CN108259180A - A kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature - Google Patents

A kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature Download PDF

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Publication number
CN108259180A
CN108259180A CN201710853056.5A CN201710853056A CN108259180A CN 108259180 A CN108259180 A CN 108259180A CN 201710853056 A CN201710853056 A CN 201710853056A CN 108259180 A CN108259180 A CN 108259180A
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chile
signature
bob
verifier
signer
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CN108259180B (en
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侍伟敏
王燕梅
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Beijing University of Technology
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Beijing University of Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
    • H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature, including initialization step；Specified signature algorithm step；Specific authentication algorithm steps；Simulation algorithm step；On the basis of classical Diffie Hellman (DH) Key Exchange Protocol thought is introduced, pass through consult session key first between initial Bell state signer and Designated-Verifier, then signer generates the initial signature value of sharable content object under the assistance of trusted third party, finally initial signature value is encrypted by the session key negotiated between signer and Designated-Verifier again and generates real signature value, the verifier equally specified can also simulate the signature value generated with signer undistinguishable, so as to fulfill the falsifiability of signer, solve e-commerce, the collision problem of authentication property and privacy in the network applications such as electronic voting and bid online, design for privacy of identities guard method provides new approaches.

Description

A kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature
Technical field
The invention belongs to digital signature, are related to a kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature, specially in quantum regime In, signer S can confirm that he endorsed a statement to Designated-Verifier V, meanwhile, V cannot be to the opposing party's confirmer signature Validity, because V has the ability of simulation S signatures.The falsifiability of signer is ensured that in this way, that is, limiting verifier makes Signature arbitrarily cannot be supplied to third party by it, which can be applied to the networks such as e-commerce, electronic voting and bid online The collision problem of authentication property and privacy is solved in.
Background technology
Common digital signature scheme has the characteristics that signature can be confirmed generally, anyone is it is only necessary to know that signature The public-key cryptography of person can verify the validity of its signature at any time.With computer technology and Internet technology Fast development needs the digital signature scheme of different purposes to meet the requirement of various particular surroundings in different application fields. Such as in e-commerce, each bank needs to issue the electronic money of oneself, but if using common digital signature scheme If being signed, then the identity of the affiliated bank of electronic money will be it is well known that disclosing for these information can in every transaction It can be so that opponent therefrom obtains related business intelligence.Obviously, bank is less comfortable with each consumer to understand these information.Together Sample also deposits the collision problem of authentication property and privacy in this kind of network application such as electronic voting, bid online.
In order to solve problem above, Universal designated verifier signature system is suggested, and in the system, one appointed to test Card person can generate effective signature, and the signature generated with signer is that undistinguishable (requires signer and specific authentication Person can generate the signature of undistinguishable), therefore only Designated-Verifier can judge whether signature is generated by signer, and Third party not can determine that the validity of signature.
