects the failure tree to the subject of the event tree, wherein the failure tree includes a hardware failure part and a physical process failure part and is connected under the top event of the failure of the passive system in an or relationship, because the failure of the hardware or the physical process of the passive system can cause the failure of the whole system. In fig. 5, a schematic diagram of such a passive system failure fault tree model is shown.
After the event tree is updated, for example, after the connection module 403 connects the passive system physical process failure as a basic event to the subject of the event tree or connects the established fault tree to the subject of the event tree, the analysis module 404 analyzes the probabilistic safety evaluation model, for example, obtains the probability of core damage or radioactive substance release in a large scale.
It should be understood that the apparatus 400 may further include other modules, for example, a module for determining an event tree in the probabilistic security evaluation model, a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a memory, a communication unit, etc., and the determining module 403-1 and the tree building module 403-2 may also be external to the connecting module 403, and the invention is not limited in this respect.
The device for applying the passive physical process failure according to the present invention can obtain the same advantages and effects as the method for applying the passive physical process failure according to the present invention, and will not be described herein again.
By way of example, considering an AP1000 passive pressure vessel external natural circulation cooling passive system (ERVC), the method described herein is used to add physical process failures to the AP1000 probabilistic safety analysis model, making the event and fault trees more rational and completing the probabilistic safety analysis model.
The method described in the invention is implemented as follows:
1. finding ERVC-related topic header in event tree in AP1000 probability security analysis model
Firstly, determining an external natural circulation cooling system of the AP1000 pressure container as a research object, and searching whether an ERVC-related question header is contained in an AP1000 probability safety analysis event tree model. The ERVC-related header does not exist through searching, but in 9 event trees of 1A, 1P, 2E and the like, the heap cavity flooding header event is related to an ERVC system, so that the header is added for further analysis.
2. Determining the concrete significance of heap cavity flooding header in event tree
The concrete meanings of the heap cavity inundation header in each event tree are different, six event trees of 1A, 1P, 2L, 2R, 3A and 3C are obtained through judgment, the heap cavity is already inundated along with the process of an accident, and the heap cavity inundation header indicates whether the ERVC natural circulation is successful or not, so that the process does not involve ERVC hardware failure. For three event trees 2E, 3D and 6, according to the analysis of accident progress, a process of cooling water injection is also required to complete the flooding of the heap cavity, thus involving hardware failure of the ERVC.
3. Connecting ERVC physical process failure to head of event tree in form of basic event
For six event trees of 1A, 1P, 2L, 2R, 3A and 3C which do not relate to ERVC hardware failure, the ERVC physical process failure can be obtained by a passive system reliability evaluation method (RMPS), and the reliability is 0.81. Establishing ERVC physical process failure basic event with failure probability of 0.19, and connecting the basic event to the heap cavity flooding header of six event trees of 1A, 1P, 2L, 2R, 3A and 3C.
4. Establishing ERVC system failure fault tree
For three event trees of 2E, 3D and 6 related to hardware failure of the ERVC, failure of the ERVC system can be divided into hardware failure and physical process failure, and a failure tree FERVC of the ERVC system is established according to a failure tree model diagram shown in fig. 5, as shown in fig. 6. The fault tree represents hardware failures in the left half and physical process failures in the right half. According to the established FERVC fault tree, the failure probability of the FERVC fault tree is 0.2 through analysis.
5. Heading connecting FERVC fault tree to event tree
The FERVC fault tree is connected to the head of a pile cavity flooding problem of three event trees of 2E, 3D and 6, and a probabilistic safety analysis model containing the physical process of the ERVC system is formed.
6. Computational analysis probability safety analysis model
After the event tree and the fault tree model are updated, the analysis and calculation of the whole power plant probability safety analysis model are carried out, and information such as the probability of radioactive substance large-scale release is updated, and the information is shown in table 1. The probability safety evaluation result of failure in the physical process of adding the ERVC is different from the prior probability safety evaluation result, and the large-scale release probability value of the containment is increased from the original 1.95E-8 per reactor year to 5.9E-8 per reactor year, which reflects the influence of the physical process of the passive system on the probability safety analysis of the whole nuclear power plant.
| Type of consequence | Original probability safety analysis model result | Updated probabilistic security analysis model results |
| BP | 5.94E-9 | 5.94E-9 |
| CFE | 1.2E-8 | 5.17E-8 |
| CFI | 1.26E-9 | 1.26E-9 |
| CFL | 2.48E-15 | 2.48E-15 |
| CI | 4.03E-10 | 4.03E-10 |
| LRF | 1.95E-8 | 5.9E-8 |
Table 1: the method adds the comparison between the probability safety evaluation result of ERVC physical process failure and the previous result.
By the method, the ERVC physical process failure is added into the AP1000 probability safety evaluation model, a reasonable result is obtained, and the effectiveness of the method is proved.
