CN104869638A - Detection method and device for GPS coordinate cheating - Google Patents
Detection method and device for GPS coordinate cheating Download PDFInfo
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- CN104869638A CN104869638A CN201510284601.4A CN201510284601A CN104869638A CN 104869638 A CN104869638 A CN 104869638A CN 201510284601 A CN201510284601 A CN 201510284601A CN 104869638 A CN104869638 A CN 104869638A
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- coordinate information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W64/00—Locating users or terminals or network equipment for network management purposes, e.g. mobility management
- H04W64/003—Locating users or terminals or network equipment for network management purposes, e.g. mobility management locating network equipment
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
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- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention discloses a detection method for GPS coordinate cheating. The method comprises that GPS coordinate information of a terminal in a preset period is obtained; first coordinate information of the terminal in the preset period is obtained by a base station positioning technology or WiFi positioning technology; deviation of the GPS coordinate information from the first coordinate information is obtained, and compared with a first preset threshold; and if the deviation is greater than or equivalent to the first preset threshold, the GPS coordinate information is determined to be forged coordinate information. The invention also provides a detection device for GPS coordinate cheating. The detection device comprises a first obtaining unit, a second obtaining unit and a first determination unit. According to the detection method and device, the GPS coordinate of any terminal can be detected by the base station positioning technology or WiFi positioning technology, and whether a user modifies the GPS coordinate can be determined.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to computer processing technology field, particularly relate to detection method and the device of gps coordinate cheating.
Background technology
At present, the use of system of calling a taxi is more and more general, and passenger can pass through subscriber equipment (User Equipment is called for short UE) upper system of calling a taxi of installing easily and issue the request of calling a taxi.But, amendment global positioning system (Global PositionSystem is often utilized the driver in system that calls a taxi at present, be called for short GPS) sit calibration method and go obtain extra interests and damage the interests of other drivers, such as carry out competition for orders by amendment simulating GPS coordinate, or affect GPS valuation distance etc. by amendment gps coordinate.
The detection method of existing common forgery gps coordinate is: the option that whether sense terminals opens " allowing simulation geographical position ", if open this option, shows that user revises gps coordinate.But for obtaining the terminal of superuser right, when not opening " allowing simulation geographical position " option, gps coordinate can be modified.
Summary of the invention
For the defect of prior art, the invention provides detection method and the device of gps coordinate cheating, can be detected the gps coordinate of any terminal by architecture or WiFi location, judge whether to revise gps coordinate.
First aspect, the invention provides the detection method of a kind of gps coordinate cheating, the method comprises:
Obtain the global position system GPS coordinate information of terminal in preset time period;
Obtain first coordinate information of described terminal in described preset time period adopting architecture technology or WiFi location technology to obtain;
Obtain the deviation of described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information, and described deviation and the first predetermined threshold value are compared;
If described deviation is more than or equal to the first predetermined threshold value, then judge that described gps coordinate information is as forgery coordinate information.
Preferably, described gps coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information; Described first coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.
Preferably, described method also comprises:
If described deviation is less than the first predetermined threshold value, then obtains and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period;
According to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information.
Preferably, described according to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information, comprising:
The changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period and the second predetermined threshold value are compared, and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period and the 3rd predetermined threshold value are compared;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is greater than the second predetermined threshold value, described base station numbering does not have change and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is less than the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is less than or equal to the second predetermined threshold value, and described base station numbering changes or the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is more than or equal to the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
Preferably, the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described acquisition and described terminal current address number and in preset time period described base station signal strength signal intensity before, described method also comprises:
Obtain the current address information of described terminal;
Described terminal current address according to obtaining determines that the distance with described terminal current address is less than the base station of predeterminable range.