In quantum scope, the quantum signature protocol having proposed at present is all come certification user by specified verifier Identity, be not traditional Universal designated verifier signature, since Designated-Verifier cannot pass through the effective mould of simulator Intend the signature of signer, then can not achieve its " property denied ".The problem of for more than, present invention introduces classical Diffie- The thought of Hellman (DH) Key Exchange Protocol proposes a kind of effective Universal designated verifier signature agreement, very based on Bell state The falsifiability of signer is just being realized, signature arbitrarily cannot be supplied to third party by limitation verifier, be electronic voting, electricity The design of privacy of identities guard method provides new approaches in the network applications such as sub- commercial affairs and bid online.
Invention content
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of methods of quantum Universal designated verifier signature, are introducing classical Diffie- On the basis of Hellman (DH) Key Exchange Protocol thought, by first between initial Bell state signer and Designated-Verifier First consult session key, then signer the initial signature value of sharable content object is generated under the assistance of trusted third party, finally Initial signature value is encrypted in generation really label by the session key negotiated between signer and Designated-Verifier again Name value, the verifier equally specified can also simulate the signature value generated with signer undistinguishable, so as to fulfill signer Falsifiability, the conflict for solving authentication property and privacy in the network applications such as e-commerce, electronic voting and bid online are asked Topic.
To reach above-mentioned target, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme that：
A kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature, includes the following steps:
Step 1: initialization step includes：
1.1.1 trusted party TC respectively with the owner Alice of signature and signer Chile shared keys, signature Shared key between owner Alice and signer Chile；
1.1.2 signer Chile and the verifier Bob specified share Bell state；
1.1.3 trusted party TC generates initial quantum state, and open public ginseng；
Step 2: specified signature algorithm step includes：
1.2.1 signer Chile randomly generates key, and public key is generated further according to same Alice and TC shared keys；
1.2.2 signer Chile generates the open initial signature that can verify that；
1.2.3 signer Chile generates shared key with the verifier Bob specified according to shared Bell state；
1.2.4 signer Chile is specified according to initial signature value generation is encrypted with the verifier Bob shared keys specified Signature；
Step 3: specific authentication algorithm steps include：
1.3.1 Designated-Verifier Bob decrypts specified signature value according to same signer Chile shared keys, is disclosed The initial signature that can verify that；
1.3.2 Designated-Verifier Bob verifies the open initial signature that can verify that according to public key；
Step 4: simulation algorithm step includes：
1.4.1 Designated-Verifier Bob is generated with Chile not according to verification information, public key and with Chile shared keys Differentiable specified signing messages.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the system framework figure of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
The present invention provides a kind of method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature, as shown in Figure 1, including trusted party TC, signature Owner Alice, signer Chile and Designated-Verifier Bob.It is first shared wherein between TC, Alice and Chile three close Key, Chile and Bob share Bell state, and TC generates initial quantum state；Chile first generates the initial signature of sharable content object Value, Chile and Bob are based on Bell state negotiating about cipher key shared, and Chile is based on shared key and generates specified signature；Bob passes through public affairs The key opened and the validity with the specified signature of Chile shared keys verification；Bob by verification information, disclosed key with And generate the specified signature value with Chile undistinguishables with Chile shared keys.Its implementation is mainly by four algorithm groups Into, including：Initialization step；Specified signature algorithm step；Specific authentication algorithm steps；Simulation algorithm step wherein,
