CN103701797B - Light-weight node and gateway two-way identity authentication method - Google Patents
Light-weight node and gateway two-way identity authentication method Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a light-weight node and gateway two-way identity authentication method which specifically comprises the following steps: A, registering a node; B, authenticating the node; C, authenticating a gateway broadcasting source. According to the method disclosed by the invention, two-way identity authentication between the node and a gateway is adopted, so that 'impersonation attack' is effectively prevented; a light-weight authentication algorithm can be used for reducing the energy consumption of the node; Merkle hash tree broadcasting source authentication is less in expenses on the aspects of calculation, storage and communication, and node capture, solicited information playback and Dos attack can be resisted.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to smart home security technical field, more particularly, to a kind of node of lightweight, gateway bidirectional identification
Authentication method.
Background technology
At present, technology of Internet of things more and more receives the concern of people.The essence of Internet of Things is by obtaining
The sensor node (abbreviation node) of object information, to carry out information gathering, carries out information transfer and exchange by ubiquitous network, leads to
Cross information processing system and carry out Information procession and decision-making.
Smart home, with house as platform, using comprehensive wiring, network service, safety precaution, the technology structure such as automatically controls
Build efficient housing facilities and safety and protection system, lifting house security, convenience, comfortableness, and realize environmental protection and energy saving
Living environment.Smart home apply as the typical case in Internet of Things evolution have in Internet of Things industry huge consumption dive
Power, has a bright future.
Domestic safety prevention system provides important safety guarantee as the subsystem of intelligent domestic system for living environment, and
Sensing technology is widely used in completing collection and the real-time control of information, sensor-based system in the subsystems of smart home
The security risk itself existing also is brought in intelligent domestic system immediately.The front end awareness apparatus of sensor-based system are sensor
Node energy is limited and makes front end sensing node readily become the object attacked by the way of radio communication, including
The personation identity of sensing node, interference, shielding, signal interception etc. are attacked.
Content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to pass through a kind of node of lightweight, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, to solve more than
The problem that background section is mentioned.
A kind of node of lightweight, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, it comprises the steps:
A, Node registry；B, entity authentication；C, the certification of gateway broadcasts source.
Especially, described step a specifically includes:
A1, node send registration request bag to gateway；
A2, gateway parse to the registration request bag receiving, the mac of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through,
Abandoning this registration request bag, if being verified, sending registration response bag to node.
Especially, described step b specifically includes:
B1, gateway send random number to the node by registration, and store this random number and corresponding node number；
After b2, node receive described random number corresponding with oneself, generate certification request bag, be sent to gateway；
B3, gateway receive certification request bag, take out corresponding random number according to node number, by itself and certification request bag
Middle data XOR, and use corresponding mac proof of algorithm mac, if being verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node,
Otherwise authentification failure, node time-out can initiate re-authentication.
Especially, described step c specifically includes:
C1, node and the prefabricated work of gateway: a series of complete y-bend merkle tree that gateway generates si and depth is 3；For
Each node i is numbered, and meets: when i is for father's node, its left child nodes is 2i, and right child nodes are 2i+1, the root section of tree
Point numbering is 1；Between node, hash value relation meets: when i is for leaf node, ki=hash (si)；When i is not leaf node
When, must there is left and right child k2i, k2i+1 in it, meet ki=hash (k2i (k2i+1))；The preset k1 of each sensor node
With hash hashing algorithm；Gateway preserves si and merkle tree；
C2, gateway send broadcast source certification bag；
C3, node are calculated as below after receiving broadcast source certification bag:
Hash (hash (hash (hash (merkle [0]) merkle [1]) merkle [2]) merkle [3]), tests
Whether the k1 demonstrate,proving its result and node itself storage is equal, if equal, certification success.
Especially, described step a1 specifically includes: node sends registration request bag to gateway, and its process is as follows:
First, node uart driver is according to the data form consulting with gateway, by identifying algorithm flag bit (1b),
Nodeid (2b), reserved bit (1b), the common 8b of reserved bit (4b) and random number are input in lkt4200 after carrying out XOR, wherein, note
The uplink packet random number n in volume stage is constantly equal to 0；
2nd, lkt4200 receives described 8b data, carries out being calculated as below generation mac (4b):
Mac [k, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+reserved bit (1b)+reserved bit (4b)) n (4b, note
Volume stage n=0)]
3rd, the packing of 13b data is encapsulated as registration request bag by node uart driver, sends to gateway.