Second aspect, the invention provides the checkout gear of a kind of gps coordinate cheating, this device comprises:
First acquiring unit, for obtaining the global position system GPS coordinate information of terminal in preset time period;
Second acquisition unit, for obtaining first coordinate information of described terminal in described preset time period adopting architecture technology or WiFi location technology to obtain;
First identifying unit, for obtaining the deviation of described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information, and compares described deviation and the first predetermined threshold value; If described deviation is more than or equal to the first predetermined threshold value, then judge that described gps coordinate information is as forgery coordinate information.
Preferably, described gps coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information; Described first coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.
Preferably, described device also comprises: the second identifying unit, for:
When described deviation is less than the first predetermined threshold value, obtains and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period;
According to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information.
Preferably, described second identifying unit, specifically for:
The changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period and the second predetermined threshold value are compared, and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period and the 3rd predetermined threshold value are compared;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is greater than the second predetermined threshold value, described base station numbering does not have change and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is less than the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is less than or equal to the second predetermined threshold value, and described base station numbering changes or the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is more than or equal to the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
Preferably, described device also comprises: positioning unit, for:
Obtain the current address information of described terminal;
Described terminal current address according to obtaining determines that the distance with described terminal current address is less than the base station of predeterminable range.
As shown from the above technical solution, the invention provides detection method and the device of the cheating of a kind of gps coordinate, by adopting architecture and WiFi localization method monitoring gps coordinate, judging whether gps coordinate exists abnormal conditions, the method is applicable to any terminal, and the difficulty that user walks around monitoring is large.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In order to be illustrated more clearly in disclosure embodiment or technical scheme of the prior art, be briefly described to the accompanying drawing used required in embodiment or description of the prior art below, apparently, accompanying drawing in the following describes is only embodiments more of the present disclosure, for those of ordinary skill in the art, under the prerequisite not paying creative work, other accompanying drawing can also be obtained according to these figure.
Fig. 1 is the schematic flow sheet of the detection method of a kind of gps coordinate cheating that the disclosure one embodiment provides;
Fig. 2 is the part run schematic diagram of the detection method of a kind of gps coordinate cheating that another embodiment of the disclosure provides;
Fig. 3 is the structural representation of the checkout gear of a kind of gps coordinate cheating that another embodiment of the disclosure provides.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in disclosure embodiment, be clearly and completely described the technical scheme in disclosure embodiment, obviously, described embodiment is only disclosure part embodiment, instead of whole embodiments.Based on the embodiment in the disclosure, those of ordinary skill in the art are not making the every other embodiment obtained under creative work prerequisite, all belong to the scope of disclosure protection.
As shown in Figure 1, the schematic flow sheet of the detection method of a kind of gps coordinate cheating provided for the disclosure one embodiment, the method comprises the steps:
S1: obtain the global position system GPS coordinate information of terminal in preset time period;
Particularly, described gps coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.Wherein, described terminal for providing service side, as the driver in vehicles dial-a-cab, the equipment such as the mobile terminal for order used or personal computer (Personal Computer is called for short PC).Such as smart mobile phone, personal digital assistant (PDA), panel computer, notebook computer, vehicle-mounted computer (carputer), handheld device, intelligent glasses, intelligent watch, wearable device, virtual display device or display enhancing equipment (as Google Glass, Oculus Rift, Hololens, Gear VR) etc.
S2: obtain first coordinate information of described terminal in described preset time period adopting architecture technology or WiFi location technology to obtain;
Particularly, described first coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.Architecture is generally applied to mobile terminal, architecture service is called again mobile location-based service (Location Based Service, be called for short LBS), the network (as GSM net) particular by telecommunications mobile operator obtains the positional information (latitude and longitude coordinates) of mobile phone users; WiFi location mainly refers to: mobile terminal has connected certain Wi-Fi hotspot, so just can call the geographical location information of all focuses near mobile terminal in hotspot database, thus and geographical location information strong and weak according to the signal of neighbouring each focus calculates the geographical position of mobile terminal further.The first coordinate information of terminal then all can be obtained according to architecture technology or WiFi location technology.
It should be noted that, the preset time period in step S1 neutralization procedure S2 is the identical time period.
