CN104994110A - Method for assigning verifier for auditing cloud storage data - Google Patents
Method for assigning verifier for auditing cloud storage data Download PDFInfo
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- CN104994110A CN104994110A CN201510419271.5A CN201510419271A CN104994110A CN 104994110 A CN104994110 A CN 104994110A CN 201510419271 A CN201510419271 A CN 201510419271A CN 104994110 A CN104994110 A CN 104994110A
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- designated
- signature
- private key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and specifically relates to a method for assigning an verifier for auditing cloud storage data. The method provided by the invention mainly comprises the steps that: firstly, a system performs block processing on a data file to generate a public and private key pair for each of a cloud user and a cloud server, the cloud user generates a signature of each data block and a data file tag, and a signature set of the data blocks, the data file and the tag of the data file are sent to the cloud server; the cloud user calls a lattice-based agent algorithm to calculate a public and private key pair for an assigned verifier according to the identity of the assigned verifier, and sends the public and private key pair to the assigned verifier safely; and finally, the assigned verifier generates an audit challenge information for the cloud server, the cloud server acquires an audit response prove according to the audit challenge information and sends the audit response prove to the assigned verifier, and the assigned verifier verifies the audit response prove according to a lattice signature verification method.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to communication technical field, relate to a kind of method that identifier of being used to specify audits to cloud storage data specifically.
Background technology
Along with the development of network technology and continuing to increase of storage demand amount, cloud is stored as memory module of new generation and is progressively occurring and rising.Although cloud stores bring many facilities to user, it is also proposed the challenge of some security privacy aspects simultaneously.Although the memory device that cloud service provider can provide fail safe higher, the data of magnanimity are stored on Cloud Server and make data more easily suffer the active attack of assailant.Concerning cloud service provider, due to some interests reasons, they may can not react the storage condition to user data truly.Such as: cloud service provider possibility is because interests reason deletes the data that some users seldom access, or cloud service provider has concealed the loss of the user data caused by him to safeguard his reputation.Therefore can find out, although cloud stores can bring a lot of advantage and facility, it can not ensure the authenticity and integrity of user storage data.
Store the safety problem of data to solve cloud above-mentioned, we need to audit to the data be stored on cloud, this scheme can audited to the data that cloud stores we be called that cloud stores Data Audit agreement.After data are stored into Cloud Server by user, user just loses the control to data.It is that the trusted third party that user or user entrust carries out regular audit to the data that cloud stores that auditable cloud stores data.By audit, user can real-time confirmation he be stored in the authenticity and integrity of the data on Cloud Server.Even if there is such cloud to store Data Audit service, to user, the executor of audit task is selected also to be the problem needing to consider.Such as, in public audit program, as long as hold effective certificate parameter, anyone can the data integrity of authentication of users.So, user private data or secret information may obtain than unauthorized parties.So, the identifier that user needs appointment one special to the task of auditing, to guarantee the privacy of data.
Current cloud stores Data Audit method all based on classical cryptosystem, and this kind of problem to be all quantum computer can easily crack, be unsafe under quantum environment.Consider that large data will in quantum epoch long-term existence, the Designated-Verifier Data Audit scheme that design can resist quantum attack just has great importance.。
Summary of the invention
To be solved by this invention, be exactly for the problems referred to above, propose a kind of identifier that is used to specify based on lattice difficult problem and store the data method of auditing to cloud, the method effectively can resist the attack of quantum computer.