Especially, described step a2 specifically includes: gateway parses to the registration request bag receiving, according to registration request
The packet explanation of bag, judges this packet for registration request bag, according to the algorithm flag bit of registration request bag, judges to generate
Lightweight algorithm used by mac, thus verifying the mac of registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandons this registration request bag,
If being verified, send registration response bag to node.
Especially, described step b3 specifically includes: gateway receives certification request bag, is taken out corresponding according to node number
Random number, by itself and front 8 byte data XORs in certification request bag, and is tested using corresponding mac algorithm according to algorithm flag bit
Card mac, if being verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, and node time-out can be initiated again to recognize
Card.
The node of lightweight of present invention offer, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method adopt two-way between node and gateway
Authentication effectively prevents " impersonation attack ", and the identifying algorithm of lightweight decreases the energy consumption of node, and merkle Hash tree is wide
Broadcast source certification less in calculating, storage, communication aspects expense, node capture can be resisted, solicited message is reset and dos attacks.
Brief description
Fig. 1 is node provided in an embodiment of the present invention, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method flow chart；
Fig. 2 is node provided in an embodiment of the present invention, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method data flow figure；
Fig. 3 is the merkle Hash tree schematic diagram of broadcast source certification provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
The invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.It is understood that tool described herein
Body embodiment is used only for explaining the present invention, rather than limitation of the invention.It also should be noted that, for the ease of retouching
State, in accompanying drawing, illustrate only part related to the present invention rather than full content.
Refer to shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the present embodiment interior joint, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method specifically include following step
Rapid:
Step s101, Node registry.The detailed process of Node registry is as follows:
Step s1011, node send registration request bag to gateway, and its form is as follows:
First, node uart driver is according to the data form consulting with gateway, by identifying algorithm flag bit (1b),
Nodeid (2b), reserved bit (1b), the common 8b of reserved bit (4b) and random number are input in lkt4200 after carrying out XOR, wherein, note
The uplink packet random number n in volume stage is constantly equal to 0.
2nd, lkt4200 receives described 8b data, carries out generation mac (4b) is calculated as below.
Mac [k, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+reserved bit (1b)+reserved bit (4b)) n (4b, note
Volume stage n=0)]
3rd, the packing of 13b data is encapsulated as registration request bag by node uart driver, sends to gateway.
Wherein, uart is universal asynchronous receiving-transmitting transmitter.Lkt4200 is so far, highest in embedded encryption chip
The encryption chip at end, it employs 32 intelligent card chips is hardware platform, provides safest encipherment scheme, and that is, algorithm is downloaded
Scheme.
Step s1012, gateway parse to the registration request bag receiving, the mac of checking registration request bag, if checking is not
Passing through, then abandon this registration request bag, if being verified, sending registration response bag to node.
Gateway parses to the registration request bag receiving, the subtype (packet explanation) according to registration request bag, sentences
Break this packet for registration request bag, the algflag (algorithm flag bit) according to registration request bag, judge to generate used by mac
Lightweight algorithm (adopts zuc, present) in the present embodiment, thus verifying the mac of registration request bag, if checking is not passed through,
Abandoning this registration request bag, if being verified, sending registration response bag to node, its form is as follows:
Mac [k, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+success (1b takies original reserved bit 1b)+
Reserved bit (4b))]
Node carries out message integrity certification according to mac after receiving this packet.
Step s102, entity authentication.The detailed process of entity authentication is as follows:
Step s1021, gateway send random number to the node by registration, and permanently store this random number and corresponding node
Number.
Mac [k, identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+reserved bit (1b)+random number ni(4b takies original
4b reserved bit)]
After step s1022, node receive described random number corresponding with oneself, lkt4200 is called to generate certification request bag,
It is sent to gateway.
Certification request bag data form:
Mac [k, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+reserved bit (1b)+reserved bit (4b)) ni(4b recognizes
N in the card first stepi)]
Step s1023, gateway receive certification request bag, take out corresponding random number according to node number, by its with recognize
Front 8 byte data XORs in card request bag, and corresponding mac proof of algorithm mac is used according to algflag (algorithm flag bit),
If being verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, and node time-out can initiate re-authentication.
Mac [k, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+success (1b takies original reserved bit 1b)+
Reserved bit (4b)) ni] in order to prevent Replay Attack, provide freshness to protect, the random number in above formula is this verification process
Middle gateway is handed down to and No. d corresponding random number (4b) of node i.
Step s103, the certification of gateway broadcasts source.
