CN110049054B - Plaintext shared data auditing method and system supporting privacy information hiding - Google Patents

Plaintext shared data auditing method and system supporting privacy information hiding Download PDF

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CN110049054B
CN110049054B CN201910332582.6A CN201910332582A CN110049054B CN 110049054 B CN110049054 B CN 110049054B CN 201910332582 A CN201910332582 A CN 201910332582A CN 110049054 B CN110049054 B CN 110049054B
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private key
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CN110049054A (en
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廖永健
范煜
周世杰
陈虹洁
乐代波
张刚林
黄文�
郑皓文
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University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

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Abstract

The invention discloses a plaintext shared data auditing method and system supporting privacy information hiding, wherein the method comprises the following steps: (1) the private key generation center initializes the system; (2) the user side extracts the private key from the private key generation center; (3) the user side generates a blind file, a file label and a corresponding signature of the file and submits the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management side; (4) the management terminal examines the file according to the received blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature, and uploads the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed; (5) and the third party auditing end audits the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud. The privacy information hiding mechanism provided by the invention can prevent a malicious manager from carrying out illegal operation on the file, and any illegal operation can be detected when the file is checked at the cloud end.

Description

Plaintext shared data auditing method and system supporting privacy information hiding
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of cloud computing security, in particular to a plaintext shared data auditing method and system supporting privacy information hiding.
Background
With the explosive growth of data volume in the recent years, more and more individuals, business companies and organizations are not storing data in self-installed servers, but choose to store data on cloud platforms with powerful computing and storage capabilities. The cloud platform provides a storage service which is more flexible and has strong expansibility, and the user can share data for others through the cloud storage service. For example, business companies such as ali and drip share some service data sets for data analysis by academia, so that the data has a greater derivative value.
However, cloud storage services are not completely reliable, and some unpredictable hardware or software errors and manual misoperation still cause data to be damaged. Moreover, the cloud service provider can hide the fact that the data is damaged from the user in consideration of commercial interests, and therefore, an auditing technology needs to be provided so that the user can detect the integrity of the data stored on the cloud and prevent fraudulent activities of an untrusted cloud service provider. In addition, sharing data and huge derivative value have attracted extensive attention of various organizations, business companies and colleges, but the conventional data integrity technology is not suitable for sharing data. The shared data cannot be completely stored in the cloud in a clear text manner for sharing because the shared data may contain privacy information, and once the privacy is disclosed to others, the privacy irreparable loss is caused to the public trust of the data sharing party and the related personal privacy. The traditional auditing scheme can realize complete detection on ciphertext data, but the use efficiency of the data is influenced by completely encrypting the data, and if the ciphertext is input into a neural network, the prediction accuracy of an obtained model can be obviously reduced. Providing the public key for decryption to the data consumer seems to be a solution, but this adds heavy key management and limits the flexibility of sharing.
Through relevant research and study, the inventions for solving the problems are few. The existing solutions have the following problems:
1. data sharing is usually initiated by a company or a large organization (hereinafter referred to as an organization), and there are often related management personnel in the organization to control the shared data. In existing solutions, the excessive rights granted by these administrators, even if they modify the data, are not discovered during data proofing and auditing, which makes the reliability and integrity of the shared data not fully trusted.
2. The administrator in the existing solutions is burdened with excessive computational and transmission pressure. This makes the node of the manager become a bottleneck in the whole scheme, and in the environment facing massive data and high concurrency, the whole data release auditing process is blocked.
3. The existing privacy data hiding mechanism needs to generate a random number for each file, and the data generation needs to store the random numbers locally so as to recover the processed privacy data. This would incur a significant storage overhead for the user and the private data would not be recoverable once the random number is lost.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: aiming at the existing problems, the clear text shared data auditing method and the clear text shared data auditing system supporting privacy information hiding can simultaneously support privacy data hiding and prevent malicious tampering behaviors of a distrusted manager on the data.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a plaintext shared data auditing method supporting privacy information hiding comprises the following steps:
(1) the private key generation center initializes the system;
(2) the user side extracts the private key from the private key generation center;
(3) the user side generates a blind file, a file label and a corresponding signature of the file and submits the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management side;
(4) the management terminal examines the file according to the received blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature, and uploads the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed;
(5) and the third party auditing end audits the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud.
The plaintext shared data auditing system for realizing the plaintext shared data auditing method supporting privacy information hiding comprises the following steps:
the private key generation center is used for initializing the system;
the user side is used for extracting the private key from the private key generation center, generating a blind file, a file label and a corresponding signature of the file and submitting the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management side;
the management terminal is used for examining the files according to the received blind files, the file labels and the corresponding signatures, and uploading the blind files, the file labels and the corresponding signatures to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed;
the cloud end is used for storing the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature submitted by the management end;
and the third party auditing end is used for auditing the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud.
In summary, due to the adoption of the technical scheme, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the privacy information hiding mechanism provided by the invention can prevent a malicious manager from carrying out illegal operation on the file, and any illegal operation can be detected when the file is checked at the cloud end. Even if the cloud end and the management end are mutually hooked, illegal tampering of the file can be found in the auditing process of the third-party auditing end.
2. The auditing scheme provided by the invention has a more reasonable system model. By redefining the role of the administrator, the probability of the administrator node becoming a computing bottleneck can be reduced. In addition, the user can directly retrieve the required data from the cloud, and the probability that the manager node becomes a communication bottleneck is further reduced. Therefore, the method has better efficiency in practical application and is more suitable for the conditions of high concurrency and mass data.
3. The privacy information hiding algorithm provided by the invention directly adopts a part of private keys of the user, thereby avoiding the storage overhead caused by random value storage of the user and avoiding the situation that the file is not recoverable due to random false deletion.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and for those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without inventive efforts.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of data auditing according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the detailed description and specific examples, while indicating the preferred embodiment of the invention, are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. The components of embodiments of the present invention generally described and illustrated in the figures herein may be arranged and designed in a wide variety of different configurations. Thus, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention, presented in the figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The features and properties of the present invention are described in further detail below with reference to examples.
Example 1
As shown in fig. 1, the plaintext shared data auditing system of the plaintext shared data auditing method supporting privacy information hiding according to this embodiment includes:
the private key generation center is used for initializing the system;
the user side is used for extracting the private key from the private key generation center, generating a blind file, a file label and a corresponding signature of the file and submitting the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management side;
the management terminal is used for examining the files according to the received blind files, the file labels and the corresponding signatures, and uploading the blind files, the file labels and the corresponding signatures to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed;
the cloud end is used for storing the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature submitted by the management end;
and the third party auditing end is used for auditing the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud.
The clear text shared data auditing method supporting privacy information hiding and realized on the clear text shared data auditing system comprises the following steps:
(1) the private key generation center initializes the system:
(1.1) randomly selecting two multiplicative groups G with the same prime order p1And GTAnd the corresponding bilinear map e: g1×G1＝GT；
(1.2) from a finite field
Figure BDA0002038173240000051
Selecting a random number x from the multiplicative group G1Randomly selecting two elements of g and u; the private key generation center reserves a main private key msk ═ x, ensures that the main private key msk cannot be revealed to anyone, and then calculates a public key P of the main private key mskpub＝gx；
(1.3) selecting a Hash function H, H0,H1:{0,1}*→G1And an
Figure BDA0002038173240000052