For achieving the above object, the present invention adopts following technical scheme:
Be used to specify the method that identifier audits to cloud storage data, it is characterized in that, comprise the following steps:
A. system initialization, specifically comprises:
A1. piecemeal process is carried out to data file, the security parameter of lattice cryptographic algorithm and the hash function of safety are set;
A2. produced the public private key pair of cloud user and Cloud Server respectively by lattice base threshold generation algorithm, cloud user secret selects signature key;
A3. cloud user produces the signature set of data block by the linear homomorphism signature algorithm on lattice, and obtains data file label by signature algorithm, and the signature set of data block, data file and data file label are sent to Cloud Server;
B. to audit devolution, specifically comprise:
B1. cloud user designated-verifier, and call according to the identity of designated-verifier the public private key pair that lattice base agent algorithms calculates designated-verifier, the public private key pair of the designated-verifier of acquisition is sent to the identifier specified;
B2. cloud user is by user identity, and the identity of designated-verifier and the PKI of designated-verifier are registered on Cloud Server;
C. to audit challenge response, specifically comprise:
C1. designated-verifier produces audit challenge information and is sent to Cloud Server;
C2. Cloud Server is according to audit challenge information, adopts preimage sampling algorithm and noise learning method on lattice to calculate audit response proof and sends to designated-verifier;
C3. whether designated-verifier checking audit response proves correct.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step a1 is:
A11. data file F is divided into l data block F={m
1, m
2..., m
l, wherein
1≤i≤l;
A12., safe Gaussian parameter σ is set, the line number n of δ and matrix, common parameter set is set
wherein q=poly (n) is the prime number of the polynomial complexity about matrix line number n, and m>=2nlogq is matrix column number,
for the upper bound of matrix norm in scheme,
for the distribution of digital signature in scheme, χ is Gaussian noise distribution; Wherein e is digital signature,
be the m dimensional vector on mould q, O is the complexity about matrix line number n.
A13., first secure hash function is set
second secure hash function
3rd secure hash function
4th secure hash function
5th secure hash function
wherein, the 3rd hash function H
3value export at D
m × min distribution,
the n × m dimension matrix on mould q,
the n-dimensional vector on mould q, Z
m × mthat m × m ties up low norm matrix, Z
qbe mould q residual class ring, subscript m is matrix columns, and subscript n is matrix line number, and subscript q is prime number, D
m × mit is low norm m × m only matrix distribution.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step a2 is:
A21. cloud user adopts lattice base threshold generation algorithm to produce public private key pair, is specially:
By lattice base threshold generation algorithm TrapGen (1
n, 1
m, q) produce homogeneous matrix
to pass
base T
amake
the public private key pair obtaining cloud user is (A, T
a), cloud user selects signature public private key pair for (spk, ssk);
A22. Cloud Server adopts lattice base threshold generation algorithm to produce public private key pair, is specially:
By lattice base threshold generation algorithm TrapGen (1
n, 1
m, q) produce uniform matrix
to pass
base T
cloudmake
the public private key pair obtaining Cloud Server is (B, T
cloud).
Further, the concrete grammar of described step a3 is:
Tentation data file F={m
1, m
2..., m
lidentify label id ∈ { 0,1}
*, for each data block
adopt public private key pair (A, the T of cloud user
a) and the PKI B of Cloud Server, be that each data block produces signature, concrete grammar is:
A31. formula is passed through
(wherein 1≤j≤n) obtains n vectorial β
1, β
2... β
n.
A32. for each data block m
i, 1≤i≤l, passes through formula
obtain μ
i, adopt μ
iand β
jdirect product h in obtaining
i,j=< μ
i, β
j>, 1≤j≤n, 1≤i≤l, is arranged
A33. for each i ∈ 1 ..., l}, cloud user is by preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre (A, T on lattice
a, h
i, σ) and produce signature θ
i;
A44. defining signature set is Ψ={ θ
i}
1≤i≤l, cloud user is by formula τ=id ‖ SSig simultaneously
ssk(id) the label τ of data file F is obtained, wherein SSig
ssk(id) be the signature of identify label id, finally, cloud user sends { F, τ, Ψ } to cloud user.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step b1 is:
Cloud user ID sends audit solicited message to designated-verifier TPA, utilizes the identity ID of designated-verifier
tPA, cloud user ID passes through formula
obtain
pass through formula
obtain the PKI of designated-verifier
and by lattice base agent algorithms NewBasisDel (A,
t
a, δ) and produce corresponding private key
wherein
it is the short base of lattice
the public private key pair obtaining designated-verifier TPA is
Further, the concrete grammar of described step c1 is:
C11. cloud user sends audit solicited message to designated-verifier TPA, and designated-verifier TPA fetches the label τ of corresponding data file F according to audit solicited message, and designated-verifier TPA utilizes open signature verification PKI spk certifying signature SSig