Message authentication is very important for many applications of wireless sensor network, in wireless environments, attacks
The person of hitting is easy to injecting data bag, and without message authentication, recipient cannot determine the true and false of these message it is impossible to safety is held
Row associative operation.In broadcast source certification, utesla authentication techniques adopt one-way hash chain, and delayed backward broadcasts hash value ki+
1 so that node calculates checking ki=h (ki+1), and ki was the hash value that a upper moment receives.The hash parameter of utesla certification
Issue mechanism can attract dos and attack.
Access control scheme based on merkle Hash tree and calculating, storage and the communication of user's access ability revocation mode
Expense is less, can resist node capture, solicited message Replay Attack, have a good autgmentability, supports multi-user, gateway
Source certification, carries out the parametric distribution of utesla using merkle tree, can reduce or eliminate the impact of dos attack.When gateway needs
When wanting Broadcasting Control order, using the broadcast channel of i-th utesla example.Parameter certificate is comprised in broadcast
paracerti.Recipient can utilize preallocated merkle tree root, carries out source certification to broadcast immediately.For example, node
Receive containing paracert3={ s3,k4,k12,k52Broadcast, carry out being calculated as below comparing, certification broadcast source: h (h (k12
⊕h(h(s3)⊕k4)⊕k52=k12As equal, certification is passed through.
Based on above-mentioned analysis, the present invention is based on merkle tree and combines the mechanism such as existing network framework route, and design is realized
There is the gateway broadcasts source authentication method of feasibility, its detailed process is as follows:
Step s1031, node and the prefabricated work of gateway: gateway generate a series of si (1,2 ..., 8) and depth be 3 complete
Full y-bend merkle tree, this tree has 15 nodes；As shown in figure 3, numbering for each node i, meet: when i is for father's node,
Its left child nodes is 2i, and right child nodes are 2i+1, and it is 1 that the root node of tree is numbered；Between node, hash value relation meets: works as i
During for leaf node, ki=hash (si)；When i is not leaf node, must there is left and right child k2i, k2i+1 in it, meet ki
=hash (k2i (k2i+1))；Each sensor node preset k1 and hash hashing algorithm；Gateway preserves si (1,2 ..., 8)
With merkle tree.
Step s1032, gateway send broadcast source certification bag.
Gateway selects the i-th-th utesla passage si, invoked procedure paracertcompute to obtain credential parameter, put into
The merkle domain of following packet:
In above-mentioned data packet format, the payload cmd length of broadcasting command is 3b, and control node completes broadcast source certification
The action command taken after work, sequence of data packet seqnum (1b) is used for preventing from returning to attack, and credential parameter merkle is
4b ensures source certification, and md5 is mac and ensures integrated authentication.
Step s1033, node are calculated as below after receiving broadcast source certification bag:
Hash (hash (hash (hash (merkle [0]) merkle [1]) merkle [2]) merkle [3]), tests
Whether the k1 demonstrate,proving its result and node itself storage is equal, if equal, certification success.
Before technical scheme is effectively resisted to smart home using the bidirectional identity authentication between node and gateway
" impersonation attack " of end awareness apparatus, the identifying algorithm of lightweight decreases the energy consumption of node, and merkle Hash tree broadcast source is recognized
Card is less in calculating, storage, communication aspects expense, can resist node capture, solicited message is reset and dos attacks.
Note, above are only presently preferred embodiments of the present invention and institute's application technology principle.It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that
The invention is not restricted to specific embodiment described here, can carry out for a person skilled in the art various obvious changes,
Readjust and substitute without departing from protection scope of the present invention.Therefore although being carried out to the present invention by above example
It is described in further detail, but the present invention is not limited only to above example, without departing from the inventive concept, also
Other Equivalent embodiments more can be included, and the scope of the present invention is determined by scope of the appended claims.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of node of lightweight, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method are it is characterised in that specifically include following steps:
A, Node registry；B, entity authentication；C, the certification of gateway broadcasts source；
Described step a specifically includes:
A1, node send registration request bag to gateway；
A2, gateway parse to the registration request bag receiving, the mac of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandon
This registration request bag, if being verified, sends registration response bag to node；
Described step b specifically includes:
B1, gateway send random number to the node by registration, and store this random number and corresponding node number；
After b2, node receive described random number corresponding with oneself, generate certification request bag, be sent to gateway；
B3, gateway receive certification request bag, take out corresponding random number according to node number, by itself and number in certification request bag
According to XOR, and use corresponding mac proof of algorithm mac, if being verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise
Authentification failure, node time-out can initiate re-authentication；
Described step c specifically includes:
C1, node and the prefabricated work of gateway: a series of complete y-bend merkle tree that gateway generates si and depth is 3；For each
Node i is numbered, and meets: when i is for father's node, its left child nodes is 2i, and right child nodes are 2i+1, and the root node of tree is compiled
Number be 1；Between node, hash value relation meets: when i is for leaf node, ki=hash (si)；When i is not leaf node, its
Must there is left and right child k2i, k2i+1, meet ki=hash (k2i (k2i+1))；The preset k1 of each sensor node and
Hash hashing algorithm；Gateway preserves si and merkle tree；
C2, gateway send broadcast source certification bag；
C3, node are calculated as below after receiving broadcast source certification bag:
Hash (hash (hash (hash (merkle [0]) merkle [1]) merkle [2]) merkle [3]), checking
Whether the k1 of its result and node itself storage is equal, if equal, certification success.
