CN109087412A - The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system - Google Patents
The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system Download PDFInfo
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- CN109087412A CN109087412A CN201810573991.0A CN201810573991A CN109087412A CN 109087412 A CN109087412 A CN 109087412A CN 201810573991 A CN201810573991 A CN 201810573991A CN 109087412 A CN109087412 A CN 109087412A
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- verification information
- validation value
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00571—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by interacting with a central unit
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/0042—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal containing a code which is changed
- G07C2009/00476—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal containing a code which is changed dynamically
- G07C2009/005—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal containing a code which is changed dynamically whereby the code is a random code
Abstract
The invention belongs to fields of communication technology, and in particular in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system in the connection method of door lock terminal and gateway and a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system gateway and server connection method.Include: one group of handshake of setting, then judges whether gateway and door lock terminal, server and gateway establish a connection using the validation value of handshake and generation.Connection method of the invention is provided with many places verifying process, it is therefore prevented that enemy passes through false gateway control door lock terminal, enemy is prevented to pass through false Servers control gateway；Meanwhile communication interaction times are few between gateway and door lock terminal, server and gateway, while strengthening security intensity, reduce the number of communications of equipment room, not only solved the problems, such as that equipment is easy the power consumption for being attacked, being controlled but also reducing equipment.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to fields of communication technology, and in particular to door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system
Connection method.
Background technique
With the development of technology, possess more preferably safety and convenience, electronic gate compared to mechanical door lock because of electronic lock
Lock is more and more applied to various places on the market.Currently, in such as campus, hotel, intelligent door lock security protection
System is more and more applied, to manage concentratedly to intelligent door lock.
But at present in campus apartment security system, data transmission mostly uses the form of plaintext to transmit, and passes in this way in data
Data are very easy to monitored, forgery and attack during defeated, there are great security risk, are easy to cause to student and school
Property loss.Common place under attack is door lock terminal and gateway, gateway and service in campus apartment security system at present
Among data transmission procedure between device, enemy manipulates gateway using false gateway manipulation door lock terminal or using false server, into
And cause economic loss.
Summary of the invention
(1) technical problems to be solved
Enemy manipulates gateway using false gateway manipulation door lock terminal or using false server in order to prevent, and the present invention provides one
The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in kind Wireless Networking door-locking system.
(2) technical solution
To achieve the above object, the main technical schemes that the present invention uses include:
The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, which comprises
101, after door lock terminal powers on, the door lock terminal sends connection life to the gateway of the door lock terminal region
It enables；
102, bind command generates the verification information for verifying the Gateway identity to the gateway based on the received；
The verification information includes: the first data of encryption, the first random array and the first accidental validation value；
103, the verification information is sent the door lock terminal by the gateway；
104, the door lock terminal verifies the verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, to institute
It states gateway transmission and is verified information, and establish connection with the gateway.
Further, the step 102 includes:
The gateway bind command based on the received generates the first random array；
The first accidental validation value is generated using the described first random array；And
The first data are formed according to the format of the first handshake, first data are encrypted, the encryption
First data, the first random array and the first accidental validation value form the verification information；
Wherein, the format of first handshake is the format stored in the gateway in advance.
Further, the step 104 includes:
The first data encrypted in received verification information are decrypted the door lock terminal, and judge after decryption the
Whether the format of one data is identical as the format of the first handshake；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the second accidental validation value is generated with the first random array in the verification information；
Judge whether the first accidental validation value and the second accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified；
Wherein, the format of first handshake is set in the door lock terminal in advance, and with the gateway
In the first handshake format it is identical.
A kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, the system comprises at least one gateways and at least one door lock terminal:
The gateway includes: the first chip and the second chip；
The AES128 program for being encrypted to the first data in verification information is built-in in first chip；
The AES128 program is also used to when the gateway receives bind command, generates the first random array；
It is built-in in second chip for generating the first accidental validation value respectively and generating the SHA256 of the first data
Program；
Wherein, the first data of the encryption, the first random array and the first accidental validation value composition are for being sent to door
Lock the verification information of terminal；
The door lock terminal includes: third chip and fourth chip；
The AES128 program for the first data of encryption to be decrypted is built-in in the third chip；
It is built-in in the fourth chip for generating the first accidental validation using the first random array in verification information
The SHA256 program of value；
Wherein, the gateway and the door lock terminal interaction are to execute the connection method of above-mentioned door lock terminal and gateway.