S3: the deviation obtaining described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information, and described deviation and the first predetermined threshold value are compared.
Specifically, the deviation of described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information is the distance between gps coordinate and the first coordinate.Then distance between the two and the first predetermined threshold value are compared.
It should be noted that, the first predetermined threshold value is arranged according to the error of architecture or WiFi location, and in general, the error of architecture or WiFi location is other at hundred meter levels, then can be arranged on hundred meter levels other for the first predetermined threshold value.
S4: if described deviation is more than or equal to the first predetermined threshold value, then judge that described gps coordinate information is as forgery coordinate information.
Further, if described deviation is less than the first predetermined threshold value, the method also comprises the steps:
S5: obtain and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period; According to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, step S5 comprises following sub-step:
S51: obtain and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period.
Wherein, base station numbering is the sequence number for unique identification base station.A corresponding base station, base station numbering.
S52: the changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period and the second predetermined threshold value are compared, and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period and the 3rd predetermined threshold value are compared.
Specifically, in preset time period, the changing value of gps coordinate refers to: the difference of the gps coordinate of the gps coordinate of the sart point in time of preset time period and the end time point of preset time period.The changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station then in preset time period refers to: the difference of the signal strength signal intensity of the same base station of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station of the sart point in time of preset time period and the end time point of preset time period.
For example, preset time period is 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock, and the changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period is: when 1 the gps coordinate of terminal and 2 time terminal the difference of gps coordinate.The changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period is: when 1 the signal strength signal intensity of base station and 2 time same base station the difference of signal strength signal intensity.
S53: if the changing value of described gps coordinate is greater than the second predetermined threshold value, described base station numbering does not have change and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is less than the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
Specifically, when the gps coordinate generation significant change of terminal in preset time period, but near terminal, base station numbering is constant and base station signal strength does not have significant change yet, then show that in preset time period, gps coordinate is the coordinate information forged.
S54: if the changing value of described gps coordinate is less than or equal to the second predetermined threshold value, and described base station numbering changes or the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is more than or equal to the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
Specifically, when in preset time period, the gps coordinate of terminal does not have significant change, but the change of base station numbering or base station signal strength generation significant change near terminal, then show that in preset time period, gps coordinate is the coordinate information forged.
In the present embodiment, before step S5, the method also comprises the steps:
Obtain the current address information of described terminal; Described terminal current address according to obtaining determines that the distance with described terminal current address is less than the base station of predeterminable range.
Wherein, the current address of described terminal can be the coordinate information obtained by base station positioning method or WiFi localization method.
The detection method that the present embodiment provides a kind of gps coordinate to practise fraud, by the positional information adopting architecture and WiFi localization method to obtain terminal, and compares the gps coordinate of this positional information and acquisition, determines whether gps coordinate is forge coordinate.
Further, the present embodiment is also according to the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station of terminal surrounding numbering and base station, and the changing value of gps coordinate in preset time period, analyzes and determines whether gps coordinate is forge coordinate.Said method like this is located Dual positioning method by architecture and WiFi and is monitored gps coordinate, judges whether gps coordinate exists abnormal conditions.And the method that the present embodiment provides is applicable to any terminal, and the difficulty that user walks around monitoring is large.
As shown in Figure 3, the disclosure still another embodiment provides the structural representation of the checkout gear of a kind of gps coordinate cheating, and this device comprises the first acquiring unit 301, second acquisition unit 302 and the first identifying unit 303, wherein:
First acquiring unit 301, for obtaining the global position system GPS coordinate information of terminal in preset time period.
Second acquisition unit 302, for obtaining first coordinate information of described terminal in described preset time period adopting architecture technology or WiFi location technology to obtain.
First identifying unit 303, for obtaining the deviation of described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information, and compares described deviation and the first predetermined threshold value; If described deviation is more than or equal to the first predetermined threshold value, then judge that described gps coordinate information is as forgery coordinate information.