ssk(id) whether effective, if so, then enter step c12, if not, then exit;
C12. designated-verifier TPA from set 1,2 ..., in l}, Stochastic choice contains the subset of c element
C13. designated-verifier TPA produces Bit String at random equably
forming audit challenge information chal is
Further, the concrete grammar of described step c2 is:
C21. cloud server is to audit challenge information
after, the public private key pair of the designated-verifier TPA that search is corresponding
iD
tPA), obtain aggregate signature simultaneously
in order to blind combined information ν, cloud user selects random vector
then by preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre (B, T on lattice
cloud, w, σ) and produce random vector
signature γ;
C22. calculate about combined information
blind value ν '=γ+H
4(w) ν;
C23. the vector that Stochastic choice is new
and calculate
C24. according to Gaussian noise distribution χ, noise vector is selected
and calculate e=θ+H
5(ν ' ‖ ξ '),
obtain and prove response message P={ ν ', w, e, ξ to designated-verifier TPA.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step c3 is:
C31. formula is passed through
(wherein 1≤j≤n) obtains n vectorial β
1, β
2... β
n;
C32. formula is passed through
obtain λ;
C33. β is adopted
jdirect product in obtaining with λ
wherein 1≤j≤n, is arranged
C34. decisive equation
and inequality
whether set up, if so, then judge that audit response is justified, if not, then judge that audit response proves mistake; Wherein, θ=e-H
5(ν ' ‖ ξ ') is above-mentioned aggregate signature, and ξ ' ties up random vector for the n on mould q, is used for participating in the ciphering process about θ.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is, can guarantee that, except designated-verifier TPA, either party can not verify the data integrity be stored on Cloud Server.
Embodiment
Technical scheme of the present invention is described below in detail:
The present invention mainly comprises the following steps:
A. system initialization, specifically comprises:
A1. piecemeal process is carried out to data file, the security parameter of lattice cryptographic algorithm and the hash function of safety are set;
A2. produced the public private key pair of cloud user and Cloud Server respectively by lattice base threshold generation algorithm, cloud user secret selects signature key;
A3. cloud user produces the signature set of data block by the linear homomorphism signature algorithm on lattice, and obtains data file label by signature algorithm, and the signature set of data block, data file and data file label are sent to Cloud Server;
B. to audit devolution, specifically comprise:
B1. cloud user designated-verifier, and call according to the identity of designated-verifier the public private key pair that lattice base agent algorithms calculates designated-verifier, the public private key pair of the designated-verifier of acquisition is sent to the identifier specified;
B2. cloud user is by user identity, and the identity of designated-verifier and the PKI of designated-verifier are registered on Cloud Server;
C. to audit challenge response, specifically comprise:
C1. designated-verifier produces audit challenge information and is sent to Cloud Server;
C2. Cloud Server is according to audit challenge information, adopts preimage sampling algorithm and noise learning method on lattice to calculate audit response proof and sends to designated-verifier;
C3. whether designated-verifier checking audit response proves correct.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step a1 is:
A11. data file F is divided into l data block F={m
1, m
2..., m
l, wherein
1≤i≤l;
A12. arrange safe Gaussian parameter σ, δ and line number are n matrix, arrange common parameter set
wherein q=poly (n) is the prime number of the polynomial complexity about matrix line number n, and m>=2nlogq is matrix column number,
for the upper bound of matrix norm in scheme,
for the distribution of digital signature in scheme, χ is Gaussian noise distribution; Wherein e is digital signature,
be the m dimensional vector on mould q, O is the complexity about matrix line number n.
A13., first secure hash function is set
second secure hash function
3rd secure hash function
4th secure hash function
5th secure hash function
wherein, the 3rd hash function H
3value export at D
m × min distribution,
the n × m dimension matrix on mould q,
the n-dimensional vector on mould q, Z
m × mthat m × m ties up low norm matrix, Z
qbe mould q residual class ring, subscript m is matrix columns, and subscript n is matrix line number, and subscript q is prime number, D
m × mit is low norm m × m only matrix distribution.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step a2 is:
A21. cloud user adopts lattice base threshold generation algorithm to produce public private key pair, is specially:
By lattice base threshold generation algorithm TrapGen (1
n, 1
m, q) produce homogeneous matrix
to pass
base T
amake
the public private key pair obtaining cloud user is (A, T
a), cloud user selects signature public private key pair for (spk, ssk);
A22. Cloud Server adopts lattice base threshold generation algorithm to produce public private key pair, is specially:
By lattice base threshold generation algorithm TrapGen (1
n, 1
m, q) produce uniform matrix
to pass
base T
cloudmake
the public private key pair obtaining Cloud Server is (B, T
cloud).