The connection method of gateway and server in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, which comprises
201, after gateway powers on, the gateway sends bind command to the server of the gateway region；
202, bind command generates the first verifying letter for verifying the server identity to the server based on the received
Breath；
First verification information includes: the second data of encryption, the second random array and third accidental validation value；
203, first verification information is sent the gateway by the server；
204, the gateway verifies first verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, to institute
It states server and sends a return information；
205, the server based on the received test for verifying described the second of the server identity by return information generation
Demonstrate,prove information；
Second verification information includes: the random array of third data, third and the 4th accidental validation value of encryption；
206, second verification information is sent the gateway by the server；
207, the gateway verifies second verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, to institute
It states server transmission and is verified information, and establish connection with the gateway.
Further, the step 202 includes:
The server bind command that the gateway is sent based on the received, generates the second random array；
Third accidental validation value is generated using the described second random array；And
The second data are formed according to the format of the second handshake, second data are encrypted, the encryption
Second data, the second random array and third accidental validation value form first verification information；
Wherein, the format of second handshake is in advance in format stored in the server.
Further, the step 204 includes:
The second data encrypted in received first verification information are decrypted the gateway, and judge after decryption the
Whether the format of two data is identical as the format of the second handshake；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the 5th accidental validation value is generated with the second random array in first verification information；
Judge whether the third accidental validation value and the 5th accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified；
Wherein, the format of second handshake is set in the gateway in advance, and in the server
The second handshake format it is identical.
Further, which is characterized in that the step 205 includes:
The server return information that the gateway is sent based on the received, generates the random array of third；
The 4th accidental validation value is generated using the random array of the third；And
Third data are formed according to the format of third handshake, the third data are encrypted, the encryption
The random array of third data, third and the 4th accidental validation value form second verification information；
Wherein, the format of the third handshake is in advance in format stored in the server.
Further, which is characterized in that the step 207 includes:
The third data encrypted in received second verification information are decrypted the gateway, and judge after decryption the
Whether the format of three data is identical as the format of third handshake；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the 6th accidental validation value is generated with the random array of third in second verification information；
Judge whether the 4th accidental validation value and the 6th accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified；
Wherein, the format of the third handshake is set in the gateway in advance, and in the server
Third handshake format it is identical.
A kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, the system comprises at least one servers and at least one gateway:
The server includes: fifth chip and the 6th chip；
Be built-in in the fifth chip for in verification information the second data and third data encrypted
AES128 program；
The AES128 program is also used to when the server receives bind command, generates the second random array；
The AES128 program is also used to when the gateway receives return information, generates the random array of third；
It is built-in in 6th chip for generating third accidental validation value respectively, generating the second data, the 4th at random
Validation value, the SHA256 program for generating third data；
Wherein, the second data of the encryption, the second random array and third accidental validation value composition are for being sent to net
The first verification information closed；
The random array of third data, third of the encryption and the 4th accidental validation value composition are for being sent to the of gateway
Two verification informations；
The gateway includes: the 7th chip and the 8th chip；
It is built-in in 7th chip and is decrypted for the third data of the second data and encryption to encryption
AES128 program；
The SHA256 journey for generating the 5th accidental validation value using the second random array is built-in in 8th chip
Sequence；
The SHA256 program is also used to generate the 6th accidental validation value using the random array of third；
Wherein, the server and the interactive connection method to execute above-mentioned gateway and server of the gateway.
(3) beneficial effect
The beneficial effects of the present invention are: the present invention provides the company of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system
Connect method, comprising: after door lock terminal powers on, door lock terminal sends bind command to the gateway of the door lock terminal region；
Bind command generates the verification information for verifying the Gateway identity to gateway based on the received；Verification information is sent door lock by gateway
Terminal；Door lock terminal verifies verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, is verified letter to gateway transmission
Breath, and connection is established with gateway.