The initialization step includes：
1.1.1 trusted party TC respectively with the owner Alice of signature and signer Chile shared keys, signature Shared key between owner Alice and signer Chile；
1.1.2 signer Chile and the verifier Bob specified share Bell state；
1.1.3 trusted party TC generates initial quantum state, and open public ginseng；
The specified signature algorithm step includes：
1.2.1 signer Chile randomly generates key, and public key is generated further according to same Alice and TC shared keys；
1.2.2 signer Chile generates the open initial signature that can verify that；
1.2.3 signer Chile generates shared key with the verifier Bob specified according to shared Bell state；
1.2.4 signer Chile is specified according to initial signature value generation is encrypted with the verifier Bob shared keys specified Signature；
The specific authentication algorithm steps include：
1.3.1 Designated-Verifier Bob decrypts specified signature value according to same signer Chile shared keys, is disclosed The initial signature that can verify that；
1.3.2 Designated-Verifier Bob verifies the open initial signature that can verify that according to public key；
The simulation algorithm step includes：
1.4.1 Designated-Verifier Bob is generated with Chile not according to verification information, public key and with Chile shared keys Differentiable specified signing messages.
Embodiment 1：
Please refer to Fig.1 the system framework figure of shown quantum specific authentication endorsement method.
1. initialization
1) Alice and Chile shared keys KAC={ a1,b1,.....,an,bn, TC is total to respectively with Alice and Chile Enjoy key KTA={ c1,d1,.....,cn,dnAnd KTC={ e1,f1,.....,en,fn, wherein ai,bi,ci,di,∈ei,；
2) Chile and Bob share Bell stateWherein | C> =| C1>,|C2>,.....,|Cn>And | B>=| B1>,|B2>,.....,|Bn>Preserved respectively by Chile and Bob, wherein |Ci>,|Bi>∈{|0>,|1>}；
3) TC is according to KTA,KTCGenerate quantum state sequenceAnd pass through safe quantum channel and be sent to Chile, whereinIt is one of following quantum state：
4) if the message of signature is M=(m1,m2,.......,mn), TC is calculated With | f (u)>, and openly | f (u)>, wherein f:|x>→|f(u)>Represent quantum hash function；
2. specified signature algorithm
1) Chile generates random number KC={ g1,h1,.....,gn,hnAnd calculateWherein KPCIt is public key, gi,hi∈{0,1}；
2) Chile is according to KAC,KCTo quantum state | φT>Perform W[1]Then operation obtains the open initial label that can verify that Name | S>
W[1]:|φT>→|S>
W[1]It is defined as
Wherein
U (1)=i σy=| 0><1|-|1><0|,
U (0)=| 0><0|+|1><1|,
V (0)=| 0><0|-|1><1|
U (0) represents unit matrix, U (1)=i σyRepresent Pauli-Y, V (0) represents Pauli-Z, and V (1)=H is represented Hadamard door.
3) Chile and Bob generates random number r respectivelyC∈{0,1}2nAnd rB∈{0,1}2n, then perform following operation：
Wherein
δ00=I=| 0><0|+|1><1|,
δ01=σx=| 1><0|+|0><1|,
δ10=i σy=| 0><1|-|1><0|,
δ11=σz=| 0><0|-|1><1|
δ00=I represents unit matrix, δ01=σxRepresent Pauli-X, δ10=i σyRepresent Pauli-Y, δ11=σzIt represents Pauli-Z.
By a secure quantum channel, Chile is sent | KC>Bob, Bob are sent | KB>To Chile；
4) Chile is performedBob is performedThen Chile and Bob with base Z=| 0>,|>1 measures K respectivelyCBAnd KBC, finally obtain shared key K=KBC=KCB；
5) Chile is performedObtain specified signature | SD>, and will | SD>, M, T } and pass through safety Channel be sent to the verifier Bob specified.
3. specific authentication algorithm
If 1) time stamp T is effective, Bob is performedObtain initial signature | S '>；
2) the public key K of Bob ChilePCIt is right | S '>Perform W[2]Operation obtains verification signature | SV>；
W[2]:|S′>→|SV′>
W[2]It is defined as:
Wherein
U (1)=i σy=| 0><1|-|1><0|,
U (0)=| 0><0|+|1><1|,
V (0)=| 0><0|-|1><1|
3) Bob with base (| 0>,|0>,......,|0>) measure | SV＞, and obtain v=(v1,......,vn), then calculateFinally calculating again | f (u ') ＞ is simultaneously verified | f (u) ＞=| whether f (u ') ＞ is equal, It is proved to be successful if equal, otherwise fails.
4. simulation algorithm
1) in the Designated-Verifier stage, Bob can obtain copy v '=(v of v1′,......,vn′)；
2) can be obtained according to v ', Bob | SV>Copy | SV′>；
3) the public key K of Bob ChilePCIt is right | SV′>Perform W[2]Operation obtains initial signature | S ">；
4) it is performed according to Chile shared keys K, BobIt obtains with signer Chile not Differentiable specified signature | SD′>。