(1.4) issuing the system common parameter Para ═ G1,GT,p,g,u,H,H0,H1,Hs,H2,Ppub)。
(2) User side extraction private key
(2.1) the user side sends a private key request to the private key generation center side and submits the user ID of the user side to the private key generation center;
(2.2) the private key generation center generates a corresponding private key by using the user ID and sends the generated private key to a corresponding user side; generating a corresponding private key sk using a user IDIDThe calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
skID＝(sk′ID,sk″ID)＝(H0(ID||0)x,H1(ID||1)x)
wherein ID represents user ID, and x is a main private key of a private key generation center;
further, the method also comprises the following steps:
(2.3) the user side verifies the integrity and validity of the received private key through the following two equations:
e(sk′ID,g)＝e(H0(ID||0),Ppub)
e(sk″ID,g)＝e(H1(ID||1),Ppub)
if both equations are true, the client accepts the private key, otherwise, re-executes step (2.1) > E
(2.2)。
(3) The user end generates the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature of the file and submits the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management
Managing the terminals;
(3.1) the user side divides the file M into n blocks, denoted M ═ M1,m2,…,mnTherein of
Figure BDA0002038173240000064
Defining a set SIS, wherein elements in the set SIS are indexes of file blocks containing privacy information;
(3.2) user end to each file block miThe following operations were carried out:
A. generating a blind file M':
when the index i of the file block belongs to SIS, the file block contains privacy information; calculating a concealment factor for a file block containing private information
Figure BDA0002038173240000061
Where Mname is the unique identification of the file M and
Figure BDA0002038173240000062
in order to hide the private information, the sum of the original file block and the hash value of the hiding factor is modulo to obtain a file block m 'of the hidden private information'i＝mi+H2(ai) mod p, thenBlind file M ═ M'1,m′2,…,m′nAnd it is known that when i ∈ SIS, m'i≠mi(ii) a When in use
Figure BDA0002038173240000065
M'i＝mi；
B. Generating a file label tau:
randomly selecting an element
Figure BDA0002038173240000063
And calculates therefrom a verification value R-g for verifying the document Mr；
Generating meta-tags τ for files0＝Mname||n||R；
Generating a document tag τ ═ τ0||IDS(τ0Ssk) | | spk, where IDS (τ)0Ssk) is a tag for calculating meta-tags τ0Ssk is the private key of the signature, spk is the public key of the signature;
C. generating a signature Φ:
is each file block M 'of Braille piece M'iComputing the signature σi：
Figure BDA0002038173240000071
After the signatures of all the blind file blocks are calculated, a signature set phi is obtainedi}1≤i≤n；
D. And the user side submits the { M', phi, tau } to the management side.
(4) The management terminal examines the file according to the received blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature, and uploads the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed:
(4.1) obtaining meta-tag tau of file from file tag tau0And using meta-tags τ0Verifying whether signature verification method IDV (tau) is passed0,spk,IDS(τ0,ssk))；
(4.2) when meta tag τ0When the verification passes, the slave meta-tag tau0And obtaining a verification value R, and verifying the integrity and the validity of the file through the following equation:
Figure BDA0002038173240000072
if the equality is not satisfied, the management end refuses the file submission; and if so, the integrity and the legality of the file are verified. In addition, whether the file has hidden privacy information needs to be verified, and the verification method is to detect whether the file block of which the index belongs to the SIS or the plaintext contains privacy information fields (such as user name, company name and the like). If yes, the management end refuses the file submission, and otherwise, the { M', phi, tau } is uploaded to the cloud.
Furthermore, the cloud end can inspect the file according to the received blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature, and the inspection method is consistent with the method for inspecting the file by the management end, so that illegal operation of a malicious manager on the file is prevented.
(5) The third party auditing end audits the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud:
(5.1) receiving the blind file and the file tag tau from the cloud end, and acquiring the meta tag tau of the file from the file tag tau0And passes signature verification method IDV (tau)0,spk,IDS(τ0Ssk)) validation meta-tag τ0The validity of (2); when passing the signature verification method, acquiring the unique identifier Mname of the file, the number n of file blocks and the meta-tag tau0Obtaining a verification value R;
(5.2) generating a random index set I, wherein the length of the index set is c, and each element in the index set belongs to [1, n ];
(5.3) selecting a random value for each element in the index set I
Figure BDA0002038173240000081
(5.4)The third party audit end sends a challenge request chal ═ i, v to the cloud endi}i∈I；
(5.5) the cloud generates an integrity certification according to the stored braille and the corresponding signature after receiving the challenge request
Figure BDA0002038173240000082
And returning the integrity certification P to the third party auditing end;
(5.6) the third party auditing end verifies the integrity certification of the file through the following equation:
Figure BDA0002038173240000083
if the equation is established, the file on the cloud is complete, otherwise the file is damaged.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents and improvements made within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (4)