The present invention provides the connection method of gateway and server in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, comprising: on gateway
After electricity, gateway sends bind command to the server of the gateway region；Bind command generates use to server based on the received
In the first verification information for verifying the server identity；First verification information is sent gateway by server；Gateway is advised according to verifying
Then verification information is verified, if being verified, sends a return information to server；Server returns based on the received
Breath of writing in reply generates the second verification information for verifying the server identity；Second verification information is sent gateway by server；Net
Verification information is verified according to proof rule in pass, if being verified, is verified information to server transmission, and with net
Connection is established in pass.
Connection method of the invention is provided with many places verifying process, it is therefore prevented that enemy is whole by false gateway control door lock
It holds, enemy is prevented to pass through false Servers control gateway；Meanwhile it being communicated between gateway and door lock terminal, server and gateway
Interaction times are few, while strengthening security intensity, reduce the number of communications of equipment room, have both solved equipment and have been easy to be attacked
The problem of hitting, being controlled reduces the power consumption of equipment again.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the connection method process of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system of the embodiment of the present invention
Figure；
Fig. 2 is the connection method flow chart of gateway and server in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system of the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
In order to better explain the present invention, in order to understand, with reference to the accompanying drawing, by specific embodiment, to this hair
It is bright to be described in detail.
Embodiment 1
A kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, system include at least one gateway and at least one door lock terminal.Gateway includes:
First chip and the second chip, door lock terminal include: third chip and fourth chip；It is built-in in first chip and third chip
AES128 program；Built-in SHA256 program in second chip and fourth chip.
As shown in Figure 1, for the stream of the connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system of the present invention
Cheng Tu, connection method are specific as follows:
101, after door lock terminal powers on, door lock terminal sends bind command to the gateway of the door lock terminal region.
It should be noted that bind command carries the equipment mark code of door lock terminal, for triggering gateway when default
Connection process is opened in long.In general, door lock terminal region is in apartment same floor.
102, bind command generates the verification information for verifying the Gateway identity to gateway based on the received；Verification information packet
It includes: the first data Data1, the first random array and the first accidental validation value MAC1 of encryption；
It is specific:
Gateway bind command based on the received, it is random using the AES128 Program Generating first of the first built-in chip type in gateway
Array, the SHA256 program of the second built-in chip type generates the first accidental validation value MAC1 using the first random array in gateway, together
When, the SHA256 program of the second built-in chip type forms the first data according to the data frame format of the first handshake in gateway
Then Data1 is encrypted the first data Data1 by the AES128 program of the first built-in chip type, the first data of encryption
Data1, the first random array and the first accidental validation value MAC1 form verification information；Wherein, the first handshake is to exist in advance
It is stored in gateway.
103, verification information is sent door lock terminal by gateway.
104, door lock terminal verifies verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, tests to gateway transmission
Card establishes connection with gateway by information；
It is specific:
The the first data Data1 encrypted in received verification information is decrypted door lock terminal, here to the of encryption
The decryption of one data Data1 be completed by the AES128 program being arranged in third chip, and judge decryption after first
Whether the format of data Data1 is identical as the format of the first handshake stored in door lock terminal in advance；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the SHA256 program in door lock terminal built in fourth chip, it is raw with the first random array in verification information
At the second accidental validation value；
Judge whether the first accidental validation value and the second accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified, door lock terminal
And connection is established with gateway；
Wherein, the first handshake set in door lock terminal in advance, the format with the first handshake in gateway
It is identical.
It should be noted that in step 104 determine the first data Data1 format whether with the first handshake data frame
Format it is identical, specifically include:
Firstly, determining whether syringe needle data are equal, if unequal, verify and do not pass through；
If equal, continue verifying adder data and verify and do not pass through if not passing through.