Claims (5)

1. a kind of implementation method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature, which is characterized in that include the following steps：
Step 1: initialization step includes：
1.1.1 trusted party TC respectively with the owner Alice of signature and signer Chile shared keys, the owner of signature Shared key between Alice and signer Chile；
1.1.2 signer Chile and the verifier Bob specified share Bell state；
1.1.3 trusted party TC generates initial quantum state, and open public ginseng；
Step 2: specified signature algorithm step includes：
1.2.1 signer Chile randomly generates key, and public key is generated further according to same Alice and TC shared keys；
1.2.2 signer Chile generates the open initial signature that can verify that；
1.2.3 signer Chile generates shared key with the verifier Bob specified according to shared Bell state；
1.2.4 signer Chile encrypts the initial specified signature of signature value generation according to the verifier Bob shared keys specified；
Step 3: specific authentication algorithm steps include：
1.3.1 Designated-Verifier Bob decrypts specified signature value according to same signer Chile shared keys, obtains open can verify that Initial signature；
1.3.2 Designated-Verifier Bob verifies the open initial signature that can verify that according to public key；
Step 4: simulation algorithm step includes：
1.4.1 Designated-Verifier Bob according to verification information, public key and with Chile shared keys generation can not area with Chile The specified signing messages divided.
2. a kind of implementation method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Described is first Beginningization step, wherein；
2.1 Alice and Chile shared keys KAC={ a1,b1,.....,an,bn, TC shares close with Alice and Chile respectively Key KTA={ c1,d1,.....,cn,dnAnd KTC={ e1,f1,.....,en,fn, wherein ai,bi,ci,di,ei,fi∈{0,1}；
2.2 Chile and Bob share Bell stateWherein | C>=| C1>,|C2>,.....,|Cn>And | B>=| B1>,|B2>,.....,|Bn>Preserved respectively by Chile and Bob, wherein | Ci>, |Bi>∈{|0>,|1>}；；
2.3 TC are according to KTA,KTCGenerate quantum state sequenceAnd pass through safe quantum channel and be sent to Chile, whereinIt is one of following quantum state：
If the message of 2.4 signatures is M=(m1,m2,.......,mn), TC is calculatedWith | f(u)>, and openly | f (u)>, wherein f:|x>→|f(u)>Represent quantum hash function；
3. a kind of implementation method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The finger Determine signature algorithm step, wherein；
3.1 Chile generate random number KC={ g1,h1,.....,gn,hnAnd calculateWherein KPC It is public key, gi,hi∈{0,1}；；
3.2 Chile are according to KAC,KCTo quantum state | φT>Perform W[1]Then operation obtains the open initial signature that can verify that | S>
W[1]:|φT>→|S>
W[1]It is defined as
Wherein
U (1)=i σy=| 0><1|-|1><0|,
U (0)=| 0><0|+|1><1|,
V (0)=| 0><0|-|1><1|
U (0) represents unit matrix, U (1)=i σyRepresent Pauli-Y, V (0) represents Pauli-Z, and V (1)=H represents Hadamard Door.
3.3 Chile and Bob randomly generate r respectivelyC∈{0,1}2nAnd rB∈{0,1}2n, then perform following operation：
Wherein
δ00=I=| 0><0|+|1><1|,
δ01=σx=| 1><0|+|0><1|,
δ10=i σy=| 0><1|-|1><0|,
δ11=σz=| 0><0|-|1><1|
δ00=I represents unit matrix, δ01=σxRepresent Pauli-X, δ10=i σyRepresent Pauli-Y, δ11=σzRepresent Pauli-Z Door.
By a secure quantum channel, Chile is sent | KC>Bob, Bob are sent | KB>To Chile；
3.4 Chile are performedBob is performedThen Chile and Bob is used Base Z=| 0>,|1>K is measured respectivelyCBAnd KBC, finally obtain shared key K=KBC=KCB；
3.5 Chile are performedObtain specified signature | SD>, and will | SD>, M, T } and it is logical It crosses safe channel and is sent to the verifier Bob specified.
4. a kind of implementation method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The finger Determine verification algorithm step, wherein；
If 4.1 time stamp Ts are effective, Bob is performedObtain initial signature | S '>；
The public key K of 4.2 Bob ChilePCIt is right | S '>Perform W[2]Operation obtains verification signature | SV>；
W[2]:|S′>→|SV′>
W[2]It is defined as:
Wherein
U (1)=i σy=| 0><1|-|1><0|,
U (0)=| 0><0|+|1><1|,
V (0)=| 0><0|-|1><1|
4.3 Bob with base (| 0>,|0>,......,|0>) measure | SV>, and obtain v=(v1,......,vn), then calculateFinally calculate again | f (u ')>And verify | f (u)>=| f (u ')>It is whether equal, It is proved to be successful if equal, otherwise fails.
5. a kind of implementation method of quantum Universal designated verifier signature according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The mould Intend algorithm steps, wherein；
5.1 in the Designated-Verifier stage, and Bob can obtain copy v '=(v of v1′,......,vn′)；
5.2 can obtain according to v ', Bob | SV>Copy | SV′>；
The public key K of 5.3 Bob ChilePCIt is right | SV′>Perform W[2]Operation obtains initial signature | S ">；
5.4 perform according to Chile shared keys K, BobObtain same signer The specified signature of Chile undistinguishables | SD′>。
CN201710853056.5A 2017-09-20 2017-09-20 Method for quantum specifying verifier signature Expired - Fee Related CN108259180B (en)

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CN108985085A (en) * 2018-07-17 2018-12-11 济南浪潮高新科技投资发展有限公司 A kind of memory SPD data ciphering method based on Pauli-Z
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