1. A plaintext shared data auditing method supporting privacy information hiding is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) the private key generation center initializes the system;
(2) the user side extracts the private key from the private key generation center;
(3) the user side generates a blind file, a file label and a corresponding signature of the file and submits the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management side;
(4) the management terminal examines the file according to the received blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature, and uploads the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed;
(5) the third party auditing end audits the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud end;
the step (1) comprises the following processes:
(1.1) randomly selecting two multiplicative groups G with the same prime order p1And GTAnd the corresponding bilinear map e: g1×G1＝GT；
(1.2) from a finite field
Figure FDA0002977521620000011
Selecting a random number x from the multiplicative group G1Randomly selecting two elements of g and u; the private key generation center reserves a main private key msk ═ x, ensures that the main private key msk cannot be revealed to anyone, and then calculates a public key P of the main private key mskpub＝gx；
(1.3) selecting a Hash function H, H0，H1：{0，1}*→G1And an
Figure FDA0002977521620000012
(1.4) issuing the system common parameter Para ═ G1，GT，p，g，u，H，H0，H1，Hs，H2，Ppub)；
The step (2) comprises the following processes:
(2.1) the user side sends a private key request to the private key generation center side and submits the user ID of the user side to the private key generation center;
(2.2) the private key generation center generates a corresponding private key by using the user ID and sends the generated private key to a corresponding user side; generating a corresponding private key sk using a user IDIDThe calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
skID＝(sk′ID，sk″ID)＝(H0(ID||0)x，H1(ID||1)x)
wherein ID represents user ID, and x is a main private key of a private key generation center;
the step (2) further comprises the following steps:
(2.3) the user side verifies the integrity and validity of the received private key through the following two equations:
e(sk′ID，g)＝e(H0(ID||0)，Ppub)
e(sk″ID，g)＝e(H1(ID||1)，Ppub)
if both equations are true, the user side accepts the private key, otherwise, the steps (2.1) - (2.2) are executed again;
the step (3) comprises the following processes:
(3.1) the user side divides the file M into n blocks, denoted M ═ M1，m2，…，mnTherein of
Figure FDA0002977521620000021
Defining a set SIS, wherein elements in the set SIS are indexes of file blocks containing privacy information;
(3.2) user end to each file block miThe following operations were carried out:
A. generating a blind file M':
calculating a concealment factor for a file block containing private information
Figure FDA0002977521620000022
Where Mname is the unique identification of the file M and
Figure FDA0002977521620000023
hiding the privacy information to obtain a file block m'i＝mi+H2(ai) modp, then generated Braille M '═ M'1，m′2，…，m′nJ when i belongs to SIS, m'i≠mi(ii) a When in use
Figure FDA0002977521620000024
M'i＝mi；
B. Generating a file label tau:
randomly selecting an element
Figure FDA0002977521620000025
And calculating therefrom a document for authenticationVerification value of M is R ═ gr；
Generating meta-tags τ for files0＝Mname||n||R；
Generating a document tag τ ═ τ0||IDS(τ0Ssk) | | spk, where IDS (τ)0Ssk) is a tag for calculating meta-tags τ0Ssk is the private key of the signature, spk is the public key of the signature;
C. generating a signature Φ:
file block M 'containing privacy information for each of Braille pieces M'iComputing the signature σi：
Figure FDA0002977521620000031
According to file blocks m 'containing private information'iCalculating the signature to obtain a signature set phi ═ sigmai}1≤i≤n；
D. The user side submits the { M', phi, tau } to the management side;
the step (4) comprises the following processes:
(4.1) obtaining meta-tag tau of file from file tag tau0And using meta-tags τ0Verifying whether signature verification method IDV (tau) is passed0，spk，IDS(τ0，ssk))；
(4.2) slave meta tag τ when passing signature verification method0And obtaining a verification value R, and verifying the integrity and the validity of the file through the following equation:
Figure FDA0002977521620000032
if the equality is not satisfied, the management end refuses the file submission; otherwise, uploading { M', phi, tau } to the cloud;
the step (5) comprises the following processes:
(5.1) receiving the blind file and the file tag tau from the cloud end, and acquiring the meta tag tau of the file from the file tag tau0And using meta-tags τ0Verifying whether signature verification method IDV (tau) is passed0，spk，IDS(τ0Ssk)); when passing the signature verification method, acquiring the unique identifier Mname of the file, the number n of file blocks and the meta-tag tau0Obtaining a verification value R;
(5.2) generating a random index set I, wherein the length of the index set is c, and each element in the index set belongs to [1, n ];
(5.3) selecting a random value for each element in the index set I
Figure FDA0002977521620000033
(5.4) the third party audit terminal sends a challenge request chal ═ i, v to the cloud terminali}i∈I；
(5.5) the cloud generates an integrity certification according to the stored braille and the corresponding signature after receiving the challenge request
Figure FDA0002977521620000041
And returning the integrity certification P to the third party auditing end;
(5.6) the third party auditing end verifies the integrity certification of the file through the following equation:
Figure FDA0002977521620000042
if the equation is established, the file on the cloud is complete, otherwise the file is damaged.
2. The plaintext shared data auditing method supporting privacy information hiding according to claim 1, wherein when an equation for verifying integrity and legitimacy of a file is established, whether the file contains the hidden privacy information needs to be verified, if yes, the management end refuses the file submission, and otherwise { M', phi, tau } is uploaded to a cloud.
3. The plaintext shared data auditing method that support privacy information hiding according to claim 1, wherein the cloud itself reviews the file according to the received blind file, the file tag and the corresponding signature.
4. A plaintext shared data auditing system implementing the plaintext shared data auditing method that supports privacy information hiding according to any one of claims 1-3, comprising:
the private key generation center is used for initializing the system;
the user side is used for extracting the private key from the private key generation center, generating a blind file, a file label and a corresponding signature of the file and submitting the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature to the management side;
the management terminal is used for examining the files according to the received blind files, the file labels and the corresponding signatures, and uploading the blind files, the file labels and the corresponding signatures to the cloud terminal when the examination is passed;
the cloud end is used for storing the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature submitted by the management end;
and the third party auditing end is used for auditing the integrity of the file according to the blind file, the file label and the corresponding signature on the cloud.
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