In the present embodiment, if false gateway, then the decryption of first data Data1 is unable to complete in step 104, meanwhile, it is false
Do not prestore the first handshake in gateway, that is, the first data Data1 after decrypting will not by the verifying of door lock terminal, into
One step, false gateway cannot obtain the first random array for generating the second accidental validation value MAC2, so first tests at random
Card value MAC1 and the verifying of the second accidental validation value MAC2 will not pass through, and door lock is whole in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system of the present invention
End and the connection method of gateway are provided with verifying process in terms of three, strengthen the safety of equipment.
In the present embodiment, door lock terminal and gateway are connected by way of wireless telecommunications；Door lock terminal and gateway respectively wrap
The wireless transport module to match is included, wireless transport module includes: zigbee module or bluetooth module.
Embodiment 2
A kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, system include at least one server and at least one gateway:
Server includes: fifth chip and the 6th chip；The gateway includes: the 7th chip and the 8th chip；5th core
Built-in AES128 program in piece and the 7th chip；Built-in SHA256 program in 6th chip and the 8th chip.
As shown in Fig. 2, for the process of the connection method of server and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system of the present invention
Figure, connection method are specific as follows:
201, after gateway powers on, gateway sends bind command to the server of the gateway region；
It should be noted that bind command carries the equipment mark code of gateway, for trigger the server in preset duration
Interior unlatching connects process.In general, gateway region is an apartment.
202, bind command generates the first verification information for verifying the server identity to server based on the received；The
One verification information includes: the second data of encryption, the second random array and third accidental validation value；
It is specific:
The server bind command that gateway is sent based on the received, utilizes the AES128 journey built in fifth chip in server
Sequence generates the second random array, in server the SHA256 program of the 6th built-in chip type using the second random array generate third with
Machine validation value MAC3, meanwhile, in server the SHA256 program of the 6th built-in chip type according to the second handshake data frame lattice
Formula forms the second data Data2, then encrypts the second data Data2 as the AES128 program built in fifth chip, adds
Close the second data Data2, the second random array and third accidental validation value MAC3 forms verification information；Wherein, it second shakes hands
Signal stores in a gateway in advance.
203, the first verification information is sent gateway by server.
204, gateway verifies the first verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, sends to server
One return information；
It is specific:
The the second data Data2 encrypted in received first verification information is decrypted gateway, here to the of encryption
The decryption of two data Data2 is completed by the AES128 program being arranged in the 7th chip；And judge decryption after second
Whether the format of data Data2 is identical as the format of the second handshake stored in a gateway in advance；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, in gateway the 8th built-in chip type SHA256 program, it is raw with the second random array in the first verification information
At the 4th accidental validation value MAC4；
Judge whether third accidental validation value MAC3 and the 4th accidental validation value MAC4 are identical, if they are the same, then verifying is logical
It crosses, gateway sends a return information to server；
Wherein, the format of the second handshake is set in a gateway in advance, and is shaken hands letter with second in server
Number format it is identical；
It should be noted that in step 204 determine the second data Data1 format whether with the second handshake data frame
Format it is identical, specifically include:
Firstly, determining whether syringe needle data are equal, if unequal, verify and do not pass through；
If equal, continue verifying adder data and verify and do not pass through if not passing through；
It should be noted that the equipment mark code for carrying gateway in the return information that gateway is sent to server is tested with this
Demonstrate,prove process as a result, for trigger the server open binding process in next verifying process.
205, return information generates the second verification information for verifying the server identity to server based on the received；The
Two verification informations include: the random array of third data, third and the 4th accidental validation value of encryption；
The server return information that gateway is sent based on the received, utilizes the AES128 journey built in fifth chip in server
Sequence generates the random array of third, in server the SHA256 program of the 6th built-in chip type using the random array of third generate the 5th with
Machine validation value MAC5, meanwhile, in server the SHA256 program of the 6th built-in chip type according to third handshake data frame lattice
Formula forms third data Data3, then encrypts third data Data3 as the AES128 program built in fifth chip, adds
Close third data Data3, the random array of third and the 5th accidental validation value MAC5 forms the second verification information；Wherein, third
Handshake stores in a gateway in advance.
206, the second verification information is sent gateway by server.