In the present embodiment, described gps coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information; Described first coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.
In the present embodiment, described device also comprises: the second identifying unit, for:
When described deviation is less than the first predetermined threshold value, obtains and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period;
According to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information.
In the present embodiment, described second identifying unit, specifically for:
The changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period and the second predetermined threshold value are compared, and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period and the 3rd predetermined threshold value are compared;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is greater than the second predetermined threshold value, described base station numbering does not have change and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is less than the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is less than or equal to the second predetermined threshold value, and described base station numbering changes or the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is more than or equal to the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
In the present embodiment, described device also comprises: positioning unit, for:
Obtain the current address information of described terminal;
Described terminal current address according to obtaining determines that the distance with described terminal current address is less than the base station of predeterminable range.
For device embodiment, due to itself and embodiment of the method basic simlarity, so description is fairly simple, relevant part illustrates see the part of embodiment of the method.
Should be noted that, in all parts of system of the present disclosure, the function that will realize according to it and logical partitioning has been carried out to parts wherein, but, the disclosure is not limited to this, can repartition all parts as required or combine, such as, can be single parts by some component combinations, or some parts can be decomposed into more subassembly further.
All parts embodiment of the present disclosure with hardware implementing, or can realize with the software module run on one or more processor, or realizes with their combination.It will be understood by those of skill in the art that the some or all functions that microprocessor or digital signal processor (DSP) can be used in practice to realize according to the some or all parts in the system of disclosure embodiment.The disclosure can also be embodied as part or all equipment for performing method as described herein or device program (such as, computer program and computer program).Realizing program of the present disclosure and can store on a computer-readable medium like this, or the form of one or more signal can be had.Such signal can be downloaded from internet website and obtain, or provides on carrier signal, or provides with any other form.
It should be noted that above-described embodiment is described the disclosure instead of limits the disclosure, and those skilled in the art can design alternative embodiment when not departing from the scope of claims.In the claims, any reference symbol between bracket should be configured to limitations on claims.Word " comprises " not to be got rid of existence and does not arrange element in the claims or step.Word "a" or "an" before being positioned at element is not got rid of and be there is multiple such element.The disclosure can by means of including the hardware of some different elements and realizing by means of the computer of suitably programming.In the unit claim listing some devices, several in these devices can be carry out imbody by same hardware branch.Word first, second and third-class use do not represent any order.Can be title by these word explanations.
Above execution mode is only suitable for the disclosure is described; and not to restriction of the present disclosure; the those of ordinary skill of relevant technical field; when not departing from spirit and scope of the present disclosure; can also make a variety of changes and modification; therefore all equivalent technical schemes also belong to category of the present disclosure, and scope of patent protection of the present disclosure should be defined by the claims.
Claims (10)
1. a detection method for gps coordinate cheating, it is characterized in that, the method comprises:
Obtain the global position system GPS coordinate information of terminal in preset time period;
Obtain first coordinate information of described terminal in described preset time period adopting architecture technology or WiFi location technology to obtain;
Obtain the deviation of described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information, and described deviation and the first predetermined threshold value are compared;
If described deviation is more than or equal to the first predetermined threshold value, then judge that described gps coordinate information is as forgery coordinate information.
2. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described gps coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information; Described first coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.
3. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described method also comprises:
If described deviation is less than the first predetermined threshold value, then obtains and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period;
According to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information.
4. method according to claim 3, is characterized in that, described according to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judges described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information, comprising:
The changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period and the second predetermined threshold value are compared, and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period and the 3rd predetermined threshold value are compared;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is greater than the second predetermined threshold value, described base station numbering does not have change and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is less than the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is less than or equal to the second predetermined threshold value, and described base station numbering changes or the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is more than or equal to the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
5. method according to claim 3, is characterized in that, the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described acquisition and described terminal current address number and in preset time period described base station signal strength signal intensity before, described method also comprises:
Obtain the current address information of described terminal;
Described terminal current address according to obtaining determines that the distance with described terminal current address is less than the base station of predeterminable range.