Further, the concrete grammar of described step a3 is:
Tentation data file F={m
1, m
2..., m
lidentify label id ∈ { 0,1}
*, for each data block
adopt public private key pair (A, the T of cloud user
a) and the PKI B of Cloud Server, be that each data block produces signature, concrete grammar is:
A31. formula is passed through
(wherein 1≤j≤n) obtains n vectorial β
1, β
2... β
n.
A32. for each data block m
i, 1≤i≤l, passes through formula
obtain μ
i, adopt μ
iand β
jdirect product h in obtaining
i,j=< μ
i, β
j>, 1≤j≤n, 1≤i≤l, is arranged
A33. for each i ∈ 1 ..., l}, cloud user is by preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre (A, T on lattice
a, h
i, σ) and produce signature θ
i;
A44. defining signature set is Ψ={ θ
i}
1≤i≤l, cloud user is by formula τ=id ‖ SSig simultaneously
ssk(id) the label τ of data file F is obtained, wherein SSig
ssk(id) be the signature of identify label id, finally, cloud user sends { F, τ, Ψ } to cloud user.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step b1 is:
Cloud user ID sends audit solicited message to designated-verifier TPA, utilizes the identity ID of designated-verifier
tPA, cloud user ID passes through formula
obtain
pass through formula
obtain the PKI of designated-verifier
and by lattice base agent algorithms NewBasisDel (A,
t
a, δ) and produce corresponding private key
wherein
it is the short base of lattice
the public private key pair obtaining designated-verifier TPA is
Further, the concrete grammar of described step c1 is:
C11. cloud user sends audit solicited message to designated-verifier TPA, and designated-verifier TPA fetches the label τ of corresponding data file F according to audit solicited message, and designated-verifier TPA utilizes open signature verification PKI spk certifying signature SSig
ssk(id) whether effective, if so, then enter step c12, if not, then exit;
C12. designated-verifier TPA from set 1,2 ..., in l}, Stochastic choice contains the subset of c element
C13. designated-verifier TPA produces Bit String at random equably
forming audit challenge information chal is
Further, the concrete grammar of described step c2 is:
C21. cloud server is to audit challenge information
after, the public private key pair of the designated-verifier TPA that search is corresponding (
iD
tPA), obtain aggregate signature simultaneously
in order to blind combined information ν, cloud user selects random vector
then by preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre (B, T on lattice
cloud, w, σ) and produce random vector
signature γ;
C22. calculate about combined information
blind value ν '=γ+H
4(w) ν;
C23. the vector that Stochastic choice is new
and calculate
C24. according to Gaussian noise distribution χ, noise vector is selected
and calculate e=θ+H
5(ν ' ‖ ξ '),
obtain and prove response message P={ ν ', w, e, ξ to designated-verifier TPA.
Further, the concrete grammar of described step c3 is:
C31. formula is passed through
(wherein 1≤j≤n) obtains n vectorial β
1, β
2... β
n;
C32. formula is passed through
obtain λ;
C33. β is adopted
jdirect product in obtaining with λ
wherein 1≤j≤n, is arranged
C34. decisive equation
and inequality
whether set up, if so, then judge that audit response is justified, if not, then judge that audit response proves mistake; Wherein, θ=e-H
5(ν ' ‖ ξ ') is above-mentioned aggregate signature, and ξ ' ties up random vector for the n on mould q, is used for participating in the ciphering process about θ.
This auditing method can guarantee the TPA except specifying, and either party can not verify the data integrity be stored on Cloud Server.And based on secondly small integer solution (ISIS) difficulty problem non-on lattice, demonstrate malice Cloud Server can not produce forgery signature, make to produce the audit certification response message of forging and can not cheat the TPA that specifies by auditing verification process.The method utilizes preimage sampling function technology on lattice to realize covering up at random the structure of code, thus guarantees curious TPA, and the initial data block message that it wants to recover cloud user from data file is that calculating is infeasible.In addition, the module exponent computing that method of the present invention does not need cost larger and Bilinear map computing, this is for the TPA specified, and it only need calculate limited linear equation just good authentication can be stored in data integrity on Cloud Server.Therefore the solution of the present invention is more conducive to the TPA that specifies in amount of calculation, in rear quantum communications environment, have very large using value.