207, gateway verifies the second verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, sends to server
It is verified information, and establishes connection with gateway；
It is specific:
The third data Data3 encrypted in received second verification information is decrypted gateway, here to the of encryption
The decryption of three data Data3 is completed by the AES128 program being arranged in the 7th chip；And judge the third after decryption
Whether the format of data Data3 is identical as the format of the third handshake stored in a gateway in advance；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, in gateway the 8th built-in chip type SHA256 program, it is raw with the random array of third in the second verification information
At the 6th accidental validation value MAC6；
Judge whether the 5th accidental validation value MAC5 and the 6th accidental validation value MAC6 are identical, if they are the same, then verifying is logical
It crosses, gateway and server establish connection；
Wherein, the format of third handshake is set in a gateway in advance, and is shaken hands letter with the third in server
Number format it is identical；
It should be noted that in step 207 determine third data Data3 format whether with third handshake data frame
Format it is identical, specifically include:
Firstly, determining whether syringe needle data are equal, if unequal, verify and do not pass through；
If equal, continue verifying adder data and verify and do not pass through if not passing through；Server and gateway pass through wireless
And/or the mode of wire communication connects；
Gateway and server respectively include the wireless transport module to match, and wireless transport module includes: zigbee module
And/or bluetooth module.
In the present embodiment, if false server, then the decryption of second data Data2 is unable to complete in step 204, step
The decryption of third data Data3 is unable to complete in 207, meanwhile, the second handshake is not prestored in false server and third is held
Hand signal, that is, the third data Data3 after the second data Data2 and decryption after decrypting will not pass through the verifying of gateway.This
It invents in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system in the connection method of server and gateway, the verification process of gateway and server includes
Process is verified twice, any one verifying process does not pass through, then gateway and server cannot be bound, and double verification process enhances
Security intensity.
It is to be appreciated that describing the skill simply to illustrate that of the invention to what specific embodiments of the present invention carried out above
Art route and feature, its object is to allow those skilled in the art to can understand the content of the present invention and implement it accordingly, but
The present invention is not limited to above-mentioned particular implementations.All various changes made within the scope of the claims are repaired
Decorations, should be covered by the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. the connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, which is characterized in that the described method includes:
101, after door lock terminal powers on, the door lock terminal sends bind command to the gateway of the door lock terminal region；
102, bind command generates the verification information for verifying the Gateway identity to the gateway based on the received；
The verification information includes: the first data of encryption, the first random array and the first accidental validation value；
103, the verification information is sent the door lock terminal by the gateway；
104, the door lock terminal verifies the verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, to the net
It closes to send and is verified information, and establish connection with the gateway.
2. the method according to claim 1, wherein the step 102 includes:
The gateway bind command based on the received generates the first random array；
The first accidental validation value is generated using the described first random array；And
The first data are formed according to the format of the first handshake, first data are encrypted, the first of the encryption
Data, the first random array and the first accidental validation value form the verification information；
Wherein, the format of first handshake is the format stored in the gateway in advance.
3. according to the method described in claim 2, it is characterized in that, the step 104 includes:
The first data encrypted in received verification information are decrypted the door lock terminal, and judge the first number after decryption
According to format it is whether identical as the format of the first handshake；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the second accidental validation value is generated with the first random array in the verification information；
Judge whether the first accidental validation value and the second accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified；
Wherein, the format of first handshake is set in the door lock terminal in advance, and in the gateway
The format of first handshake is identical.
4. a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, the system comprises at least one gateway and at least one door lock terminal, features
It is:
The gateway includes: the first chip and the second chip；
The AES128 program for being encrypted to the first data in verification information is built-in in first chip；
The AES128 program is also used to when the gateway receives bind command, generates the first random array；
It is built-in in second chip for generating the first accidental validation value respectively and generating the SHA256 program of the first data；
Wherein, the first data of the encryption, the first random array and the first accidental validation value composition are for being sent to door lock end
The verification information at end；
The door lock terminal includes: third chip and fourth chip；
The AES128 program for the first data of encryption to be decrypted is built-in in the third chip；
It is built-in in the fourth chip for generating the first accidental validation value using the first random array in verification information
SHA256 program；
Wherein, the gateway and the door lock terminal interaction are to execute any method of the claims 1 to 3.