The present invention may be embodied as methods, apparatus, and/or computer program product implemented devices. Accordingly, the present invention may be embodied in hardware and/or in software (including firmware, resident software, micro-code, etc.). Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product on a computer-usable or computer-readable storage medium having computer-usable or computer-readable program code embodied in the medium for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system. In the context of this document, a computer-usable or computer-readable medium may be any medium that can contain, store, or propagate the program for use by or in connection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
Software may be comprised of computer executable instructions stored on a computer readable medium such as a memory or other type of storage device. Further, such functions correspond to modules, which are software, hardware, firmware, or a combination thereof. Multiple functions may be performed in one or more modules as desired, and the described embodiments are merely examples. The software may be executed on a digital signal processor, ASIC, microprocessor, or other type of processor that operates directly on a computer system, such as a personal computer, server, or other computer system.
The method, the device and the equipment provided by the invention have simple specific implementation process and effectively apply the passive system physical process failure in the probabilistic safety analysis model. The probability safety analysis model obtained by the invention reflects the characteristics of the passive system and the passive nuclear power station, reflects the safety state of the nuclear power station more truly and has very important significance.
The above disclosure is only for the specific embodiments of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited thereto, and those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Such modifications and variations are intended to be included herein within the scope of the appended claims.
Claims (13)
1. A method for using passive system physical process failures, comprising:
searching whether an event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains a question header related to the passive system;
if yes, determining the specific meaning of the header related to the passive system in the event tree; and
and connecting the passive system physical process failure to the event tree according to the specific significance, wherein the passive system reliability result obtained according to the passive system reliability averaging method is connected to the event tree in a numerical form and is used as an input parameter for calculation according to the probability safety analysis model.
2. The method for employing passive system physical process failure according to claim 1, wherein finding further comprises: it is determined whether the sequence of incidents relates to a passive system and, if so, the header associated with the passive system is increased.
3. The method for employing a passive system physical process failure according to claim 1 or 2, further comprising:
and judging whether the hardware failure of the non-kinetic energy system needs to be considered at the question head according to the specific meaning of the question head related to the non-kinetic energy system in the event tree.
4. The method for employing passive system physical process failure according to claim 3, further comprising:
and if the failure of the hardware of the passive system is not considered at the head of the question, connecting the physical process failure of the passive system to the head of the event tree as a basic event.
5. The method for employing passive system physical process failure according to claim 3, further comprising:
and if the failure of the hardware of the passive system needs to be considered at the head of the question, establishing a failure tree of the passive system and connecting the failure tree to the head of the event tree, wherein the failure tree comprises a hardware failure part and a physical process failure part.
6. The method for applying passive system physical process failure according to claim 4 or 5, further comprising:
after the event tree is updated, the probabilistic security evaluation model is analyzed.
7. An apparatus for employing passive system physical process failure, comprising:
the searching module is used for searching whether the event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains the question header related to the passive system;
the determining module is used for determining the specific meaning of the topic head related to the passive system in the event tree if the topic head related to the passive system in the event tree is contained; and
and the connecting module is used for connecting the passive system physical process failure to the event tree according to the specific significance, wherein the passive system reliability result obtained according to the passive system reliability averaging method is connected to the event tree in a numerical form and is used as an input parameter for calculation according to the probability safety analysis model.
8. The apparatus for employing passive system physical process failure according to claim 7, wherein the lookup module is further configured to determine if the sequence of incidents relates to a passive system and, if so, to add headers associated with the passive system.
9. The device for applying passive system physical process failure according to claim 7 or 8, wherein the connection module further comprises:
and the judging module is used for judging whether the hardware failure of the non-kinetic energy system needs to be considered at the question head according to the specific meaning of the question head related to the non-kinetic energy system in the event tree.
10. The device for physical process failure using passive systems according to claim 9, wherein:
and if the judging module judges that the failure of the hardware of the passive system does not need to be considered at the head of the event, the connecting module connects the physical process failure of the passive system as a basic event to the head of the event tree.
11. The apparatus for physical process failure utilizing a passive system according to claim 9, the connection module further comprising:
the tree establishing module is used for establishing a fault tree of the passive system if the judging module judges that the failure of the hardware of the passive system needs to be considered at the head of the question, and the connecting module is used for connecting the fault tree to the head of the event tree, wherein the fault tree comprises a hardware failure part and a physical process failure part.
12. The apparatus for physical process failure using passive systems according to claim 10 or 11, further comprising:
and the analysis module is used for analyzing the probability safety evaluation model after the event tree is updated.
13. An apparatus for employing passive system physical process failure, comprising:
the device is used for searching whether the event tree in the probability safety evaluation model contains the question header related to the passive system;
means for determining, if included, a specific meaning of a passive system related header in the event tree; and
and means for connecting the passive system physical process failures into the event tree according to the specific significance, wherein the passive system reliability results obtained according to the passive system reliability averaging method are connected into the event tree in a numerical form as input parameters for calculation according to the probabilistic safety analysis model.
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