2. the node of lightweight according to claim 1, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method are it is characterised in that described step
Rapid a1 specifically includes: node sends registration request bag to gateway, and its process is as follows:
First, node uart driver is according to the data form consulting with gateway, by identifying algorithm flag bit (1b), nodeid
(2b), reserved bit (1b), the common 8b of reserved bit (4b) and random number are input in lkt4200 after carrying out XOR, wherein, registration phase
Uplink packet random number n be constantly equal to 0；
2nd, lkt4200 receives described 8b data, carries out being calculated as below generation mac (4b):
[(4b registers rank to mac for k, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1b)+nodeid (2b)+reserved bit (1b)+reserved bit (4b)) n
Section n=0)] three, node uart driver by 13b data packing be encapsulated as registration request bag, send to gateway.
3. the node of lightweight according to claim 2, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method are it is characterised in that described step
Rapid a2 specifically includes: gateway parses to the registration request bag receiving, and according to the packet explanation of registration request bag, judging should
Packet is registration request bag, according to the algorithm flag bit of registration request bag, judges to generate the lightweight algorithm used by mac, from
And verify the mac of registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandon this registration request bag, if being verified, sending registration and ringing
Should wrap to node.
4. the node of the lightweight according to one of claims 1 to 3, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method it is characterised in that
Described step b3 specifically includes: gateway receives certification request bag, takes out corresponding random number according to node number, by its with recognize
Front 8 byte data XORs in card request bag, and corresponding mac proof of algorithm mac is used according to algorithm flag bit, if checking is logical
Cross, then gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, and node time-out can initiate re-authentication.
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| CN105763321B (en) * | 2016-04-06 | 2018-09-28 | 深圳市奔迈科技有限公司 | A kind of Internet of Things communication encryption method and device |
| CN108564312A (en) * | 2018-05-22 | 2018-09-21 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Safety protection method, apparatus and system |
| CN109087412A (en) * | 2018-06-06 | 2018-12-25 | 咕咚网络（北京）有限公司 | The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system |
| CN110635904B (en) * | 2019-09-16 | 2020-07-31 | 绍兴文理学院 | Remote attestation method and system for software-defined Internet of things node |
| TWI778828B (en) * | 2021-10-15 | 2022-09-21 | 國立成功大學 | Blockchain-based internet of things mutual authentication method |
| CN114205129B (en) * | 2021-12-02 | 2024-06-25 | 北京八分量信息科技有限公司 | Lightweight authentication method and device in heterogeneous network and related products |
| CN114698066B (en) * | 2022-03-17 | 2024-07-23 | 杭州控客信息技术有限公司 | Automatic network access method and system for intelligent household equipment |
| CN116155633B (en) * | 2023-04-23 | 2023-06-27 | 农数源(成都)科技有限公司 | Sensor external data security protection and bidirectional authentication method, system and device |
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Effective date of registration: 20230720 Address after: 214135 Building C, Weina Sensor Network International Innovation Park, No. 200, Linghu Avenue, the Taihu Lake International Science Park, Wuxi New District, Jiangsu Province Patentee after: JIANGSU CAS INTERNET-OF-THINGS TECHNOLOGY VENTURE CAPITAL CO.,LTD. Address before: 6/F, Block C, China Sensor Network International Innovation Park, No. 200 Linghu Avenue, New District, Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province, 214135 Patentee before: JIANGSU R & D CENTER FOR INTERNET OF THINGS |