5. the connection method of gateway and server in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, which is characterized in that the described method includes:
201, after gateway powers on, the gateway sends bind command to the server of the gateway region；
202, bind command generates the first verification information for verifying the server identity to the server based on the received；
First verification information includes: the second data of encryption, the second random array and third accidental validation value；
203, first verification information is sent the gateway by the server；
204, the gateway verifies first verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, to the clothes
Business device sends a return information；
205, return information generates the second verifying letter for verifying the server identity to the server based on the received
Breath；
Second verification information includes: the random array of third data, third and the 4th accidental validation value of encryption；
206, second verification information is sent the gateway by the server；
207, the gateway verifies second verification information according to proof rule, if being verified, to the clothes
Business device transmission is verified information, and establishes connection with the gateway.
6. according to the method described in claim 5, it is characterized in that, the step 202 includes:
The server bind command that the gateway is sent based on the received, generates the second random array；
Third accidental validation value is generated using the described second random array；And
The second data are formed according to the format of the second handshake, second data are encrypted, the second of the encryption
Data, the second random array and third accidental validation value form first verification information；
Wherein, the format of second handshake is in advance in format stored in the server.
7. according to the method described in claim 6, it is characterized in that, the step 204 includes:
The second data encrypted in received first verification information are decrypted the gateway, and judge the second number after decryption
According to format it is whether identical as the format of the second handshake；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the 5th accidental validation value is generated with the second random array in first verification information；
Judge whether the third accidental validation value and the 5th accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified；
Wherein, the format of second handshake is set in the gateway in advance, and in the server
The format of two handshake is identical.
8. the method according to the description of claim 7 is characterized in that the step 205 includes:
The server return information that the gateway is sent based on the received, generates the random array of third；
The 4th accidental validation value is generated using the random array of the third；And
Third data are formed according to the format of third handshake, the third data are encrypted, the third of the encryption
The random array of data, third and the 4th accidental validation value form second verification information；
Wherein, the format of the third handshake is in advance in format stored in the server.
9. according to the method described in claim 8, it is characterized in that, the step 207 includes:
The third data encrypted in received second verification information are decrypted the gateway, and judge the third number after decryption
According to format it is whether identical as the format of third handshake；
Do not pass through if it is different, then verifying；
Otherwise, the 6th accidental validation value is generated with the random array of third in second verification information；
Judge whether the 4th accidental validation value and the 6th accidental validation value are identical, if they are the same, are then verified；
Wherein, the format of the third handshake is set in the gateway in advance, and in the server
The format of three handshake is identical.
10. a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system, the system comprises at least one server and at least one gateway, feature exists
In:
The server includes: fifth chip and the 6th chip；
It is built-in in the fifth chip for the second data and the AES128 that is encrypted of third data in verification information
Program；
The AES128 program is also used to when the server receives bind command, generates the second random array；
The AES128 program is also used to when the gateway receives return information, generates the random array of third；
It is built-in in 6th chip for generating third accidental validation value respectively, generating the second data, the 4th accidental validation
Value, the SHA256 program for generating third data；
Wherein, the second data of the encryption, the second random array and third accidental validation value composition are for being sent to gateway
First verification information；
The random array of third data, third of the encryption and the 4th accidental validation value composition are tested for being sent to the second of gateway
Demonstrate,prove information；
The gateway includes: the 7th chip and the 8th chip；
The AES128 being decrypted for the third data of the second data and encryption to encryption is built-in in 7th chip
Program；
The SHA256 program for generating the 5th accidental validation value using the second random array is built-in in 8th chip；
The SHA256 program is also used to generate the 6th accidental validation value using the random array of third；
Wherein, the server and gateway interaction are to execute any method of the claims 5 to 9.
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| CN201810573991.0A CN109087412A (en) | 2018-06-06 | 2018-06-06 | The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system |
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| CN201810573991.0A CN109087412A (en) | 2018-06-06 | 2018-06-06 | The connection method of door lock terminal and gateway in a kind of Wireless Networking door-locking system |
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