6. a checkout gear for gps coordinate cheating, it is characterized in that, this device comprises:
First acquiring unit, for obtaining the global position system GPS coordinate information of terminal in preset time period;
Second acquisition unit, for obtaining first coordinate information of described terminal in described preset time period adopting architecture technology or WiFi location technology to obtain;
First identifying unit, for obtaining the deviation of described gps coordinate information and described first coordinate information, and compares described deviation and the first predetermined threshold value; If described deviation is more than or equal to the first predetermined threshold value, then judge that described gps coordinate information is as forgery coordinate information.
7. device according to claim 6, is characterized in that, described gps coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information; Described first coordinate information comprises: longitude, latitude and timestamp information.
8. device according to claim 6, is characterized in that, described device also comprises: the second identifying unit, for:
When described deviation is less than the first predetermined threshold value, obtains and to number with the distance base station be less than in the scope of predeterminable range of described terminal current address and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station in preset time period;
According to described gps coordinate information, described base station numbering and the signal strength signal intensity of described base station, judge described gps coordinate information whether as forgery coordinate information.
9. device according to claim 8, is characterized in that, described second identifying unit, specifically for:
The changing value of the gps coordinate in preset time period and the second predetermined threshold value are compared, and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of the base station in preset time period and the 3rd predetermined threshold value are compared;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is greater than the second predetermined threshold value, described base station numbering does not have change and the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is less than the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery;
If the changing value of described gps coordinate is less than or equal to the second predetermined threshold value, and described base station numbering changes or the changing value of the signal strength signal intensity of described base station is more than or equal to the 3rd predetermined threshold value, then judge the coordinate information of the gps coordinate information in described predetermined amount of time as forgery.
10. device according to claim 6, is characterized in that, described device also comprises: positioning unit, for:
Obtain the current address information of described terminal;
Described terminal current address according to obtaining determines that the distance with described terminal current address is less than the base station of predeterminable range.
Priority Applications (20)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510284601.4A CN104869638B (en) | 2015-05-28 | 2015-05-28 | The detection method and device of gps coordinate cheating |
| MYPI2017001096A MY193639A (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| JP2017539550A JP6637054B2 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Method and system for providing on-demand service information |
| NZ751377A NZ751377B2 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| EP16742766.5A EP3252704B1 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Information providing method and system for on-demand service |
| BR112017016064-1A BR112017016064B1 (en) | 2015-02-10 | 2016-01-27 | METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION FOR AN ON-DEMAND SERVICE |
| CA2975002A CA2975002C (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| SG11201706149XA SG11201706149XA (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods And Systems For Providing Information For An On-Demand Service |
| PCT/CN2016/072357 WO2016119704A1 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Information providing method and system for on-demand service |
| KR1020177023933A KR20180006875A (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for on-demand services |
| US15/546,657 US10458806B2 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| AU2016212530A AU2016212530A1 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| GB1712010.6A GB2550309A (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2016-01-27 | Information providing method and system for on-demand service |
| PH12017501345A PH12017501345A1 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2017-07-27 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| HK18104998.4A HK1245955A1 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2018-04-18 | Information providing method and system for on-demand service |
| US16/569,632 US11156470B2 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2019-09-12 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| AU2019101806A AU2019101806A4 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2019-09-24 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| AU2019236639A AU2019236639A1 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2019-09-24 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
| JP2019228967A JP6918087B2 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2019-12-19 | Methods and systems for providing information on on-demand services |
| US17/448,717 US11892312B2 (en) | 2015-01-27 | 2021-09-24 | Methods and systems for providing information for an on-demand service |
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| CN201510284601.4A CN104869638B (en) | 2015-05-28 | 2015-05-28 | The detection method and device of gps coordinate cheating |
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| CN104869638A true CN104869638A (en) | 2015-08-26 |
| CN104869638B CN104869638B (en) | 2018-04-13 |
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