Claims (8)
1. be used to specify the method that identifier audits to cloud storage data, it is characterized in that, comprise the following steps:
A. system initialization, specifically comprises:
A1. piecemeal process is carried out to data file, the security parameter of lattice cryptographic algorithm and the hash function of safety are set;
A2. produced the public private key pair of cloud user and Cloud Server respectively by lattice base threshold generation algorithm, cloud user secret selects signature key;
A3. cloud user produces the signature set of data block by the linear homomorphism signature algorithm on lattice, and obtains data file label by signature algorithm, and the signature set of data block, data file and data file label are sent to Cloud Server;
B. to audit devolution, specifically comprise:
B1. cloud user designated-verifier, and call according to the identity of designated-verifier the public private key pair that lattice base agent algorithms calculates designated-verifier, the public private key pair of the designated-verifier of acquisition is sent to the identifier specified;
B2. cloud user is by user identity, and the identity of designated-verifier and the PKI of designated-verifier are registered on Cloud Server;
C. to audit challenge response, specifically comprise:
C1. designated-verifier produces audit challenge information and is sent to Cloud Server;
C2. Cloud Server is according to audit challenge information, adopts preimage sampling algorithm and noise learning method on lattice to calculate audit response proof and sends to designated-verifier;
C3. whether designated-verifier checking audit response proves correct.
2. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 1 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step a1 is:
A11. data file F is divided into l data block, i.e. F={m
1, m
2..., m
l, wherein
1≤i≤l;
A12. arrange safe Gaussian parameter σ, δ and line number are the matrix of n, arrange common parameter set
wherein q=poly (n) is the prime number of the polynomial complexity about matrix line number n, and m is matrix column number and m>=2nlogq,
for the upper bound of matrix norm,
for the distribution of digital signature, χ is Gaussian noise distribution, and e is digital signature,
be the m dimensional vector on mould q, O is the complexity about matrix line number n;
A13., first secure hash function is set
second secure hash function
3rd secure hash function H
3: { 0,1}
*→ Z
m × m, the 4th secure hash function
5th secure hash function
wherein, the 3rd hash function H
3value export at D
m × min distribution,
the n × m dimension matrix on mould q,
the n-dimensional vector on mould q, Z
m × mthat m × m ties up low norm matrix, Z
qbe mould q residual class ring, subscript m is matrix columns, and subscript n is matrix line number, and subscript q is prime number, D
m × mit is low norm m × m only matrix distribution.
3. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 2 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step a2 is:
A21. cloud user adopts lattice base threshold generation algorithm to produce public private key pair, is specially:
By lattice base threshold generation algorithm TrapGen (1
n, 1
m, q) produce homogeneous matrix
to pass
base T
amake
the public private key pair obtaining cloud user is (A, T
a), wherein A is the PKI of cloud user, T
afor the private key of cloud user; Cloud user selects signature key to being (spk, ssk), and wherein spk is open signature verification PKI, and ssk is secret signature private key;
A22. Cloud Server adopts lattice base threshold generation algorithm to produce public private key pair, is specially:
By lattice base threshold generation algorithm TrapGen (1
n, 1
m, q) produce uniform matrix
to pass
base T
cloudmake
the public private key pair obtaining Cloud Server is (B, T
cloud), wherein B is the PKI of Cloud Server, T
cloudfor the private key of Cloud Server.
4. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 3 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step a3 is:
Tentation data file F={m
1, m
2..., m
lidentify label id ∈ { 0,1}
*, for each data block
adopt public private key pair (A, the T of cloud user
a) and the PKI B of Cloud Server, be that each data block produces signature, concrete grammar is:
A31. formula is passed through
(wherein 1≤j≤n) obtains n vectorial β
1, β
2... β
n;
A32. for each data block m
i, 1≤i≤l, passes through formula
obtain μ
i, adopt μ
iand β
jdirect product h in obtaining
i,j=< μ
i, β
j>, 1≤j≤n, 1≤i≤l, arranges h
i=(h
i1..., h
in)
xia;
A33. for each i ∈ 1 ..., l}, cloud user is by preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre (A, T on lattice
a, h
i, σ) and produce signature θ
i;
A44. defining signature set is Ψ={ θ
i}
1≤i≤l, cloud user is by formula τ=id ‖ SSig simultaneously
ssk(id) the label τ of data file F is obtained, wherein SSig
ssk(id) be the signature of identify label id, finally, cloud user sends { F, τ, Ψ } to Cloud Server.
5. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 4 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step b1 is:
Cloud user ID sends audit solicited message to designated-verifier TPA, utilizes the identity ID of designated-verifier
tPA, cloud user ID passes through formula
obtain
pass through formula
obtain the PKI of designated-verifier
and by lattice base agent algorithms
produce corresponding private key
wherein
it is the short base of lattice
the public private key pair obtaining designated-verifier TPA is
6. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 5 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step c1 is:
C11. cloud user sends audit solicited message to designated-verifier TPA, and designated-verifier TPA fetches the label τ of corresponding data file F according to audit solicited message, and designated-verifier TPA utilizes open signature verification PKI spk certifying signature SSig
ssk(id) whether effective, if so, then enter step c12, if not, then exit;
C12. designated-verifier TPA from set 1,2 ..., in l}, Stochastic choice contains the subset of c element
C13. designated-verifier TPA produces Bit String at random equably
forming audit challenge information chal is
7. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 6 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step c2 is:
C21. cloud server is to audit challenge information
after, the public private key pair of the designated-verifier TPA that search is corresponding
obtain aggregate signature simultaneously
combined information
in order to blind combined information ν, cloud user selects random vector
then by preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre (B, T on lattice
cloud, w, σ) and produce random vector
signature γ;
C22. calculate about combined information
blind value ν '=γ+H
4(w) ν;
C23. the vector that Stochastic choice is new
and calculate
C24. according to Gaussian noise distribution χ, noise vector is selected
and calculate e=θ+H
5(ν ' ‖ ξ '),
obtain and prove response message P={ ν ', w, e, ξ to designated-verifier TPA.
8. a kind of identifier of being used to specify according to claim 7 stores the data method of auditing to cloud, and it is characterized in that, the concrete grammar of described step c3 is:
C31. formula is passed through
(wherein 1≤j≤n) obtains n vectorial β
1, β
2... β
n;
C32. formula is passed through
obtain λ;
C33. β is adopted
jdirect product in obtaining with λ
wherein 1≤j≤n, is arranged
C34. decisive equation
and inequality
whether set up, if so, then judge that audit response is justified, if not, then judge that audit response proves mistake; Wherein, θ=e-H
5(ν ' ‖ ξ ') is aggregate signature, and ξ ' is the n dimension random vector on mould q.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
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| CN105787390A (en) * | 2016-03-02 | 2016-07-20 | 深圳大学 | Data integrity verification method and system |
| CN105791321A (en) * | 2016-05-03 | 2016-07-20 | 西南石油大学 | Cloud storage data common auditing method possessing secret key leakage resistance characteristic |
| CN105978695A (en) * | 2016-05-03 | 2016-09-28 | 西南石油大学 | Batch self-auditing method for cloud storage data |
| CN106789044A (en) * | 2017-02-20 | 2017-05-31 | 西南石油大学 | Cloud storage ciphertext data public key can search for encryption method on lattice under master pattern |
| CN107124272A (en) * | 2017-05-02 | 2017-09-01 | 西南石油大学 | The lattice cloud storage data safety auditing method for supporting agent data to upload |
| CN107332665A (en) * | 2017-07-06 | 2017-11-07 | 河南理工大学 | A kind of Partial Blind Signature method of identity-based on lattice |
| CN108259180A (en) * | 2017-09-20 | 2018-07-06 | 北京工业大学 | A kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature |
| CN108965258A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-12-07 | 河南科技大学 | A kind of cloud environment data integrity verification method based on full homomorphic cryptography |
| CN109525403A (en) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-03-26 | 陕西师范大学 | A kind of anti-leakage that supporting user's full dynamic parallel operation discloses cloud auditing method |
| CN110049054A (en) * | 2019-04-24 | 2019-07-23 | 电子科技大学 | The plaintext shared data auditing method and system for supporting privacy information hiding |
| CN110266490A (en) * | 2019-07-25 | 2019-09-20 | 西南石油大学 | The keyword ciphertext generation method and device of cloud storage data |
| CN112217629A (en) * | 2020-10-13 | 2021-01-12 | 安徽大学 | Cloud storage public auditing method |
| CN112564911A (en) * | 2020-11-23 | 2021-03-26 | 重庆大学 | Identity-based cloud server computing correctness verification method |
| CN112632604A (en) * | 2020-12-21 | 2021-04-09 | 贵州航天计量测试技术研究所 | Cloud data auditing method, system and device based on multiple authorized auditors |
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| TAN SHUANG等: ""An Efficient Method for Checking the Integrity of Data in the Cloud"", 《IEEE》 * |
| XIAOJUN ZHANG等: ""Efficient Identity-based Public Auditing Scheme for Cloud Storage from Lattice Assumption"", 《IEEE》 * |
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| CN105787390B (en) * | 2016-03-02 | 2018-11-27 | 深圳大学 | A kind of verification method and its system of data integrity |
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| CN106789044B (en) * | 2017-02-20 | 2019-12-27 | 西南石油大学 | Searchable encryption method for cipher text data public key stored in cloud on grid under standard model |
| CN106789044A (en) * | 2017-02-20 | 2017-05-31 | 西南石油大学 | Cloud storage ciphertext data public key can search for encryption method on lattice under master pattern |
| CN107124272A (en) * | 2017-05-02 | 2017-09-01 | 西南石油大学 | The lattice cloud storage data safety auditing method for supporting agent data to upload |
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| CN107332665A (en) * | 2017-07-06 | 2017-11-07 | 河南理工大学 | A kind of Partial Blind Signature method of identity-based on lattice |
| CN108259180B (en) * | 2017-09-20 | 2021-01-01 | 北京工业大学 | Method for quantum specifying verifier signature |
| CN108259180A (en) * | 2017-09-20 | 2018-07-06 | 北京工业大学 | A kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature |
| CN108965258B (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2021-07-16 | 河南科技大学 | Cloud environment data integrity verification method based on fully homomorphic encryption |
| CN108965258A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-12-07 | 河南科技大学 | A kind of cloud environment data integrity verification method based on full homomorphic cryptography |
| CN109525403A (en) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-03-26 | 陕西师范大学 | A kind of anti-leakage that supporting user's full dynamic parallel operation discloses cloud auditing method |
| CN109525403B (en) * | 2018-12-29 | 2021-11-02 | 广州市溢信科技股份有限公司 | Anti-leakage public cloud auditing method supporting full-dynamic parallel operation of user |
| CN110049054B (en) * | 2019-04-24 | 2021-07-06 | 电子科技大学 | Plaintext shared data auditing method and system supporting privacy information hiding |
| CN110049054A (en) * | 2019-04-24 | 2019-07-23 | 电子科技大学 | The plaintext shared data auditing method and system for supporting privacy information hiding |
| CN110266490A (en) * | 2019-07-25 | 2019-09-20 | 西南石油大学 | The keyword ciphertext generation method and device of cloud storage data |
| CN110266490B (en) * | 2019-07-25 | 2023-04-21 | 西南石油大学 | Keyword ciphertext generation method and device of cloud storage data |
| CN112217629A (en) * | 2020-10-13 | 2021-01-12 | 安徽大学 | Cloud storage public auditing method |
| CN112217629B (en) * | 2020-10-13 | 2022-07-22 | 安徽大学 | Cloud storage public auditing method |
| CN112564911A (en) * | 2020-11-23 | 2021-03-26 | 重庆大学 | Identity-based cloud server computing correctness verification method |
| CN112632604A (en) * | 2020-12-21 | 2021-04-09 | 贵州航天计量测试技术研究所 | Cloud data auditing method, system and device based on multiple authorized auditors |
| CN112632604B (en) * | 2020-12-21 | 2024-01-23 | 贵州航天计量测试技术研究所 | Cloud data auditing method, system and device based on multi-authority auditors |
| CN113746836A (en) * | 2021-09-03 | 2021-12-03 | 南京南瑞信息通信科技有限公司 | Data holding verification method and system |
| CN113746836B (en) * | 2021-09-03 | 2022-08-23 | 南京南瑞信息通信科技有限公司 | Data holding verification method and system |
| CN114598717A (en) * | 2022-04-08 | 2022-06-07 | 徐洪记 | Distributed cloud storage data access method and data service system |
| CN114598717B (en) * | 2022-04-08 | 2024-06-28 | 佛山中盈盛达小额贷款有限公司 | Distributed cloud storage data access method and data service system |
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